SECDEF's DoD Budget Proposals

[Cavguy]

Gates said: "But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable." (Emphasis added.) I assume (yes, I know ) that he's referring to recapitalizing the current ground force vehicle fleet.

As an Armor guy, I'm not shedding any tears for the demise of FCS. Its fundamental assumptions were invalid - namely - that "information=force protection", and risk could be assumed with armor in favor of deployability. If "information dominance" would protect us, we wouldn't be losing soldiers to IED's. Like EBO, FCS tried to eliminate fog and friction from war, instead of embracing it and developing systems to compensate.

Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

[MikeF]

Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

Neil, you got me thinking again. Should we forecast the following?

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?

v/r

Mike

[selil]

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?

That right there is I believe a spark of genius. It is also population centric.

[Cavguy]

Neil, you got me thinking again. Should we forecast the following?

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?

v/r

Mike

Not necessairly, as you need both capabilities. What matters is how we organize. Do we need large armored formations for COIN? No. Do we need heavy armor to support troops in COIN? Absolutely.

I wrote a post awhile back on how I tasked organized a heavy company team for COIN - and thought it was pretty successful and flexible. It provided dismounted ability to engage the population with the firepower needed to support those dismounted troops when the sh*t hit the fan (and potentially discourage those who saw an easy and exposed target.

My flexible MTOE with the ability to customize forces to the mission was the key ingredient. My tankers sometimes used the tanks and sometimes acted as infantry. My mech guys did all kinds of varied tasks, as did the combat engineers. The mission/environment dictated our equipment set, not the other way around.

[MikeF]

Saying the same thing.

Not necessairly, as you need both capabilities. What matters is how we organize. Do we need large armored formations for COIN? No. Do we need heavy armor to support troops in COIN? Absolutely.

I was trying to summarize a planning factor not suggest a law.

v/r

Mike

[J Wolfsberger]

As an Armor guy, I'm not shedding any tears for the demise of FCS. Its fundamental assumptions were invalid - namely - that "information=force protection", and risk could be assumed with armor in favor of deployability. If "information dominance" would protect us, we wouldn't be losing soldiers to IED's. Like EBO, FCS tried to eliminate fog and friction from war, instead of embracing it and developing systems to compensate.

Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

Agree totally and completely. A key phrase used by Gates, that I doubt any of the media picked up on, was "full spectrum." Based on the new FM 3-0, that has a very specific meaning - and I hope he was revealing his intent when he used it.

Not necessairly, as you need both capabilities. What matters is how we organize. Do we need large armored formations for COIN? No. Do we need heavy armor to support troops in COIN? Absolutely.

I wrote a post awhile back on how I tasked organized a heavy company team for COIN - and thought it was pretty successful and flexible. It provided dismounted ability to engage the population with the firepower needed to support those dismounted troops when the sh*t hit the fan (and potentially discourage those who saw an easy and exposed target.

My flexible MTOE with the ability to customize forces to the mission was the key ingredient. My tankers sometimes used the tanks and sometimes acted as infantry. My mech guys did all kinds of varied tasks, as did the combat engineers. The mission/environment dictated our equipment set, not the other way around.

One of my big pushes is doing a better job at executing up front system analysis to translate desired capabilities into system functions that support the intended doctrine. That means evaluating effectiveness across the entire spectrum, a wide variety of missions, and working with the user community to provide systems that have the kind of flexibility to let you do that.

[wm]

Neil, you got me thinking again. Should we forecast the following?

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?

Sounds like a "silver bullet, one-size fits all" (actually two sizes) approach to a problem set that requires a little bit of everything used flexibly as the situation requires. Seems to me a force based around a collection of H or J-series TOE Cav squadrons would be a pretty good fit for most stuff, with suitable equipment modernizations of course.

[tankersteve]

While good in a mechanized fight, most heavy cavalry organizations don't have enough dismounts for IW/COIN. Even when shutting down a pair of Bradleys to up the total number of dismounts, it is still significantly less than what a mech platoon brings to the fight.

Our present Combined Arms Battalion, with 2 tank and 2 mech companies is a great base to start from. Many of the battalions have companies create semi-permanent task organizations which works well. These companies share the same company TACSOP and consider each other their wingman. The great weakness is the continued small size of the tank platoon and its lack of capability when not mounted.

It would be nice to have more mortars but this organization has more dedicated dismounts than the cav organizations and they have the greatest utility in any war.

I have noticed an infatuation (sorry for the potentially inflammatory word) with the cav construct. We have really screwed up the current BCT with an entire 'squadron' and only 2 maneuver battalions. It seems that people forget that reconnaissance is a mission, not an organization. I think that a maneuver battalion could conduct effective reconnaissance, but these horribly undersized/undermanned squadrons, designed for reconnaissance, do not perform well as additional maneuver formations.

Hopefully, with the move to stop the BCT growth, we can focus on properly manning the BCTs we have. Maybe, as retired COL Mansoor wants, we can get a 3d maneuver battalion back into the BCT, perhaps by cutting down the size of the RSTA squadron to a robust troop (it would help).

Tankersteve

[Cavguy]

Steve,

Agree all.

More dismounts needed in HBCT - desperately. What I enjoyed when we were in Tal Afar was the ability to customize the vehicles of a given unit to a mission - a high/low mix.

I think people like the Cav construct because it is a mix - of tanks, scouts, and aviation, which grants flexibility to the commander.. You are right - way too low on dismounts. Fix that though ....

[MikeF]

Steve,

Agree all.

More dismounts needed in HBCT - desperately. What I enjoyed when we were in Tal Afar was the ability to customize the vehicles of a given unit to a mission - a high/low mix.

I think people like the Cav construct because it is a mix - of tanks, scouts, and aviation, which grants flexibility to the commander.. You are right - way too low on dismounts. Fix that though ....

Stetsons, Class A's, and Jump boots are simply weird

[Ken White]

I have noticed an infatuation (sorry for the potentially inflammatory word) with the cav construct...It seems that people forget that reconnaissance is a mission, not an organization. I think that a maneuver battalion could conduct effective reconnaissance, but these horribly undersized/undermanned squadrons, designed for reconnaissance, do not perform well as additional maneuver formations...we can get a 3d maneuver battalion back into the BCT, perhaps by cutting down the size of the RSTA squadron to a robust troop (it would help).

Totally agree on the three maneuver Battalions and only a Cav Troop per light or heavy Bde -- plus a RSTA company with UAV /UGV (the Cav Troop should not be encumbered with that very necessary stuff).

Understand the current design was, rightly or wrongly,selected as 'the best we can do with what we have' but it really needs a relook as we head into the future.

I also believe we not only forget reconnaissance is a mission, we don't even generally do reconnaissance. With the caveat that there are a few exceptions, the Infantry commanders, mostly, do not understand the concept of mounted reconnaissance and misuse their forces badly all too often. Armor units tend to believe in flash and dash rather than painstaking recon; there's a reason for the old "bypass, re-gas and haula$$" cliché. That also with only rare exceptions -- as is the generalization that entirely too many senior people in all branches do not have the patience to wait for the length of time required for effective and competent Recon so their alternative is to send an overly heavy, unstealthy, high speed and undermanned force out to hurry up and draw fire.

That's why current Cav units are too small, they're not scouts (or dragoons) nowadays, they're sacrificial lambs.

[MikeF]

I also believe we not only forget reconnaissance is a mission, we don't even generally do reconnaissance. With the caveat that there are a few exceptions, the Infantry commanders, mostly, do not understand the concept of mounted reconnaissance and misuse their forces badly all too often. Armor units tend to believe in flash and dash rather than painstaking recon; there's a reason for the old "bypass, re-gas and haula$$" cliché. That also with only rare exceptions -- as is the generalization that entirely too many senior people in all branches do not have the patience to wait for the length of time required for effective and competent Recon so their alternative is to send an overly heavy, unstealthy, high speed and undermanned force out to hurry up and draw fire.

That's why current Cav units are too small, they're not scouts (or dragoons) nowadays, they're sacrificial lambs.

Not only is reconnaissance a mission, but I believe it is an art. Ken's points are spot on; I'll try to add a bit. Now (quite possibly before), we have to conduct reconnaissance of the physical AND human terrain. An indigenous guerilla has a comparative advantage in information- he can see us, we cannot see him. Moreover, he is the master of his terrain.

For the villages, particularly restricted areas, I believe a light approach is best. In my light RSTA, we tried to incorporate lessons learned from the LRRPs of Vietnam to employ. It worked. One distinction we made was empowering our junior leaders. My SCO sent the majority of scouts to RSLC, Ranger, Sniper, etc... to add to our human capital. In my troop, we had E4 fire supports studs talking directly to Apaches (with supervision ). That E4 is worth more than 10 Predator UAVs.

As for urban areas, I was taking an educated guess. The last time I owned major real estate in an urban area Sadr City was still Saddam City and BIAP was Saddam International Airport.

Ken- what's with this we stuff?

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

and that Speculist coulda talked to that Apache just as well w/o any supervision...

[RTK]

I also believe we not only forget reconnaissance is a mission, we don't even generally do reconnaissance.
...
That's why current Cav units are too small, they're not scouts (or dragoons) nowadays, they're sacrificial lambs.

I genuinely miss being on here everyday. It's statements like these that warm my heart and make me feel not so alone.

We have abdicated our moral authority in the realm of reconnaissance in the hopes that technology, sensors, and gizmos will provide us with what we need to win the battle. We've become obsessed with technologies replicating or replacing the senses of the Soldier. We've hosed ourselves in that arena. Thankfully Secretary Gates maybe saving us from ourselves.

We're bad enough with reconnaissance. We're even worse with security operations. We did this to ourselves when we neglected to remember that R&S is recon and security, not recon and surveillance.