SECDEF's DoD Budget Proposals

[Cavguy]

All,

Fascinating press conference. In summary:

Recommended Termination:

F-22 (stopped @ 187)
FCS vehicles (all - unsure of NLOS-C)
DDG-1000
Further C-17 Buys
Army BCT's halted @ 45 vice 48 to increase available manning, no change in endstrength increase though.
Presidential Helo
Next-Gen bomber (pending QDR)
JIEDDO and other ad-hoc organizations
TSAT cancelled

Winners:

F-35 increase
F-18 increase
UAV Increase
TF Odin-like increase
More $$ for helos - crews and airframes (?)
More SF support
DDG-51 restart
LCS increase

No change/limited info:

JTLV
EFV
Carriers (10)
FCS "Spinouts"

Gates told Congress basically to "do the right thing". That I will be interested to see.

Can't wait for Congress' and the defense lobby's reaction ....

[Entropy]

Well, good luck to him, I don't think Congress is going to play ball, but we can always hope.

Did he give any estimates on how much this would reduce the defense budget? Also, what about a reset for the Army and Marines?

[MikeF]

Gates Fights Last War

Kori Schake
Foreign Policy

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/post...t_the_last_war

Gates is setting a course to focus on counterinsurgency that will likely come at the expense of other military capabilities when budget trade-offs need to be made. The wars we are fighting do not refute transformation. Much of what Rumsfeld identified as the central advantages and central weaknesses of our military actually have been validated: our space infrastructure is too weak for the increasing demands we place on it; integrating battlefield information with long-distance precision strike allows U.S. forces to react with a dominating speed; and persistent surveillance is revolutionizing our operations.

Gates's emphasis on institutionalizing counterinsurgency sounds remarkably like fighting the last war, and too little effort has been directed toward redressing those vulnerabilities in U.S. military power most likely to produce losses in future wars. The United States is already reasonably good at counterinsurgency, as a result of the Iraq war, and the equipment has adapted relatively quickly despite a balky Pentagon bureaucracy. Gates is adopting a conservative approach that will make other, harder adaptations -- like handling cyber attacks -- more difficult in the future.

And so it begins...

v/r

Mike

[Ski]

Two major surprises. Halting growth of BCT's at 45 in order for the manning levels to catch up is one of them, but in reality it's only two less (minus the EBCT at Bliss and since FCS is on the way out, there's no reason for this BCT to stick around). The other is the JIEDDO and organizations like that (ad-hoc). I wonder what the other organizations are - AWG?

[Entropy]

This makes me cry inside:

Second, we will terminate the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter program. This program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach.

Say goodbye to Air Force rotary wing aviation and the only dedicated personnel recovery force in DoD.

[Danny]

That the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle survived. I'm rather surprised, actually. So be it. They'd better get it right, and soon, without the cost overruns and system failures that have plagued it.

[William F. Owen]

Say goodbye to Air Force rotary wing aviation and the only dedicated personnel recovery force in DoD.

I don't know how closely you've followed this fiasco, but if they hadn't scrapped it, it would probably have resulted in folks getting sacked, or worse. It's a very sorry story when studied in detail.

[82redleg]

Two major surprises. Halting growth of BCT's at 45 in order for the manning levels to catch up is one of them, but in reality it's only two less (minus the EBCT at Bliss and since FCS is on the way out, there's no reason for this BCT to stick around). The other is the JIEDDO and organizations like that (ad-hoc). I wonder what the other organizations are - AWG?

Actually, the EBCT made 49 BCTs- the goal was 48 deployable BCTs- 10 DIVs x 4 BCTs, plus 5 separates (173, 2 ACR, 3 ACR, 170 HBCT, 172 HBCT) and 5/3 ID, 5/4 ID and 6/1AD (the EBCT is 5/1AD).

[Ski]

No real loss in my opinion anyway it's sliced. I was never a big fan of the FCS concept, even more so after the costs ballooned by 200%.

Actually, the EBCT made 49 BCTs- the goal was 48 deployable BCTs- 10 DIVs x 4 BCTs, plus 5 separates (173, 2 ACR, 3 ACR, 170 HBCT, 172 HBCT) and 5/3 ID, 5/4 ID and 6/1AD (the EBCT is 5/1AD).

[Lord_Malone]

Two major surprises. Halting growth of BCT's at 45 in order for the manning levels to catch up is one of them, but in reality it's only two less (minus the EBCT at Bliss and since FCS is on the way out, there's no reason for this BCT to stick around). The other is the JIEDDO and organizations like that (ad-hoc). I wonder what the other organizations are - AWG?

AWG ain't goin' nowhere.

[Boot]

AWG ain't goin' nowhere.

I agree...from what I read and understand they are doing great work.



Boot

[selil]

Gates is adopting a conservative approach that will make other, harder adaptations -- like handling cyber attacks -- more difficult in the future.
Kori Schake
Foreign Policy

Let me just express in a few words my thoughts that a conservative approach based on fighting insurgencies will impact handling cyber attacks. Since cyber attacks most closely align with low intensity conflict. Since never has a cyber attack manifested as a high intensity conflict. While large militaries may be capable of fighting on multiple fronts they have little in the way of capability of fighting cyber. Large unwieldily forces with strict hierarchies have absolutely no place in cyber. Boo hisss. Throwing cyber out as a lost capability is not only wrong it impeaches the writer.

[Ron Humphrey]

Let me just express in a few words my thoughts that a conservative approach based on fighting insurgencies will impact handling cyber attacks. Since cyber attacks most closely align with low intensity conflict. Since never has a cyber attack manifested as a high intensity conflict. While large militaries may be capable of fighting on multiple fronts they have little in the way of capability of fighting cyber. Large unwieldy forces with strict hierarchies have absolutely no place in cyber. Boo hisss. Throwing cyber out as a lost capability is not only wrong it impeaches the writer.

What I heard was intelligence and related fields tool sets expanded and a push upward in the number of those who are training to be cyber focused with the overall impression of agility in thought action and aquisition related to such.

May be wrong but I think it may be more of what your looking for and less behemoth then many might have expected.

[selil]

What I heard was intelligence and related fields tool sets expanded and a push upward in the number of those who are training to be cyber focused with the overall impression of agility in thought action and aquisition related to such.

May be wrong but I think it may be more of what your looking for and less behemoth then many might have expected.

I think you're responding to the secdef comments and I'm responding to the catch all at the end of the article written by Kori Schake. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

Shake closed her article with

Gates is adopting a conservative approach that will make other, harder adaptations -- like handling cyber attacks -- more difficult in the future.

I can't agree with that sentiment. Though I'm always willing to listen it just seems way off base.

[Stevely]

Did he give any estimates on how much this would reduce the defense budget? Also, what about a reset for the Army and Marines?

That is what I am curious about - at some point in the not too distant future, the ground combat vehicle fleet is going to need to be recapitalized. Is there any provision for this? Most of what we have is 80s vintage and has been at war for years now. How much life can reset eke out of the existing fleet and will it continue to be funded?

[J Wolfsberger]

That is what I am curious about - at some point in the not too distant future, the ground combat vehicle fleet is going to need to be recapitalized. Is there any provision for this? Most of what we have is 80s vintage and has been at war for years now. How much life can reset eke out of the existing fleet and will it continue to be funded?

Gates said: "But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable." (Emphasis added.) I assume (yes, I know ) that he's referring to recapitalizing the current ground force vehicle fleet.

[Cavguy]

Gates said: "But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable." (Emphasis added.) I assume (yes, I know ) that he's referring to recapitalizing the current ground force vehicle fleet.

As an Armor guy, I'm not shedding any tears for the demise of FCS. Its fundamental assumptions were invalid - namely - that "information=force protection", and risk could be assumed with armor in favor of deployability. If "information dominance" would protect us, we wouldn't be losing soldiers to IED's. Like EBO, FCS tried to eliminate fog and friction from war, instead of embracing it and developing systems to compensate.

Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

[MikeF]

Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

Neil, you got me thinking again. Should we forecast the following?

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?

v/r

Mike

[Boot]

Being a Comm. guy by trade, and not knowing the details of TSAT, I will only say that the demand from the force (all services, Interagency etc...) for these type services coupled with the bandwidth intensive applications, necessitates a robust capability. I am not sure the TSAT is the answer, but there needs to be an answer.

[699guy]

out of this. We've seen the medevac variant fielded to non-stryker BCTs. The SBCT does have 3 maneuver battalions and a Cav SQDN giving it a bit more flexibility than a HBCT. I'd be the first to say this would not be the preferred formation to go against T-80s in open terrain. But its done a darn good job throughout Iraq. With the fielding of the MGS variant a company commander had the the ability to move thru a spectrum of PSYOP with the mounted speakers to .50 cal or MK-19; up to 105mm HE cannon direct or 120mm indirect all organic.
Cavguy would have loved the flexible T/O, and the ability to put 108 11Bs on the ground with trucks in support, more if you are not employing your mtrs or bringing all the trucks.

With the plug pulled on FCS will the Stryker variants, meant to bridge the gap become the endstate?