The following blog was a project for a college course on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and nation-building:

The Afghanistan surge and AFPAK plan suggests that policymakers in Washington have, at the very least, cracked a history textbook or two. When we take into account every major attempt the U.S. has made at nation-building since World War II, a few trends become strikingly obvious.

First, the amount of security (military and/or police) present in the country correlates with the speed and durability of the nation-building. Generally speaking, a greater security personnel-to-indigenous population ratio results in a more successful operation. For example, post-WWII rebuilding in Germany and post-intervention Kosovo and Bosnia (each considered successful nation-building operations) had security-population ratios of 100, 20, and 18.6 military personnel to 1,000 civilians (respectively). On the other hand, failed attempts in Haiti and Somalia only netted 3.5: 1000 and 5: 1000 ratios at their peaks (Dobbins, 2009).

At the end of 2007, the total U.S. deployments in Afghanistan (combat and non-combat) fell just under .9 personnel per 1000 Afghans—the lowest of any U.S. nation-building attempt since World War II. In 2008, the Bush administration shifted focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. By June of that year, security-population ratios jumped to 1.5: 1000 (O’Bryant, 2008). Under the Obama administration’s strategy, initial estimated troop increases in Afghanistan would grow the ratio to at least 2: 1000. While these numbers still fall short of the historical ideal, bolstering U.S. troop presence should carry a notable effect on security over the next year.

The second major historical trend expanded on under the AFPAK plan is external assistance per capita. U.S. nation-building assistance to Bosnia (1996-1997) totaled $1400 and Kosovo (2000-2001) totaled $800 per capita. Both countries held democratic elections within three years, and Kosovo witnessed the quickest GDP recovery following conflict of any nation-building operation since World War II (Dobbins, 2009). U.S. nation-building assistance in Haiti (1995-1996) fell below $200 per capita, and Haitian GDP experienced little growth since intervention. Based on these examples, assistance per capita directly correlates with the level of success of nation-building. In 2002, approximate assistance to Afghanistan ranked below Haiti at $100 per capita (Dobbins, 2009). This year, $1.5 billion in development assistance under the Obama administration’s AFPAK strategy is already pledged to tribal regions of Afghanistan. The package alone will increase assistance by $45 per capita.

Obviously, there are countless other factors (geography, socio-political differences, sources of conflict, history, etc.) to consider when engaging in and measuring the success of nation-building-- and all vary on a case-by-case basis. Thus, a “one size fits all” nation-building strategy built around security and assistance per capita ratios is no assurance of success. I believe that at the end of the day, more is certainly better—but the biggest guarantee of success is how effectively security personnel is used and development assistance is spent rather than the actual quantities dumped into a given country.


Sources:
Dobbins, James. America's Role in Nation-Building; From German to Iraq. RAND. 2009.
O’Bryant, JoAnne. CRS Report to Congress; U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. 15 July, 2008.
White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. March 2009.