Is there a Dutch approach ?

[Rex Brynen]

I may not be a smart man but I know post modernist babble when I see it.

This should help, Mark:

HOW TO SPEAK AND WRITE POSTMODERN

by Stephen Katz, Associate Professor, Sociology, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada

Postmodernism has been the buzzword in academia for the last decade. Books, journal articles, conference themes and university courses have resounded to the debates about postmodernism that focus on the uniqueness of our times, where computerization, the global economy and the media have irrevocably transformed all forms of social engagement. As a professor of sociology who teaches about culture, I include myself in this environment. Indeed, I have a great interest in postmodernism both as an intellectual movement and as a practical problem. In my experience there seems to be a gulf between those who see the postmodern turn as a neo-conservative reupholstering of the same old corporate trappings, and those who see it as a long overdue break with modernist doctrines in education, aesthetics and politics. Of course there are all kinds of positions in between, depending upon how one sorts out the optimum route into the next millennium.

However, I think the real gulf is not so much positional as linguistic. Posture can be as important as politics when it comes to the intelligentsia. In other words, it may be less important whether or not you like postmodernism than whether or not you can speak and write postmodernism. Perhaps you would like to join in conversation with your local mandarins of cultural theory and all-purpose deep thinking, but you don't know what to say. Or, when you do contribute something you consider relevant, even insightful, you get ignored or looked at with pity. Here is a quick guide, then, to speaking and writing postmodern.

I've always loved this part:

At some point someone may actually ask you what you're talking about. This risk faces all those who would speak postmodern and must be carefully avoided. You must always give the questioner the impression that they have missed the point, and so send another verbose salvo of postmodernspeak in their direction as a ``simplification'' or ``clarification'' of your original statement. If that doesn't work, you might be left with the terribly modernist thought of, ``I don't know''. Don't worry, just say, ``The instability of your question leaves me with several contradictorily layered responses whose interconnectivity cannot express the logocentric coherency you seek. I can only say that reality is more uneven and its (mis)representations more untrustworthy than we have time here to explore''.

In fairness to the article by Coined, his writing isn't really postmodern at all.

However, I'm not sure that the piece offers anything that anyone is likely to find particularly surprising. Virtually no one that I'm aware of believes that Western COIN operations don't involve all 3 "Ds." The challenge is getting the mix right, coordination, and making them work with insufficient resources in a complex and problematic environment. It seems to me that waving the 3D flag (something that we love to do in Ottawa too) all too often comes at the expense of tackling these more difficult issues.

[marct]

In fairness to the article by Coined, his writing isn't really postmodern at all.

Quite True, Rex. For some good examples of PMS (aka Post Modernist Syndrone), see The Postmodernism Generator (click reload for a new PMS essay every time!). BTW, I know of some students who actually used this for classes. What truly scares me is that at least one of them was laughing about getting an A on one of these "essays" !!!!

[Coined]

Most discussions in this thread are very constructive. Some other communicative trials I will leave for those who like to stay in the comfortzone of linear thinking.

You're right Rex, it is all about coordination. And also synchronisation!
Related to an endstate as agreed by the ministeries of Defence, Development and Foreign Affairs effects will be derived and "effectbringers" will be attached. This will be the case at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical level. Horizontally as well as vertically. Based upon a 3Block warfare approach all these effects have to be synchronised and coordinated in favour of the agreed endstate with behavioural approach relating to the population, the media and also to political, military, cultural, and economical aspects of a certain operational environment we are guests in or intervened in, considering:
1. The environment we operate in;
2. the (troop contributing) Western countries;
3. all countries which are in a certain way connected to the country we are guest in or intervened in.
Also the above has to be synchronised and coordinated.

[Ken White]

a question of nothing new.

1. The environment we operate in;
2. the (troop contributing) Western countries;
3. all countries which are in a certain way connected to the country we are guest in or intervened in.
Also the above has to be synchronised and coordinated.

I suspect most here would agree with those considerations -- but most will also note that they are all well known and long standing questions to which there are many answers -- there is no possibility of a 'one size fits all' solution as we are dealing with people. The answers will change as events occur and there will also be variations in the questions themselves.

Thus the overarching question becomes "Yes. So?" What, precisely, are you postulating?

[Coined]

a question of nothing new.I suspect most here would agree with those considerations -- but most will also note that they are all well known and long standing questions to which there are many answers -- there is no possibility of a 'one size fits all' solution as we are dealing with people. The answers will change as events occur and there will also be variations in the questions themselves.

Thus the overarching question becomes "Yes. So?" What, precisely, are you postulating?

Hmm, let's not fight eachother, if we agree ... very well, things are about to change and that is a very good sign.

I am postulating that the current way we organise our armies are residues of the past.
We have to get rid of linear thinking, dogmatic and "stove piped" organisations.
Destroying the opponent’s (military) capabilities is not sufficient anymore to achieve the primary political strategic goals. In fact, this is just a minor element of the operational environment. An environment of which society, politics, economy, culture and (non)governmental organisations are prominent.
An adapted way of acting asks for an adapted form of organisation. We have to relate to organisations as a system of systems, visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors. An organisation where kinetic and non-kinetic elements are permanently joined together into a module gives input in the ability to learn (training, practising, performing their job) from each other. The effect will be complementary. Current symmetric organised elements are residues of the past, they relate to an enemy which we will not find at the coming battlefield in the potential arena of conflict (republics bordering Russia – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan – Middle East – Northern part of Africa).
Elements which are permanently organised in modular units learn to benefit from eachother as they learn, train and operate in a constant mixed (semi)(non) permissive environment.

[Rex Brynen]

This is a place in which there is a great deal of experience and wisdom (and then again, there are people like me). You might, however, want to make sure the jargon:insight ratio tilts heavily to the latter.

We have to get rid of linear thinking, dogmatic and "stove piped" organisations.

When have these ever been good things in organizations? Were they during WWII?

Is this wholly a function of the way militaries are organized, or does it apply to all large organizations (including those in the diplomacy and development business). Oh, the stories I could tell..

Destroying the opponent’s (military) capabilities is not sufficient anymore to achieve the primary political strategic goals.

Actually it might be sufficient, if we could do it. Certainly there are very successful COIN campaigns based on such an approach (Syria, Hama 1982). However, we can't apply the "Roman" model in Afghanistan because 1) excessive application of military force generates new supporters for the insurgency, 2) we lack the military resources to do so, and 3) we're unwilling—on wholly appropriate moral grounds—to apply a sufficient level of force.

In fact, this is just a minor element of the operational environment.

Yes and no. Without adequate security on the ground, its difficult to do any effective diplomacy, and impossible to do any effective development (your other two Ds).

An environment of which society, politics, economy, culture and (non)governmental organisations are prominent.
An adapted way of acting asks for an adapted form of organisation. We have to relate to organisations as a system of systems, visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors.

I have no idea what "visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors" means.

An organisation where kinetic and non-kinetic elements are permanently joined together into a module gives input in the ability to learn (training, practising, performing their job) from each other.

Doesn't the whole "permanently" imply a degree of rigidity that will undercut the ability to respond to changes in the insurgency, other insurgencies, or non-insurgency wars?

The effect will be complementary. Current symmetric organised elements are residues of the past, they relate to an enemy which we will not find at the coming battlefield in the potential arena of conflict (republics bordering Russia – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan – Middle East – Northern part of Africa).

Is the issue one of "symmetric organization" (and I'm not sure what that means in this context), or appropriate resources, doctrine, intelligence, and strategic and operational approach?

[Ken White]

I will also offer an additional Item:

"...the coming battlefield in the potential arena of conflict (republics bordering Russia – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan – Middle East – Northern part of Africa)."

That seems to suggest that those regions will be a battlefield.

Why must that be so?

It seems to me that if the flexibility that you desire (and which many others have noted is needed) but do not offer suggestions to obtain were present, such conflicts could be averted. There seem little question that they should be ...

[Surferbeetle]

From a 2006 Speech by the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bot at the SID and NCDO Conference on Security and Development

The key to success in conflict prevention and resolution is the overall political framework that gives logic and coherence to the political, military and developmental efforts we undertake. I call this the trinity of politics, security and development - in reference to the Clausewitzian trinity of army, people and government. (The business of Clausewitz was war; our business is to make peace.)

When the trinity of politics, security and development is broken, the work of soldiers, police officers, diplomats and development workers will lack direction, lack coherence and lack impact, and, at worst, will become counterproductive.

Maintaining cohesion between our political, security and development efforts is especially relevant in regions affected by conflict, or regions that serve as safe havens for extremists and terrorists. In places where we are trying to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, our military efforts should support and be seen to support this overall effort. Where we are trying to win over the population for a more peaceful and stable order, our developmental instruments should support and be seen to support the overall effort.

This brings me to the efforts made by the Netherlands to support peace and development.

When a country has emerged from armed conflict, its social fabric has often been torn apart. The humanitarian situation is poor, the economy has collapsed, public administration has been weakened, large numbers of people are unemployed, displaced and traumatised, and the profusion of small arms and high crime rate engender feelings of insecurity. Experience has shown that, in 30% of post-conflict countries, violence flares up again within ten years. In Africa, that rate is as high as 50%

The NRC Handelsblad has some interesting articles on this topic from time to time...