Didn't we disprove this in Kosovo? Grandiose claims of vast swaths of dead enemy vehicles, shown to be tractors and outhouses once the ground forces arrived?This doesn't mean airpower can't win a war... some wars it can.
Didn't we disprove this in Kosovo? Grandiose claims of vast swaths of dead enemy vehicles, shown to be tractors and outhouses once the ground forces arrived?This doesn't mean airpower can't win a war... some wars it can.
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“their citizens (all of them counted as such) glorified their mythology of ‘rights’… and lost track of their duties. No nation, so constituted, can endure.” Robert Heinlein, Starship Troopers 1959
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Cliff,
Thanks for the pointer to AFDD 2-3. These stood out:
"In irregular operations, commanders should understand that the application of military force is in support of other instruments of national power ..."
"In addition, operations conducted in such close proximity to the civilian population also present LOAC and ROE challenges."
So you'll understand the source of (at least) my attitude, it's in response to an article by MG Dunlap (that I can't find a link to right now), and the historical attitude of "COIN from the air." 2-3 addresses the latter issue very well.
The issue of AF reluctance in the area of CAS remains.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
John,
MG Dunlap speaks for himself and not the USAF. Do some in the USAF share his views? Yes, but many do not, particularly those who've done sandbox rotations in the last decade. Some of those people have written on how the Air Force can better support joint operations, but they don't seem to get the notice that MG Dunlap does. As Ken notes, MG Dunlap makes some valid points in his articles, but they are largely ignored in favor of his more controversial positions.
There is some legitimate historical truth to that, but I don't think it applies at all today. Part of the conflict comes from differing viewpoints of how CAS is best provided. I think the Army has come around to the Air Force's view more than the reverse. I think the Air Force has proven that a low-slow aircraft using the Mk1 eyeball for targeting is not necessarily the best way to deliver CAS. One reason for the A-10C upgrade was that it was an inferior CAS platform in many situations because it lacked the capability to guide, deliver and integrate modern precision weaponry. It seems to me many critics of AF CAS don't understand that technology significantly changed CAS and the result is that platform matters a lot less than it used to.1. AF commitment to CAS is less than whole hearted.
I think we also need to consider training. Bad blood prevented the Air Force and Army from working together on CAS doctrine and training which resulted in poor operations in OEF and OIF. By contrast, the SoF forces, with embedded combat controllers who did a lot of training, performed CAS very well using bombers in the opening stages of OEF.
The fact is that despite what some detractors continue to claim, most USAF aircraft are capable CAS platforms. If we didn't have the A-10, we'd still be providing pretty decent CAS (note: I love the A-10 and don't want to see it go away - it serves important niches). So I think a lot of CAS detractors continue to live in an idealized past where CAS is platform dependent and I think they needlessly point to real or perceived wrongs by the USAF that occurred 20, 30, 40, 50 years ago that don't automatically apply today.
So, I don't think CAS is an issue today at all, based on the AAR's I've read over the past few years. I think most of the Army understands that the AF way of doing CAS, with precision weapons and sensors, is equally good if not better than the idealized vision of a CAS-only platform. In most cases, CAS is not a platform-dependent activity.
Who knows what will happen in the future and it's possible the Air Force will take a wrong turn with CAS, but I doubt it. Either way, we will find out and I, for one, will defend it as an important AF mission. I think the biggest factor will be training. Air-ground coordination is difficult and both services need to put the effort in to maintain, if not increase, the level of proficiency we have now.
Again, I think this is an historical anachronism. Undoubtedly there are some who believe that, but I think they are a minority. The AF does see it's role as very important, indeed critically important. A lot of ink is spilled debating what element of power is "decisive" or the most important in a particular campaign. I find most of those arguments silly. The fact is that the air, land and naval components are interdependent.2. The prevailing attitude within the AF is that air power alone can win wars.
You'll have to explain what you mean here and provide some evidence. "Full capability?" What does that mean?3. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the AF was not being allowed to bring its full capability to bear in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
Totally untrue. There is some hand wringing due to the fact that it's the Air Force that usually takes the blame when civilians are killed despite the fact that 99% of the time it's the land forces that ordered and authorized the strike. There have actually been times when the CAOC overruled the ground commander for fear of civilian casualties. As Cliff says, the AF takes "collateral" damage very seriously, probably too seriously in some cases. The Air Force understands that civilian casualties have a negative strategic effect and try to limit it as much as possible. His comment about lawyers is accurate.3.a. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that civilian casualties aren't a negative factor, and may be a positive factor, in COIN.
This is something else you'll have to explain and provide some justification. First of all, which conflict? The MCO portion of OIF, or something later?4. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the conflict in Iraq would have ended sooner if the AF had been allowed to inflict more damage and casualties.
Ken,
I defend the Air Force against attacks that I think are unwarranted. I think I've said a few times now how completely incompetent AF purchasing/procurement is, and we've both discussed and criticized the Air Force's defensiveness, lousy PR and inability to competently put forth its viewpoint on various matters. There are a lot of cultural and other problems in the Air Force that don't get discussed much because the same sheet of music gets played over and over. I'm not defending any of that, but what I believe are common misperceptions about the Air Force, particularly among Army personnel. Note John's bullet points above. They are all about perception and attitude. If I think the perception and attitude are wrong I'm going to speak up about it.Thus even though that was then and this is now, you, Entropy and a few others have to come 'round every few months and rise to the defense of that AF as it gets slammed for past transgressions, bad purchasing and equipping decisions and poor PR skills.
Let me give you another recent example about perceptions:
A couple of months ago on the INTELST forum a topic came up about this aircraft program. The immediate reaction was quite predictable - shock and anger about the Air Force trying to muscle in on the Army's territory by developing a manned tactical ISR system, one that can't even plug into the AF's big, expensive PED architecture! Everyone bought into their own preconceived notions about the Air Force and it's hidden agenda and thought it was a blatant ploy to grab airborne ISR away from the Army. After a day or two of this, the moderator comes on and tells the rest of the story, which I paraphrase here: This project was forced on the Air Force because the Army couldn't execute it on the SECDEF's timeline.
This is the kind of thing I see all the time Ken - a lot of assumption and jumping to conclusions based on bias and not evidence. The underlying subtext is that there is a hidden agenda at work. I don't think there's anything wrong in challenging those assumptions and what I see as false perceptions and I will continue to do so.
I know and did not mean that you should not.
I was expressing regret that you had to do it due to what I can only presume to be on the part of some posters sheer parochiality, ignorance or a desire to yank chains to see what happens.Originally Posted by Entropy
P.S.
Didn't you advise me once not to read the comments following newspaper columns? Allow me to reciprocate -- I suggest not reading the comments on so-called 'Defense Blogs' (present Company excepted) -- they're all as bad as the newspapers. The articles to which those comments are appended seem to quite often be full of ignorance and inaccuracies also.
Good advice, thanks!Didn't you advise me once not to read the comments following newspaper columns? Allow me to reciprocate -- I suggest not reading the comments on so-called 'Defense Blogs' (present Company excepted) -- they're all as bad as the newspapers. The articles to which those comments are appended seem to quite often be full of ignorance and inaccuracies also.
Let's not forget...
the Luftwaffe had it's own paratroop panzer division!
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
Entropy,
For the record, I do support the AF. In particular, I seem to be in a minority that wants the F-22 bought in its original planned number so it can accomplish the mission of air supremacy. I also would like to see C-17 purchased to replace C-130s one for one.
Thanks for your comments. I'll mull over them before spouting off about the AF again.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
I know. I was expressing regret that
Deleted, double post. ???
I served in the USAF as a ROMAD. Something directly related to CAS. I grew out of my blue uniform within a year and never wore it outside of basic training. Attached to the 82nd my squadron and my sister squadron spent 60% of our enlistment in the field with the grunts. Both squadrons completed at the very least Jump School at Ft. Benning and some went on to Air Assault School as well. It was not a pleasant 8 to 5 Air Force job.
The reason the Air Force doesn't completely let go of CAS and give it all to the Army is that the Air Force wants her assets on the ground as well. It's part of the whole SO scenerio. Cannon AFB is now entirely a SO air base and has a rather complex set of missions to perform. As intimated, all sister services have assets on the ground trained to coordinate CAS, whether the aircraft are Marine, Navy, Army, or Air Force. It doesn't matter. Maximum use of all assets available. The "S" in CAS stands for "support". The Air Force has no business reaching out beyond that with the Army's MLR, FEBA, or whatever you want to call it for CAS. The Air Force has her "Airplanes" to reach out and touch someone as far as she wants to reach for a variety of reasons to include paving a path for ground forces. This whole topic is a moot point. Sorry about that. Just how I feel about it. Some things never just go away.
Last edited by Culpeper; 04-17-2009 at 02:04 AM.
"But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
"Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"
Not exactly sure how this here ended up as "Air Force doesn't want to do CAS" thread ...
Moot the point is not. The Forces lack that 3D forced entry capability that the Russians never dropped. The Hermann Goring Division was mentioned - the Germans also never dropped that idea, see Wiesel airportable tank with TOWs and 20mm machine canon. And if I remember correctly, the JHL/HLVTOL part of the Objective Force Mobility concept also talks about lifting a FCS out a 1000 nm (which is a little too far, I guess one fighterbomber flight hour would be a good distance, or around 300nm behind the major ground combat line).
The Army AirMech Strike idea, at least as far as I understand it, was/is basically loading a M113 onto a CH-53 and flying it out a 150km. Nice, but in real life 150km doesn't even get you out of SMERCH range. And against counter-air and air defense such a force wouldn't have a chance.
No, what I was asking was, if it would make sense to give such a forced entry unit to the Air Force, like the Marines are the forced entry component of the Navy (well, should be). I mean, the Wehrmacht Fallschirmjager were also part of the Luftwaffe, and not of the Heer. As I described, the Air Force would have all the ressources needed to enable and sustain such a ground element.
Folks here might reject the notion, but the U.S. ground combat doctrine is still dominated by a slow linear development out of a long static buildup - in short they are not capable of Blitzkrieg and Bewegungskrieg, and are doctrinally less advanced and less capable than the German Wehrmacht in its time. That's why such a MotJaegReg might give new impulses and force a little competition.
And don't get me started about how in times of "jointness" it doesn't matter who "owns" what. That's probably why we have Army air assault units on amphib carriers and Marines jumping out of UH-60 as part of a mountain division operation. Jointness was invented to make sure nothing is "joint", but technological progress made it natural (optimistic angle) and pure neccessity forced it in a couple of areas.
I guess I don't understand the problem of having army air assaults launched off of amphibs, if that combination of resources best meets the combatant commanders needs. Why DOES it matter who owns what if all services are working together? Redundancies between servicies mean someone's not necessary.
"Law cannot limit what physics makes possible." Humanitarian Apsects of Airpower (papers of Frederick L. Anderson, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)
It was a lot more complicated than that and basically an idea of which I remain very un-convinced.
Air Mobile is best for Special Ops /Small Unit special mobility, (including CSAR) and after that Helos should concentrate on CASEVAC, and Re-Supply/Sustain/Relief in Place. "Soft skin Truck that jumps woods"
Can't see a need for much else in the real world
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
How do you see the Russian VDV troops? The Russians still believe in that concept; their main task would have been/is to capture rear HQs, blow up supplies, cut com lines, and take out enemy air defense. Though I have to admit that those guys I talked to were somewhat pessimistic about the prospect of being picked up again at the end of the mission (they also said the plan was to extract just the personnel, and leave the vehicles behind).
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