Understanding the Enemy

[jmm99]

I've managed to read through it up to p.107.

Here are some initial thoughts.

Some background on "Abu Bakr Naji" - apparently a covert and clandestine personality.

Sayyeed Abdul A'la Maududi, "Jihad in Islam"; Sayyid Qutb, "Milestones"; Abdullah Azzam, "Defense of the Muslim Lands"; Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner"; and the AQ statements in the Al Qaeda Reader, are useful background.

Modern Western readers will find several features foreign to modern "Western Constructs" governing political action and military action:

1. Belief in the real presence of God and Satin, with religious principles governing all aspects of the Umma's life and its relationahip to others (a theonomy; last seen in Western polity in the Middle Ages). This construct was not foreign to Westerners of the past, even after the Middle Ages (e.g., the Jesuit Relations); but today, secularism and the concept of church-state separation make it seem quite foreign.

2. Non-acceptance of Western constructs, such as the UN and the GCs. That is not to say that rules similar to the GCs will not be applied in specific situations; but, in other sitauations, rules contrary to the GCs will be applied (I've touched on that elsewhere). These folks have their own JAG officers !

3. Political action and military action are not intersections of two coins, or the flip sides of the same coin; but are the face of the same coin:

(p.85, 86-87 .pdf)
We urge that most of the leaders of the Islamic movement be military leaders or have the ability to fight in the ranks, at the very least. Likewise, we also urge that those leaders work to master political science just as they would work to master military science.
....
The interest in understanding the rules of the political game and the political reality of the enemies and their fellow travelers and then mastering disciplined political action through sharia politics and opposing this reality is not less than the importance of military action, especially if we consider that the moment of gathering the fruit—a moment which is considered the recompense for the sacrifices offered by the mujahids during long decades—is a moment resulting from a political strike and a decisive political decision. Of course, military strikes preceded and even accompanied it; but the final moment and the fate (of the movement) depends on skillful political management. Even the whole course of fighting requires good political managment so that the best results will be achieved. Additionally, there is a very important point: The meaning of every reference in this paragraph to political management is that the political decision issues from the military leader, but the entire political administration or most of it should be made up of warriors from among the assistants of the military leaders and their troops. Those are the people who should take an interest in studying the political dimension. The battle is their battle before it is the battle of others, so one should emphasize the danger of leaving the political decision in the hands of those who do not engage in military battles for any reason.

The concept is that war is too important to be left to the politicians - I'm getting close to being too cute by half; but that is what it boils down to.

A corollary is that any operation involving violence (small, medium or large) is considered part of the military wing - in short, the operators are deemed to be soldiers, regardless of whether we accept or reject that definition.

Naji's construct involves three stages; but they seem to be somewhat different from those of Mao, etc. More of that in the rest of the book, which I have to finish reading.

[MikeF]

Excellent posts by all. Thanks for the input. Here is a cross-post from Goesh that seems to fit inside this thread. Give it some thought.

By no means am I a scholar or academic despite having a Masters Degree and one (1) year of postgraduate work under my belt. Having never been in Iraq, my opinions are simply that. My involvement in a 3rd world war, Viet Nam and direct living experience with two (2) other groups of 3rd worlders, one of which was Muslim, gives me pause to suggest that "the wicked problem" is by no means unique and distinctive to Iraq. We are collectively the wicked problem and always have been and each generation views their predicament as the most intense and difficult ever. I would suggest that our Western linear thinking heightens our sensitivity, at times to the point of compulsive thinking but this is not to deny that a 'mess' exists in Iraq, or for that matter East Lost Angeles or South side Chicago or rural Appalachia or the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation - talk about disparate culture clashes and wicked problems, they are with us everywhere, vibrant, transgenerational and immune to any fix our logic and rationality can come up with.

After hanging around here for a couple of years or so and being exposed to so many professional and experienced people, I believe COIN's existence centers on four (4) principles: understanding the cultures, respecting the cultures, adopting the cultures and generating meaningful employment for those capable of bearing arms against us. We have failed with the latter two principles hence we remain in a twilight zone of being neither the occupier nor the enabler.

The most successful COIN operatives in our history were the free trappers, the mountain men operating in a 14 year period of time from 1820-1834, the rise and fall of the beaver trade. They went in small numbers hundreds of miles into uknown territory and at times lethal territory without any logistics and Intel. They successfully implemented the 4 COIN principles and survived and it can be argued they even thrived. The analogy applicable for our current dilemma would be if at the time of the invasion, separate squads of grunts dispersed from Basra and walked to Fallujah and up to Kurd land, passing through Baghdad, all done with no communication and no backup, just their packs and rifles. 60% of them would have returned south alive in 14 years using Arabic as often as English, half their attire would be Iraqi style clothing, they would have fathered some children, they would prefer a lot of Iraqi type food over American fare and they would feel a bit of a connection to Allah.

That is the core of the wicked problem, an inability to mingle and adopt. The only real shot we had at adopting was language but how many boots on the ground have basic communication skills and see any merit to speaking Arabic other than using it as a tactical tool? Secondly, and to resort to the mountain man analogy, we haven't traded for beaver pelts with young men capable of bearing arms against us. Sure, jobs have been created; Green Zone type jobs, camp followers abound but not so at the grass roots level. We could have and should have given temporary economic fixes/employment using the principles developed in our own great economic crisis, the Great Depression of the 1930s, namely the Public Works programs and Civilian Conservation Corps. Some people quickly realized back then that idle young men can easily become very discontented. How many unemployed young Iraqi males have been in at least one fire fight or provided services to those thus engaged? We will never know. Very early on, I noted via TV thousands of young Iraqi males standing idle and tens of thousands of tons of rubble - it was work waiting to be done and I presume the rubble still abounds. I'm not suggesting this was/is the solution but it was/is a most viable option for developing relationships and enabling/nurturing. What unemployed family man would have turned down good wages for 8-10-14-20 months of steady labor? 1 truck, 6 men with leather gloves, water, the noon MRE meal and cash at the end of the day and you don't have 6 enemies or potential enemies. If the reader can't envision this, then he is locked into glitches and obstacles and thinking linear while being involved in a circular environment.

Our forces and leadership are to be commended for the understanding and respect of Iraqi cultures that has been fostered and grown with remarkable speed and this at least is keeping us in the ball game. A big tip of the hat to General P. and his crew. I recall in Viet Nam a guy building a house and I inquired as to when he thought he might have it completed. He responded that his sons or grandkids would finish the job and so it is with the world's wicked problems that will require our blood and resources.