Understanding the Enemy

[Ken White]

"Why are we doing this" holds the key to the other two.

If there is no good answer to that final question in the eyes of the beholder -- not in the eyes of he, she or they who made the commitment to do 'this' whatever it was -- then the other issues become clouded and people get confused.

For example, attacking Iraq made perfect sense to me on the basis that we had responded poorly or not at all to 22 years of provocations emanating from the ME. Having lived there for a while and thus having some small insights into the prevailing mentality there, I took it for what it was (to me and simplistically here stated); a massive response by the entire Tribe to numerous assaults on the dignity of the Tribe in the form of typical desert pin-prick raids which of themselves are not terribly effective or harmful but which do tend to erode the superior position of the Tribe. Thus, in my view, the attack was worthwhile and made a great deal of sense. I believe that my view was shared by some, particuarly in the ME (who none the less objected because they didn't like the precedent).

A more west-centric view would discard my thought process and opt for the belief that the attack was ill advised. IF the west-centric viewer in question was sorting out TTP or solutions to use in Iraq, the probability is that some bad decisions would be made simply because the 'why' quotient was not known or was misunderstood...

Thus, as Marc says, "most cultures do" make the same mistakes over and over because they do not do a good job of determining why they are doing what they are doing -- or of properly explaining why they are doing what they are doing. Proper understanding by all concerned of that last point is the factor that causes confusion on the answers to the other two questions.

That's why WW II got broad popular support (on both sides), the 'why we are doing this' was quite clear and unambiguous. Most wars since then have been poorly handled in most regards because even the fighters weren't sure why they were doing what they were doing. That, I suspect will get worse before it gets better.

[MikeF]

We're trained that if we are stuck in restricted terrain and misoriented, then we stop, take a knee, pull out the map and compass, and reorient ourselves...

I don't see why that simple tactic should not be applied to many other issues.

v/r

Mike

[Ron Humphrey]

We're trained that if we are stuck in restricted terrain and misoriented, then we stop, take a knee, pull out the map and compass, and reorient ourselves...

I don't see why that simple tactic should not be applied to many other issues.

v/r

Mike

The problem is that 24/7 media cycles, international agendas, and internal bickering never take a break so a lot of times you won't see changes until after they have actually already started.

Kinda brings back why doing whats right is a better direction than doing things the "right" way. The former generally remains the same for everyone while the latter tends to be a reflection of prisms.

[Ken White]

Generals (among others... ) do not like to admit error for obvious reasons in most cases -- to the extent of not making course corrections because that implies an earlier failing -- and you have a recipe for a screw up. Complicate that by putting in another relatively clueless person high up the food chain and it only gets worse. Until someone comes along and unsticks it..

Plenty of historical examples. Some hysterical ones also -- unfortunately, when the occur in conjunction with geopolitics and this trade, they're rarely funny.

[jcustis]

Some of this goes back to the classic thread most of us posted on concerning the issuance of a single narrative. When you are trying to state the facts only and do so in a manner that outcycles the bad guys, the single narrative is critical.

I absolutely agree that the azimuth check is important beyond words. Simply blundering forward without any deliberation on what is working (and why) dooms not only you to failure down the road, but also others who cover down on your TTPs.

Sometimes we are faced with the single narrative, as addressed in the initial part of this thread, that is so strong that we cannot hope to ever outcycle or overcome its power, emotional draw, and mobilization effect. We can make the cost of acting on beliefs very high, but as the COIN fight drags out, I think history bears out that the phases of the campaign shift and become more convoluted. The masses might not be mobilized to action, but their implicit support for the insurgent remains...almost like the mother who cannot turn her thug son away from the door when he comes knocking, bleeding from a gang war gunfight.