Understanding the Enemy

[MikeF]

One thing that we seem to not yet have a handle on is what the true nature of our enemy is. After reading 3 Cups of Tea, I started given some serious thought to GEN Bashir's comment that the enemy was ignorance.

I'm not sure if you've ever watched a suicide bomber's video where he gives his testimony before martyrdom, but it is intense. In Zaganiyah, we started recovering the videos after the blast. These were our neighbors blowing themselves up so it became a bit personal. After we redeployed, non-religious teenage girls from Diyala River Valley began volunteering or being coerced. I wanted to understand why because that is the only way to stop it- not counter-IED measures- a holistic approach...I read through every translated document available on Open Source that I could find.

Here's my take:

In the same parallel that x is a function derived from y and depicted numerically on a graph, the Arab world is a wonderful, mystical land full of multiple paradoxes competing and contrasting directly with traditional western rational thought, norms, and values. This land that provided the world with Hammurabi’s law, algebra, and three religions coexists within the same mosaic that introduced honor killings, suicide bombers, and assassins. This cradle of civilization ebbs and flows in the persistent and unrelenting current of conflict with modernity while defying western utopian dreams of perpetual peace. This land contradicts and conforms in a beauty unresolved leaving most unfamiliar unnerved striving to determine some rhyme and reason to it all.

What is al Qaeda? The active absence of hope and passion skewed in anger. Tumbling, spiraling down, the Islamic Revolution unfolds in search of deep introspection. Nearly four score past, Sayyid Qutb questioned his isolation, unhappiness, and loneliness. Bitterness derived from grievances revealed, theorems proposed juxtaposed to uneducated masses; Muslim Brotherhood evolves. All for naught in distaste for compassion. Self-denial self-inflicted for naught in the lack of creativity, curiosity, and thought. No renewal of the mind, the martyr self-destructs. Who will teach the children to read? Temporal thoughts temper tolerance tolerant to teaching towards temperance. Anarchy ensues. Victims victimized verily refusing validation.

Most of this can be described by The Sayyid Qutb Reader by Albert Bergesen.

Today, two authors suggested a radical approach to defeating AQ.

How to Beat al Qaeda at Its Own Game

By Frank J. Cilluffo, Daniel Kimmage

You've probably never heard of Badr Mish'al al-Harbi, but to many, he's a hero. The star of a June 2008 Internet video called "The State of Islam [Shall] Endure," Harbi appeared under the nom de guerre Abu Omar al-Kuwaiti to sing the praises of martyrdom. Two months earlier, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas had profiled him, describing the young man as brave and pious. Today, there are 2,000 Google Arabic hits for his pseudonym.
Harbi's ticket to stardom came postmortem: On April 26, 2008, he blew himself up during a series of al Qaeda attacks in Mosul, Iraq. Soon after, Harbi's comrades in arms succeeded in turning him into an online hero. The victims, Iraqi Muslims, became a statistic.

The story of Badr al-Harbi is a case study of a battleground in the "war on terror" that has long been ignored: the struggle to control the narrative. Contrast the murderer-hero's popularity with the anonymity of his victims, and it becomes clear that al Qaeda has mastered and monopolized the storytelling.

Although elaborate tales such as Harbi's might appear to border on fiction, al Qaeda's control over the publicly told narrative has real consequences across the world. Terrorist radicalization and recruitment are a byproduct of the movies, songs, poetry, essays, and books that tell an emotionally charged story with distinctive vocabulary, clear-cut heroes and villains, and larger-than-life symbols. The story al Qaeda and its ilk tell is about a forceful response to victimization. It works by tapping into real and perceived grievances and peppering the narrative with analogies that fuse history and myth into a powerful sense of identity and purpose.

They may be onto something. The real question is- Is it really this simple?

v/r

Mike

[George L. Singleton]

Yes Mike it really is that simple.

And better use of Voice of America, radio and TV, could help turn this whole war around.

We are talking psyops and better propaganda, which we have thus far done a punk job on.

[ODB]

this in terms the family can understand. I get them to think, what if a foreign nation was here in the States? How would you react? If one thinks in terms of the number of people who would have the conviction to do whatever necessary to win vs. those who would take no stance, is it really any different? How would our media operate differently? Think of the psyops you would develop, the propaganda opportunities.

[jmm99]

Starting with the enemy, Zawahiri's "Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents", found in the Al Qaeda Reader (with other important statements), is required reading.

There are theological holes (from the Islamic perspective) in his arguments; but they have to addressed by Muslims - not Christians, such as George, JMM and MikeF.

For a different kind of martyr, study the pre-Constantinian Christian martyrs, who as pacifists were willing to die for their faith; but not to kill for it. Then fast forward to the Jesuit Order (not pacific) and its martyrs - as to which, the Jesuit Relations (Thwaites English translation) are a ready source.[*]

While I agree with the content of the message which the authors in Mike's link want to convey,

The story of al Qaeda's victims must be told compellingly and exhaustively -- from the World Trade Center to the weddings, funerals, schools, mosques, and hotels where suicide bombers have brought untold grief to thousands of families, tribes, and communities throughout the Muslim world. That narrative could tap online social networks, creating a Facebook of the bereaved that crosses borders and cultures. A series of public service announcements, timed after attacks, could detail the innocent lives snuffed out by al Qaeda.

A recent symposium hosted by the secretary-general of the United Nations points the way forward: an international, multilingual effort to sponsor networks of Web sites, publications, and television programming. The United Nations can and should play a significant convening role, bringing together victims to help meet their material needs and raising awareness by providing platforms through which to share their stories.

The U.S. government also has a critical role to play in creating a framework for victims' stories. No single agency will lead; the days of centralized, top-down communications campaigns are over. Nongovernmental organizations and millions of private citizens will make this work by adding their own experiences to the tales. Adopting this kind of decentralization, the Obama administration can make a clean break with its predecessor's strategy.

I believe that message will be effective only if it is delivered and controlled by Muslims.

--------------------------
[*] One could also contrast the Canadian Jesuits' cult of martyrdom with the culture of the CFM-Canada, which was often at odds.

[William F. Owen]

You've probably never heard of Badr Mish'al al-Harbi, but to many, he's a hero. The star of a June 2008 Internet video called "The State of Islam [Shall] Endure," Harbi appeared under the nom de guerre Abu Omar al-Kuwaiti to sing the praises of martyrdom.

Never heard of him, and exactly how many people think he's a hero. What is more, how many of those people can actually exert operational and strategic influence.

Sorry, I can't take this stuff seriously. It's an argument without evidence, and like a lot of stuff that sounds good, leads you no where, unless you enjoy rubbing your chin, about all "wicked problems" and "complexity" some cling to in order to promote agendas.

[MikeF]

Never heard of him, and exactly how many people think he's a hero. What is more, how many of those people can actually exert operational and strategic influence.

Sorry, I can't take this stuff seriously. It's an argument without evidence, and like a lot of stuff that sounds good, leads you no where, unless you enjoy rubbing your chin, about all "wicked problems" and "complexity" some cling to in order to promote agendas.

I'm sorry you feel that way Wilf. I don't have any answers that is why I ask the questions. The only agenda is that maybe people will talk about it. That's it. Personally, I think you and others here come the closest in defining anything towards pragmatic, realistic answers.

My counter-argument would be that if we don't talk about it, it will lead us to nowhere. Furthermore, no "solution" currently being implement is supported by evidence.



v/r

Mike

[jmm99]

I read a lot in certain areas that are of special interest to me. Move a bit outside of those areas and I'm a total dummy - which means I listen up a lot to what others say.

[William F. Owen]

I'm sorry you feel that way Wilf. I don't have any answers that is why I ask the questions. The only agenda is that maybe people will talk about it. That's it. Personally, I think you and others here come the closest in defining anything towards pragmatic, realistic answers.

...and I am sorry not to be more constructive. It was not your agenda I was referring to. Your question is one worth asking, but I strongly caution against assuming all the questions and observations posed by such articles are worthwhile.

If there is merit in understanding an enemy, it is in how to break his will and subvert his arguments, not understanding him, so as you can empathise with the SOB, and live happily ever after.

Until the enemy gives up the policies you find unacceptable, his physical defeat has got to be the primary purpose.

That is as close to being pragmatic and realistic as I might ever get.

[Majormarginal]

jmm99 How do you know all this stuff? I am amazed.

[jcustis]

Yes Mike it really is that simple.

And better use of Voice of America, radio and TV, could help turn this whole war around.

We are talking psyops and better propaganda, which we have thus far done a punk job on.

I don't think so, and don't agree that better propaganda (via VoA) is the answer. Sometimes, folks see through that for the sham work that it is. Often, the simple fact remains that our ideas and constructs just don't translate over. Add to that the fact that within societies such as the tribal, Arab, and Islamic one we worked so hard to shape and control in Iraq, any message coming from us is going to be ignored and downplayed, and information operations can be a tall order.

Providing accurate facts that get ahead of jihadist information, is sometimes the best that we can do, methinks.

[ODB]

How we think we can:

a. Figure out another culture

b. Figure out why they do what they do

c. Figure out how to change them

When we can't even do it in our own country.

That just might be the problem, stop putting so much thought into, crush their "nuts" and eventually they'll get tired of it or run out of people......

[MikeF]

How we think we can:

a. Figure out another culture

b. Figure out why they do what they do

c. Figure out how to change them

When we can't even do it in our own country.

That just might be the problem, stop putting so much thought into, crush their "nuts" and eventually they'll get tired of it or run out of people......

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?



v/r

Mike

[jcustis]

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?



v/r

Mike

I think we often don't like to ask the questions because framing them the right way is hard, or permits a sense of weakness to invade...and finally we often do not like the answers that are likely to arise, even if they speak the truth.

[ODB]

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?



v/r

Mike

Unfortunately what works for one will not work for the next, but is there a common ground that can be exploited?

[William F. Owen]

I don't think so, and don't agree that better propaganda (via VoA) is the answer. Sometimes, folks see through that for the sham work that it is. Often, the simple fact remains that our ideas and constructs just don't translate over. Add to that the fact that within societies such as the tribal, Arab, and Islamic one we worked so hard to shape and control in Iraq, any message coming from us is going to be ignored and downplayed, and information operations can be a tall order.

Providing accurate facts that get ahead of jihadist information, is sometimes the best that we can do, methinks.

Concur with all. Exactly right in my experience. No evidence you ever produce will convince most (not all) anti-western Arabs that the Israeli's didn't commit 911, and that the British SIS didn't murder Princess Diana.

Try and tell folks who believe in UFOs that they don't exist.

...and I don't think it is the job of any Army to alter beliefs. It's to make the cost of acting on those beliefs too high, for most people to risk.

[MikeF]

The current narrative is best defined by Abu Bakr Naji's The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through which the Umma will Pass.

It is the evolution of radical Islamic thought deriving from Sayyid Qutb's work long ago in an Egyptian cell. For some fringe movements, it lays out a methodical, rational explanation of the corruption and disenfranchisement and grievances provoked of western democracy and capitalism.

For Americans, this text is difficult to comprehend. Marc- please let me know if I'm off base with this. I believe it is simply how we think and actually process our thoughts.

For example, Americans think and read in terms of left to right, and our thought centers around I. I walked to school today. I visited small wars journal.

For Germans, thought and words are the direct opposite. It is how the world affects them not vice versa.

For Chinese, one-hundred and eleven is translated one, one, one.

I'm not sure how the Arab mind works besides understanding they read right to left, and they tend to think more romantically in verse rather than prose.

I think this insight is the distinction in our lack of communication. I'd enjoy y'alls feedback particularly if I'm off base.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

in response to your post is: Yes, it's complex -- and we have to insure that in an effort to understand, we do not over simplify.

Some time ago in a thread not worth regurgitating; Wilf and 120mm contended that cultural differences were not significant, that people were, in effect, people. While there is a great deal of truth in that belief, as there is in your stated theories, I said then that I think the truth is far more nuanced. Still think that.

I lived and operated on the local economy (everything from where I lived, to all food, people I hung out with and to how I traveled throughout the country and indeed, the entire region -- with a couple of exceptions...) in Iran for a couple of years. That allowed me to arrive at some insights on Middle Eastern thought processes, particularly about military or combat things -- but I absolutely, positively did not become an 'expert.' So be skeptical.

I also have several years each in North and Southeast Asia but not that much time on the local economy. However I did learn a little about operating modes and local cultures. Less time in Europe and Latin America but I was struck in those two by far more similarities than differences. Anyway, I'm well traveled but am emphatically not a know-it-all. So with respect to what I say on the topic of cultural knowledge, be skeptical.

Since then and particularly in the last few years, I've read a great deal written by purported ME experts and I'll tell anyone this: The western 'experts' often get it really wrong for various reasons. Be skeptical.

The Middle Easterners who write in the west (in English) often tell it wrong and rarely tell all they know. Those of the ME in the ME will frequently write or say one thing in English (or any western tongue) and quite another in Arabic or Farsi. Everyone in the ME has an agenda and it will usually be concealed as it supposed to be (Zaher versus Batin). Be skeptical.

I do not believe it is possible for one raised in the west to really understand either Asian or ME thought processes other than superficially -- and I suspect the reverse is true. One can obtain some knowledge and use that knowledge. What I do not think can be done, other than in very few quite rare individuals of all races, is to truly understand another, very different culture.

The entire ME, for example spent many years under the domination of one or another Persian Empires (and the Iraniha recall this, yes, they do...) and thus many mores and attitudes are derived from the Persian ( to include Zaher and Batin and, very importantly, the concept of Class and a pecking order, Ta'arof). Other than Iran, they were later dominated by the Desert Arab tribes and acquired some added ideas (not least of escalating small raids as an economy of force measure). Then they were ruled by the Turks accumulating still more and different ideas (including personal bravery and manipulating reports). That was followed by western intrusion (introducing greed and selfishness as well as geopolitical manipulation) and the City dwellers took over from the rural Tribes (bringing deviousness and haggling to new heights). Oh and don't forget the Greeks and the Romans also puttered around, dropping seed and whatever -- unless one has all those sometimes complimentary (but different) ideas and competing ideas inculcated from birth, one is highly likely to get the cultural milieu wrong if one tries too hard.

Pay attention to the big things and try to get them right while accepting that you're unlikely to ever fully understand the finer things. That usually will be okay. Above all and always -- be skeptical.

[MikeF]

Concur with all. Exactly right in my experience. No evidence you ever produce will convince most (not all) anti-western Arabs that the Israeli's didn't commit 911, and that the British SIS didn't murder Princess Diana.

Try and tell folks who believe in UFOs that they don't exist.

...and I don't think it is the job of any Army to alter beliefs. It's to make the cost of acting on those beliefs too high, for most people to risk.

With Wilf's valid insight and Goesh's suggestion, where do we go?

Here's how I describe it...

If everything is interconnected and intertwined, all we have to do is connect the dots to comprehend.

Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism expresses the crux of American Intervention mirrored in the self-denial conflicted with an internal desire to evangelize. Democracy works for us. Freedom isn’t free. Thus, we must free others with democracy. As good Christians, it is our duty to fix everyone else. One plus one equals three. The ghost of scarlet letters resounds in the western version of Wahabists Shar’iah law, yet we pretend it is not religious. Parables of Pharisees provoked thou screamest loudest as if you know truth. Jesus wept. John joins in joint justification.

In Vietnam, we propped up an artificial government in the hopes that they
would conform. Unfortunately, they only conformed to the corruption. Corrosion of conformity, our opportunity to assist a Vietnam in transition failed when we discarded Ho Chi Minh to salvage our relationship with France.

In Iraq, we tried Maliki.

Today, we strive to save Afghanistan. What are we attempting to save it from? Itself? To what effect? Is Hamid Karzai our friend? We assume that because he dresses well in tailored suits and speaks the Queen’s English that he shares our values, beliefs, and norms. In truth, he may be using us as a comparative advantage to unbalance the balanced opposition much as the Taliban uses al Qaeda.

Twenty years ago, we allied with the Taliban to defeat the Soviets in a marriage of convenience. After the Bear fell, we left. The Taliban did not forget. Kipling echoed for naught, yet we rationalize in the hopes of a natural gas pipeline emerging from the ashes. Phoenix is in Arizona not Kabul. A tendency of good war is oxymoron.

No doubt I weep for the deprived women of Afghanistan, but I must accept that I did not cause their suffering. It existed long before my birth. All I can control is the parameters of my family and closest friends. All I can help are those that first inquire to help themselves. I am neither an isolationist nor anti-war. That reasoning is as foolish as pretending that I am not man. I am simply taking a moment to consider our passion in some form of analysis lest we continue along the foreboding path that shadows and conforms.

Maybe it is time to leave well enough alone.

I am by no means trying to make policy statements. In all actuality, as Schmedlap voices in other threads, I'm sorting through my own personal decision matrix....I would be the first to volunteer for Goesh's expedition....

Ok, with that said, and all the politics aside, what do you think?

There is much validity in Wilf's crushing the enemy as there is in Mortenson's building schools. Where is the intersection point?

All I submit that it is better to discuss the issue rather than remaining stuck. Or rather, as Ken suggest, I'm skeptical of any translation.

Let me know if I've simplified matters too far.

In true detail to other cultures, I'd submit that we must add music...this seems appropriate

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhtcaRRngcw

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

Or even try to do so.

Viet Nam wasn't that simple. Of course Karzai is using us -- anyone in the west who thinks he is our -- Generic western collective our -- friend is a fool. Afghanistan 20 years ago was also not that simple.

I can't say you've simplified it too far though I do believe that in trying to understand things, many use the technique of trying to identify component bits, an effort that IMO generally leads to excessive fragmentation. Micro views do not solve or lead to solutions for macro problems. I offer the US Army's Tasks, condition and standards approach as an excellent example of how not to do it.

Is the task at issue your definition of that task, the other guys definition or that of a third (or greater) party? Or are there three or more different tasks being worked by many people, some known and some unknown with respect to the same time, location and issue?

Are the conditions you unilaterally impose universal or context dependent; if the latter, who or what determines the context -- you, the enemy, the weather, the terrain all of the preceding. Or does someone or something else determine the condition...

I won't even discuss the vagaries of a standard -- suffice to say that Hamid Karzai in his role does not operate with the understanding that I would were I in that role, thus his standard -- and that of most Afghan males -- of treatment of females differs considerably from mine. Since he is nominally a leader of Afghans, his standard is probably more pragmatically correct than mine would be. That means, whether I like it or not, that in that regard, on that topic, he's a better man for that job than I would be.

That's okay with me. He does not have to like or agree with me nor I with him for us to work together for mutual benefit. Either or both of us should back off if it's determined that the benefits are skewed or not mutual. We do not have to be friends. Probably could not be for many reasons. That's okay as well. It's okay because it has to be, that's reality.

I have spent a fair amount of time trying to export US missionary zeal in various climes and terrains on three continents -- most of those times, the entire operation was fouled up partly due to said zeal overriding common sense, partly because we did not understand the major defining facets of the culture we were operating in, partly as a generic result of inadequate training and education precipitating strategic, operational and really dumb tactical errors -- and once we were there partly because people expended a lot of angst over the minutia of cultural differences that they were never going to really understand -- and did not need to...

Occasionally, though it all worked -- and every time that was the case, it did so because of the right Commander, sheer professional competence of most involved and adequate as opposed to excessive and unnecessary cultural knowledge. Those successful efforts, by the way ran the full spectrum of combat from simple SFA to COIN to HIC.

Adequate cultural knowledge is not simple but it is easy, just recall everything learned in Kindergarten and apply common sense, read a bit, ask sensible questions and learn and heed the big issues -- realizing that one cannot ever answer some questions and does not need to do so.

Long way of answering your question; "With Wilf's valid insight and Goesh's suggestion, where do we go?"

Can't say. People are too different to provide an answer to that question, though it can certainly be asked. There are probably almost as many answers as there are people and that should be acceptable. Ideally, anyway -- because that degree of complexity of the human condition is unlikely to change.

To get to the root of this Thread --I believe it is futile to try to understand an enemy from a different culture; the more different, the more futile. You can learn his operating modes and define his TTP -- and you must do that. If it's assistance to another nation, you must learn the major cultural factors and must heed the local rules with local people. There is absolutely no need to try to get inside their heads and I believe that attempting to do so will only lead to great frustration and due to excessive simplification and / or inability to completely understand all the nuances of very complex human emotions and imperatives can actually cause harm.

[Bill Moore]

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?

After being lectured and after several discussions with several in our diplomatic community, I now believe that the Dept of State and perhaps the non-kinetic side of our military is more offensive than our air power and infantry could ever be. The diplomats and psychological operatives want to challenge the very essence of a culture's belief system. We're not looking for ways to co-exist acceptably, we want them to embrace our religion of democracy and free markets and embrace the Judeo-Christian value system. We don't simply want to win the war, we want to alter their society. When two extremists go to battle there is very little room for pragmatic compromise.

I think, as do many others, that we can defeat Al Qaeda's extreme ideology relatively easily if we quit attempting to "radically" alter everyone's social norms. We need to focus more on simply providing the promised bread and butter and peace, than preaching the benefits of democracy. We co-existed in relative peace before Al Qaeda surfaced, we can still live with Muslim States that don't embrace democracy, free markets, and Judeo-Christian values in the future. They'll evolve into the modern world at their own pace and in their own way.

I am as much as idealist as anyone else, but there are limits to our power. We need to focus on defeating the threats to our national interests (using realism not idealism). Longer term we continue to provide a model State for the world to look up to. Hopefully our model will provide a goal to other States to strive for, and when a people "desire" help because they are ready to make the step to democracy and more effective economic models, then we reach out to help. We can't force it down the throats of those who are not receptive to these ideas.