I've managed to read through it up to p.107.

Here are some initial thoughts.

Some background on "Abu Bakr Naji" - apparently a covert and clandestine personality.

Sayyeed Abdul A'la Maududi, "Jihad in Islam"; Sayyid Qutb, "Milestones"; Abdullah Azzam, "Defense of the Muslim Lands"; Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner"; and the AQ statements in the Al Qaeda Reader, are useful background.

Modern Western readers will find several features foreign to modern "Western Constructs" governing political action and military action:

1. Belief in the real presence of God and Satin, with religious principles governing all aspects of the Umma's life and its relationahip to others (a theonomy; last seen in Western polity in the Middle Ages). This construct was not foreign to Westerners of the past, even after the Middle Ages (e.g., the Jesuit Relations); but today, secularism and the concept of church-state separation make it seem quite foreign.

2. Non-acceptance of Western constructs, such as the UN and the GCs. That is not to say that rules similar to the GCs will not be applied in specific situations; but, in other sitauations, rules contrary to the GCs will be applied (I've touched on that elsewhere). These folks have their own JAG officers !

3. Political action and military action are not intersections of two coins, or the flip sides of the same coin; but are the face of the same coin:

(p.85, 86-87 .pdf)
We urge that most of the leaders of the Islamic movement be military leaders or have the ability to fight in the ranks, at the very least. Likewise, we also urge that those leaders work to master political science just as they would work to master military science.
....
The interest in understanding the rules of the political game and the political reality of the enemies and their fellow travelers and then mastering disciplined political action through sharia politics and opposing this reality is not less than the importance of military action, especially if we consider that the moment of gathering the fruit—a moment which is considered the recompense for the sacrifices offered by the mujahids during long decades—is a moment resulting from a political strike and a decisive political decision. Of course, military strikes preceded and even accompanied it; but the final moment and the fate (of the movement) depends on skillful political management. Even the whole course of fighting requires good political managment so that the best results will be achieved. Additionally, there is a very important point: The meaning of every reference in this paragraph to political management is that the political decision issues from the military leader, but the entire political administration or most of it should be made up of warriors from among the assistants of the military leaders and their troops. Those are the people who should take an interest in studying the political dimension. The battle is their battle before it is the battle of others, so one should emphasize the danger of leaving the political decision in the hands of those who do not engage in military battles for any reason.
The concept is that war is too important to be left to the politicians - I'm getting close to being too cute by half; but that is what it boils down to.

A corollary is that any operation involving violence (small, medium or large) is considered part of the military wing - in short, the operators are deemed to be soldiers, regardless of whether we accept or reject that definition.

Naji's construct involves three stages; but they seem to be somewhat different from those of Mao, etc. More of that in the rest of the book, which I have to finish reading.