Winning the War in Afghanistan

[jmm99]

this:

from BW
... AND the public perception of the importance of this particular AOR in the context of the global mission-set and US interests as a whole.

Since 9/11, the political side of our ledger has been operating in non-stop crisis mode (with different pages flipping in and out depending on political posturing).

It still amazes me that there was no in-depth contingency plan to handle AQ in Astan - and that one had to be developed on the run immediately after 9/11. That was a problem caused by the political side of the ledger, not the military side (IMO).

Regards

Mike

[S-2]

Nice comments gents but why are you talking about A.Q. in Afghanistan if that's the target and mission?

The number of A.Q. operatives and senior commanders we've caught or killed there is decidedly small.

They're not there. Why should they be? Place is crawling with ISAF, jets, and drones

Pretty expensive and mis-directed C.T. mission for a bunch of targets elsewhere. Pretty botched and mis-managed COIN mission if nation-building's the intent.

Trillion dollar mission?

Can we just write each afghan a cheque for $2000 and call it a day? Figure that'll save us $400B, a lot of afghan and ISAF lives, and we can go ahuntin' for ol' A.Q elsewhere.

Think I saw OBL in Portland, Oregon on Halloween eve. Sure looked like him anyway. Zawahiri too.

Couple of hotties with 'em too. Man, do they know how to party!

[Steve the Planner]

S-2. You may be on the right track.

The other day, I attended a conference where Gilles Dorronsoro, Micheal Semple, and Joanne Nathan, three non-US Afghan specialists, gave their views on Afghanistan.

They spent a lot of time on details about different Taliban Commanders in different areas that they have met with.

After a while, an audience member asked: "Why haven't you mentioned Al-Qaeda?"

The response, led by Semple, was that Al-Qaeda isn't relevant to Afghanistan. It is just always brought up by the Americans to keep US public attention on this war far-far-away.

Like you, they are of the opinion that Al-Qaeda are in Pakistan now, and not a significant issue in the current "civil war."

They argue that the Taliban only has nominal support in Afghanistan, especially since some Pashtuns are unwilling to support them. Maybe 20% support on a national level.

Instead, they are trying to "masquerade" as opponents of foreign intervention---hoping there is greater support for them on that basis than as just another minority in contention in a civil war. Thus, in part, Dorronsorro argues to pull out of Pashtun areas to limit the strength of that message, while bolstering national power projection capabilities (the Army).

Steve

[jmm99]

but US forces based in Astan to attack AQ in Pstan is what I glean from this:

from BW
Even in a "countering AQ UW" approach, Afghanistan remains important, and it would have a Deter mission on Insurgencies in those two countries (AF/PAK), Disrupt on the UW Network nodes that are critical to AQ's support of those insurgencies; and an appropriately tailored Defeat of AQ senior leadership (done in a fashion so as not to actually increase their support and effectiveness in other regions of the globe, or to destabilize the fragile governments of Afg or Pak further than they currently are.) This would still require a significant number of US troops ....

The Pakistani Army (and the ISI more so) have an aversion to non-Muslim forces setting foot in Pakistani territory. See this post on The Quranic Concept of War, by Brigadier S. K. Malik of the Pakistani Army (originally published in Pakistan in 1979).

On Fareed Zakaria's GPS today, former President Pervez Musharraf made it clear that US forces based in Pstan to attack AQ in Pstan was an unacceptable option.

The alternative is not to attack AQ in Pstan with US forces. You may support that alternative.

[S-2]

I appreciate that you offer your views or, at least a personal summary of other views, instead of some article devoid of personally attached commentary/context.

They argue that the Taliban only has nominal support in Afghanistan, especially since some Pashtuns are unwilling to support them. Maybe 20% support on a national level.

Yup, if the ABC/BBC/ARD poll from last February is any indication. Most of that 20%, btw (and oddly), belongs to foreign irhabists-not the taliban. Taliban support is creeping up-all the way from about 4% to 7-8% range. They've no traction to speak of. Further of those taliban, probably only 20% or so are committed ideologues for their movement. The rest are a mish-mash of disaffected and revenge-motivated souls, unemployed, and those whom are criminally-inclined.

Yet we know that a.) the marines, for instance, have had a profound impact in the Nawa area and, b.) the taliban are telling the Nawa locals (whom are asking our marines if it's true) that we'll be shortly leaving. BG Nicholson, himself, has wondered at the possible tenuousness of our presence.

Thus, in part, Dorronsorro argues to pull out of Pashtun areas to limit the strength of that message, while bolstering national power projection capabilities (the Army).

What a roller-coaster we've put those people (and our own) upon. Can you or Dorronsorro contrast those thoughts against our massive infrastructure buildup that's currently taking place along with our troop expansion.

Seems the momentum to expand our effort is far out in front of Dorronsorro's comments. He's behind the eight-ball and waaaay late. Hate to vietnamize my comments but we're building a veritable Cam Ranh Bay in Kandahar for ourselves and eventually an army that's nowhere close to even the ARVN that we left behind.

Finally-

...there is greater support for them on that basis than as just another minority in contention in a civil war.

Well. There IT is. Somebody finally said it.

You've read about our helicopters transporting taliban to the north as fed by PRESS TV (Iran) to the willfully gullible afghans, correct? You've therefore seen the duplicitous reactions of both Karzai and Abdullah. Both agree publically with this sickening assertion-for differing reasons. Karzai clearly promotes such to deflect attention away from his terminally corrupt regime. Abdullah agrees with this contention but does so to separate himself from Karzai on a matter that affects his base of support in the north where, supposedly, these insurgents are being transported.

The factions, it would seem, have lined up and are ready to go. Further, I can't imagine Karzai suggesting as much if he thought his support from America hinged on more lucid and rational perspectives from his office.

I have to personally face facts, though. As much as I see the U.N./ISAF/U.S. presence in Afghanistan as utterly pointless for a variety of reasons (IMHO, all sound), the larger momentum is that our withdrawal from this fiasco isn't happening anytime soon. Instead, our escalation is widening.

Others will withdraw, of course. With each ISAF soldier whom departs without an ISAF replacement, that soldier's place will be absorbed by us. Obama's ratcheting of troops at whatever size he ultimately selects will be offset by these soldiers departure.

Net? Less than we publically sell now which STILL isn't what our ground force commander has projected as a baseline minimum (40,000 minimally with 80,000 his preferred troop augmentation).

Y'all at SWJ are SMEs of the first order. You see the individual trees really well and have all the buzz words and catch phrases down. You are collectively well-paid for such.

Who's seeing the forest, though? Further, who cares to see it? Our NCA? They seem to be relying on the likes of folks at the Jamestown Foundation, AEI, CSIS, CNAS, IISS and SWJ to provide the supporting analysis leading to that mythical light at the end of the tunnel.

I've watched SWJ's nat'l relevance grow in the three years plus I've been a member. I fear, as much as anything, that the membership here and those aforementioned think-tanks are convinced that we've boxed ourselves into no other recourse but to keep on keepin' on.

Thanks for your thoughts.

[tequila]

The SWJ is well paid? Man, where's my check?

Dorronsoro is a genuine expert on Afghanistan, but I'm afraid of his prescription for the country. Every time I've heard him speak, he is prescribing, in essence, the division of the country --- reinforce in the north and the cities, protect non-Pashtun areas, and essentially concede that Pashtun areas are beyond help.

He also insists that the "McChrystal strategy just died in Helmand." I think that statement's more than a bit premature.

[S-2]

The SWJ is well paid? Man, where's my check?

Hmmm...

I see a need to elaborate.

O.K.

I guess I presumed SWJ is a hobby for professionals from related arenas. If sole-sourced from here, that might be a bit of a bummer...

Thanks.