Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Dayuhan]

At the outset, we had situations where taliban had been captured or had otherwise surrendered en masse.

http://www.combatfilms.com/cfrtv_archive_0013.asp

What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.

I believe I have my own answer, but are they more mobile and dispersed than they were in '01-'02, more committed given that they are in a resistance insurgency phase?

I tend to rub my temples when I think of the successes at the beginning, and try to ascertain why this has become so hard.

Coming from a completely non-military perspective here, though I've watched these processes in a few places.

I think this may have something to do with that transition from "clear" to "hold". When you're clearing, you have the initiative; you decide where you will clear and when. The other guy has to react to your choices. Holding is a lot more passive. If you're holding a lot of territory you have to spread out, and you have to support those spread out folks. The other guy can watch you. learn your routines, and decide where and when he wants to challenge your hold. He takes the initiative.

Of course holding doesn't preclude offense, but once you make that transition a large part of your effort, likely most of it, will be devoted to an essentially passive process that can allow the other side to take over the initiating role.

Again, a comment from an amateur perspective that may make no sense at all to the professionals... disregard if that's the case!

[Ken White]

First, we do practice and implement more complicated DA/SR tactics based on the mission, the quality of our people, equipment, organization and so forth.

I know -- but I also know that as you later note, it's a training level issue as much as anything. My point was not to dispute what is but to remind anyone reading this that what is now has not always been and, far more importantly, can be changed and will likely be changed in a larger commitment than either Iraq or Afghanistan (and both).

your son doing some CIF

Not what i wrote; he's there but is non SF and non CIF, never has been. The CIF guy also there is another relative who has long had a beanie.

...the combined operations are generally less complex for various reasons.

Various; yes...

I can find some unclassified examples of SOF tactics that GPF doesn't use.

I can think of several real quick and could probably dredge up a dozen more in a minute or so -- I can also come up with some the GPF uses that SF does not and cannot. That's not an issue or a question IMO. My point was just that in the past the line was more blurred and the future may make it so again...

I don't buy the argument that DA and SR are hyper conventional, that is a turf battle comment, not reality.

Doesn't that depend on many factors? Isn't that comment itself a little bit of a turf comment?

I fully grant that some DA stuff and much SR is beyond the capability of the GPF -- some is beyond the capability of the CIF Cos, much less a garden variety ODA. Some SR would stymie the Army of Northern Virginia and John Mosby. Horses for courses and all that...

Their tactics require more control/micromanagement...We can't afford to train that stupidly in SOF.

Again, now true (though I could argue the tactics requiring more micromanagement -- I wouldn't say requiring, just currently enduring...). Should it remain so? Probably not but it likely will until the next big war comes then a good time will be had by all -- with a whole lot of changin' goin' on...

...it requires different training and a whole new mindset in their officer ranks.

Yes to all that, noting that the same thing has been long ago done with GPF units. Still what's now is what is. Agree that the Officer corps (not GPF specific) needs to rethink their value system.

SOF is important and SOF units are needed. SF is important and SF units are needed (and IMO should not be given DA or SR missions among others, that's using a Cadillac de Ville to do a Mustang job and wasting a whole slew of that cultural and language training on a shooter job...). I'm not convinced Rangers are either important or needed but they exist (mostly because the Army realized in 1973 that they were dumbing down the GPF to such an extent that they needed somebody to be a little high speed...). The GPF is important and is needed. Everyone has a niche but the deliberate dumbing down of training for the GPF has had a number of adverse consequences.

Touting the superiority of SF / SOF in some things -- things that it was designed and is funded and equipped to do -- doesn't change the fact that many missions now being done by SF/ SOF were once done by the GPF and almost certainly will have to be again given a larger war. One can put the GPF down but one had better hope one never has to have that GPF come get ones tail out of a sling...

Parochialism and turf battles do more damage to the US Armed Forces than any evil enema...

[Ken White]

Of course holding doesn't preclude offense, but once you make that transition a large part of your effort, likely most of it, will be devoted to an essentially passive process that can allow the other side to take over the initiating role.

Add the psychological shift in focus from active to passive and the not so minor debilitation and mind set modification that results. Focus is focus. Protecting your stuff is protecting your stuff...

The Army clears, the cops hold, the economy builds. You can change that but it won't work well. Don't have adequate Cops? keep clearing until you do. You can waste money building before you hold but it'll really drive up your costs...

Again, a comment from an amateur perspective that may make no sense at all to the professionals... disregard if that's the case!

I'm sure some professional will reject it because of it's provenance.

They should not; it's accurate.

[jmm99]

Are you (both of you) not getting close to what George Decker told Pres. Kennedy: "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas." And, by extrapolation, any "good" soldier can handle any (perhaps, "almost any" is better) military situation.

To me (an isolated outlier), "good" means a "B" ("average" = "C"; "excellent" = "A"; "outstanding" is better than an "A", but is like "porn" - known when seen, but not easily defined). Of course, "special operations forces" tend to get more of those who are above "C".

All of that is relevant, but not really material, to the major US interventions from Korea and Vietnam to the Sandbox and the Rockpile - those have all been marked by difficult or impossible political constraints on both military strategies and tactics.

The military has and does beat itself for things that are and have not been within its control.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

The problem is not, and rarely is, the ability to conduct counterguerrilla operations. The problem is, and usually is, getting people to understand that countering the guerrilla as the main effort only suppresses the problem at best. Often it inflames the problem and deepens the core grievances within the community of the actual "insurgency."

Three interesting current examples, all with very different roles by the US.

1. Afghanistan. There the US actively supports the sitting government in suppressing nationalist challenges, and actually does much of the killing for them. We call this war.

2. Libya. There the US actively supports the nationalist challengers, but in a minimalist kind of way. Moral support and some air primarily.

3. Syria. There the US vigorously condoms the government for doing essentially what the government of Afghanistan is doing, though Syria does so to a much smaller degree. We say things like "they are murdering the populace" about Syria.

I was speaking with some experts on Yemen (yes, expertise is a relative thing) and many of the people in the streets of the areas Westerners have access to (not much) are confused and frustrated by why the US supports others and not them.

My assessment is that actually the US acts very consistently: we do what we think will best support our interests as we define them on the day of the decision. The problem IMO is that we more than any other people stand on a moral soapbox and make loud judgmental proclamations about what our enduring and universal values are and why they are superior to all others. Yet we subjugate values to a very confused assessment of interest; that we further confuse with odd positions on loyalty that sometimes trumps, but some time doesn't. Not hard to see why people scratch their heads in wonder.

[Ken White]

Are you (both of you) not getting close to what George Decker told Pres. Kennedy: "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas." And, by extrapolation, any "good" soldier can handle any (perhaps, "almost any" is better) military situation.

Probably...

To me (an isolated outlier), "good" means a "B" ("average" = "C"; "excellent" = "A"; "outstanding" is better than an "A", but is like "porn" - known when seen, but not easily defined). Of course, "special operations forces" tend to get more of those who are above "C".

Most would agree. I do. There are a couple of things connected to that. The first is that in a major war, history shows one has to accept a large quantity of C- people and units; the numbers required dictate that. Unfortunately, the institution that is the US Army has a fetish about mobilization and opts all too often (and post Viet Nam particularly...) for that being acceptable at all times because it is adequate for war preparation, easier on leaders and trainers, cheaper, adored by Congress (as fair but cheap and calling for BIG equipment expenditures. They like that last...) and generally acceptable even though it means that some missions will not be well served (see Afghanistan, Iraq) or served at all (see Apaches to Kosovo ).

That 'C-' state was entered during and remained after WW II. After Korea, the Army determined to improve itself to a general 'B' standard with some 'As' and set about doing that with some success. That effort was halted neatly in its tracks by Robert Strange McNamara and forced into regression by Viet Nam. A combination of lack of understanding and circumstances halted a needed and beneficial effort.

Post VN, the 'C / C-' state was deemed adequate (and also helped avoid some missions...). It worked because democracies in general aren't too comfortable with large competent Armies (one adjective is okay, both are suspect...). I think that's where we are today.

My belief is that we have a professional force operating as a conscript Army, that we should upgrade capability to 'B' or even 'B+' and that we could do that with better training and a refocus. Whether we will do that remains to be seen...

The existence of SOCOM owes much to the simple proposition that a 'C-' Army is okay but you have to have a few elements that can do better in an emergency. Interesting things help drive that; Big Army's excessive concern with uniformity and pervasive mediocrity, "...elitism not allowed here..." While the SOF-types desire to be 'different' and elite...

All of that is relevant, but not really material, to the major US interventions from Korea and Vietnam to the Sandbox and the Rockpile - those have all been marked by difficult or impossible political constraints on both military strategies and tactics.

The military has and does beat itself for things that are and have not been within its control.

That's true but it's also true the military is not blameless in the lack of success or difficulties in all those efforts. Part of the problem is that the personnel system drives much operational effort in sometimes wrong directions. For example, had either Korea or Viet Nam had most commanders with Pacific Theater experience rather than European experience...

Also, too often, the forces have been more concerned with protecting the institutions than in doing the assigned task. There's some merit in that. The civilian policy makers are rarely concerned with the state or well being of the armed forces yet someone has to preserve the ability to react to major events requiring force, so due to the blase treatment and poorly thought out missions assigned by those civilians, the services tend to husband their being and resources and not go all out to get the job done. Balancing the requirements and conflicts is not easy and all things considered, the guys at the top do a fair job. Not great, usually -- the system does not like that...

Peril of democracy I think...

[120mm]

How so? AQ wasn't around until after the Soviet Union had disappeared; it's predecessor Makhtab al Khadamat never recieved a dime from the U.S.

The Taliban are also a post anti-Soviet Jihad creation; an organization fuelled by Pakistan's flirtation with islamist policies to help fight in the Kashmir. The Taliban were an outcome of traditional Afghan warlord politics.

To say that AQ and the Taliban are second-order effects of U.S. dealing with South-East and South Asian dictators like the House of Saud, Mubarak and Zia-al-Haq would be fairly accurate. To say that the AQ and the Taliban are consequences of a new "Nazi Germany"'s direct intervention in Afghanistan is rubbish.

You've missed my point so completely in your literal minded way, I fear there is nothing I can say.

The US caused the current mess we are in by choosing to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.

We created the warlords, who later trashed the country.

The warlords trashing the country allowed the Taliban to succeed.

Our removal of the Taliban made us responsible for replacing their governance with something else.

The US has been conducting diplomacy by bombing the sh*t out of any country that strikes our whim and fancy. Based on our President's approval numbers. That makes us a mad dog on the world stage.

Even our "rebuilding" is stupid. To date, there are several things we destroyed in the 2002 campaign that we destroyed, much of it unnecessarily, that we STILL refuse to fix/rebuild/replace, to this day.

What about that are you too simple minded to understand????

[ganulv]

SOF is important and SOF units are needed. SF is important and SF units are needed (and IMO should not be given DA or SR missions among others, that's using a Cadillac de Ville to do a Mustang job and wasting a whole slew of that cultural and language training on a shooter job...). I'm not convinced Rangers are either important or needed but they exist (mostly because the Army realized in 1973 that they were dumbing down the GPF to such an extent that they needed somebody to be a little high speed...). The GPF is important and is needed. Everyone has a niche but the deliberate dumbing down of training for the GPF has had a number of adverse consequences.

Touting the superiority of SF / SOF in some things -- things that it was designed and is funded and equipped to do -- doesn't change the fact that many missions now being done by SF/ SOF were once done by the GPF and almost certainly will have to be again given a larger war. One can put the GPF down but one had better hope one never has to have that GPF come get ones tail out of a sling...

Does this have something to do with the lack of a true mountain warfare unit in the U.S. military I was asking about? My understanding is that mountain units are traditionally like airborne units in that they have a role as elite light infantry in addition to their specialized capabilities.

[carl]

Here is a link that David posted in another thread last week.

http://www.understandingwar.org/file...mOffensive.pdf

The report covers a large scale convential offensive mounted by the Pak Army in Kurram. The object of the offensive is to clear a supply line for the Haqqanis and others from Pakistan into Afghanistan. The offensive was complete with air support, some of which may have been provided by F-16s.

So. We have the Pak Army fighting to clear a supply line so the Haqqanis and others can more easily kill Americans. And they are probably using aircraft made in Texas to help do the job.

Our efforts in Afghanistan, no matter how sagely effectuated, are useless unless this situation changes. Period.

[Ken White]

Does this have something to do with the lack of a true mountain warfare unit in the U.S. military I was asking about? My understanding is that mountain units are traditionally like airborne units in that they have a role as elite light infantry in addition to their specialized capabilities.

Your understanding is correct for European Armies. The US Army has always been selectively egalitarian and has eschewed specialized units. We form 'em ad hoc for a given war but after that war, we usually disband them and the system rejects formation of new types to a great extent. That fact, hidebounditis, also led to the creation of USSOCOM.

The problem with fighting in really mountainous terrain is that a premium is place on small unit and independent action -- apparently anathema to today's Army -- so the US Army has seemed to take the position that "We don't like to fight in Mountains so we do not need mountain specialist units." Or something like that...

Roger Beaumont wrote a book tiled Military Elites -- he dislikes them; I've always contended that when he was a non-airborne MP officer, a bunch of young Airborne troopies smarted-off to him and they were only quelled when one of their NCOs told them to knock it off.

The book does illuminate the US Army attitude toward such units. Here's a LINK. I wouldn't buy it, mildly educational but not that good. A large library will likely have it as will possibly arXiv or other academic databases.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken,

The existence of SOCOM owes much to the simple proposition that a 'C-' Army is okay but you have to have a few elements that can do better in an emergency. Interesting things help drive that; Big Army's excessive concern with uniformity and pervasive mediocrity, "...elitism not allowed here..." While the SOF-types desire to be 'different' and elite...

Ken, my comments were not about turf battles between GPF and SOF, but turf battles within the SOF ranks. Lots of penis envy going around, and I guess that just comes with the turf (pun intended) when you're working with triple type A personalities. If you're organization isn't doing the sexy DA, then the DA stuff isn't SOF, it's conventional, and passing out candy to the kids, building schools, and training locals to defend themselves is SOF. All of this discussion is good for a laugh, but it also unfortunately results in dumb decisions and dumb policies over time that try to box everyone into specific boxes, so they can tell the Congressional delegates why their unit is unique (and of course why they're the only true SOF element)

The point you made above, the one I put in bold, is exactly what is holding back the GPF (and SOF to a lesser extent). GPF units have little authority to deviate from the master plan, so everyone goes through the same communist like indoctrination and training programs, those that deviate from TRADOC approved crap will be publically executed. Want to get ahead in this man's Army you better be mediocre.

As to your point about SF doing SR and DA (CIF like work), I think it is appropriate if SF does it as part of a indigenous (or foreign force in another country, like Chinese Nungs in N. Vietnam) organization serving as trainers and advisors. These are the skills needed at the moment and will continue to be needed for at least the next few years. We need grade B and better indigenious forces also for the tougher missions, and SF is uniquely trained and organized to do this. As for SR, my definition of SR goes well beyond the typical view of small teams sitting in hide sites watching a NAI. SF is uniquely suited to conducting some types of SR, they shouldn't be wasted on conducting hide site SR. That type of SR is hard and requires a lot of training to do it well (you need to do it well if you plan on surviving in a hostile environment), so if SF is going to get good at this, it means it will become a training focus, which will distract them from their primary mission sets. We have other units who can do this type of SR, SF should focus on the type of SR that they're uniquely suited to (getting country, gaining access, developing relationships, developing a deep understanding of the issues, etc.).

Dayuhan, I think your assessment is a large part of what happened, though as always there is a little more to it. As for not being a military expert, I suspect that may make you a superior tactician and strategist. Our military experts have had their butt handed to them again and again by non-military experts. Your mind is still free of self limiting doctrinal views.

[bumperplate]

Interesting course the thread has taken in the past two or three pages of comments. Also interesting in light of the recently published Army Reading List which includes books like 'Starfish and Spider', 'Click', and others, where a central theme is on organizational culture and the power of decentralization and trust - juxtapose that with the comments about the Army as a whole and you have not only a brand new discussion but some interesting views regarding this winning in Afghanistan thing.

Not long ago, I think it was either GEN Dempsey or GEN Casey was interviewed and was asked what book was on his desk for current reading. The reply was that it was the Starfish book. Makes me wonder about what that will lead to, if anything.

This thread is about 47 pages now and some of the biggest take-home points I see are that we (the U.S. military) are really hurting for some strategists, and really hurting for some leadership that people believe in, at the most senior levels. Additionally, it seems our relationship with the current governing body(ies) in Afghanistan is hugely problematic, not to mention those in Pakistan. There was something I remember from Clausewitz and some trinity or whatever, something about governments and their roles. But a lot of people these days are telling me that Clausewitz is now irrelevant, that we've entered a new era, a 4th or 5th generation of warfare that explains our inability to understand Afghanistan, and certainly that would preclude our victory there.

Personally I think many of our leaders in uniform go with the generational approach to warfare to either captivate audiences (and sell books later in life) or to produce excuses for their ineffectual ways. I believe some referencing of classic books and ideas, with a lot of common sense thrown in will show us a clear and simple way forward. When I come up with a task/condition/standard statement for that way forward, I'm sure it'll be adopted right away.

[Ken White]

Lots of penis envy going around, and I guess that just comes with the turf (pun intended) when you're working with triple type A personalities.

True dat.

and of course why they're the only true SOF element)

Or only really important war fighting organization -- that attitude's a lot broader than the SOF community...

The point you made above, the one I put in bold, is exactly what is holding back the GPF...Want to get ahead in this man's Army you better be mediocre.

I'm afraid you're right -- and also bothered that is so. We managed to stave off disaster long enough to get marginally competent by the end of WW II. That time may not be available in the future.

As to your point about SF doing SR and DA (CIF like work), I think it is appropriate if SF does it as part of a indigenous (or foreign force in another country...As for SR, my definition of SR goes well beyond the typical view of small teams sitting in hide sites watching a NAI...That type of SR is hard and requires a lot of training to do it well (you need to do it well if you plan on surviving in a hostile environment).

Agree with all that -- particularly the last bit as you define that variety of SR -- which it was called back in my time but the S then stood for special and it wasn't talked about openly. I, as you probably guessed, was using SR as in Strategic Recon which used to be LRP to LRS and not SR but then it became SR. So now we can do SR (Type II) with specially trained big army guys but must still use SF for their long held SR (Type I) mission due to are focus etc.. Or Foxes or something...

Where's Dave Maxwell -- his comments about constant changing of terms is on the money...

Dayuhan...Your mind is still free of self limiting doctrinal views.

Yep, enviably so...

[ganulv]

Roger Beaumont wrote a book tiled Military Elites […] The book does illuminate the US Army attitude toward such units. Here's a LINK. I wouldn't buy it, mildly educational but not that good. A large library will likely have it as will possibly arXiv or other academic databases.

“Worth reading, not worth buying” is one of the better book reviews I’ve ever read. Thanks for the recommendation.

[taabistan]

Adding on to the points, any future strategy in Afghanistan has to include a footnote that strongly urges a reducing of foreign aid.

From a purely humanitarian POV, putting in 145B a year into a third-world country traumatized by poverty and war was always a bad move.

It renders the government useless, because it's preoccupied with the micromanagement of foreign groups and investors with their own goals.

It also creates an enormous disparity in wealth, which drives working class Afghans into poverty and then into the hands of the Taliban.

A teacher in Afghanistan makes, on average, $70/month. A person working for any Ministry in Kabul can make between $10,000-20,000/month. This drives the housing market up, as well as the overall price of products and lowers the purchasing power of the average Afghan citizen.

Funny enough, this is one of those few times where both parties can agree on something.

[Bob's World]

I Will agree on the need to reduce the aid; but such aid does not create the disparity of wealth, it merely injects vast sums into the existing disparity of GIRoA patronage. The true downside of this is that those segments of the populace most supportive of GIRoA as a whole receive very little, and this is creating major friction as strongmen in the north see their peers in the South and East grow insanely rich. This is creating powerful friction within the former Northern Alliance, where cracks are becoming fissures.

Similarly, in those areas where there is insurgency and the bulk of the aid goes, it goes primarily to the areas and populaces loyal to GIRoA, and through the pockets of the same; enhancing the discontent of those populaces who have been supportive of the insurgency.

The effects of such projects are in many powerful ways the opposite of what is intended or advertised.

On an (largely) unrelated note, as I thumbed through my copy of "Quotable Founding Fathers" this morning, these two quotes regarding Great Britain in 1780 stood out as relevant to our current challenges:

"A change of Generals, like a change of physicians, served only to keep the flattery alive, and furnish new pretenses for new extravagances." Thomas Paine, The Crisis

"When will men be convinced that even successful wars at length become misfortunes to those who unjustly commenced them, and who triumphed blindly in their success, not seeing all the consequences." Benjamin Franklin

(To be fair the British, like the US, quite reasonably believed their cause to be just; it was the recipients of their actions who felt otherwise. Time is the jury who hears such cases; and of course that jury is still out on the second.)

[taabistan]

I think that you'll find people from the North (Abdullah Abdullah, Yunus Qanuni) benefiting quite well from financial aid. You'll also find people in Helmand, Zabul, etc. not seeing a dime of it, which may be a reason for why they're being driven into Afghanistan.

[ganulv]

A relevant interview with Edward Girardet (on a book tour for his recently published Killing the Cranes) from last night’s PBS NewsHour.

[Bill Moore]

Good article for discussion, hat tip to Steve for posting under the Smart Power thread.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/op...rt10.html?_r=1

When I walked alone across central Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 and 2002, I found Afghan villagers to be hospitable and generous, but also far more conservative, insular and Islamist than foreigners acknowledged. When I returned to the country in 2006, to establish a nonprofit organization, it was clear that their resistance was inflamed by the increasingly heavy presence of Western troops, which allowed the Taliban to gain support by presenting themselves as fighters for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign occupation.

That is obvious to most of us I hope.

In reference to the Carr Center at Harvard: The center’s research fellows collectively had more than a century of experience on the ground in Afghanistan. Research by fellows such as Andrew Wilder, David Mansfield and Michael Semple proved that our aid projects were increasing instability; that we were undermining any chance of political settlement with the Taliban; and that the Taliban-controlled areas were often more secure than the government areas. Their findings explained why our counterinsurgency strategy was empty and the “surge” was counterproductive, but they were often ignored by the military and political establishment, which has remained defiantly optimistic.

At the heart of our irrational persistence are the demons of guilt and fear. Leaders are hypnotized by fears about global security; feel guilty about the loss of lives; ashamed at their inability to honor our promises to Afghans; and terrified of admitting defeat.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

The article is a pass along from Ms. Skye.

The interesting issue for me goes back to the previous comments of transition from "clear" to "hold."

I liken it to a person trying to buy a failing business, under forced sale circumstances, with the expectation that it can be improved.

First, the battle is with the lawyers, current management and financiers (not the customer base). The initial challenge is to get clear title and control.

Second, the fun begins. What was wrong with the prior business that needs to be fixed/can be fixed to serve the customer base? Are the terms of acquisition such that they do not impede the anticipated turn-around? What if the old business owner opens a new improved version across the street, or just takes his original customer base with him?

Clear is one thing, and a fairly straight-forward activity with a limited set of players, opponents.

Hold is like moving from a one-level chess board to an interactive video game that creates its own internal and interactive feedback, response, demand and threat layers.

Each is a completely different problem set with hold being affected by the terms and conditions of clearance.

In Iraq, there was a viable, if disheveled, societal capacity which, despite our handling/mishandling, would someday provide an exit strategy, no matter how rough-and-tumble.

Afghanistan was very different. After the relatively simple clearance effort, we opposed the basic approach of propping up the old King and letting them get on with whatever they were going to get on with, despite serious societal and government damage caused from prior wars.

Here, instead of being the lawyer in the forced sale, we elected to take over the business, with great consequences and challenges, no clear business plan, an unclear customer base and mission, and with the last owner actively competing for his prior customers.

Against that backdrop, we decided to "outsource" our management responsibilities and strategies to a some of the prior employees who, in essence, brought little productive capabilities to the problem.

There is no rocket science to why we are where we are.

The question of "Winning" is arguably not on the table (Stephen Walt, Rory Stewart, etc...) so much as a transition/exit.

The only new buyers for the business as a whole are Abdullah2, the Karzais, and the Mullah. The competitors interested in carving-up some or all of it surrounding nations (Pakistan,Iran, India, China, Russia, etc...), and internal regional lords (with or without backing from nations).

The option of "doubling down" by the US, in terms of increased blood, treasure and troops, is gone, but to open issues remain:

Is there an option to recapture/replace leadership that would allow, for example, a do-over from the failed outsource strategy? (I think not, but....)

In the various "carve-up" scenarios, does an opportunity exist for us to save face, opportunities, a continuing role, or, at the least, to hurt our competitors so that, at the least, our next business efforts will be improved (or not further damaged)?

If it was my problem to solve, I believe that I would look for someone like Ambassador Crocker who can have formal/informal, direct/indirect talks with neighbors and competitors, while undertaking an clear-eyed inventory.

After that, I would make the plan and execute it.

The problems are, however, that our plan is not not in a vacuum since the landscape is under constant change, and that our plan may be a multi-level one attempting (as the SOFA did) to, essentially, do different things on paper than all parties thought they were negotiating.

While not so graphically dramatic as the helos on the roof of the Saigon Embassy, it is pretty obvious that what Ambassador Crocker sought (and reasonably expected with patience and perseverance) from the SOFA was cut short by US domestic political agendas (the election schedule), so much of what could have been reasonably been done for various US parties got left on the negotiation room floor.

Obviously, for the same reasons, this path could occur again with the continuing lament: If only the US had more time and patience.....