Winning the War in Afghanistan

[JMA]

Agree. It also creates a great degree of confusion. How can we (the UK and US) be conducting COIN when we we are not directly facing an insurgent threat (the Afghan Government is)? Then we start misreading history and fail to realise that in many of the successful COIN campaigns it was COIN and we were the government, and in unsuccessfull campaigns it wsas not COIN and we were assisting an indigenous government. UW is better as it is so broad a concept it forces us to think harder about the nature of the conflict we are involved in.

From the perspective of the government fighting an insurgency success is probably measured first in preservation of the government and secondly in defeating the insurgent. For an intervening or assisting nation both, one or neither of these may be true.

With respect the brush is too broad here.

What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

The more I read the COIN comment here I more I see that there is general confusion about insurgencies as if it were a totally different and unique form of warfare. What is really different? The enemy behaves differently. So you need to adapt. It becomes a corporals war and not a generals war.

David Galula said: "“If the individual members of the organizations were of the same mind, if every organization worked according to a standard pattern, the problem would be solved."

How, may I ask, do you get everyone of the same mind if you don't know what the illegitimate and corrupt government you are propping up is really thinking? Or when you wheel your troops through for six months at a time where they neither learn the ropes nor understand the people and the geography in that time scale.

OK so lets take it that for reasons better known to the US and Britain they have decided to follow a policy that will ensure their troops do not become fully operationally effective in Afghanistan (through specialising in the tactics needed to successfully fight the Taliban and spending long enough in-country to learn about the enemy and the terrain to meet the Taliban on close to an even playing field.)

I have mentioned it before that I see the danger that all levels of soldiers are starting to have their heads filled with all manner of the latest, the greatest, the bestest of the new fangled ideas that go under the heading COIN. It is merely a different set of fighting skills that are required. Radically different it seems. The enemy is the the once anticipated Soviet tank masses heading towards western Europe. It is a guy in sandals with an AK and pocket full of ammo moving about over terrain (both human and geographical) that he is expert and attacking a hapless government supporting soldier who is flailing around under these mosquito or flea like attacks.

Let the soldiers get on with fighting the war (20%) and let the politicians handle the rest (80%) and for heavens sake put a civilian in charge of the whole bang shooting match (not a general).

The loss of the war in Afghanistan will be chalked down to:
* The illegitimate and corrupt nature of the government.
* A lack of unity of purpose between government and outside forces.
* The inability of the government supporting forces to adapt to the tactics used by the Taliban.

So lets answer these easy questions:
* Is there any chance of defeating an insurgency when the government is illegitimate and corrupt?
* Is it possible to plan a winning counterinsurgency strategy when there is no unity of purpose between the government and the foreign military?
* How does one expect to win the shooting war when government forces don't have the locally required tactical skills to defeat the Taliban in the field?

I suggest that we not search for a scapegoat when we probably know exactly where the problem lies. Afghanistan for the US and Brit militaries is a self inflected wound.

[Ken White]

I can -- regrettably and unfortunately -- broadly agree with you. I could quibble about the edges but your essential point is correct. The governments and the institutional Armed Forces of both the UK and US are excessively hidebound and bureaucratic and have not served their citizens or their Forces members at all well.

In defense of those forces and the people in them, they are reflections of the society from which they spring. Thus I'm inclined to fault the governmental milieu and the total populace a bit more than you but there is little question that the Force's approach has been poorly chosen even in view of the admittedly limited discretion they have. The institutional Forces did not foresee the pitfalls clearly. The fact that many senior people did not know what they were getting into due to doctrinal, educational and training errors of omission by their predecessors is a sad excuse, more so because in the US (and I expect also in the UK) there were Force members who cautioned against many aspects of the effort. Regardless, the senior leaders almost certainly did not speak up as forthrightly and strongly as they should have before the decisions to deploy were made.

Thus it is indeed a self inflicted wound -- and the fact they had a lot of help and were directed to do something is not much solace. The other fact, that both Forces had and have historically induced limitations, may provide the reasons for many things but it provides little to no excuse.

Sclerosis is a pain. Political correctness is more than an annoyance...

[JMA]

I can -- regrettably and unfortunately -- broadly agree with you. I could quibble about the edges but your essential point is correct. The governments and the institutional Armed Forces of both the UK and US are excessively hidebound and bureaucratic and have not served their citizens or their Forces members at all well.

In defense of those forces and the people in them, they are reflections of the society from which they spring. Thus I'm inclined to fault the governmental milieu and the total populace a bit more than you but there is little question that the Force's approach has been poorly chosen even in view of the admittedly limited discretion they have. The institutional Forces did not foresee the pitfalls clearly. The fact that many senior people did not know what they were getting into due to doctrinal, educational and training errors of omission by their predecessors is a sad excuse, more so because in the US (and I expect also in the UK) there were Force members who cautioned against many aspects of the effort. Regardless, the senior leaders almost certainly did not speak up as forthrightly and strongly as they should have before the decisions to deploy were made.

Thus it is indeed a self inflicted wound -- and the fact they had a lot of help and were directed to do something is not much solace. The other fact, that both Forces had and have historically induced limitations, may provide the reasons for many things but it provides little to no excuse.

Sclerosis is a pain. Political correctness is more than an annoyance...

Ken it seems so damn sad. I know little of US soldiers but met some fine men, Marine and army types, who came out to Rhodesia. The same with the Brits we had a number of officers and men who were quite frankly outstanding. So there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the soldiers. Yes the politicians blow in the wind (they always have) but it is maddening that increasingly so do the generals. With the right training and equipment the US forces will be unstoppable and that depends on having the correct doctrine. There lies the crunch.

[Red Rat]

With respect the brush is too broad here.

What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.

The more I read the COIN comment here I more I see that there is general confusion about insurgencies as if it were a totally different and unique form of warfare.

I quite agree with you, there is a fundamental confusion over this. War is war, the character changes but not much else. I am off to brief this heresy to the Infantry Battle School next month

What is really different? The enemy behaves differently. So you need to adapt. It becomes a corporals war and not a generals war.

Yes, but if corporals are doing all the right stuff for the wrong reasons (strategy) it still is not going to turn out well.

David Galula said: "“If the individual members of the organizations were of the same mind, if every organization worked according to a standard pattern, the problem would be solved."

That is what doctrine is supposed to do.

How, may I ask, do you get everyone of the same mind if you don't know what the illegitimate and corrupt government you are propping up is really thinking? Or when you wheel your troops through for six months at a time where they neither learn the ropes nor understand the people and the geography in that time scale.

Two separate points here. The first I agree with. It is difficult to get everyone of the same mind if the government whom you are supporting in its counter-insurgency efforts may not see its best interests as necessarily coinciding with yours. Hence IMHO some of the issues we are having in Afghanistan.

The second is understanding the people. It is the degree to which you understand the people. Even in a 2 year tour, or four year tour or a 10 year tour there will still be soldiers who do not understand the language or people. Hell - I know soldiers who have spent 16 years in Germany, married a German lass and still do not speak a word of German! Most soldiers will spend 4-6 years in Germany and come away only knowing how to ask for 'fumf bier bitte!' Now 6 months is plenty time to learn the local geography, most boys in a ground holding company will know their patch inside out in about a month - the AOs are not physically that large. Knowing the human terrain takes much much longer - but you need an aptitude for it as well as the time to learn it. Gaining tactical proficiency probably takes about a month as well.

Personally I think we should extend tours but given the current intensity of combat I suspect that 9 months would be enough, after that it would not make sense due to the overall impact on military effectiveness.

OK so lets take it that for reasons better known to the US and Britain they have decided to follow a policy that will ensure their troops do not become fully operationally effective in Afghanistan (through specialising in the tactics needed to successfully fight the Taliban and spending long enough in-country to learn about the enemy and the terrain to meet the Taliban on close to an even playing field.)

I think what you are saying is not that troops 'do not become fully operationally effective' (we do not send them out there unless we think they are!) but that we could optimise further their effectiveness. That is true, and I think that we could extend their tours somewhat, but there are advantages to the way we do things as well as disadvantages. Again I hark back to 'this is a limited war with limited resources'. We cannot specialise in the tactics we use in Afghanistan partly for the simple reason we do not have the kit to do so and I do not see that changing for the forseeable future.
Secondly TTPs evolve constantly and we need to train our soldiers on the constants and not the variables. You train on the variables when they are certainties. When we ran Iraq and Afghanistan concurrently the training for each was quite different as the fighting was very different in the two different theatres. If all we were ever going to do was Afghanistan then maybe we would change things more (if we had the money!).

I have mentioned it before that I see the danger that all levels of soldiers are starting to have their heads filled with all manner of the latest, the greatest, the bestest of the new fangled ideas that go under the heading COIN.

More of an officer problem!

It is merely a different set of fighting skills that are required. Radically different it seems. The enemy is the the once anticipated Soviet tank masses heading towards western Europe. It is a guy in sandals with an AK and pocket full of ammo moving about over terrain (both human and geographical) that he is expert and attacking a hapless government supporting soldier who is flailing around under these mosquito or flea like attacks.

It is a guy with sandals an AK and a plentiful supply of IEDs. The basics of the fighting skills are not that different for the close combat infantryman from that which were taught in the Cold War or from what you would recognise from your experience. The biggest difference in TTPs has been brought about by the IED threat. In WW2 we faced the same threat (but we called them 'schuh mines' (now it would be called a 'low metal content victim operated IED') and various other bits of nasty stuff) but that was an unlimited war and we were not quite so sensitive about casualties (although the Kangaroo APC was specifically developed to counter the issue of AP mines and in particular schuh mines which were a bugger to detect). Away from the grunt on the ground the biggest difference at HQ level is the complexity and amount of battlespace management, information management and consequence management required.

Let the soldiers get on with fighting the war (20%) and let the politicians handle the rest (80%) and for heavens sake put a civilian in charge of the whole bang shooting match (not a general).

"War is too serious a matter to leave to soldiers" Georges Clemenceau. I am completely with you on this one. Unfortunately the politicians seem to think that war should be left to the generals. One of the clear lessons from the UK Iraq Inquiry Iraq Inquiry is that there was no clear command (and no interest) at UK Cabinet level. Personally I would call the former UK Governments attitude neglectful, bordering on 'criminal neglect'. This jury is still out on the current regime.

The loss of the war in Afghanistan will be chalked down to:
* The illegitimate and corrupt nature of the government.
* A lack of unity of purpose between government and outside forces.
* The inability of the government supporting forces to adapt to the tactics used by the Taliban.

So lets answer these easy questions:
* Is there any chance of defeating an insurgency when the government is illegitimate and corrupt?
* Is it possible to plan a winning counterinsurgency strategy when there is no unity of purpose between the government and the foreign military?
* How does one expect to win the shooting war when government forces don't have the locally required tactical skills to defeat the Taliban in the field?

I suggest that we not search for a scapegoat when we probably know exactly where the problem lies. Afghanistan for the US and Brit militaries is a self inflected wound.

In answer to your questions:
1) Yes. Numerous examples of this having happened.

• Imperial Germany in the Herero Campaign in German South-West Africa (modern day Namibia) from 1904 until 1907.
• Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers
• Russia against the Chechens (eventually )

From all the perspective of respective governments (Imperial German, Sri Lankan and Russian) these were and are successful campaigns. From the perspective of the insurgent or rebellious supporting population the governments were illegitmate and very often corrupt as well; they still lost.

2) Very difficult, and I can think of no example.

3) You cannot. But both Afghan Government and Coalition forces appear to have the tactical skills concerned in Afghanistan, there just are not enough of them and I am not convinced by the strategy either.

Finally a question from my end. I agree that we are meeting the insurgent on nothing close to an even playing field; it is (at the tactical level) considerably skewed towards us. What makes you think it isn't?

[Eden]

Finally a question from my end. I agree that we are meeting the insurgent on nothing close to an even playing field; it is (at the tactical level) considerably skewed towards us. What makes you think it isn't?

Hmmmm, I'm not so sure. Sure, we have greater firepower and more or less complete dominance in the air, but there are a number of factors, both inherent and self-imposed, that limit our ability to apply firepower or exploit our air power. We are also, for the most part, better at fire and maneuver. But even with those advantages we cannot always impose our tactical will on the enemy. The terrain is often the insurgent's friend, from mountains to the corrugated fields around Kandahar that offer cover, concealment, and numerous avenues of approach or withdrawal to the bad guys.

More important, though, is our lack of mobility. Our inability to pursue in any meaningful sense (due to poor off road ability, too few helicopters, heavily burdened infantry, and a reluctance to accept the inherent risks of pursuit) means that we can rarely exploit the tactical dominance we enjoy. In other words, the enemy normally enjoys the initiative and freedom to maneuver...and in my experience this tends to cancel out our dominance in precision application of firepower

[Red Rat]

Hmmmm, I'm not so sure. Sure, we have greater firepower and more or less complete dominance in the air, but there are a number of factors, both inherent and self-imposed, that limit our ability to apply firepower or exploit our air power. We are also, for the most part, better at fire and maneuver. But even with those advantages we cannot always impose our tactical will on the enemy. The terrain is often the insurgent's friend, from mountains to the corrugated fields around Kandahar that offer cover, concealment, and numerous avenues of approach or withdrawal to the bad guys.

More important, though, is our lack of mobility. Our inability to pursue in any meaningful sense (due to poor off road ability, too few helicopters, heavily burdened infantry, and a reluctance to accept the inherent risks of pursuit) means that we can rarely exploit the tactical dominance we enjoy. In other words, the enemy normally enjoys the initiative and freedom to maneuver...and in my experience this tends to cancel out our dominance in precision application of firepower

Hmm yes and no. I agree with what you have said , but in the overwhelming majority of tactical engagements Coalition forces still come off the better. The issue is our perceived inablility to tie these tactical successes into anything more meaningful. Our lack of tactical mobility linked to lack of resources (manpower) and risk aversion (self-constraining our ability to manoeuvre effectively what we have) does mean that we are tied to a slow process of securing areas by lots of FOBs in order to generate stability in order to gain support.

However:

1) The tactics we are using are very troop intensive - the one thing we lack above all else. With our lack of troops we should be manoeuvering more (not less) and taking the fight to the enemy. It is a matter of balance and I am not convinced that we have the balance right.
2) The strategy of stabilising at district level in order to win support for the Government of Afghanistan IMHO appears flawed because I am not too sure if the Afghan Government is very interested in many of the districts in an altruistic manner.
3) The successes and gains we do have are not perceived as such, quite possibly because intuitively people (the media) recognise that stabilising at district level is not going to lead to conflict resolution without change at national level.

[Ken White]

...With our lack of troops we should be manoeuvering more (not less) and taking the fight to the enemy. It is a matter of balance and I am not convinced that we have the balance right.

And an emphatic yes at that. Terrible thing is that most of the Troops are more than willing...

...I am not too sure if the Afghan Government is very interested in many of the districts in an altruistic manner.

Agree and if we can see that, why cannot the policy makers...

Great understatement, BTW.

3) The successes and gains we do have are not perceived as such, quite possibly because intuitively people (the media) recognise that stabilising at district level is not going to lead to conflict resolution without change at national level.

Yea, verily. Raises the same question...

Sigh.

[davidbfpo]

Originally Posted by JMA:

With respect the brush is too broad here.
What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

Which Red Rat replied to:

Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976), mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort ( RR is wrong). I am not familiar with how the Omani government, the Sultan, asserted national control or oversight, but present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

[Red Rat]

Originally Posted by JMA:

Which Red Rat replied to:

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976), mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort ( RR is wrong).

I stand corrected!

My understanding is that the other elements were under Operational Control (OPCON) the Omani Armed Forces. I do not recall there being a Coalition structure per se, it was all under a unified chain of command crossing both political and miltary spheres. The UK No 2, Brigadier Colin Maxwell, certainly started off as a contract officer with the Omani armed forces which until the early 1970s (for the rank and file) consisted largely of Baluchis (circa 70% and arabs (30%), a ratio which was reversed over the 1970s.

I wait for someone to enlighten me on the pol/mil command arrangements for the Iranian contingent (who manned the so called 'Red Line') and others.

We seemed to be much more pragmatic about command arrangements then. The equivalent now would be to make an American 4 star general Afghan Minister of Defence, an American Ambassador as the Minister of Interior (the UK dominated the Ministry of the Interior in the 1950s and 1960s as well) and double hat the Minister of Defence as COMISAF. While we are at it we officer the ANP and ANA with contract officers on attractive salaries and run similar schemes in the civil service for 10-15 years until the locals can take over.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by JMA:

Which Red Rat replied to:

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976), mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort ( RR is wrong). I am not familiar with how the Omani government, the Sultan, asserted national control or oversight, but present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

From a strategic view I recall that what was decisive in the "hearts and minds" part of the Dhofar rebellion was that they used "turned" insurgents (Firqat units) in the main to work among the locals as they were kith and kin.

Surely that must be a lesson for Afghanistan?

Don't use Uzbeks to police Pashtun areas. Understand and exploit the tribal/ethnic diversity to best advantage.

[JMA]

Have to do this one in a couple of bites.

Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.

This has been covered in another post.

But I would say that it is seldom a matter of how many soldiers and where they came from but rather what they did on the ground.

I quite agree with you, there is a fundamental confusion over this. War is war, the character changes but not much else. I am off to brief this heresy to the Infantry Battle School next month

I would be interested in how you approach this issue.

Yes, but if corporals are doing all the right stuff for the wrong reasons (strategy) it still is not going to turn out well.

Fortunately at section level the corporal does not much more than take part in the shooting war (hopefully). So if he and his men are shooting men with guns there's not much wrong with that. If he shoots people on the their way to lay IEDs, in the process of laying IEDs or on the way back from laying IEDs then there is not much wrong with that either.

It is the Generals who need to have the mind change and stop looking at the war as moving brigades around and sweeping large areas with large forces and let the minor tactics decide the shooting war.

That is what doctrine is supposed to do.

For any doctrine to work you first need to have that doctrine and people who understand it enough to train the masses to march in lock-step in this regard.

[JMA]

Two separate points here. The first I agree with. It is difficult to get everyone of the same mind if the government whom you are supporting in its counter-insurgency efforts may not see its best interests as necessarily coinciding with yours. Hence IMHO some of the issues we are having in Afghanistan.

I would have thought that the last election would have been the deal breaker with the Karzai regime. From here on its all downhill like after the ouster of Diem in South Vietnam.

The second is understanding the people. It is the degree to which you understand the people. Even in a 2 year tour, or four year tour or a 10 year tour there will still be soldiers who do not understand the language or people. Hell - I know soldiers who have spent 16 years in Germany, married a German lass and still do not speak a word of German! Most soldiers will spend 4-6 years in Germany and come away only knowing how to ask for 'fumf bier bitte!' Now 6 months is plenty time to learn the local geography, most boys in a ground holding company will know their patch inside out in about a month - the AOs are not physically that large. Knowing the human terrain takes much much longer - but you need an aptitude for it as well as the time to learn it. Gaining tactical proficiency probably takes about a month as well.

This is why, I submit, you need specialised units and not just the run of the mill soldiers who signed up because the "good" jobs in civvie street were scarce at the time. The problem is that by the time these guys get to know a little about the place they are on their bicycle back to the UK. It is just a tour afterall. There is no mental commitment which drives them to want to learn more about the place and the people. Now if it takes a month to get the troops up to tactical proficiency then surely the answer is to drop the "jolly" to Kenya and extend the tour by the month and do a battle camp in a quiet area/province so by the time they get to Helmand they hit the ground running.

Of course I have issues with rotating battalions in toto as the whole battalion needs to settle down and a good enemy will take advantage of that. Permanent units rotating platoons on a R&R basis while maintaining a permanent presence down to company level provides the best operational continuity. Now I'm sure you will come up with some reasons why this will not work either.

Personally I think we should extend tours but given the current intensity of combat I suspect that 9 months would be enough, after that it would not make sense due to the overall impact on military effectiveness.

Are you saying that military effectiveness begins to deteriorate beyond 9 months? Not sure I agree with that. What sort of R&R system would you propose for a 9 month tour? What do the US say, as they have both 9 months and a year tours?

[Ken White]

This is why, I submit, you need specialised units and not just the run of the mill soldiers who signed up because the "good" jobs in civvie street were scarce at the time.

I'm not sure anyone here disagrees with the logic of that. The issue is UK and US political viability of so doing. That's what precludes it other than for a few small highly specialized units.

Of course I have issues with rotating battalions in toto ... Now I'm sure you will come up with some reasons why this will not work either.

Don't know about Red Rat but I will agree that it would work and would be an operational improvement, thus I cannot give you a reason it will not work -- I can give you a reason it will not happen: Service and domestic politics plus potential employments in or deployments to other theaters. Unlikely at this time but no Leader in either nation is willing to risk that it absolutely will not be required.

Are you saying that military effectiveness begins to deteriorate beyond 9 months? Not sure I agree with that. What sort of R&R system would you propose for a 9 month tour? What do the US say, as they have both 9 months and a year tours?

In reverse order, the US Army has had one year tours (briefly 15 months), going to nine months (hopefully). The Marines and some SOF use seven month tours. The Marines and SOF do not get out of country R&R, the Army grants one two week leave, mid tour to anywhere the individual wishes to go.

The move to the nine month tour is desired to cut combat exposure time, move to a 9 month out / 18 month home regimen in the belief that for most troops (not all), such a regimen will aid in reducing combat stress, PTSD, family stress at home (a BIG item politically. A really big item...) and in aiding overall force retention plus readiness for other contingencies. Recall that for the UK and US world wide commitments are possible and must be catered for. Both nations have other things going on and Afghanistan is not the reason for existence of their armed forces. In fact, it is viewed as a major inconvenience rather than a pressing need. That has to do with the 'strategy' and the apparent strategic necessity -- or desirability...

As to a deterioration of military effectiveness at nine months, LINK, LINK. Aside from those links, conversations with people currently involved provide strong anecdotal agreement or corroboration. It's not a question of 'cannot do it' -- it's a question of best balance for the troops (and their families -- most are married nowadays; the divorce rate is worrisome to many politicians), for the nations in toto, potential other commitments, costs (all sorts) and, lastly, effectiveness. Noting for that last, rightly or wrongly, that acceptable as opposed to optimum is sought...

[Steve the Planner]

If I am an Uzbek or Tajik who suffered at the hands of Pashtuns when they were in charge, I would be stoking contacts and resources for a time when Pashtuns may come to power again with Pak backing.

These folks aren't stupid, and they aren't counting on us to save them.

Stand by.

All the US training, tactics and deployment schedules will not put the genie in the box.

[Pete]

All the US training, tactics and deployment schedules will not put the genie in the box.

As Red Rat stated in a previous post, what seems to have lacked is the determination to win at the highest political level. I doubt that Bush or Obama-- or for that matter Blair, Brown, or Cameron--ever told the generals to win within x number of years. If I recall correctly Rumsfeld originally wanted to get out of Afghanistan and Iraq before insurgencies there ever took root. When we decided to stay to see the jobs through the full implications of those decisions probably weren't fully understood at the time or even given much discussion. Hence this multiple personality disorder national policy of conducting COIN ops from now until forever, one tour at a time, but with artificial "deadlines" for bailing out as a concession to the left-of-center part of the electorate.

[JMA]

If I am an Uzbek or Tajik who suffered at the hands of Pashtuns when they were in charge, I would be stoking contacts and resources for a time when Pashtuns may come to power again with Pak backing.

These folks aren't stupid, and they aren't counting on us to save them.

Stand by.

All the US training, tactics and deployment schedules will not put the genie in the box.

If I were an Uzbek or a Tajik I would be looking for a federal system to protect minority rights or they will be facing a crisis like the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey.

Sucking up to the Pashtuns would be incredibly stupid. Can you trust the word of a Pashtun? Ask the Brits.

[Steve the Planner]

JMA:

Exactly. Absent an effective federal system, they are at risk. A federal system is not in the offing, and sucking up to the wayward brothers is hazardous.

So, what do you really do?

Prepare for the storm to come, with a substantial possibility for a fault line between the Pashtun control areas and the rest. I'm not sure that civil war is the right term so much as internal partitioning grounded in security imperatives.

Steve

[Red Rat]

I would have thought that the last election would have been the deal breaker with the Karzai regime. From here on its all downhill like after the ouster of Diem in South Vietnam.

And that is why we study history!

This is why, I submit, you need specialised units and not just the run of the mill soldiers who signed up because the "good" jobs in civvie street were scarce at the time. The problem is that by the time these guys get to know a little about the place they are on their bicycle back to the UK. It is just a tour afterall. There is no mental commitment which drives them to want to learn more about the place and the people. Now if it takes a month to get the troops up to tactical proficiency then surely the answer is to drop the "jolly" to Kenya and extend the tour by the month and do a battle camp in a quiet area/province so by the time they get to Helmand they hit the ground running.

Of course I have issues with rotating battalions in toto as the whole battalion needs to settle down and a good enemy will take advantage of that. Permanent units rotating platoons on a R&R basis while maintaining a permanent presence down to company level provides the best operational continuity. Now I'm sure you will come up with some reasons why this will not work either.

But our 'good guys' and not the 'run of the mill blokes' are doing this to a certain degree already. In terms of operational effectiveness putting units on 2 year tours (as per N. Ireland) or forming units to work permanently in Theatre is a good practical step. There are reasons why it would be difficult to do (but not impossible!).

1. The UK government has only just (2009) signed up to Afghanistan being a rolling 3 year commitment. Prior to that it was a rolling 6 month commitment. Now we can plan 3 years out (but no more) in terms of structures and finances.

2. Intensity of fighting (linked to the point about combat effectiveness). 205 Corps, the in place Afghan formation is becoming increasingly battle fatigued. Any individual posted to a unit in Helmand is likely able to do only so much before the same happens, so a tour length of 2 years linked to a rotation in and out of the line?

3. To have an impact the unit or formation is going to have to be large enough to have an impact - so probably brigade sized to replace the brigade that is out there (I do not see what a unit can do which is not already being down by the units and individuals on extended tours in theatre already). Not all the c10,000 troops in AFG will need to be on permanent tours, probably just the ground holding units and HQ elements, so circa 2500-4000. This is where it gets messy. If AFG was a Big War and not a Small War then we would no doubt flip ourselves inside out to meet the requirement, as we have done before. But AFG is a small war and we have been told to meet the (changing) national objectives at minimal cost so, with that in mind in order to find the men for AFG how much do we change the Army's:

• Training system (individual, unit and formation)
• Promotion system
• Pay system (we pay personnel on extended tours in AFG considerably more)
• Postings system

All these are affected, not so much by the people who go out there (volunteers who get better prospects across the board) but those left behind.

Of course finding a quiet place or province for people to train up in, if it was outside the current British AO might then necessitate a Coalition wide agreement, exposing all the countries to renegotiating their slice of the cake and that might be a political risk that NATO may not want to take with so many waverers at the moment. Coalitions of the now reluctant are always messy.

Lastly most soldiers going to AFG have a huge mental commitment to learn more about the people and the culture, partly professional (it is needed to get the job done) and partly personal (it is a matter of survival). But the Army is not all Tier 1 (SF) or Tier 2 (Para/Commando). There are some who are esceptional, some who are good and most who are average. Whether you encourage or force the exceptionals and very goods to go to AFG for extended tours the end result is that you are going to penalise the remainder in terms of operational effectiveness.

Putting units and formations into AFG for extended periods is a good idea from the point of view of operational effectiveness on the ground. But it might not be a good idea for the army as a whole or (more likely) it would be prohibitively costly. Units permanently or semi-permanently in theatre, rotating sub-units through if done right will work. The issues are in the details.

To sum - in many ways a good idea. Would be messy to implement but not impossible. The deciding factor in whether to do it or not is the perceived cost and whether it is regarded as acceptable or not. Note that this is the UK perspective. The US when faced with some of the same issues adopted various policies ('stop loss', extended tours etc) which had very much the same impact as some of the stuff I speak about above, for Iraq. But that was a political decision to run the armed forces very very hard because it was perceived as worthwhile. UK plc has not made the same call.

Should we do what JMA suggests now? I think the moment has passed. We have units and individuals in Theatre for extended periods and the ANA and ANP are more capable. What is more interesting is why wasn't this model looked at in 2006? I suspect because there was no desire to look forward more then 6 months at the time, certainly at senior civil servant level and politician level there was a willing suspension of belief that they needed to plan long term. how much the senior military hierarchy bucked this or not, and the reasons why they did or did not I do not know.

[JMA]

And that is why we study history!

Sadly a lot of the people making the massive strategic decisions only read history. I am light in the area of reading widely myself. But the key IMO is the ability to extract the lessons that can be learned from the past and not merely reading about it.

But our 'good guys' and not the 'run of the mill blokes' are doing this to a certain degree already. In terms of operational effectiveness putting units on 2 year tours (as per N. Ireland) or forming units to work permanently in Theatre is a good practical step. There are reasons why it would be difficult to do (but not impossible!).

1. The UK government has only just (2009) signed up to Afghanistan being a rolling 3 year commitment. Prior to that it was a rolling 6 month commitment. Now we can plan 3 years out (but no more) in terms of structures and finances.

Yes, it is never too late and now that the parameters are finite it makes things a lot easier.

2. Intensity of fighting (linked to the point about combat effectiveness). 205 Corps, the in place Afghan formation is becoming increasingly battle fatigued. Any individual posted to a unit in Helmand is likely able to do only so much before the same happens, so a tour length of 2 years linked to a rotation in and out of the line?

I had suggested that the org be so structured that a battalion will always have four rifle companies in the field which in turn will always have three full strength platoons. Now as far as ensuring that you always have three platoon in the field on ops you will need a fourth platoon to facilitate R&R rotations.

So the potential out of the front line is in fact 25%... not bad. The trick would be to get them out of theatre for the full time of their R&R - get a belly full of beer, get into a few fights and get their leg over etc etc - and then straight back into the fray. Taking a small retraining bite out of their 25% from time will do no harm.

3. To have an impact the unit or formation is going to have to be large enough to have an impact - so probably brigade sized to replace the brigade that is out there (I do not see what a unit can do which is not already being down by the units and individuals on extended tours in theatre already). Not all the c10,000 troops in AFG will need to be on permanent tours, probably just the ground holding units and HQ elements, so circa 2500-4000. This is where it gets messy. If AFG was a Big War and not a Small War then we would no doubt flip ourselves inside out to meet the requirement, as we have done before. But AFG is a small war and we have been told to meet the (changing) national objectives at minimal cost so, with that in mind in order to find the men for AFG how much do we change the Army's:

• Training system (individual, unit and formation)
• Promotion system
• Pay system (we pay personnel on extended tours in AFG considerably more)
• Postings system

All these are affected, not so much by the people who go out there (volunteers who get better prospects across the board) but those left behind.

The key to the training is the initial predeployment stuff. Thereafter you train at platoon level in the size of the call-signs you fight in (4 man, 8 man, 12 man? Platoon?)

Pay - you pay them their normal salaries plus (what do you call it) their combat allowance? No more.

Promotions must be in line with their normal career paths. If during the next say three years the odd NCO needs to go off and do a tactics or other career necessary course then he goes.

Postings Well you may as well take them for the period until its all over in AFG. I would think you may well have them fighting over the opportunity to serve in a shooting war for three years at full combat pay. Of course you may well have a number of RTUs of people who fold-up or aren't up to it. Another incentive to serve would be to ensure that where the want to they will be given preference to sign on for additional service in the army after the three years.

Of course finding a quiet place or province for people to train up in, if it was outside the current British AO might then necessitate a Coalition wide agreement, exposing all the countries to renegotiating their slice of the cake and that might be a political risk that NATO may not want to take with so many waverers at the moment. Coalitions of the now reluctant are always messy.

Much less applicable if you have them permanently posted to AFG than for the guys swinging through for 6 months every two years. No real negotiation would be necessary as you would get the yanks to break the news to the "1,000 odd Outer Batislavians" in some peaceful backwater that some Brits will be conducting some training in their patch from time to time

Lastly most soldiers going to AFG have a huge mental commitment to learn more about the people and the culture, partly professional (it is needed to get the job done) and partly personal (it is a matter of survival). But the Army is not all Tier 1 (SF) or Tier 2 (Para/Commando). There are some who are esceptional, some who are good and most who are average. Whether you encourage or force the exceptionals and very goods to go to AFG for extended tours the end result is that you are going to penalise the remainder in terms of operational effectiveness.

Well this "commitment" to learn is going to get less and less as the "end" approaches for those doing 6 month tours.

Exceptional soldiers at Brecon or on Salisbury Plain may turn out to perform around the average level when they find themselves way out of their geographical comfort zone and among strange and exotic people (otherwise found only in small numbers in London). I suggest then that soldiers improve the more experienced they become in theatre. Good will become very good, average will become better - that is if the basic soldiering skills are up to standard from the get go.

Putting units and formations into AFG for extended periods is a good idea from the point of view of operational effectiveness on the ground. But it might not be a good idea for the army as a whole or (more likely) it would be prohibitively costly. Units permanently or semi-permanently in theatre, rotating sub-units through if done right will work. The issues are in the details.

I can't see how it could be more costly than it is now.

Having formed permanent/semi-permanent units in AFG would release others like armour for example to start to prepare for the next mechanised war requirement. It will also negate the objection that the whole army will end up being specialised for AFG to the exclusion of all else and of course it will simplify the equipment uses.

To sum - in many ways a good idea. Would be messy to implement but not impossible. The deciding factor in whether to do it or not is the perceived cost and whether it is regarded as acceptable or not. Note that this is the UK perspective. The US when faced with some of the same issues adopted various policies ('stop loss', extended tours etc) which had very much the same impact as some of the stuff I speak about above, for Iraq. But that was a political decision to run the armed forces very very hard because it was perceived as worthwhile. UK plc has not made the same call.

Once the commitment has been made it will all fall into place quite simply. (I promise ) This is not rocket science... all it needs is an executive decision and the compliance of the rank and file.

Should we do what JMA suggests now? I think the moment has passed. We have units and individuals in Theatre for extended periods and the ANA and ANP are more capable. What is more interesting is why wasn't this model looked at in 2006? I suspect because there was no desire to look forward more then 6 months at the time, certainly at senior civil servant level and politician level there was a willing suspension of belief that they needed to plan long term. how much the senior military hierarchy bucked this or not, and the reasons why they did or did not I do not know.

Had this been considered in 2006 then it would have been a cake walk by now.

Now is the time to do it so that it can take care of the last three years and allow other specialised armour, para, marine units to get back to their core business.

Of course subject to how things pan out you can, say, after two years or so start to integrate Afghans into the units with the view to handing over the unit and its duties to Afghans by the end and maybe retaining a training or mentoring function thereafter.

[William F. Owen]

With respect the brush is too broad here.

What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

Britain had a Policy in Oman. The Sultan wanted us there.

Let the soldiers get on with fighting the war (20%) and let the politicians handle the rest (80%) and for heavens sake put a civilian in charge of the whole bang shooting match (not a general).

This "COIN is 80% political" is rubbish. All war is political. Soldiers set forth policy, using violence. Politicians create policy. No politics = no wars.

The loss of the war in Afghanistan will be chalked down to:
* The illegitimate and corrupt nature of the government.
* A lack of unity of purpose between government and outside forces.
* The inability of the government supporting forces to adapt to the tactics used by the Taliban.

Broken policy = broken strategy - which is why the UK only "risk/resources" 10,000 men at a time.

So lets answer these easy questions:
* Is there any chance of defeating an insurgency when the government is illegitimate and corrupt?

Yes, but what is the "Policy?"

* Is it possible to plan a winning counterinsurgency strategy when there is no unity of purpose between the government and the foreign military?

No war can be won under that condition.

* How does one expect to win the shooting war when government forces don't have the locally required tactical skills to defeat the Taliban in the field?

No war can be won under that condition.