Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

All insurgency is politics, intra to a state. Otherwise, it isn't insurgency...Thus, the Taliban is insurgency.

it does raise the questions (1)Which Taliban groups, plural, are so involved and does the existence of disparate groups mean there are multiple insurgencies; (2) The Talibs are intra to Afghanistan and to Pakistan. They are also therefor 'inter'. Does this then become and interintrainsugency (I³)...

All UW is politics as well inter to a state, otherwise it isn't UW...Thus, the AQ operation is UW.

Now we have introduced AQ and UW added to the Talibs and insurgency (ies). What about the Drug Gangs, the smugglers and the many non-Talib, non-AQ Afghans from not only Pushtun but other ethnic groups that do not want a strong Afghan State. Where do they fit?

Like Gen. Odierno noticing recently that when there is less US presence in Iraq there is less resistance to US presence in Iraq. Hmmm.

Why the "Hmmm." That's the sort of thing you've been saying all along -- though you never seem to notice that most here agree with that thesis -- so why express thoughtfulness?

Now, while we are dealing with what is primarily a resistance insurgency in Afghanistan we look to increase the primary motivation to the insurgency: US presence.

Unfortunately, two and two do not make five. I'd first note that as we are not the government in Afghansitan, the insurgents are not insurging against us, they're insurging against the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Though it does not seem logical, you may decrease insurgency in Afghanistan by decreasing US presence. However, you are more likely to increase it by removing US troops, thus allowing your insurgents (supported by the drug crowd, the smugglers and your AQ types plus my other disaffected Afghan types) to increase their pressure, giving them a win, which is how they will see it and broadcast it.

Less resistance to US presence is one thing; there is absolutely no evidence that US presence in Afghanistan is "the primary motivation to the insurgency." That's quite another thing...

[Infanteer]

Wasn't the "foreign troops are an antibody to peaceful settlement" idea something that guided operations in Iraq from about 2004-2006(ish)? End result was gangs and militias taking over the streets?

[Bob's World]

Well, the white man's border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is moot to the Pashtun populace, of which the Taliban is a subset, so (just like the false border of North and South Vietnam to that populace years ago) it does not apply to understanding of the insurgency that is going on. You can't just draw a line through a populace and change an insurgency into a state on state conflict.

Second, there is PLENTY of evidence that the majority of the insurgencies motivation for action is the presence of the foreign invader. This, in the history of these people in this region, is the one thing that they can come together to agree upon: all internal conflict must be set aside to deal with any outside intrusion. Once that is done, they they can get back to their ongoing internal dramas.

This in no means is a recommendation that the US needs to cut and run, but rather that the current labor intensive strategy on the table is not what is needed to get to the best solution in Afghanistan, either for the people there, or for the US. Less is more.

And, if the Taliban should happen to prevail someday in Afghanistan (which I highly doubt, at least in the extreme form they operated before, as the information age is making the type of dark age Islam they promote less tenable every day) we need to not have painted ourselves into such a position that we can only see them as "enemies." We need to learn to work with the government in charge, not just governments in charge that we either helped shape or otherwise approve of. (And this hold to every country, not just Afghanistan).

[jmm99]

is the evidence at hand with respect to this:

from Ken
Less resistance to US presence is one thing; there is absolutely no evidence that US presence in Afghanistan is "the primary motivation to the insurgency." That's quite another thing...

Among Astan's Biggest Problems as perceived by Afghanis (chart posted earlier), "Interference of foreign countries" (I marked that item in the chart with an *) resulted in responses:

2006 - 1%
2007 - less than 1%
2008 - 3%

So, on the narrow issue as stated, the SMG has tossed the COL a fastball - I'd have to call it a strike, unless the COL has some evidence to the contrary.

The Afghanis' perception of higher prices (double-digit problem in 2008) might be due to inflation caused by US and other international spending in Astan, which would include a component of military spending. However, the same problem (if that is the cause, which is quite possible) would be magnified by a much larger civilian and FID effort (as some have proposed).

Added after last BW post: "PLENTY of evidence". Have to say this - fellow attorney: Make your case. Prove it.

Nice to see both of you back on this thread in fine form.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

I put "Taliban" in quotes because those "Islamic scholars" are not a monolith - as GEN McChrystal's report makes clear, there are three major groups.

In late 2007, the Senlis Council (not quite mainstream) was chided for its claim that - More Than Half of Afghanistan "Under Taliban". By 11 Sep 2009, VOA was broadcasting the ICOS (International Council on Security and Development in London) report that the Taliban have a "permanent presence" in 80 percent of Afghanistan.

As so often he does, Bill Roggio provides us with two different pictures:

3 Sep 2009 - Data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry; map from Reuters.

11 Sep 2009 - The ICOS' meaningless map on Taliban presence in Afghanistan.

and provides brief explanations for both maps - which prove that how you define terms has a definite impact on use of statistics.

A large (8MB pdf) version of the ICOS map is here.

Roggio makes this point, which seems valid:

If you want to know about the level of Taliban presence, it makes more sense to break out the country by districts. And you need to look at more than just attacks and sightings. Are the Taliban collecting taxes, running a parallel government, openly recruiting fighters? Are local security forces providing security or are they holed up in district centers? Does the Taliban run the region from dusk until dawn? Do schools remain closed due to Taliban threats? Were the people in the district able to vote in the last election? Etc.

Very much standard stuff (much of it keyed to the presence & extent of "shadow goverenment"), which is well to be reminded of.

The attached snips from the map based on data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry shows a fair amount of "Taliban" activity north of Hwy 1 (approx. location shooped in by me). It supports Roggio's point that a district by district analysis is required, which is not an armchair sport to be attempted at home.

[Ken White]

You can't just draw a line through a populace and change an insurgency into a state on state conflict.

Not that I said it was a state on state conflict, merely pointed out there was some interstate traffic. However, it is de facto and de jure interstate -- may have been dumb for the British to draw that line but draw it they did, like it or not that line exists and the fact the Pushtun do not like it doesn't render it moot. It's there, we're there. That's reality; messy stuff, that...

Second, there is PLENTY of evidence that the majority of the insurgencies motivation for action is the presence of the foreign invader.

Not what I hear from folks there. Though I acknowledge that some folks there say that's their motivator -- amazing how many people all over the world, in high and low places, lie about their REAL motivation. Also see JMM's post.

Once that is done, they they can get back to their ongoing internal dramas.

They're engaging in their internal dramas (plural, not all insurgencies, as previously noted) now, we just happen to be in the line of fire.

And we volunteered for that...

(And this hold to every country, not just Afghanistan).

I'm with you -- all you gotta do is stop all those librul politicians from both parties in DC from trying to save the world and make it look like us.

[Bob's World]

I put "Taliban" in quotes because those "Islamic scholars" are not a monolith - as GEN McChrystal's report makes clear, there are three major groups.

In late 2007, the Senlis Council (not quite mainstream) was chided for its claim that - More Than Half of Afghanistan "Under Taliban". By 11 Sep 2009, VOA was broadcasting the ICOS (International Council on Security and Development in London) report that the Taliban have a "permanent presence" in 80 percent of Afghanistan.

As so often he does, Bill Roggio provides us with two different pictures:

3 Sep 2009 - Data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry; map from Reuters.

11 Sep 2009 - The ICOS' meaningless map on Taliban presence in Afghanistan.

and provides brief explanations for both maps - which prove that how you define terms has a definite impact on use of statistics.

A large (8MB pdf) version of the ICOS map is here.

Roggio makes this point, which seems valid:



Very much standard stuff (much of it keyed to the presence & extent of "shadow goverenment"), which is well to be reminded of.

The attached snips from the map based on data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry shows a fair amount of "Taliban" activity north of Hwy 1 (approx. location shooped in by me). It supports Roggio's point that a district by district analysis is required, which is not an armchair sport to be attempted at home.

As I have stated before, I am a big fan of polling as the best way to gather the most valuable information for shaping FID engagement and advising a HN on their COIN activities. But also, of course, we all know how one has to always be cautious when dealing with any "measure" of such subjective things.

So, given that a very effective insurgency can be driven by a very small portion of a state's total populace, my first observation would be that the percentage may well be fairly small in a poll if asked this question. Similarly if on would have polled the American colonies, particularly outside of Massachusetts, in 1776, one would probably not made an overwhelming case for an independence movement either.

I would be curious though to see what percentage of the insurgent populace believes that their primary objective is the removal of the Americans and their allied military presence? These things are complicated; as an example of that complication, as I looked at the "enemy controlled" map it looked almost identical to "Karzai controlled" maps I had seen from the election... Not shocking in that both Karzai and the Taliban represent the same main regions and ethnic groups; but complicated. I haven't seen much discussion of this apparent incongruity.

[Bob's World]

is the evidence at hand with respect to this:



Among Astan's Biggest Problems as perceived by Afghanis (chart posted earlier), "Interference of foreign countries" (I marked that item in the chart with an *) resulted in responses:

2006 - 1%
2007 - less than 1%
2008 - 3%

So, on the narrow issue as stated, the SMG has tossed the COL a fastball - I'd have to call it a strike, unless the COL has some evidence to the contrary.

The Afghanis' perception of higher prices (double-digit problem in 2008) might be due to inflation caused by US and other international spending in Astan, which would include a component of military spending. However, the same problem (if that is the cause, which is quite possible) would be magnified by a much larger civilian and FID effort (as some have proposed).

Added after last BW post: "PLENTY of evidence". Have to say this - fellow attorney: Make your case. Prove it.

Nice to see both of you back on this thread in fine form.

Regards

Mike

Ok, this is single source, and I don't offer this as conclusive by any means, but it is collaborative of the point I am making. In reading this summary of interviews with several Taliban members, there are subtle, yet important windows into how they think in how they phrase their comments.

Example:

Pg 41: Kahn: "The Americans and their Afghan allies..."

(If this were a revolution, I would expect him to say this in the opposite order)

Pg 41: Akhundzada: " There are famous Taliban poems about how mujahedin come to free villages from occupiers at the point of a bayonet."

(We should remember that Taliban motivation and purpose when we first invaded the country is very different than it is now as they come back to remove the invaders. Certainly they hope to take power and return to their fundamentalist Islamic approach, but while they may achieve the first, the latter will be much less likely in today's environment - particularly if the US remains engaged with whatever government emerges in Afghanistan, and does not isolate itself from a victor that it does not approve of)

Pg 41/42 Haqqani: " Between 2006 and 2009 I have personally raised hundreds of new recruits to join the resistance...The unpopularity of the Karzai regime helps us immensely. In 2005 some Afghans thought Karzai would bring positive change. But now most Afghans believe the Taliban is the future. The Resistance is getting stronger day by day."

Ok, like I said single source. Newsweek has an agenda, as do all of the men they spoke with. Take it with a grain or two of salt, but don't just discount what these men say. Hell, our intel guys quote everything that AQ puts out as if it were carved on stone tablets, and far more of the content of those carefully crafted bits of propaganda are BS than these candid comments from rank and file Taliban.

These guys are not AQ, and are fairly open about their disdain for the Arabs. We should be leveraging this. The Taliban could expel, capture, or kill AQ in a matter of days if they wanted to, certainly they could shut them down in Pashto lands quickly and indefinitely. I simply offer that we may have lost our perspective as to why we are in Afghanistan in the first place, and that by changing our approach to the Taliban we could most likely get much more quickly to an end of AQ in the region, and a relatively stable Afghanistan and Pakistan with legitimate, self-determined governments in place that are at worst neutral toward the US.

This a danger of a threat-centric approach that tends to expand the scope of an operation rather than limit it. Also the danger of "War on AQ" approach that leads to the tendency to try to make AQ connections to bring "threats" into the band of authorities for action.

When we start treating the Taliban more like a political party and less like a militant arm of AQ we will begin moving in the right direction.

[davidbfpo]

I once again recommend reading: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ which makes valuable points that ISAF have not learnt: use of Afghan highways (including blocking Highway 1 for hours), off-FOB night time work by the French (unlike most ISAF), ISAF response to highway accidents and working with the Afghans - cited below:

ISAF is here to bring security to the people of Afghanistan so they can re-build their economy and infrastructure. But ISAF can’t protect the people of Afghanistan – they cannot even protect themselves. The reality is that we have this backwards – it is the people of Afghanistan who are able to provide the protection and security us foreigners need to operate outside the wire. All we need do is demonstrate commitment to the people thus providing a reason for them to believe in us and support our mission. (My emphasis).

That is why my son and I can travel around as freely as we do – the people protect us – they warn us if danger is about – they look after us when we walk around the bazaars. The reason the people protect us is because everyone in Jalalabad knows who we are and what we are doing and they appreciate it. In Gardez the Taliban came to several of our projects and asked what was going on. The local people told them in no uncertain terms that the rehabilitation of their karez’s and canals was the first good thing which has happened to them since the Americans came and that if the Taliban interfered the people would fight them. The Taliban did not interfere and I suspect many of them were working on our projects – 6 bucks a day is good pay for unskilled laborers in Afghanistan.

Our FOB’s are full of men and woman who would love to have the freedom to operate like we do so they too could make a difference. I recieve emails from them daily. But our military system will not let them off the FOB’s, out of the body armor, or out of the large stupid, dangerous MRAP’s. Instead we continue to bring “security” to the local people at the point of a gun. How stupid is that?

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

I once again recommend reading: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ which makes valuable points that ISAF have not learnt: use of Afghan highways (including blocking Highway 1 for hours), off-FOB night time work by the French (unlike most ISAF), ISAF response to highway accidents and working with the Afghans - cited below:



davidbfpo

Yes sir, that is why I keep saying you have to have a plan to mobilize the population.....which is essentially a political movement! Which is why Mao always had a Political Cadre with his Military Cadre. Adapt that idea to modern conditions and things would start turning around because the People would have the will to fight back because they were fighting for something.

[Infanteer]

Second, there is PLENTY of evidence that the majority of the insurgencies motivation for action is the presence of the foreign invader. This, in the history of these people in this region, is the one thing that they can come together to agree upon: all internal conflict must be set aside to deal with any outside intrusion. Once that is done, they they can get back to their ongoing internal dramas.

This in no means is a recommendation that the US needs to cut and run, but rather that the current labor intensive strategy on the table is not what is needed to get to the best solution in Afghanistan, either for the people there, or for the US. Less is more.

Oh, I don't doubt that. I'm sure if bearded men in man-jammies and turbans were cruising around my town looking to rustle up some of my neighbours, I would harbour some resentment, regardless of their motive.

I guess there is two important factors - who pisses off the locals more and what's in it for them. Who do locals resent more, us or some proselytizing assholes or local thugs who kick them around? I'm not to sure, and I'm willing to bet the answer differs, largely, from village to village. I bet that "time" plays a factor for the locals in deciding whom to support - better the asshole you know than the stranger in a long line of strangers who is likely to leave. Self-interest is a pretty big motivator.

That being said, if locals see "increased foreign soldier presence" equals "better protection by the government", then perhaps more soldiers is the answer? However, this begs the question - is a strange ANA soldier likely to afford you any greater perception of local security than a strange ISAF soldier when your conception of nationality doesn't really go beyond your local fields or district?

And, if the Taliban should happen to prevail someday in Afghanistan (which I highly doubt, at least in the extreme form they operated before, as the information age is making the type of dark age Islam they promote less tenable every day) we need to not have painted ourselves into such a position that we can only see them as "enemies."

Thank you for that. So much of what we read these days warns of imminent Taliban takeover without a change to ISAF strategy. First, the Taliban are not taking anything over with 100,000 NATO soldiers in that country. They tried Mao Phase III in Kandahar in 2006. Second, the rise of the Taliban was the result of some very specific regional conditions - Afghan split between feuding warlords, Pakistan given free reign, and Russia and the West basically cutting all strings for various reasons. Now-a-days, Pakistan has a slightly different take on militant Islam, Russia, India and the US all seem to have interests in providing support to Kabul, and life is somewhat going in most of the country.

I'm not willing to give the Taliban status as the "natural governing party" of Afghanistan just quite yet.

Anyways, I'm rambling - cheers,

Infanteer

[davidbfpo]

From JMM earlier: IEC Election Results (with a nice interactive map). Karzai lost in most "Northern Alliance" provinces; he won in Pashtun provinces (the questioned votes). Very regional and ethnic from all appearances; but a province by province study would have to be made.

Thanks for the link. Can anyone here offer an explanation on why so few people across the country voted in the provincial elections? It is very marked.

davidbfpo

A reply came from a SWC rare lurker:

There are many reasons why provincial counts were lower. The first is levels of education. Many of the voters did not know who the provincial candidates were or what they represented. This is, of course, sometimes a problem here in the West, despite all our advanced channels of communications. The lack of even basic infrastructure in parts of the country
means that this is far more of a problem in Afghanistan.

The second problem is that the emphasis was on who becomes the president. There was a lot of interest in the elections at 'street/village' level. There was a degree of cynicism of course but I observed a great deal of enthusiasm for the elections on election day. The turnouts were higher than expected, but all the focus was on presidential candidates.

In some provinces, voters appeared to be either happy or indifferent towards their provincial governors; both also explain lower voting patterns.

On the election generally:

In certain communities (eg some of the kuchi nomads), it is alleged no one voted or that headmen stuffed ballot boxes. So far, until the ECC work is complete, there is no way of substantiating this rumours. I did not see any of this practice. I heard a lot of rubbish being spouted by journalist in Kabul - some of whom hadn't even been on the ground at all (except in the safe Kabul and Panjshir areas).

The writer recommends this website (international election observers): http://democracyinternational.com/afghanistan/

[Steve the Planner]

Right. Fighting for themselves, and what they are trying to accomplish. (Whoever themselves might be).

Two comments really triggered my reaction. First, about economics, and second about blocking the road.

Its really hard to explain the distortive effects of reconstruction, as presently applied.

One deputy governor in Iraq explained to me that, if they really wanted a school, they could have one built in very nice condition for about $150,000. If the US did it with locals, maybe $500,000 (and a piece of crap to boot). If the US did it through USACE, after a 6 month engineering project in North Carolina, and bids through central bidding processes (Oh yeah, Dubai and Quttar where all the payola was rolling), maybe $5,000,000, but in a condition that was, typically, unihabitable, and at the wrong location. As he said with great irony, "And the Americans call us thieves?"

Their was a story in today's Wash Post about how the Anbar shieks made money: A $300,000 profit on a $450,000 school project.

Sounds like the Deputy Governor knew the numbers pretty well.

But when educated community leaders can make $300,000 a pop for a small handful of US projects, they are not focused on community needs. Obviously.

And when the economy is flat on its back due to trade restrictions and war limitations, it gets flooded with imports, all of which are being chased by the war profiteering silly money.

I am always enthralled, after a major earthquake or disaster, with the routine efforts people, even under the greatest challenges, will go to to get their lives back to some semblance of normal. VERSUS, in US conflict countries, they all stand around and wait for the cash. What is wrong with our strategy?

At the same time, I recall plowing through the streets (on the wrong side of the road) of Tikrit in our armoured column, 50 Cal warning shots going at each intersection, cell phones jammed, and everything coming to a stop for our one hour visit. Folks running in panic in some places we went. Our barricades permanently disrupting routine traffic and social flow, blocking natural drainage, etc...

From an Iraqi civilian perspective, those Americans were dangerous, powerful, and not to be messed with. So do what they say, and don't try to question.

Do I need to go to Afghanistan to tell whether that is going on there? No. Regretably, it is the "American Way!"

So we bring the place to a standstill to save it from some obscure geo-political issue that, at best, was way off their radar screen in the course of living their daily lives. But we disrupt those daily lives on so many levels.

I sincerely believe there is a better way to approach all of this, but, that's just my opinion.

Steve

[Ken White]

I once again recommend reading: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ which makes valuable points that ISAF have not learnt: use of Afghan highways (including blocking Highway 1 for hours), off-FOB night time work by the French (unlike most ISAF)...

However, they're politically constrained from using the same techniques in most cases due essentially to fear of casualties that cannot be 'explained.'

it is ludicrous that casualties from big fire fights that accomplish little can be 'explained.'

FWIW, a lot of folks other than the French are operating in the wee hours. it just, correctly, is not publicized -- partly due to the reason I stated above...

[William F. Owen]

1-Yes he did and each unit had a political commander as well as a military commander. Like the Taliban and the connection to their madrassas a religious/political organization with military capabilities. As TX Hammes has pointed out Guerrilla Warfare is evolving, they don't need a conventional Army to achieve their goals.

Well the "Political officers" are basically your CA guys, with a smattering of PSYOPS. In Colonial times they were the "Civil Commissioners."
My point is, the Tailban is absolutely no different from the vast majority of Irregular armed forces throughout 3,000 of military history.
They are nothing new and nor are their methods - 99% weapons are over 40 years old. TX is plain wrong and I keep telling so. There is simply no evidence - just a belief.
To whit, what is "Guerilla Warfare" and how is it evolving?

2-surprised you ask that, as you have said many times war is politics carried on with different means. Or as Mao said political power comes from the barrel of a gun.

My enquiry is to the nature of your statement. Mao was paraphrasing CvC -poorly as it happens - but simply put, if the Taliban could not inflict casualties using violence, they would be politically irrelevant.

[Ken White]

...Certainly they hope to take power and return to their fundamentalist Islamic approach, but while they may achieve the first, the latter will be much less likely in today's environment - particularly if the US remains engaged with whatever government emerges in Afghanistan, and does not isolate itself from a victor that it does not approve of..

No question. That at least partly explains the Taliban. What about the drug dudes and the Smugglers, the Afghans who simply do not want an effective powerful central government -- or simply a Pushtun dominated central government. Need to be careful not to oversimplify the issue, that can lead to flawed decisions...

These guys are not AQ, and are fairly open about their disdain for the Arabs. We should be leveraging this. The Taliban could expel, capture, or kill AQ in a matter of days if they wanted to, certainly they could shut them down in Pashto lands quickly and indefinitely.

True, they could -- but they won't because AQ are Muslim, rich and provide international intelligence information not otherwise available in addition to funds.

On another note, I draw your attention to this op-ed piece by a gentleman who, as I do, offers a counterpoint to your oft repeated -- yet doomed -- plea for American minimalism; LINK .

[slapout9]

Well the "Political officers" are basically your CA guys, with a smattering of PSYOPS. In Colonial times they were the "Civil Commissioners."
My point is, the Tailban is absolutely no different from the vast majority of Irregular armed forces throughout 3,000 of military history.
They are nothing new and nor are their methods - 99% weapons are over 40 years old. TX is plain wrong and I keep telling so. There is simply no evidence - just a belief.
To whit, what is "Guerilla Warfare" and how is it evolving?

1-That is my point to?! the Talban are not any different. The evolution part as it relates to Mao is that it is not going to be necessary to have a formal uniformed military force to achieve your objectives.

2-I don't understand all this IW,UW,FID,COIN stuff it is all the same to me. My definition of Guerrilla Warfare or Irregular warfare comes the SOE Syllabus on Irregular Warfare (declassified and for sale in the UK don't have a link; linked added: http://www.amazon.com/SOE-SYLLABUS-L.../dp/190336518X and not cheap).

Irregular warfare has 3 objectives, to achieve control of the Political, Economic and Military functions of the target Country/area. The methods are propaganda, sabotage,espionage,passive Resistance,secret armies and Political-Military uprisings. That is a condensed version anyway.

Exact wording can be found on pages 35-36 of SOE Syllabus of lectures.

[jmm99]

We often look too hard (IMO) at the "small wars" aspects of Mao and his ChiComs - though, no doubt, those "irregular warfare" aspects were important and laid the ground work for the future. We should also look at how Mao actually won in the major contest (ending with creation of the PRC, 1 Oct 1949), and his counter-unconventional warfare campaigns against Nationalist remnants left on the mainland after the KMT government fled to Formosa.

Lesson Learned No. 1 - Winning a conventional war, using unconventional warfare tactics in the enemy's rear areas.

The Chinese Civil War began in 1927 (somewhat earlier dates have some justification) and extended until 1949 (one could argue that it is still playing out in less violent forms). It was interrupted by the Second Sino-Japanese War, resulting in the two parties (KMT and CPC) forming a Second United Front (the First United Front had disintegrated ca. 1927). We best know Mao from his writings regarding the first phase of the Civil War and the Japanese War.

After the Japanese were defeated, warfare between the KMT and CPC was very much a conventional war (divisions, corps, field armies). It did, however, have an unconventional side from the CPC standpoint, with guerrilla units and cadre infrastructures established in nominally KMT-held areas. In addition, it also included a sophisticated subversion program within the KMT forces, which eventually turned entire units (corps, plural) to the CPC side - four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month (this Google Book, pp. 132-133).

The numbers (from the Wiki link) tell it all:

KMT Strength

4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)

CPC Strength

1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)

A reasonable generalization, which is Infanteer's point:

First, the Taliban are not taking anything over with 100,000 NATO soldiers in that country. They tried Mao Phase III in Kandahar in 2006.

is that "irregular threats" can be disruptive and deadly; but they generally are not existential, unless they can reach the winning conventional phase (which requires them to either develop adequate conventional forces, Mao and Giap; or link-up with external conventional forces - the end game in old FM 31-21). Apparently, the intel folks in Bob's shop would disagree (are they in the mindset that we are akin to the Cuban Batista regime, which did fall without a conventional military phase ?).

-------------------------------
Lesson Learned No. 2 - Waging counter-unconventional warfare campaigns.

When the KMT government and its best forces departed for Formosa, they left behind over a million second rate troops and militia with instructions to wage guerrilla warfare against the ChiComs. Those KMT units were spread all over China. The three principal campaigns were:

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Central and Southern China

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Eastern China

While the campaigns (and the sub-campaigns within them) were somewhat different (METT-T), they had roughly three phases:

1. Employment of regular CPC conventional forces (with militia holding already secured local areas) to defeat more conventional KMT guerrilla forces. Essentially this was "salami slicing" - breaking up the larger KMT forces into much smaller packages. The regular CPC footprint was generally kept to the minimum required to defeat the KMT forces which opposed them.

2. Once phase 1 succeeded, political cadres were deployed to the secured area - standard stuff: armed propaganda (including targeted assasinations), political agitation of the masses, development of local defense forces, etc. The number of political cadres was close to the number of regular forces (e.g., one instance of ~40K regulars with ~30K political cadres). Nice to have political commissars as the political struggle intensifies.

3. Once phase 2 succeeded (which also involved some "salami slicing"), the effort passed to what we would call a law enforcement effort along gendarmerie lines, where kill became subsidiary to capture and convert - the ChiComs being big on "re-education".

This was an indigenous effort. As to it working in Astan, it would have to be an effort by the Astan National Security Forces. You can judge whether that would be feasible under present and reasonably into the future conditions.

PS: When the Taliban captured Kabul in the 90s, their effort was very much conventional warfare - in Astan terms.

A List of Chinese battles.

Regards to all - interesting posts

Mike

PS - to BW: I too noticed the correlation between Karzai's mammoth vote totals and the "Taliban" areas as I was compiling his provincial totals. Don't know what (if anything - see last quote in my signature) to make of that. It is interesting to speculate on what Karzai really wants as his vision of a future Astan.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

I have to disagree with the contention that the Taliban are basically no different from any other insurgent group in past history. I believe that T.X. Hammes is on to something, especially his point about what he labels as the "generational" mismatch between the two sides in a conflict.

The Taliban have clearly evolved from the period during which they ruled most of Afghanistan. Not just on the military side, with the migration of TTPs from other conflicts and the linking up with international jihadists, but also on the political and psychological sides. Two examples that I'll cite: 1) after the Paris donor conference in June 2008, the civilians in the Kandahar PRT were passed a copy of critical Taliban talking points on PowerPoint slides. The points were extremely well written, to the point that they almost seemed to have been drafted by an NGO with deep experience in Afghanistan. In the pre-2001 Taliban regime I don't think that any Taliban official would have even known about this conference, cared about it, or had the education to effectively criticize it. These Taliban talking points drew a "wow" from the PRT political officers but there seemed to be little if any interest in them from ISAF, at least at the RC-South level. 2) In 2008, Canadian officials discovered that at least half of the National Solidarity Program projects in Zhari District in Kandahar Province had apparently been compromised by the Taliban. In some cases the money was reportedly being turned over to the Taliban once it got out to the field and in other cases the funding was being diverted at the bank account level. This from a program that is considered one of the great development success stories in Afghanistan. However, it now seems to be dawning on people, thanks in large part to a September 2009 media report on globalpost.com, that the Taliban have infiltrated the entire aid disbursement process and are receiving substantial funding from foreign assistance for Afghanistan. It reminds me of stories I've heard about the FARC insurgents in Colombia stopping people at roadblocks and using laptops to verify their financial status.

Getting back to T.X. Hammes' point about a generational mismatch, I like to use the following joke: What would happen if Mullah Omar and COMISAF put out edicts to their subordinates to compose a piece of music? In the Taliban case, they would round up some musicians and tell them to write a piece of music. It probably wouldn't be very sophisticated, but it would be done quickly and would be recognizable as music. On the other hand, if the ISAF staff was given this tasking, the first thing they would do is to create several cells of at least 25-50 officers each. One cell would analyze the history of music composition, one cell would analyze the structure of musical notes, another cell the psychological effects of music, etc. After several weeks of exhaustive work the staff would deliver several alternatives to the commander, none of which would be recognizable as music, at least not to Afghans. I think the Taliban is inside the ISAF OODA loop, and not just in the IO area.

[Steve the Planner]

Pol Mil:

Your description triggered a nightmare image of the meeting where the, no doubt, 100 slide powerpoint was haggled down to a final form for presentation.

Race horse designed by committee?

Steve