Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Rex Brynen]

Conventional Wisdom Won't Work in Afghanistan
JOSHUA FOUST | 17 JUL 2009
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW

The cliché that you must "protect the population" in order to win a counterinsurgency has now become entrenched in conventional wisdom. This is especially so of the war in Afghanistan, where civilian casualties have become a deeply polarizing issue. It has become so important that, during a recent trip to Helmand Province, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new commander of U.S. and NATO-led troops in Afghanistan, declared that Coalition forces must make a "cultural shift" in Afghanistan, away from their normal combat orientation and toward protecting civilians.

But protecting the population requires knowing where it lives. Here, the Army's conventional wisdom fails.

In Iraq, the population was heavily urbanized, so spreading out into the cities made sense. The Surge, for example, was almost entirely focused on Baghdad. Now the consensus seems to be that the Army should focus on securing Afghanistan's major cities as well.

Pretending that Afghanistan is an urban culture clashes with reality. According to the Central Statistics Office, around 10 percent of Afghanistan's population is still nomadic. Afghanistan's 10 largest cities hold less than 20 percent of its people, and the rest of Afghanistan lives in small rural communities.

[Ken White]

tried to point out that Afghanistan was not Iraq; that the far more rural Afghans were not Arabs; that the terrain in Afghanistan made it a totally different game; that MRAPS were not a good buy and a few other things. We may have been on to something.

Still, not necessarily a doomed operation. All those items are easily addressed. We'll see how smart and adaptable the the new Command crowd is...

[AmericanPride]

wait, Afghanistan does not have oil - then why are we nation building. We gave 15 billion to Africa for AIDS - we did not get anything out of it. We responded and helped with disaster relief after the Tsunami - there was nothing to gain.

We've had a developing economic interest in Afghanistan since the 1990s under Clinton, not only for its limited resources, but also as a transit country for access to the rest of Central Asia's resources, most importantly natural gas. Afghanistan is the only alternative other than Turkemenistan via the Caspian Sea. We give billions of dollars of AIDS money to Africa because those countries in turn buy our patented drugs that we protect by sanctioning the countries if they decide to produce them generically (and cheaper). We give aid elsewhere because typically that aid is tied to an understanding that they will use the funds to purchase American products.

[Ken White]

you neglected to mention that US non-governmental aid generally is far in excess of governmental aid to most nations -- and it mostly goes with no strings...

Private giving for developing nations is $71B of which $47B are personal remittances to said developing nations; subtracting those (which BTW, are an economic loss to the US but are accepted here with virtually no limitations), there's still $26B in aid compared to the $25B of official USG aid, about a third of which is military aid (and over half of that in the bribes to Egypt and Israel thanks to James Earl Carter). So in non military aid, that's about one and a half times as much no string aid as that with the expectation -- but rarely a demand -- of purchasing US goods.

People can be and are altruistic; governments by and large are not -- they generally act in their interests. Which is what they're supposed to do...

[goesh]

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009...est=latestnews

"U.S. Debating Payoffs to Afghan Poppy Growers
Obama administration is considering whether to pay off Afghan farmers to stop them from growing heroin poppies on contract for the Taliban, senior officials told the Associated Press. "

The article goes on to express concern that farmers will take the cash and still grow their poppies. It would be stupid to grease their palms with cash and ask them not to grow, rather let them plant and before the crops near maturity, pay them high market value then destroy the crop(s). The taliban then has to extort money from the farmers and that makes them like us.

[Entropy]

I think Afghanistan's rural character makes our job much more difficult. We do not have the forces to have a permanent presence in every village and despite our many attempts, Afghan forces are inadequate for the task as well. IMO we were able to do more with less in Iraq because populations were concentrated and so one COP, for example, could impact a large number of people. That isn't the case in Afghanistan - a lower population density, a much larger geographic area mean the same number of COP's will impact fewer people. We have fewer troops overall, so that probably means fewer COP's and less impact from a pop-centric strategy. Then there is the enemy, who is more tactically proficient, better organized and able to mass and carry out complex attacks if given the chance. Added to that are a host of other tactical and operational headaches. Then there is the border and the troubles in Pakistan which are fundamental problems that pop-centric advocates have yet to address in any practical manner in my opinion.

[Entropy]

Oh, and some additional complications:

Pakistan is objecting to expanded American combat operations in neighboring Afghanistan, creating new fissures in the alliance with Washington at a critical juncture when thousands of new American forces are arriving in the region.

Pakistani officials have told the Obama administration that the Marines fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan will force militants across the border into Pakistan, with the potential to further inflame the troubled province of Baluchistan, according to Pakistani intelligence officials.

Pakistan does not have enough troops to deploy to Baluchistan to take on the Taliban without denuding its border with its archenemy, India, the officials said. Dialogue with the Taliban, not more fighting, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.

[Fuchs]

you neglected to mention that US non-governmental aid generally is far in excess of governmental aid to most nations -- and it mostly goes with no strings...

Private giving for developing nations is $71B of which $47B are personal remittances to said developing nations; subtracting those (which BTW, are an economic loss to the US but are accepted here with virtually no limitations), there's still $26B in aid compared to the $25B of official USG aid, about a third of which is military aid (and over half of that in the bribes to Egypt and Israel thanks to James Earl Carter). So in non military aid, that's about one and a half times as much no string aid as that with the expectation -- but rarely a demand -- of purchasing US goods.

People can be and are altruistic; governments by and large are not -- they generally act in their interests. Which is what they're supposed to do...

Altruism is just a method of making yourself feel better - and therefore still self-centered and rational. Altruists just have a different set of preferences.
The only really selfless actions (if there are any) are based on social instincts.
Most humans sanction antisocial behaviour of others even at their own disadvantage, for example.

- - -

Are private transfers of this kind really fully private?
I can reduce my income tax by donating to accredited non-profit organizations. This means that the state bears a part of the burden.

[Ken White]

Are private transfers of this kind really fully private?
I can reduce my income tax by donating to accredited non-profit organizations. This means that the state bears a part of the burden.

They take far more than they need so if the bear a small burden, that's perfectly acceptable.

Nothing today is fully private...

[Old Eagle]

http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-campaign