Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

Ken,

Short answer is I don't think we need to "fix" Afghanistan or Pakistan, just to stop breaking them would be a good first step.

Next I would move our manhunting efforts back into the shadows and tailor it to focus on taking down those individuals critical to the functioning of critical nodes instead of those in senior leadership. This then frees up SOF and the rest of our military to doing what we should have focused on from the outset: Getting a self-determined government of Afghanistan up and functioning on their terms and standards and getting out.

I would then stop using NATO to coerce our European allies to act against their own national interests in order to support ours. I suspect for most the only national interest they serve by going to Afghanistan is the one of sustaining a civil relationship with the U.S. and keeping us on the hook for funding a large portion of European defense by staying in NATO.

I would stop forcing the Pakistani government to exert itself in the Pasto tribal areas. We see it as them executing their duties as a government, the Pashto see it as an incursion on their tribal sovereignty. We press for it because we think it will bring stability and weaken the Taliban, instead it has brought instability and has strengthened the Taliban.

Borders are overstated. The Pashto zone I suggest could be defined in historic terms of where people live not where lines are drawn. Other COAs could achieve a simiar effect, but the main idea is that we need to adopt new views of what sovereignty means that are more adaptive to the emerging world. I suspect more wars have been fought because of borders than from the lack of them in recent times.

I would not just abandon, but ban all metrics of "effectiveness" of governance and instead use simple local polling to determine "goodness" of governance. If the populace is satisfied it is good enough no matter how ineffective; if the populace is dissatisfied it is not good enough no matter how effective. Goodness would become our standard (I.e., the populaces standard becomes ours, not the other way around).

I would make "legitimacy" CCIR item. Any perceptions of US as being the source of legitimacy of a host nation governance would be identified and addressed immediately. All engagement would be designed with a primary focus of ensuring that anything we did to assist in enabling good governance was designed to avoid any perceptions of legitimacy over the same. In that vein I would identify and extricate ourselves from every such perception around the world, beginning in the Middle East. This would requrie significant policy changes in our relationships with Saudi Arabia, Israel (top 2) and several other states.

Obviously this is jsut the tip of the iceberg, there is a lot below the surface that is not visible in this small space.

[Ken White]

In fact, I strongly agree with virtually all of it. However, (he said, clearing throat), Uhhmm, are we being realistic in what we both agree would be beneficial. Seems to me:

Your first two paragraphs are not only beneficial but easily achievable -- we really ought to get started on both those things. Today.

The issues of not pressing Pakistan and local satisfaction with governance -- regardless of international desires or 'standards' are possible. Difficult but possible. The biggest problem with both would be, I think, getting the consensus required. That said, we should certainly try.

However, with respect to not using NATO, recognition of the fact that borders are really becoming passe, the Pashto zone and the "legitimacy" issue, I suspect we can wish but are unlikely to see in our lifetimes. Unfortunately -- because those three and a half are quite important. The good news is that they are not necessary for the other issues to be pursued.

You're of course correct about borders and wars. The British and the French have much to answer for in that respect. I suppose they can be forgiven to an extent as they just did what seemed right at the time but those fault lines they built have been problematic for many years -- and likely will be in the future...

Thanks for the considered response; I'm old and retarded, all I can do is say Attaboy and agree -- you can push for those things as policies and I'm sure you are doing that. I wish you success.

But I still don't think we can truly do a national strategy...

[davidbfpo]

The 'ink spot' paper reads well and fits COIN theory and practice. The first place to try it in Afghanistan are not "the usual suspect" provinces along the Durand Line, but the northern and other provinces where the local and national Afghan government has some impact. Maybe - from faraway - this is shoring up safer areas and not where the fighting is. Better try up north where there is a chance of success IMHO.

Controlling the border with Pakistan is a seperate, related issue and simply unlikely to happen. All the high-tech tools sound grand and can we distinguish between traders in civil goods from arms carriers or refugees with personal weapons? No.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

The article has a lot of systems thinking in it and should be viable if we choose to do it......but as Wilf said..... do we have the Political will to do it for X number of years.

In "General Systems Theory" (cain't spell the guys name) the first popular book on the subject you will find that the first question to ask when analyzing a system is what is inside the system...then what is outside the system...then what is the material (boundary) that separates them. Pretty much all successfully COIN strategies I have seen follow this pattern whether by design or by default. The Perimeter/Boundary/Filter/Access Point and being able to control what or who comes in or out is the key IMHO.