Winning the War in Afghanistan

[slapout9]

Thats why I have been saying the COG is not the people......it's the Government. Always has been always will be, thats why we have Revolutions and Insurgency. Guvmints either cause problems or provide solutions and A'stan is a really Big problem. Whenever Guvmint provides common benefit to ALL the people they prosper......when they don't......they follow the SBW unstoppable law......they dis-intergrate!

[Ken White]

...that's plus or minus 4 million by my mark...168,000 opponents that do or don't exist---somewhere...maybe twice that many...And if we don't even know whether 30% of them are urban, or 50%+, how could we really be planning and implementing any kind of effective civilian post-conflict or reconstruction strategy, except "in the land of make believe?"

Is it incompetence, or just recklessness that we aren't out there trying to screw that number down to a gnats ass?

In fact, I'm pretty sure it is neither incompetence or recklessness but a combination of caution -- not too many demographers want to wander around collecting data when people are popping caps all over the place -- and the xenophobic reaction of ALL hill people to outsiders who flat do not want you to know too much about them or their business. Afghanistan is not Iraq and the Afghans are not Arabs. Compared to Afghanistan, Iraq is a conflict free modern paradise on several accounts and levels...

Still sort of unsettled in the 'Stan. When it settles down a bit more, there will then be time to gather data to do the planning. Can't do much reconstruction in the post conflict mode until the conflict dissipates a bit in any event.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

No offense, but there are plenty of ways to get out reasonable estimates (+/-5%) without knocking on doors like a census worker in the wilds of Kentucky.

Right that there are no demographers there, but plenty of special ops, CA, etc... who have a pretty good idea of what's going in their turf.

I got a lot of that in Iraq for the wild areas, but with a little luck, and once people knew what I was looking for, had a steady stream of SF who would stop by and brief me on towns and settlements not shown on any maps, and exactly how many folks were in each house (after we field checked them with air photos). Plenty of other ways to count bodies, too, ya know.

Problem is that to get aggreagte data---the things needed for decision-making---somebody has to be very systematic about collecting and assembling it into "information."

Guarantee you there ain't nobody doing that, but IMHO must be if they are going to plan and effect success.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

Problem is the concept of "government" which all these US actors are desperately seeking.

In Iraq, you had a post-Ottoman culture and gov/social structure based on a strong central government (very top down) and provincial/local administration through "bureaus" from the national ministries. We decided to create some kind of half-assed Jeffersonian democracy grounded in states rights and all lkinds of other great political theories. A very tough row to hoe, and no certainty that it will actually work. The old bureaucracy always existed, and will continue to exercise power, particularly because, in that Country, and geography, central control was an important functional structure for ag control, water and canal management, etc... It was the backbone of making "the land between two rivers" a bountiful place.

By contrast, Afghanistan never had a strong central government, and probably never will. There are so many large and small functional regions, each with a unique economic, social, ethnic, religious, geographic relationship (including cross-border). Unlike Iraq's Bureaus, Afghan regions were organized through elders and jirgas, and never through bureaucratic systems of any kind (national or provincial).

In Afghanistan, we take the opposite approach to Iraq (central vs, decentral), but, our desire does not make it so, or even practical. Or, as the saying goes" Good luck with that!"

At best, you would have a national government that effectively engaged the functional regions, and served as a conduit for international aid. But that's about it. Regions (whether a village or tribe that guides a small valley, or a Kandahar that drives a big province) are the game.

Steve

[slapout9]

The whole idea is that we can send a few ODAs instead of a few Divisions to places like this where we have concerns that are important, but that for whatever reason are best managed with a light hand on the wheel.

Trust me, we understand moral obligation. We just don't think one should wear it like a badge of honor to cover motivations that are in fact something very different....

Bob,STP, I should have responded to this earlier but now is as good a time as any. I am very familiar with what an ODA can do or used to be able to do. 12 to raise an train 1200. Twice my First Sergeant volunteered me to be assigned to an SF group for training. Here is what I was taught the SF methodology was. Used to be called the 7 steps from Hell.

1-Psychological preparation of the target audience.
2-Initial contact between Guerrillas and US contacts.
3-Infiltration of USSF.
4-Organizing of the Guerrillas.
5-Build up of the Guerrillas.
6-Employ the Guerrillas in Guerrilla Warfare.
7-Demobilize the Guerrillas.


You don't need no stinking army or police force or funny looking uniformsall you need is people,guns and money and leadership.

And did I tell you about taking over the local radio station, back then they were a little bit country and I was a little bit Rock and Roll about an hour later the parking lot was full of Volunteers!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SboRijhWFDU

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

I thought it was "Lawyers, Guns and Money?"

Steve

[Entropy]

Steve,

Do you have a link to the UN report? All the estimates I've seen (including from the UN), put the urban population at around 25%.

I don't really understand this idea I've been hearing that we need to defend population centers in Afghanistan. What do people think we've been doing since 2001? Long ago we put FOBs in or near all the major cities/large towns, built new roads to several (ie. Tarin Kowt) and have, in general, kept these urban areas relatively safe. In 2007 it was pretty clear the Taliban (Quetta Shura) wanted to take back Kandahar - they began with an IO campaign but never got anywhere because their forces were destroyed whenever they tried to mass. Perhaps now they are trying to infiltrate the urban areas (esp. Kandahar).

Regardless, I don't see how a "defend the cities" strategy that I've heard some advocate is going to get us anywhere.

The economic statistics may be true if the poppy trade is not included - the poppy trade dwarfs all other economic sectors. There is simply no way the service sector could be 39% of the economy with poppy included.

[Ken White]

No offense, but there are plenty of ways to get out reasonable estimates (+/-5%)...Plenty of other ways to count bodies, too, ya know...

Yep, been other places and done that, the data got used when it was a good time to use it...

Guarantee you there ain't nobody doing that, but IMHO must be if they are going to plan and effect success.

You did it in Iraq and you presume no one is as smart, dedicated or committed in Afghanistan?

Perhaps but I suspect there probably is a Steve clone there -- maybe a few.

The problem is not the data -- the problem is the security situation and ability to use that data. As I understand it, total responsibility for all projects and planning are migrating to the Embassy and the Aid / PRT crowd other than minimal CERP funds. Units are being told to submit all requested projects so it would seem someone has enough data on which to operate that the Punditocracy isn't aware of -- not that it's at all difficult to have information they aren't privy to...

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

I have the report in pdf. March 30, 2009, Ministry of Urban Development Report to the UN Habitat National Settlements Program in Nairobi.

Too big to post, but email me.

Meeting at CSIS, in DC tomorrow. UNAMA Development Chief. Should have a copy, although it was to UN's Habitat Group. (Stovepiping there too)

We have a Global Planners Network to which Afghanistan particpates. Civilian only, but these urbanization issues are fundamental to everybody in that region. Staffs from Afghanistan in 2004 showed 20% urban, then 30% about 2005, and now estimates may be at or over 50%. See a pattern? Same, but more so, in most Middle East, Asian Countries, but exacerbated by drought and conflict resettlement.

I don't think an urban warfare concept is the way to go either, but it is foolish not to realize that these places are a routine and well-marked haven. Engagement and tracking is critical at this stage; urban war fighting is not. Civic relief, and community assistance stuff is key at the moment (ala Rory Stewart), not expensive USACE projects. It ain't about us building things, but them helping themselves (with reasonable help from us).

A recent article I saw somewhere recently indicated that that whole poppy revenue thing was overblown. Like anywhere we are engaged, it is just to easy to make lots of money grafting our reconstruction projects. The more we waste, the more they have. Why work too hard?

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

In Jan, I heard from lots of top US folks that it was all done, but from folks on the ground in Afghanistan that it is not. One of them was one of the guys in the US that changed his position once he got there. Who you gonna believe?

Steve

Be nice if they did, but I would worry a lot less if I wasn't staring at the Kagan Report from this month that shows the obvious. Pop in Afghanistan is between 26 and 30 million. What?????

[Entropy]

Steve,

Going from 20% to 50% urbanization would mean an increase in the urban population of about 8 million over the course of 4 years. That's pretty extraordinary if it's true. Personally, I'm very skeptical.

[Steve the Planner]

Re: Demographics

Demographers clearly distinguish between estimates of population and forecasts of population. This was a serious problem in US undertstanding of Iraqi practices.

A simplistic estimate, or projection, takes two prior data points and carries the line forward.

A forecast takes the projection and adjusts it to account for important factors such as major population relocations, conflict displacement, increased birth, life expectancy or death rates.

Iraq's official figures routinely consisted of projections for each province based on changes shown between the 1988 and 1998 Census, carried forward to 2008. They did, in fact, include some forecast components for a few major displacement areas.

The US never quite got the drift, but, since the 1950's, Iraq had a well-established system of provincial census reporters, all UN and British trained, and highly capable. Most continued to count everything (sheep, citrus groves, tractors, cars, trucks (by type), and people) throughout occupation. They just didn't report it to us. These ministries know far more than they ever shared with us. Why was that?

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

The report indicates a return of some four million refugees, plus conflict and drought-driven farm abandonment. That many would not necessarily be likely to go the places of US concern, but to the North and West (where the real estate booms are going on), but mostly in "informal settlements in and around urban areas.

Best way to check for much of it is to follow refugee patterns in surrounding and sponsoring nations (Germany for Afghans?). Or that informal Afghan refugee camp near the Calais crossing in France?

Hard to see the forest for the trees sometimes, but what if the pop really was near 30 million at some point, and 30% urban, but four million fled for Germany? Downward changes in aggregate pop also affect percentages without any change in urban pop. But it does change the character and distribution of the people at issue.

Steve

PS- Don't have the time or resources to track it down now. Just following open source data and published background trends. Like the men in black, reading the National Enquirer for the latest alien sightings.

[davidbfpo]

A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

4) The ever useful: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ with two pieces on What To Do and this older piece: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/?p=1943

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Slapout:

I thought it was "Lawyers, Guns and Money?"

Steve

Thats true we had one as part of our auxillary.....he was the county prosecutor

[slapout9]

A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

4) The ever useful: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ with two pieces on What To Do and this older piece: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/?p=1943

davidbfpo

Really good stuff here David. Again older SF teams had Civil Affairs and PsyOps as part of their organization.....one stop shopping......start a country in a box......then something happened

[Ken White]

In Jan, I heard from lots of top US folks that it was all done, but from folks on the ground in Afghanistan that it is not. One of them was one of the guys in the US that changed his position once he got there. Who you gonna believe?

Neither of the above -- the truth is most likely somewhere in between; to wit: A few folks are probably trying to pull it together but it's very difficult to do due to the environment. Plus, people vary in their ideas on the worth of metrics...

On Kagan and data -- or anyone else and 'data' out of Afghanistan (or Iraq -- or Kentucky, for that matter), I'm not a data wonk and am pretty well convinced that most metrics are meaningless in warfare. Thus any data from a ploicy wonk here in CONUS is sorta suspect to me -- all those pundits have agendas; they can't make policy but they like to think they can affect it.

So data IMO is sort of inconsequential in warfare. It is not in planning, building or reconstruction or even providing aid (though that last is subject to environmental caveats), just in warfare.

I tend to take all demographic data with a grain of salt; I do not believe you can finitely track numbers, categories and 'needs' of people with the degree of accuracy many like to believe. People are too devious, unpredictable and varied to allow true accuracy -- you can get a ball park for most things and that's adequate.

You get in a backward area like parts of rural Kentucky where I'm from and those mountain dwellers won't tell you much, will deceive you if they think it's in their interest, will inflate or deflate figures to improve their situation and more. Much more; they'll lie to you and hassle you just to say they did. There are guys -- and gals -- there that'll cut your throat for a hundred bucks. And they're sort of on your side. Afghans aren't on your side, you're a Kaffir and to be lied to with no penalty, ripped off or killed without a blink (no money involved) and they've been playing both ends against the middle for 3,000 years. No way you're going to get accurate data.

So I do understand your requirements and complaint but I doubt you'll get much accuracy in numbers for a good many reasons. YMMV -- that should be okay with both of us. Is with me.

[Ken White]

...older SF teams had Civil Affairs and PsyOps as part of their organization...then something happened

happened. Him / that and 'added missions' for budget justification. CA and PsyOps weren't glamorous enough to attract money in the lean 90s...

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Kandahar has never had much of a coalition force presence and until recently was ignored by ISAF. There is a Canadian PRT camp in the northeastern part of the city, with a mech infantry company as its force protection element, and there is also a SOF compound on the northwest edge of the city, but that is it for coalition forces. The ANP and NDS have had the lead on security and until recently there wasn't even an ANA presence inside the city apart from some headquarters and support units.

Kandahar Air Field (Pogadishu II), the headquarters for RC-South, Task Force Kandahar, and various other units that make up the nearly 20,000 (and rising) bodies behind the wire is actually located twelve miles south of Kandahar City. For those at KAF who travel outside the wire via ground movement Kandahar City has been usually seen as merely a place to transit on the way to somewhere else (typically Helmand or Uruzgan) except by the PRT and SOF personnel who actually live in the city. The city has been a black hole for ISAF as far as understanding what is going on there and there has been little appreciation for Kandahar's significance for the Taliban and for the Pashtun people.

Per the Washington Post and other media articles, people are now paying attention to Kandahar City. The deployment of additional U.S. troops to the RC-Soth AOR played a large part in bringing the city up on the radar screen, and, I suspect, the change of leadership in ISAF headquarters in Kabul also played a part. The issue of security in Kandahar City is now being addressed and I believe that we will see some significant changes.

I read with interest the Kagans' briefing on required reinforcements but I would take the demographic figures with a grain of salt. I don't think that anyone has a good idea of the population of Kandahar City - I've heard estimates ranging from half a million up to one and a half million. I think that figures for districts are not much more than guesses and complicated by the displacement of population that can be temporary, permanent, seasonal, and/or periodic. If I had to guess, I would say that a majority of the population in the south still live in villages. I also got the sense that the culture remains largely rural and is extremely insular - on the latter point, much more so than Helmand Province, for example.

The conventional wisdom is that the Taliban are attempting to take over the districts surrounding Kandahar City with the goal of attacking and occupying the city itself. Leaving the aside the fact that the Taliban are already present in the city - for example, the area of the city north of the Canal is reportedly a Taliban stronghold - I am not convinced that this is the Taliban goal. Rather, I suspect that the Taliban are aiming to demoralize and shatter resistance through the staging of spectacular attacks. This would presumably lead to the melting away of government authority to include the defection of ANSF units to the Taliban side. The June 2008 attack on Sarpoza prison was likely a preview and a real eyeopener for me because the reaction of Kandaharis to this attack demonstrated that support for the Afghan Government was extremely shallow.

[Steve the Planner]

Pol-Mil:

Thanks for the sobering assessment of Kandahar. My concern is that, as we role forward, making sure cities like Kandahar don't get too out of control, is the defense against possible future urban conflict.

Spent the afternoon with the policy wonks on K Street (CSIS). Mark Weber, UNAMA Developer/Donor Coordinator provided a sobering stat: A Demographic Time Bomb: 7 million young Afghans will soon be graduating from schools and need real jobs to keep them occupied, one million per year graduating soon.

In the US, we track the teenager age-cohort bubbles as the trigger/driver for crime.

On the good side, his talk was refreshingly inspiring as to a possible positive future for Afghanistan. Very different than what most folks here and are discussing.

Some bullets:

-Coordinating efforts for higher education options, vo tech that can serve the Country's needs, and revenue/jobs stategies based on exploiting natural resources (iron ore, minerals and natural gas).

-Challenge: Afghan assets are in the North and West, not the area of US interest, and need major infrastructure investments to exploit.

-Challenge: Break down stovepipes within ministries, move toward NSF & NDP based approaches driven by Afghans.

-Challenge: Move US PRTs from quick hits to coordinated and focused projects/programs grounded in Afghan NSF/NDP approaches.

-Opportunity: Infrastructure needs their not subject to major graft, corruption, destruction.

http://csis.org/multimedia/video-afg...ent-priorities

Certainly, there is a long way to go between positive UNAMA early steps, and actual major accomplishments, but, for the first time in a while, I was inspired to be "guardedly" optimistic about Afghanistan's future.

Mark is here to start trying to sell the concepts to the US.

What do you think?

Steve