Winning the War in Afghanistan

[George L. Singleton]

The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.

The British experience in Malayia did not happen in a few years.

We are up against essentially a non-existant society in Afghanistan, weaker even than the original US Articles of Confederation that governed while the US Revolutionary War dragged on due to lack of the strongest support needed but not then possible from the original Congress in Philadelphia.

I still think a return to the monarchy for Afghainsitan, with tribal jiirgas working under same is more likely to work...although a modified weak Parliamentary system able to veto or check and balance a King might work, too?

[davidbfpo]

My original remark

Some people don't want their own "truths" disturbed, locally I'd say the supposed inevitability of Indian-Pakistani conflict is a bigger problem.

Omerali's part response

David, You are buying into the supposed "eternal india pakistan conflict" too easily. Which probably means you get your Pakistan from Pakistani army mess halls. The "eternal conflict" is used by the army to have its way within Pakistan.

I do not buy into the 'eternal conflict', a conflict that has been used by both countries for too long and has changed recently for the better. Pakistan does not need to spend so much on its military, largely for conventional warfare and not COIN etc. Yes, the Pakistani Army then claims more than the budget, but to decide on national security issues. Never been to a Pakistani Army mess hall, I have spoken to two Pakistani officers briefly on the subject, most of my viewpoint comes from reading and listening. One concern I have, shared by many here, is how effective is the Pakistani national response? Secondly, what is the true extent of Islamist power within the Army and ISI?

davidbfpo

[Entropy]

The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.

There are some things that no amount of "political will" can accomplish.

[omarali50]

My original remark

One concern I have, shared by many here, is how effective is the Pakistani national response? Secondly, what is the true extent of Islamist power within the Army and ISI?

davidbfpo

David, I run an email discussion group called Asiapeace. We have 650 or so members, mostly Indian and Pakistani, mostly journalists and academics. A lot of our discussions would be of interest to you (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/asiapeace/). Anyway, to answer your questions:
Pakistan's "national" response is likely to be a bit confused. For a very long time, the army has been dominant in domestic politics. GHQ makes and breaks political parties, manipulated elections, set up a parallel system of monitoring via intelligence agencies that was not accountable to any civilian authority. But they dont have (and did not have) perfect control. There was always resistance from various political groups. But they managed to keep "national security" as their own preserve for a long time. Their version of "national interest" was not questioned (and questioners faced very real consequences) and most politicians (mostly corrupt, and interested in bread and butter issues like pols all over the world) tended to avoid getting tangled up in that area. The army's own vision came out of their academies and NDC (or so they thought) but was actually heavily influenced (almost completely controlled, some would say) by the jihadi faction of the army. This jihadi faction had a clearer view of what they wanted and were able to use people like Pervez Musharraf and all the other so-called "secular" officers because they (the jihadis) used terms like "strategic depth" and "national security parameters" and "Indian threat assessment" and other such bull#### and the low intellectual level of the army high command meant they never figured out what this policy would lead to. As a result, the relatively small jihadi faction was able to pursue an almost insane policy of training and arming half a million jihadis in full view without anyone every asking them what would happen when this vast jihadi army got to work..I am summing up a long story very briefly but will be happy to elaborate in future discussions. Anyway, GHQ has sort of figured out that some readjustment is needed, but its a work in progress, nowhere near done. Civil society is well beyond GHQ in rethinking these policies, but still has less power than the army does. Islamists (who were always in a minority but able to use the army to make up for that) are still around but even they are not clear about what end is up anymore. Some of them are clearly scared of the jihadis they have nurtured for so long. So, long answer and incomplete, but "national response" is still a bit confused, but is moving away from the jihadis and is beginning to question the army's role in this mess. At the same time, this is the army we have, so some people are willing to cut them a lot of slack if they start to fight at least some of the jihadis. Personally, I think that someone has to keep a very close eye on the army otherwise its going to just kill some random poor sods and keep the hardcore intact for future use in Kashmir and Afghanistan and we will be back to square one. Their mouthpieces like "paknationalists.com" are still distinguishing good jihadis and bad ones and promoting an anti-indian hysteria that will allow the army to maintain its position in society. Unless this is some sort of very sophisticated psyops operation by the CIA (I doubt it) this propaganda does not suggest that they have changed their ways too much...
got to run, but more later..