Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...

There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:

As a result of these perceptual differences, he tends to exclude them and classify what I would consider to be much of the "normal" operations, as rogue and controllable, while I view them as predictable destabilizing agents.

Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable. Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.

Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.

I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.

There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...

[Rex Brynen]

This is one reason I have a real hard time with much of the current vogue talk of "failed" and "failing" states; when the criteria to measure success are pure Westphalia; and those that are deemed the most failed are often those with the least in common with western europe and may well have very good governance in place, just not of the westphalian variety.

These things must always be measured with a local ruler. To go around the world with a western ruler and assess whether or not everyone measure up is as arrogant as it is ignorant.

There's a certain paradox here, however. Just at the local population may be resentful of external attempts to impose a certain (Western) model of governance, they may be equally resentful of an apparent double standard whereby the West fails to hold local clients and allies to broader human rights and governance norms.

Let's take Egypt as an example. While the Mubarak regime certainly receives substantial foreign aid, in no way can the current system of governance be considered a foreign imposition. Rather, it has an evolutionary authoritarian lineage stretching back to the 1952 coup against the (pro-Western) monarchy. US development aid and FMA (totaling around $1.5 billion a year) is only around 1% of GDP--helpful, but certainly not critical, to regime survival.

What is the "local ruler" to be used in measuring this case? How do we know? If we press Mubarak hard for reform, are we imposing alien values on an indigenously-developed political system? Or are we supporting the local population?

Many of the local elites will argue that you need to use a Middle Eastern ruler--and that a moderate authoritarian Mubarak government is better than the chaos that would follow any efforts at full-scale democratization. Don't rock the boat, they'll say--let us evolve on our own.

Conversely, much of the public, and most human rights and reforms advocates, complain that the US isn't rocking the boat enough. They complain that universal human rights norms aren't being applied in the Egyptian case, and argue that the West is being hypocritical in failing to press Egypt harder. Polls suggest that--contrary to elite opinion--the vast majority of Egyptians want a democratic politic system of some sort.

This is not to say that Western reform efforts don't involve a great deal of ethnocentrism--they do. Indeed, they often betray a remarkable ignorance of our own political evolution (case in point: most Western countries weren't properly democratic, in terms of enfranchising the female half of the population, until the early or even mid-20th century). On the other hand, how do we avoid the moral relativism of accepting "local" governance solutions that themselves may be repressive or unpopular, or allowing ourselves to manipulated by authoritarian elites who use supposed cultural values to defend their own narrow political and economic interests?

[Bob's World]

Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...

There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable. Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.

Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.

I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.

There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...

All began with poor governance, none due to ineffective governance. I will expand later, but have defined on here a few times. Its a two step process:

1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with

2. The perception that there is no legitimate and certain means to address the same.

Governance itself may be extremely effective and trip this trigger; or extremely ineffective and not trip this trigger.

[marct]

Hi Folks,

I always use "good governance" rather than "good government for a very specific reason. As Marc points out, governance may not in fact come from some government that may well lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the populace. This governance may come from a tribal construct, or even from some industrial/corporate construct.

Point is, that whatever construct it is that the populace recognizes, that is where issues of goodness must be addressed.

Now that I agree with ! Of course, tribal constructs, corporations and other options for governance tend not to be recognized as "valid" within the post-Westphalian model, which is where a lot of the problems come from.

Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...

Maybe I'm seeing his model through my own "Grad Pub" lens, but I do think that some forms of it are achievable. I'm actually hammering away at his lexicality (the words he uses and the concepts and ontologies they imply) rather than at his desired (idealistic ) end state.

There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:

Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable.

Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.

Interesting, Ken. Hmmm, personally, I don't think "government" is necessary at all - it is, after all, quite a recent invention within the last, say 12,000 years. On the flip side, some form of "governance" does appear to be necessary, and the forms of governance do appear to have positive and negative selection criteria surrounding them based on population density, technology, environment, communications and a whole slew of other factors.

Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.

Well, I could argue that all governments are criminal conspiracies that have gained control over the means of inculcating a cultural acceptance of their criminal activity. Naw, I think I'll just point out that "criminality" is a social construct that varies dramatically by culture, society and time period and is, in the final analysis, a pretty useless construct .

I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.

Actually, I agree with you on this - it is a distressing tendency that, IMO, causes more harm than good. BTW, when i said that "criminality" was a pretty useless construct, I meant it as an in being used as an explanatory construct (works rhetorically, but it crappy in other ways). "Criminality", however, is an excellent indicator of the populations perceptions of the legitimacy of a governance construct (i.e. government, clan "law", etc.).

There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...

Well, I sometimes think of governance as the gel in a petrie dish; it doesn't necessarily cause something, but it can hinder or help its growth.

[slapout9]

This is one reason I have a real hard time with much of the current vogue talk of "failed" and "failing" states; when the criteria to measure success are pure Westphalia; and those that are deemed the most failed are often those with the least in common with western europe and may well have very good governance in place, just not of the westphalian variety.

That is why I push Systems Theory. There is no such thing as a "failed state"except in some politicians mind.... The System is not failing it is "changing" often violently, which can be a really big problem for the larger system it connects to. When we begin to understand that we may start making some headway. It's like Bob said all countries (live political systems) are in various sates of Insurgency(change) the degree of that change and the method used to cause the change will often determine if we will intervene or not.

Systems Music by Billy Joel..."We didn't light it but we tried to fight it"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjKLN...eature=related

[UrsaMaior]

This paper argues that the Russians failed in Afghanistan through its own mis-managed attempts at COIN and nation-building, not repressive population control techniques and tactical losses of helicopters.

Afghanistan is the New Afghanistan
Artemy Kalinovsky
Foreign Policy



v/r

Mike

With all due respect does Mr Kalinovsky really believes what he writes? All the soviets wanted was another puppet state. Kinda 'istans they already had.
In my humble experience KGB was above everything. Party members, military officers everything. There may have been ONE occasion where a governor fouled up KGB plans but it was probably his last.

It may be hard to accept for some but the mighty Red Army lost to barefoot partisans. With the equipment and the training the average soviet officer and the enlisted personnel had it was an impossible task, and the nature of the soviet state made it unacceptable for the population. In this order.

There is a german journalist Siegfried Kogelfranz) who made interviews with all the survining eastern tyrants (dictators). In his book called Diktatoren im Ruhestand, Berlin, 1997 he wrote about KGB chef Kryuchkov speaking with hungarian dictator Karoly Grosz in 1988. He said, they are destabilising us using the bandits in Afghanistan and on the top the islam, we are about to loose all our southeastern region.

[Rex Brynen]

2. The perception that there is no legitimate and certain means to address the same.

The issue of legitimacy is a tricky one--how do we know it when we see it? Do populations accept political processes as "legitimate" on normative/cultural grounds, or is legitimacy also shaped by perceptions of the availability of alternatives, or lack thereof?

(On an unrelated side note, when I started teaching political science in Calgary I used to illustrate the concepts of authority and legitimacy by reference to why, on an empty road at 2am, we nonetheless stop at a traffic light. When I first used that example here in Montreal, my class burst into laughter. Few here would consider stopping at a red light if there was no other traffic around. )

[omarali50]

I see too much emphasis on nation building, governance and whatnot and not enough on finding and killing the leadership of the enemy. The Afghan people can get by with very minimal governance (and will probably resent too much governance) but they are caught in the middle between two armies and are not sure which one is going to win. There is no concievable way of delivering "good governance" without changing the calculation of "who is winning". Show them that the US/ANA is winning (not "has won", just "winning") and most of the governance issues will disappear because local bosses will rule themselves as before and will side with the winning side. Actual governance will spread out slowly from the cities and it can take decades and that would still be OK. The real reason no one turns in the taliban is because no one is sure the US is likely to stay and win and nobody wants their head cut off for collaborating with the infidels after the infidels leave. On a related note, a successful regime does not have to deliver too much education and healthcare if it can deliver retribution for major crimes against the regime. Again, its not necessary to solve every attack. But the impression has to be established (over time) that attacks lead to determined and very PERSISTENT efforts to find out who came, where they came from, who harbored them, etc. Again, you dont need to be perfect, but you need to have a reputation for determined and tenacious enforcement, NOT wild and over the top punitive retribution...

[Bob's World]

The issue of legitimacy is a tricky one--how do we know it when we see it? Do populations accept political processes as "legitimate" on normative/cultural grounds, or is legitimacy also shaped by perceptions of the availability of alternatives, or lack thereof?

(On an unrelated side note, when I started teaching political science in Calgary I used to illustrate the concepts of authority and legitimacy by reference to why, on an empty road at 2am, we nonetheless stop at a traffic light. When I first used that example here in Montreal, my class burst into laughter. Few here would consider stopping at a red light if there was no other traffic around. )

Half of America was outraged by the Bush Administration; and similarly we will probably achieve half of America being outraged at the Obama administration; yet there is no risk of insurgency, why??

For me, I try to capture this in my second component of "poor governance." Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work. That no matter how much they disagree with the current office holders that they can vote and their vote will count, and that no matter what, in 8 years the President they despise will be gone. It is this confidence in the process that they have a legitimate (legal) means of redress that prevents them from taking illegal means.

It is a two step process. So one must seek to understand both the issues that give rise to this level of dissatisfaction, as well as the points of distrust or total lack of, process to address them. Good FID should work at then targeting both of these aspects of governmental failure to take away the casuation for insurrection and insurgency. BUT, we must also do so in a way that we do not assume a perceived role of inappropriate legitimacy ourselves over that same government, or we risk adding our names to the target list of the insurgency.

[Bob's World]

I see too much emphasis on nation building, governance and whatnot and not enough on finding and killing the leadership of the enemy. The Afghan people can get by with very minimal governance (and will probably resent too much governance) but they are caught in the middle between two armies and are not sure which one is going to win. There is no concievable way of delivering "good governance" without changing the calculation of "who is winning". Show them that the US/ANA is winning (not "has won", just "winning") and most of the governance issues will disappear because local bosses will rule themselves as before and will side with the winning side. Actual governance will spread out slowly from the cities and it can take decades and that would still be OK. The real reason no one turns in the taliban is because no one is sure the US is likely to stay and win and nobody wants their head cut off for collaborating with the infidels after the infidels leave. On a related note, a successful regime does not have to deliver too much education and healthcare if it can deliver retribution for major crimes against the regime. Again, its not necessary to solve every attack. But the impression has to be established (over time) that attacks lead to determined and very PERSISTENT efforts to find out who came, where they came from, who harbored them, etc. Again, you dont need to be perfect, but you need to have a reputation for determined and tenacious enforcement, NOT wild and over the top punitive retribution...

There is always someone else to step up, and often they may be much more qualified than the guy you just took out of their way. Also, it tends to validate insurgent propaganda and expand their influence in the populace, particularly if you are sloppy in your engagement methods. Not saying there is no place for it, but I always recommend using a solid nodal analysis to ID the right guys to take out. Go to any HQ and you can take out 30 guys by date of rank with no negative effect on efficiency. Now, do an analysis of key nodes as to what makes that HQ function and take out the 30 guys who really make the place work, the IT guy, the comms guy, the one who keeps the power running, etc and you can shut it down. Work smarter. Just going after senior leaders is not smart targeting.

[omarali50]

I suggest that the bar for "the system will work" can be set even lower. In the 19th century Ranjit Singh conquered what is now the NWFP in Pakistan. After the conquest, some Yusufzais erupted in rebellion and looted villages and created mayhem. Ranjit Singh force marched his army back across the Indus, smashed the rebels, appointed an Italian governor and went back...and have very little trouble for the next few years. My point is: in an underdeveloped country with no functioning modern institutions (rural afghanistan), the bar is really really low. People will rebel when they think rebellion pays better or when the rulers are too exploitative and are actively bothering them. They will not rebel when they think the price is too high and the gains too small...that is the calculation you have to move in your favor. Now, I know this is not the 19th century and in urban afghanistan the standards are going to be different, but for most of the country, the bar for good governance is basically "minimal exploitation and botheration and maximum targeted retribution for overt violent rebellion". The US either does not impose costs, or imposes them unjustly (like bombing wedding parties). ..

[Ken White]

Well, I could argue that all governments are criminal conspiracies that have gained control over the means of inculcating a cultural acceptance of their criminal activity. Naw, ...

Don't back off, you were on a roll. Accurate one, I might add...

when i said that "criminality" was a pretty useless construct, I meant it as an in being used as an explanatory construct (works rhetorically, but it crappy in other ways). "Criminality", however, is an excellent indicator of the populations perceptions of the legitimacy of a governance construct (i.e. government, clan "law", etc.).

Agreed but it was easier to type than "the innate selfishness of humans that requires some sort of restraint to preclude excessive brutality in grasping and prevent the retardation of community growth by some individuals at the expense of others and most of whom are opposed to governance or government in any form as it intereferes with their takings unless of course said governances support the takings." Or something along that line...

[slapout9]

Half of America was outraged by the Bush Administration; and similarly we will probably achieve half of America being outraged at the Obama administration; yet there is no risk of insurgency, why??

For me, I try to capture this in my second component of "poor governance." Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work. That no matter how much they disagree with the current office holders that they can vote and their vote will count, and that no matter what, in 8 years the President they despise will be gone. It is this confidence in the process that they have a legitimate (legal) means of redress that prevents them from taking illegal means.

It is a two step process. So one must seek to understand both the issues that give rise to this level of dissatisfaction, as well as the points of distrust or total lack of, process to address them. Good FID should work at then targeting both of these aspects of governmental failure to take away the casuation for insurrection and insurgency. BUT, we must also do so in a way that we do not assume a perceived role of inappropriate legitimacy ourselves over that same government, or we risk adding our names to the target list of the insurgency.

That is not completely accurate. Everyone that hated Bush go could to the mall after they got off work for 8 years. That is no longer true and is likely to get worse. That is when you will see the Insurgency scale start to tip in America. What would make this even worse is if things start getting better in A'stan but worse at home. How good a government is that follows a policy like that will be questioned and not only at the poles.

[Rex Brynen]

Don't back off, you were on a roll. Accurate one, I might add...

Then you'll enjoy Charles Tilly's influential classic, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.

[marct]

Half of America was outraged by the Bush Administration; and similarly we will probably achieve half of America being outraged at the Obama administration; yet there is no risk of insurgency, why??

For me, I try to capture this in my second component of "poor governance." Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work. That no matter how much they disagree with the current office holders that they can vote and their vote will count, and that no matter what, in 8 years the President they despise will be gone. It is this confidence in the process that they have a legitimate (legal) means of redress that prevents them from taking illegal means.

That is not completely accurate. Everyone that hated Bush go could to the mall after they got off work for 8 years. That is no longer true and is likely to get worse. That is when you will see the Insurgency scale start to tip in America. What would make this even worse is if things start getting better in A'stan but worse at home. How good a government is that follows a policy like that will be questioned and not only at the poles.

You know, this captures a few key points that your model needs to address, Bob. First off, Slap is, IMO, understating it when he says it "is not completely accurate". You (the US) has had a low level "insurgency" running for at least 30 years - look at the gangs (and Cartels) operating, to say nothing about the militias. Saying that "Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work" is, IMO, not just inaccurate, it's wrong, otherwise you wouldn't have areas of you major cities that are not safe to enter.

What you do have is enough people sharing that perception that the system "works".

[marct]

Then you'll enjoy Charles Tilly's influential classic, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.

Cool ref, Rex. One of my students has been using Tilly's work a lot.

[Ken White]

Then you'll enjoy Charles Tilly's influential classic, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.

Two keepers:

Lane, a superbly attentive historian of Venice, allowed specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors.

Smedley Butler would agree...

As would FDR and some current political types.

First, popular resistance to war making and state making made a difference. When ordinary people resisted vigorously, authorities made concessions: guarantees of rights, representative institutions, courts of appeal. Those concessions, in their turn, constrained the later paths of war making and state making.

Still true, I believe but the process of buying compliance or acceptance ala A. Krupp certainly and regrettably works. To an extent. I look forward to seeing just how great an extent...

Thanks again.

[slapout9]

You (the US) has had a low level "insurgency" running for at least 30 years - look at the gangs (and Cartels) operating, to say nothing about the militias. Saying that "Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work" is, IMO, not just inaccurate, it's wrong, otherwise you wouldn't have areas of you major cities that are not safe to enter.

What you do have is enough people sharing that perception that the system "works".

Hi marct, it is getting worse, just look at the people that kept their kids home so they could not hear the President of the United States make a speech about staying in school My informal indicators say we are heading in the wrong direction and it is still slow but it is accelerating. Things are popping

[Bob's World]

You guys are a tough crowd.

First, crime and political uprisings are two very different things. Just like state vs state warfare is very different than warfare between a state and its own populace. I do not pretend to offer any insights as to how to make crime go away, that is a different topic for another forum.

Next as to militias, and McVeigh-like malcontents. Look to the first component of my definition of poor governance:

1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with

Ok, I was dashing out the door, and could have been more precise, but while you certainly do not have to have anything close to a majority of the populace in this distinct group that is dissatisfied to have insurgency, it does have to be significant. What does that equate to? It would depend on degree of motivation, terrain, amount of external support, weakness of government, etc, etc, but probably at least 10% of the pop to really get trouble going. Not a few wingnuts in Montana or the mountains of SW Oregon.

As to Slap, it always seems more oppressive when it is your team on the outs, doesn't it? Liberals felt the same way a year ago. Breathe deeply, and no matter what, 8 years from now someone else will be President. I guarantee it.

[marct]

Hi Bob,

You guys are a tough crowd.

Hey, it's a tough job, but someone has to do it !

First, crime and political uprisings are two very different things. Just like state vs state warfare is very different than warfare between a state and its own populace. I do not pretend to offer any insights as to how to make crime go away, that is a different topic for another forum.

Hmm, is it? Take a look at the concept of fuzzy sets, and you'll see why both slap and I are talking about it. The problem is that there really is no strick dividing line between "crime" and "insurgency".

Next as to militias, and McVeigh-like malcontents. Look to the first component of my definition of poor governance:

1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with

Ok, I was dashing out the door, and could have been more precise, but while you certainly do not have to have anything close to a majority of the populace in this distinct group that is dissatisfied to have insurgency, it does have to be significant. What does that equate to? It would depend on degree of motivation, terrain, amount of external support, weakness of government, etc, etc, but probably at least 10% of the pop to really get trouble going. Not a few wingnuts in Montana or the mountains of SW Oregon.

If memory serves me correctly, the totally percentage of the population involved in the Algeria insurgency was under .1% at the start of it. My point, here, is that the line between "crime" and "insurgency" is really tricky and "fuzzy".

As to occasional wingnuts, I'll ask Slap to post the numbers of gang members in the Bloods, Crips and other groups that are acting as "local governance". My gut guess would be that it is well over 100k.

As to Slap, it always seems more oppressive when it is your team on the outs, doesn't it? Liberals felt the same way a year ago. Breathe deeply, and no matter what, 8 years from now someone else will be President. I guarantee it.[/quote]