Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bill Moore]

What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.

We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.

Also worth noting the USSR's initial efforts were successful also for different reasons.

[Ken White]

We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.

However, the good news is my spies tell me that we're going back to a variation the 2001-02 policies with a couple of added hookers after being Americans and trying every conceivable alternative...

[Bill Moore]

The new plan sounds great

Ken, my comment on SOF tactics compared to GPF tactics is two fold. First, we do practice and implement more complicated DA/SR tactics based on the mission, the quality of our people, equipment, organization and so forth. Good news on you your son doing some CIF work over there, but as you know the combined operations are generally less complex for various reasons. I don't want to risk crossing security lines, but I think I can find some unclassified examples of SOF tactics that GPF doesn't use. I don't buy the argument that DA and SR are hyper conventional, that is a turf battle comment, not reality.

Doesn't mean GPF couldn't employ these tactics if they were trained to do so, but they don't train that way. Their tactics require more control/micromanagement. Instead they're busy doing that task, condition, standard stuff, ensuring they tie a proper square know on their pressure dressing, and disassemble their weapons IAW the steps in the manual, any other path will disqualify you even if you disassemble your weapon. We can't afford to train that stupidly in SOF. Although some of the leadership in SF over the years pushed this crap, we had to do 10 random Army Common Tasks every year as part of certification. One of the stupidiest diversions I have ever seen in our ranks.

Moving on, second is our approach to a mission, while it isn't necessary a tactic, it is the whole SF view of the world using area studies, area assessments, intelligence, leveraging locals, working indirectly as well as directly, working in small units unafraid in the middle of the badlands, etc. GPF has been doing this in a spoty manner, some units are actually good at it, while others will focus on defending their FOB to the last man. I think calling it Special Warfare is appropriate and yes GPF can conduct Special Warfare if they choose to do so, but it requires different training and a whole new mindset in their officer ranks.

I agree that the Army can fix itself in relative short order if the leaders push the change. Right now they talk a lot about the strategic corporal, but the reality is that strategic corporal generally wears LTC and COL wings. In some cases that mentality leaks into SOF ranks, but that is the exception, not the rule.

Case in point, I witnessed the same SOF unit deploy to OIF with different leaders each time. The first time they had a micro manager who was risk adverse and a lot of good SF troops had their reputations soiled by this chicken ####. The same unit deployed again under and up and coming super SF Commander and they did fantastic. Leadership is decisive period, if you want to change the culture in the Army you put the right leaders in the right places and empower them (and they in turn empower their men, and those who can't handle it are weeded out).

I remember my earlier days in the Army, the Platoon Sgts were walk on water NCOs in the infantry. They walked their talk and were constantly mentoring their troops in practical combat skills. Not sure when it broke, but it did break.

[Ken White]

First, we do practice and implement more complicated DA/SR tactics based on the mission, the quality of our people, equipment, organization and so forth.

I know -- but I also know that as you later note, it's a training level issue as much as anything. My point was not to dispute what is but to remind anyone reading this that what is now has not always been and, far more importantly, can be changed and will likely be changed in a larger commitment than either Iraq or Afghanistan (and both).

your son doing some CIF

Not what i wrote; he's there but is non SF and non CIF, never has been. The CIF guy also there is another relative who has long had a beanie.

...the combined operations are generally less complex for various reasons.

Various; yes...

I can find some unclassified examples of SOF tactics that GPF doesn't use.

I can think of several real quick and could probably dredge up a dozen more in a minute or so -- I can also come up with some the GPF uses that SF does not and cannot. That's not an issue or a question IMO. My point was just that in the past the line was more blurred and the future may make it so again...

I don't buy the argument that DA and SR are hyper conventional, that is a turf battle comment, not reality.

Doesn't that depend on many factors? Isn't that comment itself a little bit of a turf comment?

I fully grant that some DA stuff and much SR is beyond the capability of the GPF -- some is beyond the capability of the CIF Cos, much less a garden variety ODA. Some SR would stymie the Army of Northern Virginia and John Mosby. Horses for courses and all that...

Their tactics require more control/micromanagement...We can't afford to train that stupidly in SOF.

Again, now true (though I could argue the tactics requiring more micromanagement -- I wouldn't say requiring, just currently enduring...). Should it remain so? Probably not but it likely will until the next big war comes then a good time will be had by all -- with a whole lot of changin' goin' on...

...it requires different training and a whole new mindset in their officer ranks.

Yes to all that, noting that the same thing has been long ago done with GPF units. Still what's now is what is. Agree that the Officer corps (not GPF specific) needs to rethink their value system.

SOF is important and SOF units are needed. SF is important and SF units are needed (and IMO should not be given DA or SR missions among others, that's using a Cadillac de Ville to do a Mustang job and wasting a whole slew of that cultural and language training on a shooter job...). I'm not convinced Rangers are either important or needed but they exist (mostly because the Army realized in 1973 that they were dumbing down the GPF to such an extent that they needed somebody to be a little high speed...). The GPF is important and is needed. Everyone has a niche but the deliberate dumbing down of training for the GPF has had a number of adverse consequences.

Touting the superiority of SF / SOF in some things -- things that it was designed and is funded and equipped to do -- doesn't change the fact that many missions now being done by SF/ SOF were once done by the GPF and almost certainly will have to be again given a larger war. One can put the GPF down but one had better hope one never has to have that GPF come get ones tail out of a sling...

Parochialism and turf battles do more damage to the US Armed Forces than any evil enema...

[ganulv]

SOF is important and SOF units are needed. SF is important and SF units are needed (and IMO should not be given DA or SR missions among others, that's using a Cadillac de Ville to do a Mustang job and wasting a whole slew of that cultural and language training on a shooter job...). I'm not convinced Rangers are either important or needed but they exist (mostly because the Army realized in 1973 that they were dumbing down the GPF to such an extent that they needed somebody to be a little high speed...). The GPF is important and is needed. Everyone has a niche but the deliberate dumbing down of training for the GPF has had a number of adverse consequences.

Touting the superiority of SF / SOF in some things -- things that it was designed and is funded and equipped to do -- doesn't change the fact that many missions now being done by SF/ SOF were once done by the GPF and almost certainly will have to be again given a larger war. One can put the GPF down but one had better hope one never has to have that GPF come get ones tail out of a sling...

Does this have something to do with the lack of a true mountain warfare unit in the U.S. military I was asking about? My understanding is that mountain units are traditionally like airborne units in that they have a role as elite light infantry in addition to their specialized capabilities.

[carl]

Here is a link that David posted in another thread last week.

http://www.understandingwar.org/file...mOffensive.pdf

The report covers a large scale convential offensive mounted by the Pak Army in Kurram. The object of the offensive is to clear a supply line for the Haqqanis and others from Pakistan into Afghanistan. The offensive was complete with air support, some of which may have been provided by F-16s.

So. We have the Pak Army fighting to clear a supply line so the Haqqanis and others can more easily kill Americans. And they are probably using aircraft made in Texas to help do the job.

Our efforts in Afghanistan, no matter how sagely effectuated, are useless unless this situation changes. Period.

[Ken White]

Does this have something to do with the lack of a true mountain warfare unit in the U.S. military I was asking about? My understanding is that mountain units are traditionally like airborne units in that they have a role as elite light infantry in addition to their specialized capabilities.

Your understanding is correct for European Armies. The US Army has always been selectively egalitarian and has eschewed specialized units. We form 'em ad hoc for a given war but after that war, we usually disband them and the system rejects formation of new types to a great extent. That fact, hidebounditis, also led to the creation of USSOCOM.

The problem with fighting in really mountainous terrain is that a premium is place on small unit and independent action -- apparently anathema to today's Army -- so the US Army has seemed to take the position that "We don't like to fight in Mountains so we do not need mountain specialist units." Or something like that...

Roger Beaumont wrote a book tiled Military Elites -- he dislikes them; I've always contended that when he was a non-airborne MP officer, a bunch of young Airborne troopies smarted-off to him and they were only quelled when one of their NCOs told them to knock it off.

The book does illuminate the US Army attitude toward such units. Here's a LINK. I wouldn't buy it, mildly educational but not that good. A large library will likely have it as will possibly arXiv or other academic databases.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken,

The existence of SOCOM owes much to the simple proposition that a 'C-' Army is okay but you have to have a few elements that can do better in an emergency. Interesting things help drive that; Big Army's excessive concern with uniformity and pervasive mediocrity, "...elitism not allowed here..." While the SOF-types desire to be 'different' and elite...

Ken, my comments were not about turf battles between GPF and SOF, but turf battles within the SOF ranks. Lots of penis envy going around, and I guess that just comes with the turf (pun intended) when you're working with triple type A personalities. If you're organization isn't doing the sexy DA, then the DA stuff isn't SOF, it's conventional, and passing out candy to the kids, building schools, and training locals to defend themselves is SOF. All of this discussion is good for a laugh, but it also unfortunately results in dumb decisions and dumb policies over time that try to box everyone into specific boxes, so they can tell the Congressional delegates why their unit is unique (and of course why they're the only true SOF element)

The point you made above, the one I put in bold, is exactly what is holding back the GPF (and SOF to a lesser extent). GPF units have little authority to deviate from the master plan, so everyone goes through the same communist like indoctrination and training programs, those that deviate from TRADOC approved crap will be publically executed. Want to get ahead in this man's Army you better be mediocre.

As to your point about SF doing SR and DA (CIF like work), I think it is appropriate if SF does it as part of a indigenous (or foreign force in another country, like Chinese Nungs in N. Vietnam) organization serving as trainers and advisors. These are the skills needed at the moment and will continue to be needed for at least the next few years. We need grade B and better indigenious forces also for the tougher missions, and SF is uniquely trained and organized to do this. As for SR, my definition of SR goes well beyond the typical view of small teams sitting in hide sites watching a NAI. SF is uniquely suited to conducting some types of SR, they shouldn't be wasted on conducting hide site SR. That type of SR is hard and requires a lot of training to do it well (you need to do it well if you plan on surviving in a hostile environment), so if SF is going to get good at this, it means it will become a training focus, which will distract them from their primary mission sets. We have other units who can do this type of SR, SF should focus on the type of SR that they're uniquely suited to (getting country, gaining access, developing relationships, developing a deep understanding of the issues, etc.).

Dayuhan, I think your assessment is a large part of what happened, though as always there is a little more to it. As for not being a military expert, I suspect that may make you a superior tactician and strategist. Our military experts have had their butt handed to them again and again by non-military experts. Your mind is still free of self limiting doctrinal views.

[ganulv]

Roger Beaumont wrote a book tiled Military Elites […] The book does illuminate the US Army attitude toward such units. Here's a LINK. I wouldn't buy it, mildly educational but not that good. A large library will likely have it as will possibly arXiv or other academic databases.

“Worth reading, not worth buying” is one of the better book reviews I’ve ever read. Thanks for the recommendation.