That "Taabistan" proposal is pretty much the "CT" scenario that Biden was said to have favoured while Obama bought into the "surge" thing?
Agree with Davidbfpo.
While I too am writing from an armchair far removed and have not served in Afghanistan, I have talked and do talk with those who have and are there now. Based on my own small knowledge of the US, its Army and the events in Afghanistan as well the words of those to whom I talk, it strikes me that this from Taabistan:is quite likely far more indicative of the US military 'Can-Do' attitude, a reluctance to admit lack of success and concern over impending budget cuts than it is a valid military assessment -- or, far more importantly, a valid political assessment...It seems to me that the military leaders are very apprehensive of a draw down of the military, even though most civilian experts (Andrew Wilder, Rory Stewart, Michael Semple and myself) have been advocating it for years. They believe they are making progress and the changes by Obama to be detrimental to that "success."
The sensing I get from folks on the ground is that most units are doing a little good but the bulk of contacts that achieve much real success in any measure are by the SOF elements, the rest are there, doing their best under poor circumstances. Those include but aren't limited to the short tour length, poor rotation plans, excessive force protection efforts all affected by the foolishly announced draw down and departure 'time table' and the known poor political effort that bizarrely envisioned making Afghanistan into a unitary modern state in a short time -- an effort doomed before it started.
One gets a sensing the Troops are doing what's asked of them to the best of their ability (significant training shortfalls considered) but that in far too many cases, the wrong things have been and are being asked. That means a lot of Marines and Soldiers are being frittered and misused.
To what purpose?
All that said, IMO the potential for "a reduction in foreign aid to curb corruption and promote patient re-building, and a larger civilian presence (diplomats) that will engage in negotiations and treaties with the Taliban?" is not likely to be a significant improvement. Slight, yes -- but no major change in trajectory.
"Rebuilding Afghanistan" is a great example of the dictum "be careful what you want; you may get it..."
That "Taabistan" proposal is pretty much the "CT" scenario that Biden was said to have favoured while Obama bought into the "surge" thing?
For US interests pure CT probably works, so long as we back off from targeting nationalist insurgents and focus solely on AQ leadership and the foreign fighters they bring in.
GIRoA's interests are adequately served by the stalemate we are in currently, particularly as it assures our continued presence to both protect them and bring in large sums of money. If GIRoA wanted to resolve the insurgency they would embrace reconciliation and work this out. In listening to a former senior Afghan security official a few days ago he was quickly able to list the handful of tribes from which the bulk of the insurgency comes from, and equally quick to accuse the Coalition for not understanding this and addressing the problem.
I thought, gee, that is really your problem, not ours, and why is it that GIRoA has not reached out to achieve a reconciliation with the leadership of those few tribes? Simple answer is that that would require a Northern Alliance-based government to share what, with Coalition protection, it need not share. So long as we stay it is not in their interest to resolve this. As soon as we depart it is.
This is not a "war" that we must either "win" or "lose" and we do ourselves a disservice when we couch it in such terms. This is merely one node of a much larger problem that we are supposed to be dealing with, best that we put it in the proper perspective sooner rather than later...
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
We know how to prevent AQ being allowed into the country by any future Afghan government. As in the promise of a repeat of the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. No need for any special forces in the meantime.Originally Posted by davidbfpo
The message should be clear. No AQ and no opium... or we bomb you out of business... again.
Last edited by JMA; 08-26-2011 at 05:05 PM.
That pretty much sums it up.
I think the interesting thing about the COIN Vs CT argument is that CT is inherently selfish, we are deploying the smallest force to simply conduct kill or capture missions, along with training mainly Afghan Special Forces to carry out the role foreign Special Forces were. Now we have to accept that in terms of COIN such kill or capture missions have been extremely negetive, creating anger amongst communities falsely targeted etc. CT it seems is only sticking your finger in the dyke (and even then not stemming the flow of torrent enough), in other word the reasons behind the growing insurgency which is mainly discontent within the Afghan population toward an inept and corrupt Afghan government is still there. Unless we do something to tackle this, COIN or whatever then all hell will break lose once we've gone. Of course there is always the option we arm the Afghan government to the teeth and create another dictatorship, Karzai isn't far off as it is.
Posted by TDB,
So? Exactly whose dollars and son's lives do you plan to be generous with if it doesn't serve our national interests?COIN Vs CT argument is that CT is inherently selfish
Why are we concerned with the Afghan's internal insurgency? The fact that all hell was going to break lose wasn't missed by the regional experts, but it was ignored by the policy makers who decided to transform Afghanistan into a viable nation-state and not having a plan nor the resources to do so, assuming this is even possible. I'm not sure why "we" have to do something about this, or self interests are Al Qaeda and while there are some links between AQ and the insurgency they are not strong and the marriage of convenience won't last long if the cost of retaining the relationship is unacceptable.in other word the reasons behind the growing insurgency which is mainly discontent within the Afghan population toward an inept and corrupt Afghan government is still there. Unless we do something to tackle this, COIN or whatever then all hell will break lose once we've gone.
There is the "we" again, why can't the Afghan people determine their own future? That is what an insurgency is all about.option we arm the Afghan government to the teeth and create another dictatorship, Karzai isn't far off as it is.
I think Ken has an accurate assessment of where we are.
Bob's World: Unfortunately, Petraeus decided he could kill his way out of this, and part of that has been allowing various ethnic groups to settle old scores by using or SOF troops to target their enemies.
Bill: I wouldn't use "selfish". I'd use "short-sighted". If you're ok with the US acting as a rogue state, randomly killing anyone in the world who displeases us, I guess CT is just fine. Sooner or later, the world will decide to put us down like a rabid dog, and frankly, they would be right to do so.
The underlying problem, is that AQ in Afghanistan and the Taliban were created by America, when it decided to exploit Afghans to bog down and ultimately destroy the Soviet Union using their country/sons and then discarding them when we were finished. If you LIKE the idea of the US being the modern equivalent of Nazi Germany on steroids, fine. Personally, I think that lack of ethics will bite us in the rear, again.
Well the decision was made by the Bush administration when deciding to invade. Entering a country which was already in a mess, removing what little form of government there was and hoping everyone would suddenly realise they were free, put on suits and go and work in an officer. Hyperbole aside. If you make the decision to invade a country, then make the decision to put in place a government which will prevent terrorist from training in it, then you need to put the work in and make sure it works. Now I'm not going to say that the life of an Afghan civilian in 20 years time is worth more than a 19 year old soldier now. It pains me to hear the news that another British soldier has been killed. My point was not from an emotional stand point, it was from pratical stand point. The insurgency is of America's making, yes pointing the finger at the U.S. Going into a country with no idea of social/tribal/ethnic schisms, the way power is handled. This followed up by years of blundering by ISAF created the beast. The international community made the Taliban's job a hell of a lot easier.
As for national interest, staying away from the fuzzy idea that the whole world should just get along and someone has to slap people on the wrist when they fall out. Obama himself has talked about regional security, the situation is rapidly turning into one which resembles a failed state (not that I like using the term), IF (big if) when ISAF/US leave the GoIRA/ANA/ANP cannot cope and the Taliban return to power and decide to carry out their plans for a greater Pashtunistan in the FATA/NWFP I can't see India sitting idly by. This is pure speculation, but we know that both countries have an interest in Afghanistan due to their "cold war". Then there is the assent of China, involved in construction project in Afghanistan, tell that isn't in America's national interest. My point is that what goes on in Afghanistan is very much in the U.S national interest, it may not be in the interest of the voter, but when have the two been mutually exclusive.
Now, I'm not saying that we should carrying on with the "COIN" strategy in Afghanistan, because lets face it, it isn't COIN. In terms of blood and treasure, we could deffinitely see a reduction in the coist in blood if we implemented something more in line with what some of the Small Wars contributors perscribe.
Please do not, for one moment believe that I care nothing for the lives of service men and women. I do very much, having several close friends who have served in Afghanistan, the gut wrenching moment when a death is announced and the gap between that and the official naming is awful.
How so? AQ wasn't around until after the Soviet Union had disappeared; it's predecessor Makhtab al Khadamat never recieved a dime from the U.S.
The Taliban are also a post anti-Soviet Jihad creation; an organization fuelled by Pakistan's flirtation with islamist policies to help fight in the Kashmir. The Taliban were an outcome of traditional Afghan warlord politics.
To say that AQ and the Taliban are second-order effects of U.S. dealing with South-East and South Asian dictators like the House of Saud, Mubarak and Zia-al-Haq would be fairly accurate. To say that the AQ and the Taliban are consequences of a new "Nazi Germany"'s direct intervention in Afghanistan is rubbish.
While this is not the best of statements to make, I have to say, I believe there are a lot of people in uniform that are still looking for a fight. Not sure if it's a "warrior ethos" thing or that many have gotten used to it or that many feel they still need to go out onto the battlefield and prove themselves or re-prove themselves as warfighters and leaders of warfighters.
Based on this thread, not sure if any form of victory is going to be declared or realized for OEF. Still not really sure about Iraq either. If OIF & OEF are going to shut down, where is the next war?
If we don't bring both theaters to a palatable conclusion, we are going to suffer some of the same ills suffered after Vietnam, with a lot of veterans wholly disappointed and left feeling as their deeds were meaningless. If that happens and it's back to garrison 24/7, it's going to get ugly. Discipline problems are going to go sky high, people leaving the service are going to take their combat experience and expertise with them, and the garri-troopers will be left running the show, once again.
Interesting dynamic and I truly hope that whatever we end up with in both these theaters is either victory or the best substitution for it - and that we are not left being lead by garrison leaders, but rather by combat leaders with true visionary skills, not management skills.
The issue with your notion of combat leaders is that it requires constant combat to teach junior officers how to lead in combat so they can be promoted in what the continuous turn over through the ranks. This has been a problem during the current conflict, high rankers with little or (more likely) no combat experience. This will however be an ever present threat in the mordern age.
Regarding your point about a vietnam-type syndrome, I fear we are alread feeling its effect. The UK is not immune to this, we experienced it after the Falklands and Op Banner in Northern Ireland. We are having soldiers return with extreme mental anguish ans PTST with very little established to deal with them. I believe it is the same situation in the States, this is an issue, though I believe that unlike in Vietnam the general concensus is "bring our boys home" so they don't die as opposed to "stop bombing vietnam". We haven't had that My Lai moment and I hope we won't. Public opinion is not against the soldiers but rather the cost in blood and treasure. Bringing the conflicts to a preferable end may act in a cathartic way for those who served, I'd rather it create a situation where further intervention is not required.
TDB posted:
As for national interest, staying away from the fuzzy idea that the whole world should just get along and someone has to slap people on the wrist when they fall out. Obama himself has talked about regional security, the situation is rapidly turning into one which resembles a failed state (not that I like using the term), IF (big if) when ISAF/US leave the GoIRA/ANA/ANP cannot cope and the Taliban return to power and decide to carry out their plans for a greater Pashtunistan in the FATA/NWFP I can't see India sitting idly by. This is pure speculation, but we know that both countries have an interest in Afghanistan due to their "cold war". Then there is the assent of China, involved in construction project in Afghanistan, tell that isn't in America's national interest. My point is that what goes on in Afghanistan is very much in the U.S national interest, it may not be in the interest of the voter, but when have the two been mutually exclusive.
TDB, my points were intentionally provokative and I don't concur with the statements I made 100%, actually far from it, but on the other hand it gets tiring hearing comments from various think tanks that we need to continue the course when the course we're on is not working. More time won't fix a faulty strategy, you have to change the strategy itself. Time in itself will continue to march on indefinitely (in theory), changes in the security situaion won't magically happen just because we give it more time.
Agreed there will be consequences if we pull out of Afghanistan, just as there will be other types of consequences if we stay. We're between the proverbial rock and a hard place, and while some of it couldn't be avoided, some of it is simply due to pie in the sky policies. If we stay, we will support the current government (that we put in place), which many (to include many Afghans) thinks needs to change. The only way it will change (so it seems) is if we step back and stop protecting it and let an internal revolt unfold. Then the question is who is best postured to overthrow the government if we step back (not pull out)? I suspect it is either the Taliban or the military, and if the military takes over and forms a transition government, then that will deal a blow to us psychologically because we will failed to establish a democracy (as though we have one there now). Knee jerk reactions from our government will call for a rapid transition back to civilian government, when a rapid transition is probably the last thing needed. In short we rea major part of the problem in Afghanistan, and only a minor part of the solution.
I am definitely not advocating for the old days where the CIA interfered with foreign governments by sponsoring coups, but instead finding (if possible, and it may not be) a way to step back from protecting the current government. Let the Afghan people determine their future. If the current government can hold, then perhaps it is more legitimate than we give it credit for; if it falls, then we can only hope the new leaders (dictators at least initially) will provide for their people better, and that the West doesn't automatically start prancing around on the world stage about sanctions, form a new government now, etc.
It appears all of our strategic efforts are focusing on transforming a government (while the tactical units continue to trade blows with the insurgents) that apparently doesn't want to transform, and ISAF realizing that has shifted much focus to the local level to include the Village Stability Operations (or whatever it is called now), which has made some impressive gains, but to what end? Are we somehow going to connect a functional lower level village to a dysfunctional state and then go home?
Sacrifice comes with the military profession, and while the military (especially the Soldiers and Marines on the tip of the spear trading blows everyday with the enemy) have little input into the policies, they are not blind to how ineffective they are. We have thousands of examples of tactical success that are not synergic, but simply good independent actions that don't add up to success beyond a small place during a small period of time. Being Soldiers and Marines they still do their job from relatively well to very well (units and individuals vary in quality), but knowing full well if they stay on the current track they won't see much change in the long run.
Personally, I think we need to stay in Afghanistan (what size, our roles, etc. are all up for debate), but significant changes need to be made to the strategy. Unfortunately, we're gearing up for election season in the U.S., so rational discussions will be silenced with the same ole faulty logic employed on previous elections, so any option other than staying the "current" course will be spun as weakness on the war on terror. Actually having the will to change course to more effectively fight terrorists would require greater strength than continuing to march down the same ole established path, but our national psychology won't allow that to happen.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 08-28-2011 at 12:24 AM.
I believe I made a similar comment in another thread but I'll also mention it here: I like the theory of CT and SOF-centric approaches. However, aren't we placing too much on our SOF community and tasking them to the point where they are forced to abandon some of their core competencies, hence losing some of those core competencies?
Why can't we train our more conventional forces to take on some of those mission sets that are on the edge between conventional and unconventional? FID v. SFA seems to be an area we can really maximize the conventional side. I have rarely seen conventional force personnel establish rapport with indigenous forces at the same level as I've seen this accomplished by Army SF. But, let's face it, it's not magic - it can be taught and developed. In order to do so, our conventional forces must stop being the 'ugly american' and need to sit down, shut up, and take in what a lot of our talented SOF pax have to say, and importantly our conventional people need to check their rank and ego at the door. This "mental" side of the equation: putting yourself in the correct mindset, getting to the "act tactically, think strategically" side, rather than just trying to please your rater/senior rater, is where I see the greatest disparity in my limited time being in joint environments with conventional and unconventional units in the same AO. However, I see a great possibility for these talents and skillsets to be passed on by the SOF side to the conventional side.
This is not meant to be a probing question, but is there that much of a difference between some of our conventional units and SOF units in terms of executing some of these COIN and CT missions? For example, if 20 or so people are to go to a village and execute a raid in order to roll up some HVI, why can't those 20 people come from the 101st, as opposed to 2/75, or an ODA, etc?
My point here is that I see the issue of force-tailoring to be a recurring theme in the comments about the way ahead in Afghanistan. I also see that we are taking on great risk to our SOF community by continually stating that things need to be SOF-centric. Seems to me, if the approach needed is solidly supported and well founded, then we ought to be making sure we act accordingly by training the forces necessary and providing some long term protection to our SOF capabilities for the health of that community and the capabilities we'll assuredly need from them in the future.
I think we were on to something with the MiTT concept and it had great promise after some bad beginnings, but it seems we've pretty much abandoned that. It could have developed into an increase in capability and broadened the conventional force and provided some flexibility to the unconventional side - at least that's my opinion.
In the end, I think we have some bright minds out there that have or can identify the road to victory for our strategic purposes. But, as usual, we have some roadblocks and a general unwillingness to execute because it's either out of our comfort zone or just doesn't jive with the way we've been doing business. However, as the saying goes, if you do what you've always done, you're gonna get what you've always got.
Thanks to TDB for your previous response.
Bumperplate,
What makes SOF special beyond the personnel selection? In my view it is their organization (very flexible) and special tactics. As you said once the Army actually starting picking some good guys to man th MITTs the program made an impact. The Marines did fairly well with their CIDG equivalent in Vietnam with platoons. If conventional force leaders are willing to power down and detach units and give them greatr automony many will be very successful, but then the big boss can't micromanage them, and the big boss also assumes more risk that many conventional officers in the senior ranks aren't willing to accept, so while your idea is good in theory, unfortunately weak spined senior leaders will find a way to avoid doing it. They could do it now if they wanted, and I'm pretty sure some of the Marine units are. It would be pretty powerful if we decentralize more and more of our forces so we could deny freedom of movement to the Taliban more and more, but I think there are some poles in the tent that need to be addressed, such as the number of terps and how we sustain the forces logistically. Air dropping water and MREs shouldn't be too much of a problem, hell we may even be able to do with it drones in the near future.
But still, E7s and LTs making tactical decisions without Bn and Bde oversight! Simply unheard of
At the outset, we had situations where taliban had been captured or had otherwise surrendered en masse.
http://www.combatfilms.com/cfrtv_archive_0013.asp
What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.
I believe I have my own answer, but are they more mobile and dispersed than they were in '01-'02, more committed given that they are in a resistance insurgency phase?
I tend to rub my temples when I think of the successes at the beginning, and try to ascertain why this has become so hard.
We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.
Also worth noting the USSR's initial efforts were successful also for different reasons.
This is one of my rare disagreements with Bill Moore.
To go back to Bumperplate:In a word -- Turf.Why can't we train our more conventional forces to take on some of those mission sets that are on the edge between conventional and unconventional?... But, let's face it, it's not magic - it can be taught and developed. In order to do so, our conventional forces must stop being the 'ugly american' ... rather than just trying to please your rater/senior rater, is where I see the greatest disparity in my limited time being in joint environments with conventional and unconventional units in the same AO...This is not meant to be a probing question, but is there that much of a difference between some of our conventional units and SOF units in terms of executing some of these COIN and CT missions? For example, if 20 or so people are to go to a village and execute a raid in order to roll up some HVI, why can't those 20 people come from the 101st, as opposed to 2/75, or an ODA, etc?
Prior to the Viet Nam fiasco, conventional units trained for and could do those missions -- all of them. SF (there were few SEALs, no CAG, no 75th) was relatively small and focused on IW in an offensive mode. Initial US Troop deployments in Viet Nam were by units that had trained for SFA and that could and did do all Bumperplate suggests and did it pretty well.
Then the Personnel system took over, the one year tour was established and rotations began. In 1966 what I've called the Second Team came in and they weren't as competent at the basics for the environment because they had trained exclusively for European deployment; they weren't quite as capable so SF was expanded. In 1967, the Third string arrived and things started downhill. To cut this short, the 'conventional' force became less and less competent and so was cut out of the more exotic stuff. Didn't need to happen and should not have but it did...
Fast forward to 1987 and USSOCOM was established (an interesting tale unto itself...), By that time the big Army had bought into a very flawed Task, Condition and Standard training system which was designed to train marginal recruits rapidly to minimum skill levels -- it did that and, with no war on, that seemed okay. This system did not produce units that could reliably do the more sophisticated and complex missions and, as USSOCOM was looking for missions to justify themselves, they migrated direct action missions into the folder. It was more complex than that and there were other factors but that in essence is why conventional units don't do that stuff today. Most cannot due to marginal training and -- turf...
Bill Moore:Heh. I'll grant selection, add training (and money therefor...) and the organization's flexibility. OTOH, the tactics aren't special based on my experience and that of a currently serving Son, his friends and another couple of relatives including one currently deployed CIF typeWhat makes SOF special beyond the personnel selection? In my view it is their organization (very flexible) and special tactics..
Most -- not all of those TTP -- are things any decent infantry battalion should be able to do (and have done and almost certainly will again if we have another war on the scale of Viet Nam or Korea, much less WW II) and most used to be able to do at least some of those things (good units could more than others but that never changes and is still true today). That was back in the Pleistocene era as shown in the attached picture (XVIII trained for light roles and SFA; II Corps trained for Europe and the ME, both on the basis of 80% primary mission / 20% the other mission).In your time -- not prior to 1970. Different world back then. Risk aversion was killed quickly if it raised its ugly head (today it seems to be encouraged...). PSG /SFCs and LKTs who wouldn't seek responsibility and independence of action got fired in many units. I ran Recon Platoons, Airborne and Armored Cavalry off and on for seven years, less than two years total out of that with a Platoon Leader (counting all five, from one month to 10 at various times. Did that in peace and war (both combat deployments without a PL and had some interesting and independent missions far away from the flag pole). I assure you there were many other SSG and Platoon Sergeants who were acting platoon leaders and who were as well or even more trusted. Viet Nam killed that and the smart guys that rebuilt the Army foolishly left trust building (among other things...) out of their repertoire...But still, E7s and LTs making tactical decisions without Bn and Bde oversight! Simply unheard of.
Shorter that - you're right for now; didn't use to be that way; can be fixed; will have to be with a big commitment.
Back to Bumperplate -- Turf -- and training. Units aren't trusted to do things like that because our training doesn't embed the basics of the trade at all well. Lack of training breeds lack of capability, one cannot or at least should not ask people to do things they have not been trained for.
Today's individuals are, across the board, better trained than were those in the days of that picture -- but the units can't do half what those units could do then. If I were a conspiracy theorist, I'd think it was by design to limit the missions on which the Army might be employed but I suspect it's a Hanlon's razor thing. I hope that's all it is...
Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.
I'm not sure it's that simple
However, the good news is my spies tell me that we're going back to a variation the 2001-02 policies with a couple of added hookers after being Americans and trying every conceivable alternative...
The new plan sounds great
Ken, my comment on SOF tactics compared to GPF tactics is two fold. First, we do practice and implement more complicated DA/SR tactics based on the mission, the quality of our people, equipment, organization and so forth. Good news on you your son doing some CIF work over there, but as you know the combined operations are generally less complex for various reasons. I don't want to risk crossing security lines, but I think I can find some unclassified examples of SOF tactics that GPF doesn't use. I don't buy the argument that DA and SR are hyper conventional, that is a turf battle comment, not reality.
Doesn't mean GPF couldn't employ these tactics if they were trained to do so, but they don't train that way. Their tactics require more control/micromanagement. Instead they're busy doing that task, condition, standard stuff, ensuring they tie a proper square know on their pressure dressing, and disassemble their weapons IAW the steps in the manual, any other path will disqualify you even if you disassemble your weapon. We can't afford to train that stupidly in SOF. Although some of the leadership in SF over the years pushed this crap, we had to do 10 random Army Common Tasks every year as part of certification. One of the stupidiest diversions I have ever seen in our ranks.
Moving on, second is our approach to a mission, while it isn't necessary a tactic, it is the whole SF view of the world using area studies, area assessments, intelligence, leveraging locals, working indirectly as well as directly, working in small units unafraid in the middle of the badlands, etc. GPF has been doing this in a spoty manner, some units are actually good at it, while others will focus on defending their FOB to the last man. I think calling it Special Warfare is appropriate and yes GPF can conduct Special Warfare if they choose to do so, but it requires different training and a whole new mindset in their officer ranks.
I agree that the Army can fix itself in relative short order if the leaders push the change. Right now they talk a lot about the strategic corporal, but the reality is that strategic corporal generally wears LTC and COL wings. In some cases that mentality leaks into SOF ranks, but that is the exception, not the rule.
Case in point, I witnessed the same SOF unit deploy to OIF with different leaders each time. The first time they had a micro manager who was risk adverse and a lot of good SF troops had their reputations soiled by this chicken ####. The same unit deployed again under and up and coming super SF Commander and they did fantastic. Leadership is decisive period, if you want to change the culture in the Army you put the right leaders in the right places and empower them (and they in turn empower their men, and those who can't handle it are weeded out).
I remember my earlier days in the Army, the Platoon Sgts were walk on water NCOs in the infantry. They walked their talk and were constantly mentoring their troops in practical combat skills. Not sure when it broke, but it did break.
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