Winning the War in Afghanistan

[slapout9]

Slapout:

For agricultural reconstruction purposes, it is important to remember that farmers have a critical movement before and after crops. They don't need a permanent safe road, but a safe route movement at crop cycle times.

Pre-US, Northern Iraq was arguably no safer than today, so there were set times and rendevouz points where farmers would meet up with a police/military escort to move crops to market. The road was not safe, nor did it need to be, on a permanent basis---just needed safe movements to market at critical times.

So, the drone has two weakness: It can see more than a human analyst can follow 24/7, and, while it sees, it doesn't always know what its looking at---a wedding party, a gathering of farmers with crops to move to market, or a rally point of bad guys.

Better to understand critical movements, then lay on the route clearance, surveillance, protection when it is needed. Triage is not general on a permanent basis, but linear security for critical movements, when they are needed.

Linear forts like the PEZ aren't bad, but in Iraq, they failed to truly optimize the concept. Not just pipelines and power lines, but a secure land bridge: a road down the center with trailer/connex/oil storage terminals at critical locations.

Steve

How about this?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ecr7u-Z1Q3Y&NR=1

Clear the skies...Hold the skies....Build an Air Bridge to the Objective.

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

Where is Rube when we need him?

Steve

[slapout9]

Slapout:

Where is Rube when we need him?

Steve

Until you win the war think movable Infrastructure.....then you can build the more permanent large scale projects.

[davidbfpo]

Via an IT security blogsite ( http://www.schneier.com/blog/ ) an article on terrorist havens in US strategy: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...src=newsletter The author Paul Pillar is ex-CIA.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Via an IT security blogsite ( http://www.schneier.com/blog/ ) an article on terrorist havens in US strategy: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...src=newsletter The author Paul Pillar is ex-CIA.

davidbfpo

Yep, good article. Like I said one of the capabilities of AQ is that it is Terrain Independent. At the Strategy level we have never dealt with that and figured out how to counter it. We can't go around and invade every country in the world just because they have a group that is operating there. Only one thing left to do.....hire some more PhD's and pay them a few million dolllars to study it for a few years

[davidbfpo]

Accoring to this odd article: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...es-aid//print/ these warlords are offering their help against the Taliban. Rhetoric aside - is this a "quick fix" to the lack of Afghan troops i.e. ANA?

I can hear the critics already on relying once more on the warlords, let alone the Northern Alliance and it's human rights record. Plus the presentation aspect of non-Pashtuns campaigning in the south and east.

Could a re-mobilised "temporary ANA" deployed in the north, even around Kabul, enable ANA units re-deployment and enable R&R for those in the south? Not a "quick fix", but IMHO a good fix.

On reflection and assuming Karzai retains the presidency, which Dostum supported, could Karzai use that re-mobilisation himself and show NATO / ISAF that he can provide more ANA troops.(Note I am aware that the ANA is a mixture, but has a large core fom the North and few Pashtuns).

davidbfpo

[Old Eagle]

When we originally tried to develop a comprehensive and cohesive Ministry of Defense, one of the aims was to work the warlords out of job. Amb (then MG) Eikenberry was one of the major forces in this attempt. Recall that the 1990's success of the Taliban was due in large part to a de facto civil war among feuding warlords. Dostum himself was a large contributor to the destruction of Kabul and the surrounding areas. Returning to that model IMHO does not offer much chance of long term success. Thousands killed, millions of refugees. (Although there remains the populist argument that those killed and displaced are only little brown people.) There was and probably still is enough popular Afghan support to make some sort of civil government system work.

"I have not failed. I have discovered 10,000 ways that don't work."
Thomas Edison