Winning the War in Afghanistan

[goesh]

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009...est=latestnews

"U.S. Debating Payoffs to Afghan Poppy Growers
Obama administration is considering whether to pay off Afghan farmers to stop them from growing heroin poppies on contract for the Taliban, senior officials told the Associated Press. "

The article goes on to express concern that farmers will take the cash and still grow their poppies. It would be stupid to grease their palms with cash and ask them not to grow, rather let them plant and before the crops near maturity, pay them high market value then destroy the crop(s). The taliban then has to extort money from the farmers and that makes them like us.

[Entropy]

I think Afghanistan's rural character makes our job much more difficult. We do not have the forces to have a permanent presence in every village and despite our many attempts, Afghan forces are inadequate for the task as well. IMO we were able to do more with less in Iraq because populations were concentrated and so one COP, for example, could impact a large number of people. That isn't the case in Afghanistan - a lower population density, a much larger geographic area mean the same number of COP's will impact fewer people. We have fewer troops overall, so that probably means fewer COP's and less impact from a pop-centric strategy. Then there is the enemy, who is more tactically proficient, better organized and able to mass and carry out complex attacks if given the chance. Added to that are a host of other tactical and operational headaches. Then there is the border and the troubles in Pakistan which are fundamental problems that pop-centric advocates have yet to address in any practical manner in my opinion.

[Entropy]

Oh, and some additional complications:

Pakistan is objecting to expanded American combat operations in neighboring Afghanistan, creating new fissures in the alliance with Washington at a critical juncture when thousands of new American forces are arriving in the region.

Pakistani officials have told the Obama administration that the Marines fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan will force militants across the border into Pakistan, with the potential to further inflame the troubled province of Baluchistan, according to Pakistani intelligence officials.

Pakistan does not have enough troops to deploy to Baluchistan to take on the Taliban without denuding its border with its archenemy, India, the officials said. Dialogue with the Taliban, not more fighting, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.

[IntelTrooper]

Oh, and some additional complications:

It seems the Pakistani representative misspoke. What he/she meant to say was:

A weak Afghanistan run by ISID-controlled Taliban, totally dependent on Pakistan for all its goods, services, and skilled labor, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.

[Fuchs]

you neglected to mention that US non-governmental aid generally is far in excess of governmental aid to most nations -- and it mostly goes with no strings...

Private giving for developing nations is $71B of which $47B are personal remittances to said developing nations; subtracting those (which BTW, are an economic loss to the US but are accepted here with virtually no limitations), there's still $26B in aid compared to the $25B of official USG aid, about a third of which is military aid (and over half of that in the bribes to Egypt and Israel thanks to James Earl Carter). So in non military aid, that's about one and a half times as much no string aid as that with the expectation -- but rarely a demand -- of purchasing US goods.

People can be and are altruistic; governments by and large are not -- they generally act in their interests. Which is what they're supposed to do...

Altruism is just a method of making yourself feel better - and therefore still self-centered and rational. Altruists just have a different set of preferences.
The only really selfless actions (if there are any) are based on social instincts.
Most humans sanction antisocial behaviour of others even at their own disadvantage, for example.

- - -

Are private transfers of this kind really fully private?
I can reduce my income tax by donating to accredited non-profit organizations. This means that the state bears a part of the burden.

[Ken White]

Are private transfers of this kind really fully private?
I can reduce my income tax by donating to accredited non-profit organizations. This means that the state bears a part of the burden.

They take far more than they need so if the bear a small burden, that's perfectly acceptable.

Nothing today is fully private...

[Old Eagle]

http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-campaign

[davidbfpo]

I'd heard the name before, perhaps from her days reporting in Afghanistan for NPR and she appeared in May 2009 on the Charlie Rose show: http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10289

An excellent summary of where we were and the route ahead - governance being the theme. Plus some cautionary remarks on whether Obama's strategy is right. Her comments on Pakistan are less firmly based.

I noted elsewhere she has been retained as an adviser to General McCrystal.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Cordesman seems to have much the same concerns as many others, including me.

"If you don't provide those resources and additional brigade combat teams, if you do not, I think, effectively move the Afghan security forces toward doubling them. I think unless we're prepared to commit those resources. If we somehow believe that a civilian surge of 700 people and tailoring our force posture to the views of a completely different set of strategic priorities, this is going to win, the answer is no, it's going to lose."

[davidbfpo]

Almost a title to avoid here Security Sector Reform; anyway the link goes to a Canadian think tank on Afghanistan and SSR: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/defa...istan%20v1.pdf

Nothing startling, covers security forces, legal system etc and the main author appears to be an Afghan.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

All slightly depressing

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8177935.stm

[jmm99]

is directly linked here and here. It had an impact on the modified ROE/RUFs. The incidence of civilian (non-combatant) casualties seems to cluster - that is, a few incidents with large casualties tend to skew the picture.

I haven't seen any metrics (tables or charts) breaking down the civilian casualties by number per incident - e.g., 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 25+, etc. Based on the anecdotal incidents sidebarred in the UNAMA report, if one brings in heavy stuff, civilian casualties mount rapidly.

[davidbfpo]

Discovered via a Pakistani-American blogsite: http://watandost.blogspot.com/

A typically detailed paper by Anthony Cordesman on 'The New Metrics of Afghanistan: The Data Needed to Support Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build', which appeared 7th August 2009 (or last month, very confusing): http://csis.org/publication/new-metrics-afghanistan

CSIS has been tracking the data that are made available by NATO/ISAF, the US, other allied countries, the UN, available for several years. A survey of the key maps, graphics, and other data that are now provided is available on the CSIS web site at :

http://csis.org/publication/dynamics...-status-reportWhich alas does not take you to anything but prose.

A review of these data reveals critical problems that call the integrity of most public Western reporting on the Afghan conflict into question. It also shows that clear needs exist for more objective reporting and measures of effectiveness

I recollect Metrics had it's own thread sometime ago: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3895

davidbfpo

[Bernard Finel]

I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.

Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.

But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.

--BF

[Valin]

National Post
8/20/09

We wish Afghanistan's society were more like our own. We wish that there weren't so much corruption, that the domestic military and police were more competent and professional, that death sentences were no longer issued for Muslims who convert to other faiths and that laws permitting wife-beating weren't passed.

Then again, if Afghanistan already were a stable, humane and modern democracy, there would have been no need for our troops to deploy there in the first place.
(snip)

[davidbfpo]

Steve Coll's taut piece on the arguing over Afghanistan: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...tml#entry-more

Note the links to General McChrystal's guidance -v- Rory Stewart's critique.

davidbfpo

[Dayuhan]

The president of the Council on Foreign Relations, writing in the NYT, declares Afghanistan operations to be "a war of choice"...

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/opinion/21haass.html

If Afghanistan were a war of necessity, it would justify any level of effort. It is not and does not. It is not certain that doing more will achieve more. And no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan lessens our ability to act elsewhere, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq. There needs to be a limit to what the United States does in Afghanistan and how long it is prepared to do it, lest we find ourselves unable to contend with other wars, of choice or of necessity, if and when they arise.

Not really a revolutionary opinion, but perhaps an indication of where the foreign policy establishment may be looking.

[Rex Brynen]

... that if you were going to organize elections with so much potential for stabilizing or destabilizing a country, you would work out this little issue in advance:

Reporter's diary: Afghan elections, al-Jazeera English, 21 August 2009.

News focus instead steered toward the issue of potential fraud. It seemed the supposedly indelible ink that voters dipped their fingers into to prevent voting a second time, had washed off in certain cases.

One of those who cried foul was Ramazan Bashardost, number three in the presidential race.

President Karzai has responded by saying he tried to wash the ink off his finger several times and that it was still there.

Three of our Afghan staff went to vote, at three different polling stations - all of them washed the ink off.

Inkygate could be here for some time. It would be funny if it weren't so potentially serious.

[Ken White]

If the foreign policy establishment is looking in one direction, it behooves someone to look in several others. Their track record isn't too good...

Actually, the war in Afghanistan is of course a war of choice. That, however, does not preclude it also being a war of necessity. It need not have been but it became and it is now necessary. Contrary to what Haas says, it was not necessary in the first place -- Foreign Policy errors led to the attack that led to Afghanistan -- but it is now necessary. So he has it exactly backwards.

Haas says that the Korean War and the Persian Gulf war were wars of necessity. Went to the first, stepped back and allowed a son to go to the second -- neither was a war of necessity in any sense until we committed to them. Then they also became necessary. Same Son has also been to the current two and seems to think they were wars of choice that became necessary. As he said to me once "We either finish it now or we'll be back in ten years." I made much the same comment about the 1991 war -- pillars of the foreign policy establishment didn't agree...

Haas misses the point that the secret is to not commit to such wars unless they are truly necessary lest such commitment become a matter of displaying national integrity and responsibility in finishing what one started. Prating about the national interest should consider that it is in our interest to avoid unnecessary conflicts but if engaged we must do our very best.

I am reminded of one pillow (sic) of our Foreign Policy Establishment and her asinine quote leading to the foolishness that was Kosovo. “What is the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if you can't use it?”

Haas also says this:

"...no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan lessens our ability to act elsewhere, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq. There needs to be a limit to what the United States does in Afghanistan and how long it is prepared to do it, lest we find ourselves unable to contend with other wars, of choice or of necessity, if and when they arise."

While certainly a case of stating the obvious -- to an extent that is both inane and patronizing, a difficult feat -- it also shows the banal and short sighted outlook of that foreign policy establishment.

[Bob's World]

I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.

Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.

But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.

--BF

...any metric you can measure change in within a 4-year period IS NOT STRATEGIC.

Perhaps this is why we muck around in strategy-less tactics; they may not be taking you anyplace you want to be, but at least you can measure how fast you are getting there!