Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bill Moore]

Posted by BW: Never ask the guy in the fight what the most important objective is, because it will invariably be the guy he is fighting. Strategy must be derived by those removed from the current fight, otherwise it will likely be skewed more by "urgency" rather than "importance."

Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintan the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.

posted by omarali50: I think that the US is not winning in Afghanistan, not because the war is so "complex". Its because at one level its really simple. As Bin Laden said: people will bet on the stronger horse. In this case, far too many people are betting that the taliban will win. Unless there is a decisive change in that assessment, its a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may be that in war nobody will tell you their whole plan, but its also true that in this case not seeing a plan keeps a lot of fence-sitters on the fence.

Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.

[omarali50]

Bill, first of all, I personally dont think the Taliban are stronger. I think their strength has always depended on Pakistani support (providing the skills they lacked and an international long term view) and a particular set of favorable circumstances and without that support, and in today's changed circumstances, they cannot conquer or hold afghanistan EVEN IF foriegn forces withdraw.
About why "many people" think the taliban is going to win (stronger was perhaps the wrong word), I think its as you said: people expect they will out-endure the US forces. The US has less of a permanent interest in Afghanistan and will eventually say 'f..k it" and leave after one last burst of bombing. The Jihadis in Pakistan (and they are the ones with international ambitions, the taliban themselves would be just a rural pakhtun phenomenon without their input) take a very long view of things and in their own opinion, they will always have more people willing to die than the US or any other infidel power. Once the US leaves, US agents like Zardari and the ANP will leave on the next plane (if they are lucky) and things will be back to status quo ante. I personally think they are wrong because they overestimate their own strength and unity and underestimate how much resistance there will be. Mostly, I think they overestimate their own unity. The army will not have the region back in their grip like they imagine and the jihadis will not have the army back in their grip like they used to. Instead, the US would leave behind an endless and extremely messy civil war in which Jihadi victory is by no means assured. Their extreme ruthlessness and clarity of purpose is not matched by any deep organizational unity. THEY will kill each other more efficiently than any infidel could (and the infidels will help). And their ideology has absolutely no section about how to be a modern state.....that part was a gift of the British raj and this time around it will depart with the infidels. But that is another story.
Some of the fence sitters have an idea about the mess that would result if the US leaves, but again, they are not sure the US can stick around, so mess or not, they have to place their bets on what will follow. On the other hand, if the US looks like it has a winning plan, then everyone else will start calculating differently. btw, "winning plan" does not mean plan to make a deal with the taliban and scoot. In that case, everyone knows who will be cutting heads next year in Kabul stadium and plans accordingly.

[omarali50]

David,

You are buying into the supposed "eternal india pakistan conflict" too easily. Which probably means you get your Pakistan from Pakistani army mess halls. The "eternal conflict" is used by the army to have its way within Pakistan. But when the army changes its mind about some aspect of the conflict, miracles happen and suddenly that issue is not intractable anymore. Its not public opinion that is driving the conflict. Its the army (and its well lubricated psyops division) that is driving the public opinion. I am not saying India and Pakistan would suddenly be all kumbaya if the army changd its mind, but I must insist that given half a chance, the mainstream politicians (nawaz sharif, zardari, altaf, etc) would make deals and allow trade and travel and wrap up the jihad in no time...Pakistanis and Indians would still insult each other (like British and German footbal fans do) but that is an entirely different matter..

[George L. Singleton]

The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.

The British experience in Malayia did not happen in a few years.

We are up against essentially a non-existant society in Afghanistan, weaker even than the original US Articles of Confederation that governed while the US Revolutionary War dragged on due to lack of the strongest support needed but not then possible from the original Congress in Philadelphia.

I still think a return to the monarchy for Afghainsitan, with tribal jiirgas working under same is more likely to work...although a modified weak Parliamentary system able to veto or check and balance a King might work, too?

[davidbfpo]

My original remark

Some people don't want their own "truths" disturbed, locally I'd say the supposed inevitability of Indian-Pakistani conflict is a bigger problem.

Omerali's part response

David, You are buying into the supposed "eternal india pakistan conflict" too easily. Which probably means you get your Pakistan from Pakistani army mess halls. The "eternal conflict" is used by the army to have its way within Pakistan.

I do not buy into the 'eternal conflict', a conflict that has been used by both countries for too long and has changed recently for the better. Pakistan does not need to spend so much on its military, largely for conventional warfare and not COIN etc. Yes, the Pakistani Army then claims more than the budget, but to decide on national security issues. Never been to a Pakistani Army mess hall, I have spoken to two Pakistani officers briefly on the subject, most of my viewpoint comes from reading and listening. One concern I have, shared by many here, is how effective is the Pakistani national response? Secondly, what is the true extent of Islamist power within the Army and ISI?

davidbfpo

[Entropy]

The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.

There are some things that no amount of "political will" can accomplish.

[omarali50]

My original remark

One concern I have, shared by many here, is how effective is the Pakistani national response? Secondly, what is the true extent of Islamist power within the Army and ISI?

davidbfpo

David, I run an email discussion group called Asiapeace. We have 650 or so members, mostly Indian and Pakistani, mostly journalists and academics. A lot of our discussions would be of interest to you (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/asiapeace/). Anyway, to answer your questions:
Pakistan's "national" response is likely to be a bit confused. For a very long time, the army has been dominant in domestic politics. GHQ makes and breaks political parties, manipulated elections, set up a parallel system of monitoring via intelligence agencies that was not accountable to any civilian authority. But they dont have (and did not have) perfect control. There was always resistance from various political groups. But they managed to keep "national security" as their own preserve for a long time. Their version of "national interest" was not questioned (and questioners faced very real consequences) and most politicians (mostly corrupt, and interested in bread and butter issues like pols all over the world) tended to avoid getting tangled up in that area. The army's own vision came out of their academies and NDC (or so they thought) but was actually heavily influenced (almost completely controlled, some would say) by the jihadi faction of the army. This jihadi faction had a clearer view of what they wanted and were able to use people like Pervez Musharraf and all the other so-called "secular" officers because they (the jihadis) used terms like "strategic depth" and "national security parameters" and "Indian threat assessment" and other such bull#### and the low intellectual level of the army high command meant they never figured out what this policy would lead to. As a result, the relatively small jihadi faction was able to pursue an almost insane policy of training and arming half a million jihadis in full view without anyone every asking them what would happen when this vast jihadi army got to work..I am summing up a long story very briefly but will be happy to elaborate in future discussions. Anyway, GHQ has sort of figured out that some readjustment is needed, but its a work in progress, nowhere near done. Civil society is well beyond GHQ in rethinking these policies, but still has less power than the army does. Islamists (who were always in a minority but able to use the army to make up for that) are still around but even they are not clear about what end is up anymore. Some of them are clearly scared of the jihadis they have nurtured for so long. So, long answer and incomplete, but "national response" is still a bit confused, but is moving away from the jihadis and is beginning to question the army's role in this mess. At the same time, this is the army we have, so some people are willing to cut them a lot of slack if they start to fight at least some of the jihadis. Personally, I think that someone has to keep a very close eye on the army otherwise its going to just kill some random poor sods and keep the hardcore intact for future use in Kashmir and Afghanistan and we will be back to square one. Their mouthpieces like "paknationalists.com" are still distinguishing good jihadis and bad ones and promoting an anti-indian hysteria that will allow the army to maintain its position in society. Unless this is some sort of very sophisticated psyops operation by the CIA (I doubt it) this propaganda does not suggest that they have changed their ways too much...
got to run, but more later..

[bigdukesix101]

The UK can barely maintain 8,900. Don't look for any more they are not resourced to do it.

[davidbfpo]

Bigduke,

Yes, the UK commitment of around 9k troops is unlikely to grow much. The commitment, ostensibly one brigade is in fact really two brigades and accounts for 10% of the entire regular UK Army (my estimate). There are a number of reservists called up, as individuals not units IIRC and of course both the Royal Navy (includes Royal Marines) and Royal Air Force are there too.

I suspect comparison figures are available for European NATO contributors. Is the US commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq of a similar proportion?

Apart from the apparent inability of the UK military to generate additional resources there is the far wider political and public unease with the role. Add in our economic slide too.

Have a look at this critical UK-based blogsite for more: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Note the main contributor now says we should not be there.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A Canadian think tank paper 'Afghanistan’s Alternatives for Peace, Governance and Development: Transforming Subjects to Citizens & Rulers to Civil Servants', by what appears to be an Afghan scholar in exile in the USA: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/defa...0Paper%202.pdf

Yet to read fully, but as the civil aspects are getting more prominence worth a peek.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Michael Yon has been embedded with UK troops in Sangin, for fiev weeks and has written an excellent first-hand account: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm Yon is now en route to embed with USMC.

For murky reasons his embed has ended and neither side agrees why.

Stephen Grey, a UK journalist, has written a wide ranging article on the campaigning and whether the local strategy is correct: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp...and/index.html

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintan the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.



Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.

Bill, when you get a chance send me an email. I'd like to get your thoughts on a concept. It's just powerpoint, so there is some "reading between the lines" required, but I know you'll be able to keep the trail.

[Surferbeetle]

A Canadian think tank paper 'Afghanistan’s Alternatives for Peace, Governance and Development: Transforming Subjects to Citizens & Rulers to Civil Servants', by what appears to be an Afghan scholar in exile in the USA: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/defa...0Paper%202.pdf

Yet to read fully, but as the civil aspects are getting more prominence worth a peek.

davidbfpo

...for the link. Interesting reading this morning, his sketch of various parallel governments in particular. This one calls for another cup of coffee.

By the way, this might be of general interest to the water-centric folks: Water resource development in Northern Afganistan and its implications for Amu Darya Basin

This publication examines increased water use by Afghanistan and its implications for other water users in the basin, including the Aral Sea, both in the short and long term. Topics discussed include: the amount of Amu Darya flows generated in northern Afghanistan; the amount of water presently used in northern Afghanistan, prospective use in the near future, and possible impact of the increased use on the riparian states and the Aral Sea; existing agreements between Afghanistan and the neighbouring Central Asian states on the use of waters in the Amu Darya Basin, their relevance and applicability in the present and in the future; and future directions for water resources development and improved water management in the basin.

[Valin]

Michael Yon has been embedded with UK troops in Sangin, for fiev weeks and has written an excellent first-hand account: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm Yon is now en route to embed with USMC.

For murky reasons his embed has ended and neither side agrees why.

Stephen Grey, a UK journalist, has written a wide ranging article on the campaigning and whether the local strategy is correct: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp...and/index.html

davidbfpo

Thanks for the links


Cracking on in Helmand

(snip)

The public debate has rarely reflected the mixed-up reality of the war. In July, when the number of dead since 2001 overtook the total in Iraq, the debate was couched as politicians versus generals. Our troops demanded more helicopters, reinforcements and money. All of that was true—when Sergeant Johnson’s comrades kept vigil over his body for 24 hours, it was because no helicopter was available to take him off the hill. And a day earlier, many Afghan civilians had died because there were no helicopters to ferry the injured to hospital. But more men and more choppers are not going to win this war, still less address its purpose.

While this may be true, it must be asked if more men and equipment would not have provided the time needed to get the correct strategy?

Neither the air cavalry nor legions of fresh troops defeated the Vietcong.

The writer shows a real lack of knowledge about that damn war by saying this.

[davidbfpo]

Writing in The Guardian, an ex-UK Army officer, with an opening passage

Afghanistan: a question of stamina. We must finish the job in Afghanistan – the geopolitical alternative is too terrible to consider

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...-case-scenario

Ands ends with

Not for us perhaps, at least not initially, but for so many others. Now the fight has started we need to finish it. We have promised to help create something better and must deliver it. We just have to have the stamina and courage, both physical and moral to do so.

As expected there is a commentary here: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...-strategy.html

davidbfpo

[Valin]

Writing in The Guardian, an ex-UK Army officer, with an opening passage
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...-case-scenario

Ands ends with

As expected there is a commentary here: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...-strategy.html

davidbfpo

Exactly! The question is, do our political leaders have the guts(?) to stand up to the anti-war forces. Secondly, can they explain to people why we must stay there and win and the consequences of leaving.

How long does it take to fly from Kabul to Leeds or Denver Co.?

"Shrink The Gap"
Thomas PM Barnett

[William F. Owen]

This 'The Afghanistan Abyss' on SWJ Blog takes some time to make sense of.

So apparently the Pashtun opposition is a function of absolute numbers. The average man living in the village will suddenly notice a extra 21,000 troops?

Really, how will another 21,000 have any perceptual impact at all? For those against the US, it matters not if it is 10,000 or a 100K.

[Bob's World]

Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintain the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.



Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.

If you get a chance, read Sarah's "Punishment of Virtue," there are some great insights there from a non-military perspective of someone who spent a great deal of time within the populace and working the problem; in fact as I listened to the CD during my commute I was struck that this is a perspective that our SF guys should be bringing as well.

But, with growing frustration with the Karzai government's failure to deal with those aspects of governance that they found the most intolerable (i.e., poor governance) that they had no recourse to address through the men he allowed to stay in official positions, which the exploited for their own gain; many were beginning to yearn for the "good old days" of when the Taliban were in power. For all their faults, there was much that was good as well.

Few want the Taliban in power; but most want things to be better than they are now. It provides a crack in the social will for the Taliban to pry on. And remember, in a Taliban ran state there will be no more foreign military presence; and we cannot underestimate how powerful of a message that must be given the history of these people.

For the US we should remember that we did not go to AFG to wage war on the Taliban, if they would have agreed to deny AQ sanctuary we would probably be working with them right now, with very little presence in this country. Mission Creep is a dangerous thing. There is enduring value in Colin Powell's principles for these types of expeditions.

Our problem is that we assess Taliban governance from OUR perspective. The simple fact is that as the information age continues to bring light to the darkest corners of the globe, the harsh, dark age policies of the pre 9/11 Taliban are unsustainable. Either they would evolve or become quickly obsolete.

I look at American history and we idolize the image of the Pilgrims that settled New England. Harsh, men in black, who were uncompromising, intolerant religious extremists that held a fringe ideology of Christianity. They tortured their women and exiled any who dared to hold different religious beliefs to their own. (Thank God for the liberal Dutch colony in New York, which attracted people from all walks, nations, and ideologies; and which was the birthplace of many of the concepts that ultimately came to be thought of as "American.") But the Pilgrims evolved.

The Taliban, if successful, will evolve as well; and it will be on a far more compressed timeline than what the Pilgrims ran on. We just need to go back to our going in position. Deny sanctuary to AQ and groups like them, allow civilian aid organizations access and security, and don't violate international law.

I may not like the way my neighbor talks to his wife, or treats his kids. But if he isn't violating the law I have no legal right to confront him. Certainly there are moral imperatives, but "imperative" is the operative word, and "not like" does not raise to that level.

BL, we in the US do not need to fear the Taliban, lets focus on the real issue. We get off track and make the problem worse when we keep expending the "threat" list and attacking more and more of these organizations. We conflate them in our minds; and then unite them against us by our actions.

[Bob's World]

The UK can barely maintain 8,900. Don't look for any more they are not resourced to do it.

They would take 8,900 KIA and spit in the enemy's eyes; and have a million men on the ground.

Again, while the metrics guys are looking for indicators, we should apply a couple of metrics to the approach of our NATO allies to this sticky mess.

They come primarly to service the national interest of maintaining good relations with the US; not for any national interests they feel are at stake in Afghanistan. I suspect, that many, like the Pakistanis, realize that supporting the American approach to this problem to date too fully is far more likely to create instability at home, rather than the opposite.

Sometimes your friends are the last ones to tell you when you're being a jackass.

[marct]

Sometimes your friends are the last ones to tell you when you're being a jackass.

Yup. Of course, sometimes we do and you don't listen .