Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

First thing we need to do is determine what is "victory" for the US in this country in terms of our national interests (i.e. "victory" for the Afghans may be a very different thing, and good on them for that. We just don't need to confuse their victory for our victory and actually put our self at risk of a strategic setback because we pushed for the wrong end zone down at the operational level).

This then needs to be balanced in the larger global context of what the U.S. wants to redefine its role as in this new, post-Cold War, post-Bushesque GWOT, globalized world. This will give us the context to know how much to ask of our allies, to better understand who are allies and enemies really are these days (applying old logic to that analysis is leading us to dangerous conclusions IMHO), and what reasonable schemes of engagement are for any given state balanced within the much broader context of how they impact the U.S.'s endeavors around the region and the world.

To simply debate COIN tactics (or more accurately, how the US and coalition forces support the host nation's COIN) against one particular insurgent group in one particular state is something we need to let the commander's on the ground sort out. What the Generals and the Policy wanks need to do is get out of our tactical commander's lanes and start doing the hard work of sorting out the big picture in their own. Afterall, that's what they get paid to do.

[Ken White]

a COIN or Stability Operation is either deluded or not thinking clearly. Lacking a scorched earth, there will be no victory. Since we are not going to play G.Khan, the best that can be hoped for is an acceptable outcome. I have seen no evidence the US has yet determined what such an out come might be in its view. There is even less evidence that there is a consensus in Afghanistan that can provide an Afghan view of what such an out come might be.

As Eden has said several times, I suspect the Afghan view is a loose, sort of Federal national government that can preclude foreign interference and control the war lord factor -- other than , it will leave people alone.

That doesn't accord well with western thought.

Bob's World says:

This then needs to be balanced in the larger global context of what the U.S. wants to redefine its role as in this new, post-Cold War, post-Bushesque GWOT, globalized world.

Two thoughts -- it's a Post Clinton-Bushesque world. One led to the other as sure as day leads to night.

Secondly, good plan -- however, given that this is the USA, my bet is that (a) It will not happen in the sense you wish; (b) the sheer number of players that will wade in on what that role might be will preclude any except a poor compromise solution being proffered; (c) as soon as that new role is determined by said poor compromise, there will be a concerted and successful effort, domestically and internationally to change it.

...This will give us the context to know how much to ask of our allies, to better understand who are allies and enemies really are these days (applying old logic to that analysis is leading us to dangerous conclusions IMHO)...

Ask and ye will not receive -- other than from a very few and that will be reduced in supply and come with caveats. We have no allies, other than temporary accommodations. I'm unsure why people cannot accept and understand that. Our size, wealth, global power projection capability and selfishness all conspire to insure we can be respected (but are not now to the extent possible and desirable due to misuse of our power and flawed domestic choices) but we are not going to be liked, not at all. Nor are we going to have any allies other than those who see their own temporary advantage in allying with us. They will be fickle. OTOH, we have a slew of enemies and are likely to have more.

None of that is meant to be gloomy; it's cool. Been that way in the world ever since I first went overseas in 1947; hasn't changed much in the intervening years and is unlikely to change in the future -- until we go into real and major decline. Then the Jackals and Hyenas will appear, the latter laughing...

... What the Generals and the Policy wanks need to do is get out of our tactical commander's lanes and start doing the hard work of sorting out the big picture in their own. Afterall, that's what they get paid to do.

True, hopefully the will not waste time trying to develop a national strategy for a nation with a short attention span.

[George L. Singleton]

Folks, closing the Afghan-Pakistan Border is like trying to count the sands in front on one condo at Gulf Shores, Alabama from the back steps used to access the beach down to the every changing waterline.

Border is too vast and rugged for a conventional closing.

However, using satellites and infra red technology we can bomb the hell out of much of the border but that takes a lot of resources to do.

[William F. Owen]

Border is too vast and rugged for a conventional closing.

However, using satellites and infra red technology we can bomb the hell out of much of the border but that takes a lot of resources to do.

I'm not a technophile, but GSR, LOROPS and UGS can certainly make huge strides in making sure that a significantly more of the traffic is interdicted. Making the border difficult for the bad guys is not a tall order.... given the resources.

[Bob's World]

The "border" is not now, nor ever was the issue. In fact the current line drawn on Western maps is no more than that; simply a line drawn by westerners for westerners. It helps us feel that there is order in the world and that our western concepts of state sovereignty codifed at Westphalia hold equal sway everywhere.

To focus on making this border mean more than that is to virtually ensure defeat by creating a task too large to accomplish that even if somehow accomplished serves solely to drive a wedge through the heart of the very populace who's support the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to attain some degree of stability.

We need a new model, the old one won't work here.

Perhaps a broad "Pashto zone" that encompasses their traditional tribal homeland as a "border" instead of a thin line so comforting to us?

Dual citizenship for all within, and governed with a system rooted in their historic tribalism?

What about the Taliban you ask? Those guys work for the government of Pakistan, I suspect they will drop their papers and quit that arrangement if given a better option.

What about AQ you ask? I suspect if we made the PNG of AQ as the condition precedent for such an arrangement they would be out on their little Arab backsides within a week. Sanctuary lies within a poorly governed populace, take away the poor governance and the sanctuary goes with it.

Regradless of what bold new COA is adobted, to simply work harder and faster at the old one won't do the trick, it'll just wear us out sooner.

[Ken White]

Perhaps a broad "Pashto zone" that encompasses their traditional tribal homeland as a "border" instead of a thin line so comforting to us?

Dual citizenship for all within, and governed with a system rooted in their historic tribalism?

Since you use the word 'within' that raises the question; does this "Pashto zone" have a border?

What about the Taliban you ask? Those guys work for the government of Pakistan, I suspect they will drop their papers and quit that arrangement if given a better option.

Actually, I didn't ask -- and I strongly question the validity of your last two statements and ask, if they are true, what is your better option?

What about AQ you ask? I suspect if we made the PNG of AQ as the condition precedent for such an arrangement they would be out on their little Arab backsides within a week. Sanctuary lies within a poorly governed populace, take away the poor governance and the sanctuary goes with it.

Good plan -- with what, if anything, do you propose to replace the poor governance?

You continually tell us what is wrong but I've seen few concrete solutions that can realistically be expected to be applied, surely you have some specific and achievable fixes that we can use to start toward if not reach this nirvana of a 'new America' that returns to its original values.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

Short answer is I don't think we need to "fix" Afghanistan or Pakistan, just to stop breaking them would be a good first step.

Next I would move our manhunting efforts back into the shadows and tailor it to focus on taking down those individuals critical to the functioning of critical nodes instead of those in senior leadership. This then frees up SOF and the rest of our military to doing what we should have focused on from the outset: Getting a self-determined government of Afghanistan up and functioning on their terms and standards and getting out.

I would then stop using NATO to coerce our European allies to act against their own national interests in order to support ours. I suspect for most the only national interest they serve by going to Afghanistan is the one of sustaining a civil relationship with the U.S. and keeping us on the hook for funding a large portion of European defense by staying in NATO.

I would stop forcing the Pakistani government to exert itself in the Pasto tribal areas. We see it as them executing their duties as a government, the Pashto see it as an incursion on their tribal sovereignty. We press for it because we think it will bring stability and weaken the Taliban, instead it has brought instability and has strengthened the Taliban.

Borders are overstated. The Pashto zone I suggest could be defined in historic terms of where people live not where lines are drawn. Other COAs could achieve a simiar effect, but the main idea is that we need to adopt new views of what sovereignty means that are more adaptive to the emerging world. I suspect more wars have been fought because of borders than from the lack of them in recent times.

I would not just abandon, but ban all metrics of "effectiveness" of governance and instead use simple local polling to determine "goodness" of governance. If the populace is satisfied it is good enough no matter how ineffective; if the populace is dissatisfied it is not good enough no matter how effective. Goodness would become our standard (I.e., the populaces standard becomes ours, not the other way around).

I would make "legitimacy" CCIR item. Any perceptions of US as being the source of legitimacy of a host nation governance would be identified and addressed immediately. All engagement would be designed with a primary focus of ensuring that anything we did to assist in enabling good governance was designed to avoid any perceptions of legitimacy over the same. In that vein I would identify and extricate ourselves from every such perception around the world, beginning in the Middle East. This would requrie significant policy changes in our relationships with Saudi Arabia, Israel (top 2) and several other states.

Obviously this is jsut the tip of the iceberg, there is a lot below the surface that is not visible in this small space.

[Valin]

Since you use the word 'within' that raises the question; does this "Pashto zone" have a border?

Google Images Pashtunistan

H/T David Kilcullen for introducing to the word.

[William F. Owen]

To focus on making this border mean more than that is to virtually ensure defeat by creating a task too large to accomplish that even if somehow accomplished serves solely to drive a wedge through the heart of the very populace who's support the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to attain some degree of stability.

OK, the use of the word border seems to be causing problems. Fact is we are not going to convince the Taliban that their military success is impossible, if they have freedom of action to move back and worth to their safe areas.

Yes, "closing" the border is probably impossible. Making it 90% more difficult to cross, than it currently is, is not.

[Eden]

In 2006, after NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps took over as ISAF headquarters, an ink spot strategy was seriously discussed and half-way implemented. It was classic COIN stuff, just as described in the piece that kicked off this thread, and we planners pushed it hard.

Here is why it was never fully adopted:
1. The Afghans didn't like it. It meant abandoning some areas, and that just upset too many special interests within the Afghan mafiocracy that passed for a national government.
2. The Americans didn't like it. It meant abandoning the operational design for victory they had already worked out and were halfway through implementing. They assumed it was just a fig-leaf strategy which would allow the NATO allies to hide behind the wire; they much preferred chasing insurgents around RC-East, building roads to nowhere, and pursuing a quasi-French Indochina program of placing outposts in regions of no particular worth.
3. Many NATO allies didn't like it. It meant, in several cases, moving out of their selected provinces - which they thought would look like defeat and reflect badly on them - into areas they had avoided in the first place because of high levels of violence. They much preferred to pursue their individual 'wars' using the tactics they thought best.

Here is why it probably wouldn't have worked anyway:
1. Oil spots need to be dropped in either areas of high enemy activity, or in places of exceptional and/or inherent worth. There are none of the latter in Afghanistan, and we did not have the combat power to do the former.
2. To sustain themselves, the insurgents in Afghanistan do not really need prolonged access to the population; they simply need to be able to strike at it. You can't prevent suicide attacks through heightened security, you can only reduce their effectiveness, and effectiveness isn't really what the insurgents are after. Activity begets support in this strange corner of the planet, and oil spots simply give the bad guys more room to maneuver.
3. It would have been a free pass to the drug lords.
4. Oil spot theory presupposes active and effective development of the secured terrain. In 2006/7/8, that was not a realistic prospect. Except for road-building, pretty much all development efforts during this period were abject failures.

Bottom line is that absent unity of command or unity of effort or adequate resources, pretty much any strategy will do as well as any other.

[Entropy]

I pretty much agree with Ken's comments.

On the border, we can probably do a better job of interdiction, but one complicating factor is that a lot of people besides insurgents use the border. Some are insurgents, some are smugglers, some are doing legitimate trade, some are visiting family, etc. Even if it were possible "closing" the border is going to have some significant negative effects. Sorting legitimate border crossings from insurgent use is going to be difficult given the terrain and all the other complicating factors.

[Presley Cannady]

First thing we need to do is determine what is "victory" for the US in this country in terms of our national interests (i.e. "victory" for the Afghans may be a very different thing, and good on them for that. We just don't need to confuse their victory for our victory and actually put our self at risk of a strategic setback because we pushed for the wrong end zone down at the operational level).

I hear that phrase ("we need to define 'victory'") or variants of it a lot, along with the caveat that victory for the US may not coincide with the host population's idea of the preferred end state. I maybe wrong here, but I thought it clear from the outset that drying up Af-Pak of the people, means and/or will to source terrorist attacks against the West was the Coalition's overriding objective. I've never seen a survey indicating that Western electorates really gave a rat's behind about anything else. Even if there the aspirations of the host populations--shifting they may be--mismatched with all other concerns eminating from our great centers of strategic thought, doesn't achieving that one goal mean...well...the Coalition wins?

[davidbfpo]

What is going on? A short BBC News clip, note interview with ex-Taliban Amabassador to Pakistan at the end, commenting on talking to the Taliban: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8119110.stm

Apologies for those who cannot view.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A review of the provinces on either side of the Durand Line (no video clips) and a useful summary: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7601748.stm

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A long (73 mins) sound only interview of the ex-CIA Station Chief in Kabul, thirty years ago, which is interesting and not listened yet to fully: http://www.electricpolitics.com/podc...or_bazaar.html

A summary appears in this article: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham..._b_201355.html

Note he is multi-lingual (a point that has appeared here before) and has visited Pakistan more recently with RAND (no details).

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A non-Western contact having visited Kabul recently observed that:

a) The war was increasingly difficult and the Taliban could just wait for the Western presence to end;
b) No-one in Kabul, especially Afghans, thought the West would stay and the latest adjustments were an exit strategy. The one exception a Russian whose views was a new US encirclement strategy.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Have know idea how accurate this is, but very disturbing if true.


http://therealnews.com/t/index.php?o...4&jumival=3511