Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

I don't think there will be a major revival of land transit either; but I believe Steve is talking about conflict and competition for control of the resources in the region on central Asia where the route once was. I think this is very likely, and as the ability of the US to deter such conflicts wanes may happen sooner than later.

[Dayuhan]

I agree that conflict over Central Asian energy resources is a real possibility. I do not think it's likely to involve the US, for reasons of geography a relatively minor player in that picture. It is a very likely Russia/China flashpoint somewhere down the line. The Chinese want the oil and gas: it's the only really substantial supply that they can get that doesn't rely on vulnerable shipping routes. The Russians don't need the energy, but control of the transit routes from Central Asia to Europe gives them a lot of leverage over Europe and over their former possessions on their southern border... maintaining that sphere of influence is important to them for a lot of reasons.

I don't think that conflict is likely to involve Afghanistan or Pakistan at all, and I doubt that the US would have any ability to deter it even now, though there's little immediate prospect of it erupting. Another one of those things we don't and won't control.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob, Dayuhan:

Right, a potential flash point, perhaps more grounded in ego than objective economic realities.

Problem with Oil/Gas inland/maritime exchange is not about whether it is technically feasible, but which resources were invested in, and the immediate impacts of change.

Right now, there are some pipelines and some tankers going to different markets, with investments in either being substantial and long-term.

Overtime, certain investments create explicit short-medium term constraints which, if threatened, can create flashpoint.

It all depends on what, overtime, emerges, and what kinks in the hose occur.

[Dayuhan]

Problem with Oil/Gas inland/maritime exchange is not about whether it is technically feasible, but which resources were invested in, and the immediate impacts of change.

Right now, there are some pipelines and some tankers going to different markets, with investments in either being substantial and long-term.

There's a fundamental difference between tankers and pipelines... pipelines only go to one place. A country with an oil port, say Saudi Arabia, can load tankers going to a dozen different destinations at the same time. Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan are limited to where the pipelines go. Cuts the options a bit.

Right. If kinks in that hose (now or in the future) occur, they would affect those dependent on that hose--not likely to be US.

One reality of the oil business is that a kink in anyone's hose affects everyone else. If the Chinese hose from Kazakhstan gets kinked, the Chinese won't stop burning oil. They'll buy on the spot market, push the price up, and compete to buy the oil that other buyers are now getting. Because they have lots of money, they can compete quite effectively. Just because Angola sells to China and Nigeria sells to the US doesn't mean Angolan oil is "Chinese supply" or Nigerian oil is "American oil". Either will sell to the highest bidder, like everybody else.

Cutting off oil supply from one country to another is not quite the weapon it's sometimes thought to be. It doesn't starve that country, just pushes the price up for everyone.

[Ken White]

...conflict and competition for control of the resources in the region on central Asia where the route once was. I think this is very likely, and as the ability of the US to deter such conflicts wanes may happen sooner than later.

I submit we shouldn't be concerned with deterring such conflicts in that and several other locations around the world where we really have no interests...

Other than commercial, of course -- but that 'reason' is often ferociously overstated and embellished to appear far more valuable than it actually will be. The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality. It has done us no favors over the years.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

Right. If kinks in that hose (now or in the future) occur, they would affect those dependent on that hose--not likely to be US.

[Ken White]

...not likely to be US.

--and sitting on the sidelines occasionally can be beneficial...

No 'glory' in it but beneficial.

[Fuchs]

The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality.

I'd say there are more reasons, and even if you don't count them as reasons, they are at least prerequisites.

[JMA]

The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality. It has done us no favors over the years.

We have touched this before and IMHO the reason these adventures so often end in tears is because the military plan is conceived by politicians and yes-man generals and then poorly implemented both strategically and tactically.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

True tbat the leg bone is connected to the tailbone, but the practical reality is that if anyone affects the supply (with price increases), they also directly affect the income and stability of the country affected.

I understood the issue to be more related to whether potential kinks in the supply chain warrant US military engagement on the old Silk Road.

I'm with Ken's approach---sitting on the sidelines is sometimes beneficial.

[Bob's World]

I submit we shouldn't be concerned with deterring such conflicts in that and several other locations around the world where we really have no interests...

Other than commercial, of course -- but that 'reason' is often ferociously overstated and embellished to appear far more valuable than it actually will be. The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality. It has done us no favors over the years.

I just mean US deterrence in general, the effect of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union; not the result of any specific program of deterrence so much as just not being anyone out there willing to risk conflict with the US as they do their own Cost-Risk/benefit analysis.

Call it "hegemony" if you will. I think we had about 4-5 years at the end of WWII; and another longer period post Soviet collapse that is probably already over. I point this out to people (not you I suspect) who have bought into the wild idea that the future is all about Irregular Warfare and that major state on state warfare is largely obsolete. My personal opinion is that there are a lot of unresolved issues that have been temporarily set on hold or "frozen" due to US hegemony that will become increasingly active and violent if need be.

I think Central Asia, with its underdeveloped resources, and sitting between a lot of more powerful, resource hungry neighbors is a likely place for conflict. One that I agree we should stay completely out of.

[Ken White]

I just mean US deterrence in general...I point this out to people (sic) who have bought into the wild idea that the future is all about Irregular Warfare and that major state on state warfare is largely obsolete. My personal opinion is that there are a lot of unresolved issues that have been temporarily set on hold or "frozen" due to US hegemony that will become increasingly active and violent if need be. {* added / kw)

I think Central Asia, with its underdeveloped resources, and sitting between a lot of more powerful, resource hungry neighbors is a likely place for conflict. One that I agree we should stay completely out of.

...also Em-fat-i-cally, absolutely -- and Roger that.

I'd only add that * denotes a fog bank (defined as an area of apparent grayness...) with which I think we are not prepared to cope -- and I'm afraid a fog horn and full speed ahead aren't the right answers, particularly with our Radar set on the 1 mile range gate...

[Bill Moore]

While none of us actually know how the future will unfold, I really can't see how a conflict over energy in Central Asia would be localized. The potential confluence of seller, buyer, middle man interests and then their allies interests "could" result in a wider scale conflict that will effect more than the region. I'm not advocating U.S. involvement in other people's fights, but rather supporting Bob's argument that deterrence is probably in our national interests. Whether deterrence will work or not has always been questionable.

Irregular warfare will remain (as it has for years) a persistent condition globally that will challenge our security interests in some locations, but the greatest threats are still state versus state conflicts, and of course they'll leverage the irregular actors where possible to augment other efforts (just as they did during the two world wars).

The SECDEF was correct IMO when he said we need balanced capabilities, but I suspect we're way out of balance at the moment.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Information technology advances will continue, so IW will continue as well. States are outside the OODA loop of "controlling" just about everything these days. When I warn of the rise of state on state competition and conflict I do not mean to imply that irregular competition and conflict will wane.

We will soon be enjoying the worst of both worlds, so to speak. Key is to take a major appetite suppressant as to what one convinces them self they must exercise control over. Currently we cast far too wide a net in that regard. "Influence" is the coin of the realm in the emerging competition / conflict ecosystem and that is a fuzzy concept that we have not been managing very effectively of late. Relying too heavily on military might may well earn a certain type of respect, but it can burn a lot of influence as well.

More and more the US must order or bribe or both to form "alliances of the willing" (I believe it is a bit of a Freudian recognition that we know these are not truly willing allies, or we would not feel compelled to mention it in the title). Influential leaders are followed, they they do not drive. This is repairable, but some fundamental changes are in order.

[Ken White]

...supporting Bob's argument that deterrence is probably in our national interests. Whether deterrence will work or not has always been questionable.

Noting your "probably" I'm unsure that doing something questionable is in our interest.

We need to be able to deter -- however, we must determine what we need to deter. I suggest we've erred in trying to 'deter' things that didn't need deterring (Viet Nam, Lebanon) and things that we could not deter (Somalia among others) while we have failed to deter things that we should have (30 years of probes from the Middle East).

As we all know, deterrence can take many approaches...

[JMA]

Irregular warfare will remain (as it has for years) a persistent condition globally that will challenge our security interests in some locations, ...

Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.

[Ken White]

Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.

Neither we or the British have much reason to participate in large number in many if any of those contests.

Build a strong capability, in a Democracy, and it will cry to be used -- whether it's necessary or not. Better to have slight capability and be able to to adjust if required. A good specialist will beat a good generalist in a specialized effort, a prudent generalist would avoid that by any means, fair or foul. There are other ways to deter, impact, disrupt. It is just stupid to play by the rules of another on his court...

I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting.

(Note underlines...)