Winning the War in Afghanistan

[bumperplate]

While this is not the best of statements to make, I have to say, I believe there are a lot of people in uniform that are still looking for a fight. Not sure if it's a "warrior ethos" thing or that many have gotten used to it or that many feel they still need to go out onto the battlefield and prove themselves or re-prove themselves as warfighters and leaders of warfighters.

Based on this thread, not sure if any form of victory is going to be declared or realized for OEF. Still not really sure about Iraq either. If OIF & OEF are going to shut down, where is the next war?

If we don't bring both theaters to a palatable conclusion, we are going to suffer some of the same ills suffered after Vietnam, with a lot of veterans wholly disappointed and left feeling as their deeds were meaningless. If that happens and it's back to garrison 24/7, it's going to get ugly. Discipline problems are going to go sky high, people leaving the service are going to take their combat experience and expertise with them, and the garri-troopers will be left running the show, once again.

Interesting dynamic and I truly hope that whatever we end up with in both these theaters is either victory or the best substitution for it - and that we are not left being lead by garrison leaders, but rather by combat leaders with true visionary skills, not management skills.

[TDB]

While this is not the best of statements to make, I have to say, I believe there are a lot of people in uniform that are still looking for a fight. Not sure if it's a "warrior ethos" thing or that many have gotten used to it or that many feel they still need to go out onto the battlefield and prove themselves or re-prove themselves as warfighters and leaders of warfighters.

Based on this thread, not sure if any form of victory is going to be declared or realized for OEF. Still not really sure about Iraq either. If OIF & OEF are going to shut down, where is the next war?

If we don't bring both theaters to a palatable conclusion, we are going to suffer some of the same ills suffered after Vietnam, with a lot of veterans wholly disappointed and left feeling as their deeds were meaningless. If that happens and it's back to garrison 24/7, it's going to get ugly. Discipline problems are going to go sky high, people leaving the service are going to take their combat experience and expertise with them, and the garri-troopers will be left running the show, once again.

Interesting dynamic and I truly hope that whatever we end up with in both these theaters is either victory or the best substitution for it - and that we are not left being lead by garrison leaders, but rather by combat leaders with true visionary skills, not management skills.

The issue with your notion of combat leaders is that it requires constant combat to teach junior officers how to lead in combat so they can be promoted in what the continuous turn over through the ranks. This has been a problem during the current conflict, high rankers with little or (more likely) no combat experience. This will however be an ever present threat in the mordern age.

Regarding your point about a vietnam-type syndrome, I fear we are alread feeling its effect. The UK is not immune to this, we experienced it after the Falklands and Op Banner in Northern Ireland. We are having soldiers return with extreme mental anguish ans PTST with very little established to deal with them. I believe it is the same situation in the States, this is an issue, though I believe that unlike in Vietnam the general concensus is "bring our boys home" so they don't die as opposed to "stop bombing vietnam". We haven't had that My Lai moment and I hope we won't. Public opinion is not against the soldiers but rather the cost in blood and treasure. Bringing the conflicts to a preferable end may act in a cathartic way for those who served, I'd rather it create a situation where further intervention is not required.

[Bill Moore]

TDB posted:

As for national interest, staying away from the fuzzy idea that the whole world should just get along and someone has to slap people on the wrist when they fall out. Obama himself has talked about regional security, the situation is rapidly turning into one which resembles a failed state (not that I like using the term), IF (big if) when ISAF/US leave the GoIRA/ANA/ANP cannot cope and the Taliban return to power and decide to carry out their plans for a greater Pashtunistan in the FATA/NWFP I can't see India sitting idly by. This is pure speculation, but we know that both countries have an interest in Afghanistan due to their "cold war". Then there is the assent of China, involved in construction project in Afghanistan, tell that isn't in America's national interest. My point is that what goes on in Afghanistan is very much in the U.S national interest, it may not be in the interest of the voter, but when have the two been mutually exclusive.

TDB, my points were intentionally provokative and I don't concur with the statements I made 100%, actually far from it, but on the other hand it gets tiring hearing comments from various think tanks that we need to continue the course when the course we're on is not working. More time won't fix a faulty strategy, you have to change the strategy itself. Time in itself will continue to march on indefinitely (in theory), changes in the security situaion won't magically happen just because we give it more time.

Agreed there will be consequences if we pull out of Afghanistan, just as there will be other types of consequences if we stay. We're between the proverbial rock and a hard place, and while some of it couldn't be avoided, some of it is simply due to pie in the sky policies. If we stay, we will support the current government (that we put in place), which many (to include many Afghans) thinks needs to change. The only way it will change (so it seems) is if we step back and stop protecting it and let an internal revolt unfold. Then the question is who is best postured to overthrow the government if we step back (not pull out)? I suspect it is either the Taliban or the military, and if the military takes over and forms a transition government, then that will deal a blow to us psychologically because we will failed to establish a democracy (as though we have one there now). Knee jerk reactions from our government will call for a rapid transition back to civilian government, when a rapid transition is probably the last thing needed. In short we rea major part of the problem in Afghanistan, and only a minor part of the solution.

I am definitely not advocating for the old days where the CIA interfered with foreign governments by sponsoring coups, but instead finding (if possible, and it may not be) a way to step back from protecting the current government. Let the Afghan people determine their future. If the current government can hold, then perhaps it is more legitimate than we give it credit for; if it falls, then we can only hope the new leaders (dictators at least initially) will provide for their people better, and that the West doesn't automatically start prancing around on the world stage about sanctions, form a new government now, etc.

It appears all of our strategic efforts are focusing on transforming a government (while the tactical units continue to trade blows with the insurgents) that apparently doesn't want to transform, and ISAF realizing that has shifted much focus to the local level to include the Village Stability Operations (or whatever it is called now), which has made some impressive gains, but to what end? Are we somehow going to connect a functional lower level village to a dysfunctional state and then go home?

Sacrifice comes with the military profession, and while the military (especially the Soldiers and Marines on the tip of the spear trading blows everyday with the enemy) have little input into the policies, they are not blind to how ineffective they are. We have thousands of examples of tactical success that are not synergic, but simply good independent actions that don't add up to success beyond a small place during a small period of time. Being Soldiers and Marines they still do their job from relatively well to very well (units and individuals vary in quality), but knowing full well if they stay on the current track they won't see much change in the long run.

Personally, I think we need to stay in Afghanistan (what size, our roles, etc. are all up for debate), but significant changes need to be made to the strategy. Unfortunately, we're gearing up for election season in the U.S., so rational discussions will be silenced with the same ole faulty logic employed on previous elections, so any option other than staying the "current" course will be spun as weakness on the war on terror. Actually having the will to change course to more effectively fight terrorists would require greater strength than continuing to march down the same ole established path, but our national psychology won't allow that to happen.

[bumperplate]

I believe I made a similar comment in another thread but I'll also mention it here: I like the theory of CT and SOF-centric approaches. However, aren't we placing too much on our SOF community and tasking them to the point where they are forced to abandon some of their core competencies, hence losing some of those core competencies?

Why can't we train our more conventional forces to take on some of those mission sets that are on the edge between conventional and unconventional? FID v. SFA seems to be an area we can really maximize the conventional side. I have rarely seen conventional force personnel establish rapport with indigenous forces at the same level as I've seen this accomplished by Army SF. But, let's face it, it's not magic - it can be taught and developed. In order to do so, our conventional forces must stop being the 'ugly american' and need to sit down, shut up, and take in what a lot of our talented SOF pax have to say, and importantly our conventional people need to check their rank and ego at the door. This "mental" side of the equation: putting yourself in the correct mindset, getting to the "act tactically, think strategically" side, rather than just trying to please your rater/senior rater, is where I see the greatest disparity in my limited time being in joint environments with conventional and unconventional units in the same AO. However, I see a great possibility for these talents and skillsets to be passed on by the SOF side to the conventional side.

This is not meant to be a probing question, but is there that much of a difference between some of our conventional units and SOF units in terms of executing some of these COIN and CT missions? For example, if 20 or so people are to go to a village and execute a raid in order to roll up some HVI, why can't those 20 people come from the 101st, as opposed to 2/75, or an ODA, etc?

My point here is that I see the issue of force-tailoring to be a recurring theme in the comments about the way ahead in Afghanistan. I also see that we are taking on great risk to our SOF community by continually stating that things need to be SOF-centric. Seems to me, if the approach needed is solidly supported and well founded, then we ought to be making sure we act accordingly by training the forces necessary and providing some long term protection to our SOF capabilities for the health of that community and the capabilities we'll assuredly need from them in the future.

I think we were on to something with the MiTT concept and it had great promise after some bad beginnings, but it seems we've pretty much abandoned that. It could have developed into an increase in capability and broadened the conventional force and provided some flexibility to the unconventional side - at least that's my opinion.

In the end, I think we have some bright minds out there that have or can identify the road to victory for our strategic purposes. But, as usual, we have some roadblocks and a general unwillingness to execute because it's either out of our comfort zone or just doesn't jive with the way we've been doing business. However, as the saying goes, if you do what you've always done, you're gonna get what you've always got.

Thanks to TDB for your previous response.

[Bill Moore]

Bumperplate,

What makes SOF special beyond the personnel selection? In my view it is their organization (very flexible) and special tactics. As you said once the Army actually starting picking some good guys to man th MITTs the program made an impact. The Marines did fairly well with their CIDG equivalent in Vietnam with platoons. If conventional force leaders are willing to power down and detach units and give them greatr automony many will be very successful, but then the big boss can't micromanage them, and the big boss also assumes more risk that many conventional officers in the senior ranks aren't willing to accept, so while your idea is good in theory, unfortunately weak spined senior leaders will find a way to avoid doing it. They could do it now if they wanted, and I'm pretty sure some of the Marine units are. It would be pretty powerful if we decentralize more and more of our forces so we could deny freedom of movement to the Taliban more and more, but I think there are some poles in the tent that need to be addressed, such as the number of terps and how we sustain the forces logistically. Air dropping water and MREs shouldn't be too much of a problem, hell we may even be able to do with it drones in the near future.

But still, E7s and LTs making tactical decisions without Bn and Bde oversight! Simply unheard of

[jcustis]

At the outset, we had situations where taliban had been captured or had otherwise surrendered en masse.

http://www.combatfilms.com/cfrtv_archive_0013.asp

What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.

I believe I have my own answer, but are they more mobile and dispersed than they were in '01-'02, more committed given that they are in a resistance insurgency phase?

I tend to rub my temples when I think of the successes at the beginning, and try to ascertain why this has become so hard.

[Bill Moore]

What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.

We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.

Also worth noting the USSR's initial efforts were successful also for different reasons.

[Ken White]

We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.

However, the good news is my spies tell me that we're going back to a variation the 2001-02 policies with a couple of added hookers after being Americans and trying every conceivable alternative...

[Dayuhan]

At the outset, we had situations where taliban had been captured or had otherwise surrendered en masse.

http://www.combatfilms.com/cfrtv_archive_0013.asp

What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.

I believe I have my own answer, but are they more mobile and dispersed than they were in '01-'02, more committed given that they are in a resistance insurgency phase?

I tend to rub my temples when I think of the successes at the beginning, and try to ascertain why this has become so hard.

Coming from a completely non-military perspective here, though I've watched these processes in a few places.

I think this may have something to do with that transition from "clear" to "hold". When you're clearing, you have the initiative; you decide where you will clear and when. The other guy has to react to your choices. Holding is a lot more passive. If you're holding a lot of territory you have to spread out, and you have to support those spread out folks. The other guy can watch you. learn your routines, and decide where and when he wants to challenge your hold. He takes the initiative.

Of course holding doesn't preclude offense, but once you make that transition a large part of your effort, likely most of it, will be devoted to an essentially passive process that can allow the other side to take over the initiating role.

Again, a comment from an amateur perspective that may make no sense at all to the professionals... disregard if that's the case!

[Ken White]

Of course holding doesn't preclude offense, but once you make that transition a large part of your effort, likely most of it, will be devoted to an essentially passive process that can allow the other side to take over the initiating role.

Add the psychological shift in focus from active to passive and the not so minor debilitation and mind set modification that results. Focus is focus. Protecting your stuff is protecting your stuff...

The Army clears, the cops hold, the economy builds. You can change that but it won't work well. Don't have adequate Cops? keep clearing until you do. You can waste money building before you hold but it'll really drive up your costs...

Again, a comment from an amateur perspective that may make no sense at all to the professionals... disregard if that's the case!

I'm sure some professional will reject it because of it's provenance.

They should not; it's accurate.

[Ken White]

To go back to Bumperplate:

Why can't we train our more conventional forces to take on some of those mission sets that are on the edge between conventional and unconventional?... But, let's face it, it's not magic - it can be taught and developed. In order to do so, our conventional forces must stop being the 'ugly american' ... rather than just trying to please your rater/senior rater, is where I see the greatest disparity in my limited time being in joint environments with conventional and unconventional units in the same AO...This is not meant to be a probing question, but is there that much of a difference between some of our conventional units and SOF units in terms of executing some of these COIN and CT missions? For example, if 20 or so people are to go to a village and execute a raid in order to roll up some HVI, why can't those 20 people come from the 101st, as opposed to 2/75, or an ODA, etc?

In a word -- Turf.

Prior to the Viet Nam fiasco, conventional units trained for and could do those missions -- all of them. SF (there were few SEALs, no CAG, no 75th) was relatively small and focused on IW in an offensive mode. Initial US Troop deployments in Viet Nam were by units that had trained for SFA and that could and did do all Bumperplate suggests and did it pretty well.

Then the Personnel system took over, the one year tour was established and rotations began. In 1966 what I've called the Second Team came in and they weren't as competent at the basics for the environment because they had trained exclusively for European deployment; they weren't quite as capable so SF was expanded. In 1967, the Third string arrived and things started downhill. To cut this short, the 'conventional' force became less and less competent and so was cut out of the more exotic stuff. Didn't need to happen and should not have but it did...

Fast forward to 1987 and USSOCOM was established (an interesting tale unto itself... ), By that time the big Army had bought into a very flawed Task, Condition and Standard training system which was designed to train marginal recruits rapidly to minimum skill levels -- it did that and, with no war on, that seemed okay. This system did not produce units that could reliably do the more sophisticated and complex missions and, as USSOCOM was looking for missions to justify themselves, they migrated direct action missions into the folder. It was more complex than that and there were other factors but that in essence is why conventional units don't do that stuff today. Most cannot due to marginal training and -- turf...

Bill Moore:

What makes SOF special beyond the personnel selection? In my view it is their organization (very flexible) and special tactics.

Heh. I'll grant selection, add training (and money therefor...) and the organization's flexibility. OTOH, the tactics aren't special based on my experience and that of a currently serving Son, his friends and another couple of relatives including one currently deployed CIF type .

Most -- not all of those TTP -- are things any decent infantry battalion should be able to do (and have done and almost certainly will again if we have another war on the scale of Viet Nam or Korea, much less WW II) and most used to be able to do at least some of those things (good units could more than others but that never changes and is still true today). That was back in the Pleistocene era as shown in the attached picture (XVIII trained for light roles and SFA; II Corps trained for Europe and the ME, both on the basis of 80% primary mission / 20% the other mission).

But still, E7s and LTs making tactical decisions without Bn and Bde oversight! Simply unheard of.

In your time -- not prior to 1970. Different world back then. Risk aversion was killed quickly if it raised its ugly head (today it seems to be encouraged...). PSG /SFCs and LKTs who wouldn't seek responsibility and independence of action got fired in many units. I ran Recon Platoons, Airborne and Armored Cavalry off and on for seven years, less than two years total out of that with a Platoon Leader (counting all five, from one month to 10 at various times. Did that in peace and war (both combat deployments without a PL and had some interesting and independent missions far away from the flag pole). I assure you there were many other SSG and Platoon Sergeants who were acting platoon leaders and who were as well or even more trusted. Viet Nam killed that and the smart guys that rebuilt the Army foolishly left trust building (among other things...) out of their repertoire...

Shorter that - you're right for now; didn't use to be that way; can be fixed; will have to be with a big commitment.

Back to Bumperplate -- Turf -- and training. Units aren't trusted to do things like that because our training doesn't embed the basics of the trade at all well. Lack of training breeds lack of capability, one cannot or at least should not ask people to do things they have not been trained for.

Today's individuals are, across the board, better trained than were those in the days of that picture -- but the units can't do half what those units could do then. If I were a conspiracy theorist, I'd think it was by design to limit the missions on which the Army might be employed but I suspect it's a Hanlon's razor thing. I hope that's all it is...