Winning the War in Afghanistan

[bigdukesix101]

The UK can barely maintain 8,900. Don't look for any more they are not resourced to do it.

[davidbfpo]

Bigduke,

Yes, the UK commitment of around 9k troops is unlikely to grow much. The commitment, ostensibly one brigade is in fact really two brigades and accounts for 10% of the entire regular UK Army (my estimate). There are a number of reservists called up, as individuals not units IIRC and of course both the Royal Navy (includes Royal Marines) and Royal Air Force are there too.

I suspect comparison figures are available for European NATO contributors. Is the US commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq of a similar proportion?

Apart from the apparent inability of the UK military to generate additional resources there is the far wider political and public unease with the role. Add in our economic slide too.

Have a look at this critical UK-based blogsite for more: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Note the main contributor now says we should not be there.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A Canadian think tank paper 'Afghanistan’s Alternatives for Peace, Governance and Development: Transforming Subjects to Citizens & Rulers to Civil Servants', by what appears to be an Afghan scholar in exile in the USA: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/defa...0Paper%202.pdf

Yet to read fully, but as the civil aspects are getting more prominence worth a peek.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Michael Yon has been embedded with UK troops in Sangin, for fiev weeks and has written an excellent first-hand account: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm Yon is now en route to embed with USMC.

For murky reasons his embed has ended and neither side agrees why.

Stephen Grey, a UK journalist, has written a wide ranging article on the campaigning and whether the local strategy is correct: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp...and/index.html

davidbfpo

[Valin]

Michael Yon has been embedded with UK troops in Sangin, for fiev weeks and has written an excellent first-hand account: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm Yon is now en route to embed with USMC.

For murky reasons his embed has ended and neither side agrees why.

Stephen Grey, a UK journalist, has written a wide ranging article on the campaigning and whether the local strategy is correct: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp...and/index.html

davidbfpo

Thanks for the links


Cracking on in Helmand

(snip)

The public debate has rarely reflected the mixed-up reality of the war. In July, when the number of dead since 2001 overtook the total in Iraq, the debate was couched as politicians versus generals. Our troops demanded more helicopters, reinforcements and money. All of that was true—when Sergeant Johnson’s comrades kept vigil over his body for 24 hours, it was because no helicopter was available to take him off the hill. And a day earlier, many Afghan civilians had died because there were no helicopters to ferry the injured to hospital. But more men and more choppers are not going to win this war, still less address its purpose.

While this may be true, it must be asked if more men and equipment would not have provided the time needed to get the correct strategy?

Neither the air cavalry nor legions of fresh troops defeated the Vietcong.

The writer shows a real lack of knowledge about that damn war by saying this.

[davidbfpo]

Writing in The Guardian, an ex-UK Army officer, with an opening passage

Afghanistan: a question of stamina. We must finish the job in Afghanistan – the geopolitical alternative is too terrible to consider

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...-case-scenario

Ands ends with

Not for us perhaps, at least not initially, but for so many others. Now the fight has started we need to finish it. We have promised to help create something better and must deliver it. We just have to have the stamina and courage, both physical and moral to do so.

As expected there is a commentary here: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...-strategy.html

davidbfpo

[Valin]

Writing in The Guardian, an ex-UK Army officer, with an opening passage
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...-case-scenario

Ands ends with

As expected there is a commentary here: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...-strategy.html

davidbfpo

Exactly! The question is, do our political leaders have the guts(?) to stand up to the anti-war forces. Secondly, can they explain to people why we must stay there and win and the consequences of leaving.

How long does it take to fly from Kabul to Leeds or Denver Co.?

"Shrink The Gap"
Thomas PM Barnett

[Surferbeetle]

A Canadian think tank paper 'Afghanistan’s Alternatives for Peace, Governance and Development: Transforming Subjects to Citizens & Rulers to Civil Servants', by what appears to be an Afghan scholar in exile in the USA: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/defa...0Paper%202.pdf

Yet to read fully, but as the civil aspects are getting more prominence worth a peek.

davidbfpo

...for the link. Interesting reading this morning, his sketch of various parallel governments in particular. This one calls for another cup of coffee.

By the way, this might be of general interest to the water-centric folks: Water resource development in Northern Afganistan and its implications for Amu Darya Basin

This publication examines increased water use by Afghanistan and its implications for other water users in the basin, including the Aral Sea, both in the short and long term. Topics discussed include: the amount of Amu Darya flows generated in northern Afghanistan; the amount of water presently used in northern Afghanistan, prospective use in the near future, and possible impact of the increased use on the riparian states and the Aral Sea; existing agreements between Afghanistan and the neighbouring Central Asian states on the use of waters in the Amu Darya Basin, their relevance and applicability in the present and in the future; and future directions for water resources development and improved water management in the basin.

[Bob's World]

The UK can barely maintain 8,900. Don't look for any more they are not resourced to do it.

They would take 8,900 KIA and spit in the enemy's eyes; and have a million men on the ground.

Again, while the metrics guys are looking for indicators, we should apply a couple of metrics to the approach of our NATO allies to this sticky mess.

They come primarly to service the national interest of maintaining good relations with the US; not for any national interests they feel are at stake in Afghanistan. I suspect, that many, like the Pakistanis, realize that supporting the American approach to this problem to date too fully is far more likely to create instability at home, rather than the opposite.

Sometimes your friends are the last ones to tell you when you're being a jackass.

[marct]

Sometimes your friends are the last ones to tell you when you're being a jackass.

Yup. Of course, sometimes we do and you don't listen .

[Bob's World]

Yup. Of course, sometimes we do and you don't listen .

Those who are the busiest telling others what to do and how to do it are rarely the best listeners as well. Particularly when they are so damn certain in their "rightness."

[max161]

Those who are the busiest telling others what to do and how to do it are rarely the best listeners as well. Particularly when they are so damn certain in their "rightness."

We should all heed those wise words especially here on the SW Council!!!

I think it would be a great graduate student project for someone to analyze the national security debate since about 2006 to the present and try to assess the major protagonists (and antagonists)and their actual contributions to the debate and discern whether their outspoken positions on everything from the success or lack of success of the "Surge" to the American Way of COIN to the so-called "lily pad" "strategy" has really contributed to our ability to protect US national security. Or are they just peddling their own pet ideas and projects?

Debate is healthy and important but so is the ability to listen, learn, and discern, so that we can prevent the three major failures of all military operations - failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate (Cohen and Gooch in Military Misfortune)

[Fuchs]

Krulak letter to George Will

http://abcnews.go.com/images/ThisWee...ak_letter2.pdf

He's not about winning, but about accomplishing the real mission.

[Surferbeetle]

SWJ attracts excellent minds and acts as a digital salon which allows for the critical examination of many facets of the complex problems we face. I greatly appreciate the opportunities to visit because of the reasoned discourse shared by experienced people.

Marc, Dayuhan, Ken, Bill Moore, ODB, Omarali50, Wilf, and many others to include BW have valued insights to share however we all, to include myself, need to regularly fight the tendency to conflate our egos with the issues at hand.......this is much bigger than just one mans opinion...

[slapout9]

Yup. Of course, sometimes we do and you don't listen .

I am a Wardenfile but Bob is a "Missionary Man" for your listening pleasure and cultural enhancement.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RMEDBhXh-w

[jmm99]

Mr Will's article I read, but GEN Krulak's letter (linked by Fuchs) got my attention. The pdf doesn't allow cut & paste - so his 5 points are attached. I think they deserve some discussion here.

Buggered up my hand this weekend (so, one finger typing which does the hand no good) - in Internet terms, the lawyer is effectively silenced.

[Ken White]

Not being a Lawyer but able to use two fingers on the keyboard and being always willing to share my opinions, I'll take a shot at it.

General Krulak is as usual, pretty well on the money -- though I think he missed one critical issue. By the numbers:

1. He's right, of course -- that does not change the fact that we should be able to get DoD and DoS on the same page and it would behoove us to do so to preclude or at least diminish future stupidity on this scale. Depart too soon and the impetus to fix that disconnect will be diligently allowed to dissipate with the connivance of both Departments.

2. True, no question -- we do not have the troops to do the COIN trick. So any idea of 'fixing' Afghanistan before we depart should be DOA. We can leave it better than we found it and we can do as best we can what we said we would do and not just abandon them as we had before. Pakistan would appreciate that. So would Russia. So will the Afghans. So will we in the long term -- one of those pay now or pay more later things...

3. He's right again. We cannot defeat their ideas in spite of eight years trying. Will we -- can we -- come up with better ideas in the near term? Perhaps, perhaps not. Long as we're there, no harm in trying.

4. Still right -- But:

Afghanistan's structure is not a vital US national interest, nor, in a sense is that of Pakistan -- however, reasonable performance by both is in the interest of the world -- and thus, ultimately, in our interest to at least some degree.

What is in our national interest is finishing the commitment we launched eight years ago. It is not a 'vital' interest in the existential category however it is a critical issue that can have long term deleterious effects on the existential bit if not properly handled -- as we have seen over the past 30 years.

Whether we should have launched and made such a commitment is irrelevant. We did and we're there. In the view of most in the West, obviously including General Krulak and George Will, that is not a pressing or non-negotiable commitment; we should be able to say "we're tired now and the Troops are being run ragged by this and we need the money spent here at home so we plan to pack up and go home." We can say that.

However, the rest of the world will know we reneged on a commitment that we freely made. Even if we elect to go into denial over the issue, others will not. They will add one more item to the "America can be worn down" list which already has too many entries.

His suggestion about Hunter Killer Teams is reasonable and can be done. Unfortunately, it will not stop the slide of Afghanistan into chaos and will get a lot of good guys killed for very little benefit. I've done what he suggests as did many in the 1st MarDiv and the Army's 5th RCT in Korea in early 1951. It is effective, it cleared out the Guerrilla remnants of the North Korean Army (who were not well trained but were very dedicated -- as are others) around Masan and Pusan in a matter of weeks. It also killed a helluva lot of civilians and created one of today's hotbeds of anti-US sentiment in South Korea, That's 58 years ago -- and they still remember. Most of the world has a far longer memory (and attention span) than Americans seem to possess. I think he and Will both forgot that as well...

I also strongly doubt that we have adequate forces trained in numbers to support the idea; I doubt that Congress would go along with it -- certainly not after the first couple of H-K Teams got totally wiped out by the opposition -- or a Wedding Party proven innocent is killed to the last baby.

His suggestion entails a bunch of support and airplane people in Afghanistan. Due to distances involved, at least some would have to be there; the other 'Stans can and might take a few but no one will take many Americans because the Russians don't want that -- either way, those become targets as do their resupply convoys. Of course, we could use Contractors or get the Afghan Police to provide security. In short that's one of those idea that looks great on paper but a closer look reveals problems of capability -- and will. And little real change...

In summary, lot to agree with. However, he totally ignores the non-western idea of humbling the Great Satan as an activity for fun and profit. Surprising given Beirut and a Marine plus the hard fact that the humbling bit is exactly why we are in Afghanistan and Iraq. That's the goal they have, humbling -- death by a thousand grains of sand -- and our early departure from Afghanistan would aid them in achieving it.

We may not have a clearly defined goal in the eyes of many but I submit that goal should simply be to finish what we started, get a minimalist government in place that most Afghans can and will support -- then make sure we don't get stuck on stupid and try to do stuff like this in the future -- because regardless of what many like to think, we don't have that many friends out there and there are a great many who do not wish us well. Faltering performance is seen by many as an invitation to kill the weak who cannot keep up. Or to help others do that...

[Surferbeetle]

From Business Week by Amb. Ryan Crocker: The Ambassador on the Front Lines

Americans tend to want to identify a problem, fix it, and then move on. Sometimes this works. Often it does not. Of course, imposing ourselves on hostile or chaotic societies is no solution either. The perceived arrogance and ignorance of overbearing powers can create new narratives of humiliation that will feed calls for vengeance centuries from now. What's needed in dealing with this world is a combination of understanding, persistence, and strategic patience to a degree that Americans, traditionally, have found hard to muster.

From London Review of Books by Amb. Rory Stewart The Irresistible Illusion

The fundamental assumptions remain that an ungoverned or hostile Afghanistan is a threat to global security; that the West has the ability to address the threat and bring prosperity and security; that this is justified and a moral obligation; that economic development and order in Afghanistan will contribute to global stability; that these different objectives reinforce each other; and that there is no real alternative. One indication of the enduring strength of such assumptions is that they are exactly those made in 1868 by Sir Henry Rawlinson, a celebrated and experienced member of the council of India, concerning the threat of a Russian presence in Afghanistan:

In the interests, then, of peace; in the interests of commerce; in the interests of moral and material improvement, it may be asserted that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty, and that any moderate outlay or responsibility we may incur in restoring order at Kabul will prove in the sequel to be true economy.

[Rex Brynen]

We may not have a clearly defined goal in the eyes of many but I submit that goal should simply be to finish what we started, get a minimalist government in place that most Afghans can and will support

...this is becoming harder by the day, if the latest reports on the scale of voter fraud in the elections are accurate:

Fake Afghan Poll Sites Favored Karzai, Officials Assert, New York Times, 6 September 2009

KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghans loyal to President Hamid Karzai set up hundreds of fictitious polling sites where no one voted but where hundreds of thousands of ballots were still recorded toward the president’s re-election, according to senior Western and Afghan officials here.

The fake sites, as many as 800, existed only on paper, said a senior Western diplomat in Afghanistan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the political delicacy of the vote. Local workers reported that hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of votes for Mr. Karzai in the election last month came from each of those places. That pattern was confirmed by another Western official based in Afghanistan.

“We think that about 15 percent of the polling sites never opened on Election Day,” the senior Western diplomat said. “But they still managed to report thousands of ballots for Karzai.”

Besides creating the fake sites, Mr. Karzai’s supporters also took over approximately 800 legitimate polling centers and used them to fraudulently report tens of thousands of additional ballots for Mr. Karzai, the officials said.

The result, the officials said, is that in some provinces, the pro-Karzai ballots may exceed the people who actually voted by a factor of 10. “We are talking about orders of magnitude,” the senior Western diplomat said.

...

Most of the fraud perpetrated on behalf of Mr. Karzai, officials said, took place in the Pashtun-dominated areas of the east and south where officials said that turnout on Aug. 20 was exceptionally low. That included Mr. Karzai’s home province, Kandahar, where preliminary results indicate that more than 350,000 ballots have been turned in to be counted. But Western officials estimated that only about 25,000 people actually voted there.