Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.
Why?
Neither we or the British have much reason to participate in large number in many if any of those contests.
Build a strong capability, in a Democracy, and it will cry to be used -- whether it's necessary or not. Better to have slight capability and be able to to adjust if required. A good specialist will beat a good generalist in a specialized effort, a prudent generalist would avoid that by any means, fair or foul. There are other ways to deter, impact, disrupt. It is just stupid to play by the rules of another on his court...
I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting.
(Note underlines...)
Ken:
I thought I had a few, but Wikipedia tells me they were just movies. My mistake.
Steve
Agreed... but you have and you will (thanks to your respective politicians).
The capability needs to be built because it is going to be used as it has in the recent past.Build a strong capability, in a Democracy, and it will cry to be used -- whether it's necessary or not. Better to have slight capability and be able to to adjust if required. A good specialist will beat a good generalist in a specialized effort, a prudent generalist would avoid that by any means, fair or foul. There are other ways to deter, impact, disrupt. It is just stupid to play by the rules of another on his court...
The US has a 3m man military - half active, half reserve. Take a quarter million from each and prepare them, train them for interventions of an irregular war nature. Let the remainder prepare for the war with Russia or China that will never come... unless you are expecting an invasion from Mexico.
This approach will have a significant benefit for the US military in that it will force the military to attend to the (internationally acknowledged if not locally) weakness in the US military in the inability of companies/platoons/squads ability to operate independently with the specific command skill requirement thereof.
Secondly it will remove the 'tour mentality' that has been applied to war since Korea and at the same time keep the units and their command more constant and stable. 100 times better than right now I would say.
Its a good question... but its irrelevant. The politicians screw it up all the time and sadly so do the generals. Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors). One notices from the Brit military that at or around Lt Col senior officers need to become politically astute to survive and advance. What that level is in the US I don't know but it will be there. The problem is that these senior officers (many of whom have abundant physical courage) don't have much in the way of the moral courage required to stand up to the politicians even if it means an end to their military careers.I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting.
(Note underlines...)
The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.
Last edited by JMA; 10-08-2011 at 08:36 PM.
How so? MG is out, and without commitment of substantial outside ground forces. The US isn't trying to install or maintain a government, and has a half decent chance of staying uncommitted in the inevitable post-MG mess. Those were the objectives. They were achieved. What's the problem?
Maybe so, but they can be won and lost at the policy level. We screwed up in Afghanistan when we decided to install and maintain an Afghan government. Once that decision was made there was very little that could be done at any level to avoid sinking into the mire.
If winning is achieving your objective, the first and most important step to winning is to select clear, practical, objectives that are realistically achievable with the resources and within the time that you're willing to commit. That's not something the US has done terribly well.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
How many Battalions does the Pope have?
We certainly have; should've learned from Viet Nam that such interventions are foolish. We did, a bit and other than a few little aberrations, we avoided any major commitment along those lines for 30 years. Hopefully, within the next 30 -- and with two strikes to learn from -- we will grow a bit smarter. So there may be no "will."I don't agree on either count. "It is going to be used" is awfully positive and while you may be correct, I would hope -- as I said above, -- we get a bit smarter. There are other, better ways to handle such situations.The capability needs to be built because it is going to be used as it has in the recent past.
The capability doesn't have to built, it has to available which is not the same thing. Adjustments to training, some underway should be adequate IF they are not halted.We've been in several wars that weren't expected. They didn't all come in irregular form, think Korea and Kuwait...Let the remainder prepare for the war with Russia or China that will never come... unless you are expecting an invasion from Mexico.We have had a skill deterioration, no question. That is entirely the fault of the training establishment who took decent training programs and tossed them to adopt the atrocious Task, Condition and Standard process, probably so someone could say he brought great change on his watch. We have -- too slowly -- learned that was indeed a mistake and the Army is now groping for a way to fix their problem without admitting they used a flawed process for 30 years. That's the bad news -- the good news is that some units transcend that norm and can and in fact do those things, though there are not enough of them.This approach will have a significant benefit for the US military in that it will force the military to attend to the (internationally acknowledged if not locally) weakness in the US military in the inability of companies/platoons/squads ability to operate independently with the specific command skill requirement thereof.Maybe, maybe not. Probably not. The tour length is a Congressional issue...Secondly it will remove the 'tour mentality' that has been applied to war since Korea and at the same time keep the units and their command more constant and stable. 100 times better than right now I would say.No it isn't. Even dumb politicians eventually learn a little, even dumb American politicians whose egos do not allow the reading of history -- the Army needs to point that out (acknowledging that dumb Generals are another story...).Its a good question... but its irrelevant.As I told you long before it startedThe politicians screw it up all the time and sadly so do the generals. Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors).-- and he isn't surrounded by military advisors. By law, he only has one -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He talks to others on occasion but my impression is he talks and they listen...
Same rank. There's some slight merit in what you say but it's far from totally accurate. It's also far more complex than moral courage -- the degree of military subordination to civilian authority in the US is hard for many from other nations to fathom. It has a very pernicious effect...One notices from the Brit military that at or around Lt Col senior officers need to become politically astute to survive and advance. What that level is in the US I don't know but it will be there. The problem is that these senior officers (many of whom have abundant physical courage) don't have much in the way of the moral courage required to stand up to the politicians even if it means an end to their military careers.I can agree with the sentiment and all it conveys but must point out that nowadays those Battalions come from different units, frequently from different nations and small wars are only fought by all those Battalions if their higher headquarters and / or nation allow them to fight and do not otherwise intrude too heavily...The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.
What, Perfesser, is your solution to that little rub?
The interventions are only foolish because the generals are not allowed to win. Can't remember anywhere where the US forces were defeated.
I said the capability is needed because it is going to be used again and again. You disagree. Your disagreement is based on the hope that this is not true or that despite when you know the need is coming that you should not prepare accordingly?I don't agree on either count. "It is going to be used" is awfully positive and while you may be correct, I would hope -- as I said above, -- we get a bit smarter. There are other, better ways to handle such situations.
The capability doesn't have to built, it has to available which is not the same thing. Adjustments to training, some underway should be adequate IF they are not halted.
Politicians get smarter? Individually yes, they are like coyotes but rather than smarter they get more cunning. The problem is that just when a president starts to be in a position to learn from his screw-ups a new one is elected and he brings along a whole entourage of smart guys who have all the answers. When they had a good few thousand soldiers killed and/or maimed they move on and the cycle repeats itself. Its the US electorate that needs to get smart.
Then you use the balance of the active and reserve forces (all 2.5m of them - remember I said select and train 0.5m (half active, half reserve) to train for irregular wars).We've been in several wars that weren't expected. They didn't all come in irregular form, think Korea and Kuwait...
Come on Ken we live in the ear of the spin doctor. No problem for them to sell change on the basis that with the 21st Century have come new challenges which the military must adapt to. My fear would be that after 30 years there is no one left who remembers how it should be done.We have had a skill deterioration, no question. That is entirely the fault of the training establishment who took decent training programs and tossed them to adopt the atrocious Task, Condition and Standard process, probably so someone could say he brought great change on his watch. We have -- too slowly -- learned that was indeed a mistake and the Army is now groping for a way to fix their problem without admitting they used a flawed process for 30 years. That's the bad news -- the good news is that some units transcend that norm and can and in fact do those things, though there are not enough of them.
Congress again? Remind me who the enemy is again?Maybe, maybe not. Probably not. The tour length is a Congressional issue...
As I said (above) the politicians rotate so there is always a new crop of guys with big egos who know everything.No it isn't. Even dumb politicians eventually learn a little, even dumb American politicians whose egos do not allow the reading of history -- the Army needs to point that out (acknowledging that dumb Generals are another story...).
You were correct with your knowledge of how things work in the US, I was wrong in thinking that because the boys off that carrier could have wrapped it all up over a weekend that would be the preferred option.As I told you long before it started
I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief. Hitler thought that because he was head of state he somehow inherited the powers of a master military strategist - and see where that got him. The same bloated ego seems to be the problem with US Presidents. I sympathise.
Well it seems the US general staff is full of "yes sir, yes sir, three bags fill sir" types. What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? "Same rank. There's some slight merit in what you say but it's far from totally accurate. It's also far more complex than moral courage -- the degree of military subordination to civilian authority in the US is hard for many from other nations to fathom. It has a very pernicious effect...
Don't complicate it Ken, play to your strengths. All you have to really worry about is what you have control over. Don't concern yourself with the token gesture forces from nations who are just going through the motions.I can agree with the sentiment and all it conveys but must point out that nowadays those Battalions come from different units, frequently from different nations and small wars are only fought by all those Battalions if their higher headquarters and / or nation allow them to fight and do not otherwise intrude too heavily...
What, Perfesser, is your solution to that little rub?
But remember:
* If the government you are supporting is corrupt or illegitimate or both,
* If the local government's troops are crap or non-existent,
* If your commander's hands and those of his troops are tied by political limitations and RoE,
* If your military deployments lack continuity at all levels,
* If the war is seriously unpopular at home,
... then you have no chance of success!
Interventions in support of unpopular, inept, unsustainable governments that have little or no capacity to sustain themselves, without popular support at home are foolish no matter what you allow your generals to do. Even if you manage the temporary "win" of a transient military defeat of the insurgents, you still don't achieve the long term objectives, because those rely on a local capacity that doesn't exist and that you don't have the power to bring into existence.
The only non-foolish thing to do in these cases is to avoid any long-term involvement. If there's something there that really needs to be done, do it and get the hell out. Once you choose to stay, you're in the merde no matter what your strategy and tactics are. Strategy and tactics are the servants of policy and if the policy goals are unachievable (e.g. "install a sustainable western-style democracy" in Afghanistan") no strategy or tactics will make much difference.
Fortunately our foolish Presidents drag us into survivable conflicts. If we'd had a Hitler we'd have charged off and fought with the Soviet Union and China instead of meddling in little messes, and there would likely not be a United States today.
That option was of course available, but it would have left the US in the completely unacceptable position of being responsible for the aftermath. Next thing you know we'd be backing an unpopular and unsustainable government with little or no capacity to sustain itself against any number of insurgents, with little or no popular support back home: foolish. Much better to have it the way it went. Of course it's a mess and it will continue to be a mess; post-Daffy Libya was always going to be a mess. It's not our mess, and that was the critical objective that had to be met.What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? "
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Unbelievable -- you've seen the light. Great!
Awright. Great! Unbelievable -- but you're finally coming to understand the problem...Don't be snide and condescending, that's unnecessary. Not based on either -- it's based on a broader understanding of US policy and polity than you have or seem willing to accept. We do a lot of stupid things for a variety of good and bad reasons but we aren't therefor necessarily stupid and we do learn, if slowly.I said the capability is needed because it is going to be used again and again. You disagree. Your disagreement is based on the hope that this is not true or that despite when you know the need is coming that you should not prepare accordingly?
I see glimmers of hope in that direction -- the one potential flaw is the 'do good' mentality. Those squirrels are quite dangerous (see Libya...).Not so. They're smart enough -- but they tend to be far too tolerant of well known political foibles. That seems to be happening. Let us pray iot does.Politicians get smarter?... Its the US electorate that needs to get smart.In order, yes but the US Army is absolutely and insanely determined to never admit it makes mistakes. Everyone in the Army knows that's foolish and most Civilians know that also, yet they persist. It's one of their biggest flaws....No problem for them to sell change on the basis that with the 21st Century have come new challenges which the military must adapt to. My fear would be that after 30 years there is no one left who remembers how it should be done.
That last is more than a valid concern and it is evident that it has already occurred. Too many are reluctant to look at how things were done (or more importantly, why...) but a few are researching. The Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group is a repository of knowledge and good sense due to its wise use of retired persons as contractors and it is trying to affect training. It is moving to TRADOC and that has potential to be beneficial. There are other pockets of rediscovering basics and common sense, we can only hope they are encouraged and grow. Too early to tell but at this point the prognosis is marginal trending to favorable. We'll see.They mean well, really -- but warfighting is WAY down their list of priorities while the happiness of Mom and Pop, the Voters, are way up on that list.Congress again? Remind me who the enemy is again?Those days are gone, period / full stop. They have been for over 30 years and you missed it at the time because you were busy. Two important points; that pertains not just to the US; and that reality MUST be a part of planning.You were correct with your knowledge of how things work in the US, I was wrong in thinking that because the boys off that carrier could have wrapped it all up over a weekend that would be the preferred option.Thank you, we need all the help we can get on that score. Egos are a terrible thing...I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief...I sympathise.
My personal belief is that there should be no Commander in Chief. The Government should give its order to a Director of Military Operations who must give a minimally directive mission to geographic or type Commander who will design and execute plans to accomplish that mission. Not to be, I don't suppose, we must have bureaucracy...The system has always kept those guys (and there are always some stooging about...) under tight control. That control always existed and has since well titled Mad Anthony Wayne retired. It has tightened over the years with only rare exceptions, generally during the Civil War and to a lesser extent in WW II. Since then and particularly since Viet Nam for a variety of both Army and Societal reasons it has worsened, I foresee no major reduction barring an existential war.Well it seems the US general staff is full of "yes sir, yes sir, three bags fill sir" types. What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? "
I presume the personal pronoun is directed at the US. I agree with you but US consensus on that score is lacking due to an absence of need to focus. Each situation is different and as you know, politics of the day hold sway. It is critical that non-US observer bear in mind that US foreign, defense and military policy is almost entirely driven by American domestic politics. Little -- too little -- attention is paid to the realities internationally....play to your strengths. All you have to really worry about is what you have control over. Don't concern yourself with the token gesture forces from nations who are just going through the motions.Amazing!!! Absolutely correct (and thus my preference for avoiding such doomed escapades).But remember:
* If the government you are supporting is corrupt or illegitimate or both,
* If the local government's troops are crap or non-existent,
* If your commander's hands and those of his troops are tied by political limitations and RoE,
* If your military deployments lack continuity at all levels,
* If the war is seriously unpopular at home,
... then you have no chance of success!
After two years you've finally learned the things you blithely ignored that I tried to tell you at the outset...
Bill:
I suppose the issue of specialist and generalist has to do with the task at hand.
I spent enough time in Iraq with the truly magnificent men from Ft. Campbell to know that, within their military tasks, the breadth and depth of their training and expertise made them both capable specialists and generalists.
Where, I believe Dayuhan, Ken and I may differ with you is the nature and purpose of the task.
If, after 2003, Iraq was about transition to civilian control, OR long term administration of a failed state, the SF specializations and generalizations are not the key issue in answering basic next step questions?
How many Americans does it take to change an Iraqi lightbulb?
My guess? About 37. First, a response team to take out the anti-US sniper who shot out the light bulb (plus the ground clearance, air support, TOC oversight, and medevac system). Second, the bulb insertion team (plus all of the above). Last, the logistical chain to deliver the light bulb.
How many Iraqis does it take to change an Iraqi light bulb? One. Either they get it from the government (which might not function), or they buy it on the bountiful black market, then screw it in. Note: Any Iraqi with electricity for a light bulb has already had multiple interactions with the black market to fuel and/or operate his generator. A light bulb is a non-issue.
The inherent problem in this math is not a military one, and little of SF expertise can solve it. Possibly quite the opposite---that failing to solve it induces the need for SF fingers in the dyke that would otherwise not be necessary.
How many Americans does it take to change an Afghan light bulb?
Probably a lot more, especially in places where the theory of a light bulb has yet to become a reality.
Specialists in what?
Generalists in what?
How about the Philippines in the early 1900s?
Or how about all the insurrections put down by the Soviets within their empire, the USSR?
I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not.
(I am assuming IW means irregular warfare.)
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
The Philippines have been in a continuous state of low to high level insurgency since the Spanish first landed. No victories there.
Government suppression of those segments of the populace who dare to stand up for themselves are Pyhrric victories at best.
As to Malaya? The Brits finally conceded that they had no legitimacy or right to govern Malaya and finally removed the office of the high commissioner and also ensured that the ethnic Chinese populace had their civil rights issues addressed to the degree that they no longer supported the insurgents. They removed the thorn of external colonial intervention from the paw of the oppressed and aggrieved segment of the populace that the insurgency arose from.
There are always many motivations for why one joins an insurgency, but causation? That almost invariably derives primarily from how government governs and how some or various distinct and significant segments of the populace feel about the same.
True victories are where government evolves to address their shortcomings. So yes, of all your examples, Malaya is the best of good COIN; but not for the reasons found in military accounts of that insurgency.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Hate to sound like a very broken record, but there is a big difference between using SF for a targeted and localized mission, and building democracy, participatory governance and community engagement-either locally or up through the governance chain.
Back to Dahuyan's comment: A specialist beats a generalist. There is no generalist theory of new governance that has ever shown any enduring value. Soup with knives, cups of tea, hearts and mind, money as a weapon, etc... do not create viable communities or community governances---ground truth shows the opposite. Never worked in any neighborhood any of you ever lived in, and never would. Why should it work anywhere else.
It would be fun sometime to explain to the military why none of this stuff ever works, but it would require a willing organizational audience.
Libya, at present, is a community governance/participation problem for Libyans.
Steve,
Are you implying we have such specialists in the military or even the government? Actually I suspect history will support the argument that specialists are academics and very ineffective in the real world. It is very much the generalist, or rather the individual leader who the people either willingly embrace or fear that enables the development of new governments. Most won't be overly effective whether designed by a specialist or a generalist, it is the nature of government to be somewhat ineffective.There is no generalist theory of new governance that has ever shown any enduring value. Soup with knives, cups of tea, hearts and mind, money as a weapon, etc... do not create viable communities or community governances---ground truth shows the opposite. Never worked in any neighborhood any of you ever lived in, and never would. Why should it work anywhere else.
Mickey D's HR Plan...
Hmmm...so let's save the USG (...or Russian Gov, or Egyptian Gov, or...) some cash, wander over to Mickey D's and pick us up some generalists who will function as:
...drone pilots, satcom operators, and sf/d-boy stand-in's for tonights HVT mission. Specialists/academics are not needed...
...folks who will perform tonights emergency room shift and take care of broken bones, gsw, head injuries, internal damage, and follow on icu care. Specialists/academics are not needed...
....folks who can develop an engineering design, cost estimate, work breakdown statement, project schedule, statement of work, quality assurance/quality control plan, negotiate a contract, manage a contract, qualify for a construction bond, run a construction team, and get a country's infrastructure built. Specialists/academics are not needed...
...folks who can operate and maintain a coal-fired, natural-gas fired, oil-fired, or even a nuclear power plant. Specialists/academics are not needed...
...folks who can devise and execute fiscal and monetary policy...
Or, perhaps things are not that simple?
Sapere Aude
Heh. Didn't we do this earlier...
See Bob -- it was never totally quelled, just kept on a low simmer -- and we eventually left...Describe today's USSR to me?Or how about all the insurrections put down by the Soviets within their empire, the USSR?Because the intervening Army was the army of the government of Malaya at that time. The British had total control of ALL aspects of government. That's something no one else has ever had, including us in the Philippines and the Russians in the various SSRs. On Malaya, the distinct and obvious ethnic tilt also was unusual...I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not.it does. Not also my emphasis on large forces; a few have been turned by small forces.(I am assuming IW means irregular warfare.)
My point is that commitment of large conventional forces to such efforts is pretty well a route to failure; certainly to less than stellar success -- there's always a great cost in all aspects to everyone involved for small to no benefit, possibly to detriment...
Steve, you provided a great justification for specialists in general, but tapped danced all around my question and didn't provide an answer. We clearly provided all the specialists you mentioned above and more, what we didn't have was a capable generalist to pull them altogether in a cohesive way. More importantly, the nations we invaded didn't have that person or persons, or perhaps our actions prevented them from achieving power.
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