Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

First, crime and political uprisings are two very different things. Just like state vs state warfare is very different than warfare between a state and its own populace. I do not pretend to offer any insights as to how to make crime go away, that is a different topic for another forum.

I don't think you can dismiss it that lightly. As Marc said:

The problem is that there really is no strick dividing line between "crime" and "insurgency".

That says it better and more succinctly I did above:

""I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus (one) misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.""

You also said:

Look to the first component of my definition of poor governance:1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with

Maslow's first two needs are: Survival (Breathing, thirst, hunger, sex) and Security (Physical safety, freedom from attack). If one subscribes to that, then only e.g. hunger would drive one to fight and thus relinquish safety.

Maslow is suspect on many counts but in this case a look at most insurgencies will show that the insurgents did not operate in tune with his heirarchy at all -- they went hungry (usually enduring injustice and disrespect in the process) for a cause and 'good governance was not the cause; their government or power or continued profit was the cause.

In any event, if as you say "crime and political uprisings are two very different things." then perhaps you can answer my query:

""...However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...""

[raptor10]

Actually I would like to disagree with the notion that there is not a clear line of demarcation between crime and insurgency. I think once we look at all the salient features that distinguish insurgency we can see that it takes on a sufficiently different character from that of gang warfare to merit completely different modes of thought.

First off the United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines insurgency as "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." 1

The two main aspects of the definition insurgency that we should consider are that it is politically motivated and to attain it's political ends it resorts to warfare - as opposed to organized movements that use peaceful processes to engender a bloodless coup.

Warfare must neccessarily be thought of "as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities." 2

This political aspect is such a defining characteristic of an insurgency that it is a sufficient and neccessary condition of it.

The activities of these Bloods and Crips generally does not resemble the activites of insurgents in any meaningful way to warrant an analogy, it is the difference between Latrunculi and Legitimus hostis.

[raptor10]

""...However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...""

Hows about the battle of Adrianople?

I know, I know, I'm reaching pretty far back but it's the first that comes to mind.

[slapout9]

Folks, I have a detail that was just assigned to me that I have to take care of so I will respond with a little more detail later.

1-But my short answer is Gangs are Governments!!! They essentially perform the same functions and are formed for the same reasons.

2-When 2 systems engage both are changed. Meaning what happens in A'stan has a lot to do with what happens in America, most people just don't think the way.

3-When marct talks I always listen.

More when I can.

[Ron Humphrey]

Seems to me I remember reading about many of the problems which led to the downfall of both the Ottoman and Persian empires had quite a bit to do with "bad Governance"

kids with no clue and what not

Picking the wrong fight for little cause, and reckless abandon with treasuries also pretty high on the list

[Ken White]

Actually I would like to disagree with the notion that there is not a clear line of demarcation between crime and insurgency. I think once we look at all the salient features that distinguish insurgency we can see that it takes on a sufficiently different character from that of gang warfare to merit completely different modes of thought.

First note that no one said a thing about gang warfare, so that should not be an issue.

First off the United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines insurgency as "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." 1

Yes they do -- and if you believe the US Government's definition's of things are invariably correct, you haven't spent much time in the doctrine development arena and been in 20 person meeting where the most intransigent had his way and the proverbial squeaking wheel got oiled.

That is a convenient definition because I hope you can picture the furor is we were said to be aiding the Thais halt the mostly Muslim smuggling rings in the south that do business with Malaysia -- or that we're really still in Afghanistan due to the large scale Poppy cultivation and resultant smuggling out of southern Afghanistan. Those are criminal activities-- not gangs in the US sense but still criminal.

The two main aspects of the definition insurgency that we should consider are that it is politically motivated and to attain it's political ends it resorts to warfare...

Is it politically motivated or, are they like FARC in Colombia or the MLF or Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines all of which say they are politically motivated movements opposing a corrupt government -- when the truth is far different. I also mentioned the smugglers in Al Anbar.

Warfare must neccessarily be thought of "as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities." 2

That's patently ridiculous. It would be nice of that were so -- then we wouldn't have to fight Al Qaeda or Taliban neither of whom is a political community in the sense that Plato probably understood or meant. Regardles,, I suspect that if you were in a major fire fight with an unorganized group of drug runners in Mexico, you'd probably think you were in a war...

This political aspect is such a defining characteristic of an insurgency that it is a sufficient and neccessary condition of it.

We can disagree on that. Life just isn't that simple.

The activities of these Bloods and Crips generally does not resemble the activites of insurgents in any meaningful way to warrant an analogy, it is the difference between Latrunculi and Legitimus hostis.

Your erudition is impressive. Whatever you wish to believe but allow me to remind you that you're the one who brought US Gangs into the picture, no one else has suggested that aspect at all -- though I did say the Mexican drug gangs seem to be at war with the Mexican Army. Insurgency or not?

The issue was the blending of criminal activities with an insurgency. Activities which can include kidnapping, smuggling, extortion, embezzlement -- a host of thing NOT involving Gangs but those in power or who want power. I named seven specific instance of so-called insurgencies that actually are criminal operations using politics as cover. There are many more -- including tax evasion by 13 colonies...

As for Adrianople; "However, once across the Danube (and in Roman territory), the dishonesty of the provincial commanders Lupicinus and Maximus led the newcomers to revolt after suffering many hardships." (emphasis added / kw) LINK. That's a Wiki Quickie, dig into the Goths in more detail and you discover a lot of criminality on both sides.

It would be nice if it was as clear cut as you say. Regrettably it is not.

[Ken White]

Seems to me I remember reading about many of the problems which led to the downfall of both the Ottoman and Persian empires had quite a bit to do with "bad Governance"

whipped in war. They had plenty of insurgencies in their long lives, so which of them were the result of that poor governance?

The issue was not bad governance, there's plenty of that about -- then and now -- or who won, the question was name an insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

[Ken White]

2-When 2 systems engage both are changed. Meaning what happens in A'stan has a lot to do with what happens in America...

More. Much more with what happens here...

[Bob's World]

"An Insurgent, A Ranger, and a Gang member walk into a bar..."

I'm sure there is a joke in there somewhere, but I'm not laughing. Many things look similar on their face, many of these things also perform similar functions. If you want to somehow employ these things to do some similar task, then that may well work out.

But, and this is the critical element I suspect of BW analysis: If you want to make one of these things either go away or become unnecessary/irrelevant you must focus on why they exist and target that causation.

We recognize that as part of the empowering of non-state actors and populaces in general by the new information age that we are in; that criminal non-state actors are increasing in their resilance and ability to compete with formal governemmts in meeting needs of the populaces they emerge from; just as politcially motivated non-state actors are. On their face, this is a very similar phenom; and they both create major challenges to the formal governances that they challenge and compete with.

However, I have not been swayed by brothers Slap and Marc that becasue a criminal gang often looks and acts much like a political insurgency that they should be engaged with the same solution set any more than I have been swayed by brother WILF that because the same similarities exist between interstate military forces and intrastate insurgents that they should be addressed similarly as well.

I recognize why those beliefs are logical, I just believe they are flawed as they focus on capability and function over causation and purpose.

[marct]

Hi Bob,

But, and this is the critical element I suspect of BW analysis: If you want to make one of these things either go away or become unnecessary/irrelevant you must focus on why they exist and target that causation.

I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you on this point so much as I am disagreeing with you on causation. Despite Raptor10's stated belief that

This political aspect is such a defining characteristic of an insurgency that it is a sufficient and neccessary condition of it.

I totally disagree; monocausality, in this case "politics", is completely at odds with the historical record.

We recognize that as part of the empowering of non-state actors and populaces in general by the new information age that we are in; that criminal non-state actors are increasing in their resilance and ability to compete with formal governemmts in meeting needs of the populaces they emerge from; just as politcially motivated non-state actors are. On their face, this is a very similar phenom; and they both create major challenges to the formal governances that they challenge and compete with.

Agreed, but I see this as a continuing process where the "formal governments" you refer to are merely a phase. From my viewpoint, the crucial processes to examine are group formation, group dynamics and group interaction - institutional "crystallization" to use a term from theoretical sociology. As such, "causation" is an emergent property of these processes, and groups slip and slide between interactive states.

Coming from this viewpoint, what I want to know is the process whereby a group decides to move into one of the several states that might be termed as "insurgent". This could be an isolation state ("Independence"), a revolutionary state (taking over the governmental institutions), a state of acting outside the social institutions (sometimes called "criminality"), or any number of other states that delegitimize the governance status of the "formal" system.

However, I have not been swayed by brothers Slap and Marc that becasue a criminal gang often looks and acts much like a political insurgency that they should be engaged with the same solution set any more than I have been swayed by brother WILF that because the same similarities exist between interstate military forces and intrastate insurgents that they should be addressed similarly as well.

I wouldn't say that they are in the same relational states, but I would argue that the difference between those states is fairly shallow, and it is quite possible to move between them. Should they be engaged with "the same solution"? Nope, but that is neither here nor there when it comes to the issue of developing a theoretical model of group interactions and dynamics. Limiting your model to the solutions you currently have available is, IMO, quite dangerous since it means that you have a large blind spot where you can be attacked with impunity because "it's not [my] problem".

I recognize why those beliefs are logical, I just believe they are flawed as they focus on capability and function over causation and purpose.

I suspect that you are ascribing purpose rather than analyzing it . As to causation, I'm still not sure why you rely on a sui generis taxonomy if you are interested in actual causation.

Bob, let me reiterate that I am treating this like a grad pub discussion - I'm playing with the ideas and models with a desired goal of co-creating a model that can actually match all available data. That's an academic style focus, and I recognize that it is quite different from what you are looking for. I even recognize that the type of model I would like to see developed would be hard to apply given today's institutional blinders .

[Bob's World]

Its all good discusion. Far better than I often get with people who are actually "in the business" so to speak.

We look at what we describe as the "nexus of Crime, Migration, and Extremism" in the context of what we see as "a competition for sovereignty." here in my shop. Those are the headlines, and there is much behind those comments, and the comments themselves are often intrepted in ways we don't intend by those who hear them in isolation.

The world is in a period of accelerated change. Its fascinating. Old instituions and "truths" are being challenged by newly empowered individuals and organizations. I agree completely that what most see as "governance" today will look very different to our grandchildren. Count on it. But what to fear and what to embrace? Not all change is bad, even if it is changing what we see as "good" currently.

But I just caution (myself as well as others) that we don't become so blinded by what we know that we fail to understand. My personal quest is one of understanding and constraint in a community that is far more impressed by and rewarding of knowledge and action. I'm ok with that. I have a role.

[marct]

You know, Bob, you should really get your shop to host a symposium and get us all together in person .

On a (slightly) more serious note, one of the things that's happened in academia is we have specialized so much that we often don't have people with similar interests in our home universities. The development of COI's such as SWJ has really allowed us to get out and talk shop with people who are looking at the same "events" but from radically different perspectives.

[Fuchs]

I unleashed some cruelty on this thread; I used the "Search this thread" function with the word "definition".

It was used in the past 20 hrs, but never in regard to the word "victory".

SWC has a feel of near-scientific, serious debate - shouldn't we look at the definition of the most important term?

I ask because "mission accomplished" isn't the same as victory". In fact, it's not even necessarily "success" (except with a tunnel vision on the mission).


I'd say a war is "won" if it was the better alternative to peace.
To defeat an enemy but to sustain higher net damage than would have occurred without the war is no success and no victory to me - it's rather a failure.

So let's not just look at mission accomplishment and defeating an enemy - let's also take into account the damages that the West accepts by waging war.

I never got why many people value the life of a civilian higher than the life of a soldier. I'd rather sustain 100 dead civilians in a terror strike than to sustain 200 KIA in a WOT.
And I'd certainly favour spending money on actual defence over spending money on offence as long as the offence doesn't seem to live up to the hype of protecting us.


It doesn't matter whether you disagree - I think we can agree that it's no good idea to spend resources and lives on an approach if we know a better approach.
A discussion of an approach and how it could succeed should therefore take into account what else could be done (or at least hint at it).

[Ken White]

"An Insurgent, A Ranger, and a Gang member walk into a bar..."

Look at the Insurgent -- but don't forget there are really only a few Rangers on a per capita basis (this is a good thing... ) and that all -- most -- criminality is not based on being a Gang member. Most criminality is in fact NOT gang related any more than most Soldiers are Rangers or everyone in a bar that doesn't agree with governmental policies is an insurgent. One could say the wealthiest Criminals have risen above gang membership to an executive level and thus seek to broaden their powers by tucking the government under their wing.

Gangs are not the point; the point is that criminal activity fuels the origin of many so called Insurgencies which adopt the mantra of "the government is oppressive" simply because it sells well in the western press. As it apparently does among people who should be willing to look a little deeper...

As you say:

you must focus on why they exist and target that causation.

Couldn't agree more. I'm merely suggesting that if one gets target fixation one can focus on the wrong causation and thus apply a not totally appropriate fix.

Seven current 'insurgencies' were cited above. All are nominally opposed to 'poor governance' in the telling. All are in fact criminal operations touting insurgency as a cover.

[Bob's World]

What we need is some bold new concept of Full-Spectrum Deterrence that helps us to balance our enagement, pro and con, across this enhanced range of players so that we can better achieve the effects we seek, without inadvertantly provoking effects we'd rather avoid.

I'll need to get on this...

[jmm99]

I agree with this in theory:

To defeat an enemy but to sustain higher net damage than would have occurred without the war is no success and no victory to me - it's rather a failure.

but, in practice, it is impossible to balance the books. Positing that we have a war which ends, we can tally up the costs, tangible and intangible. Tallying up the costs, tangible and intangible, if we had not the war in the first place, is speculative because there are too many variables involved.

Alternative history is fun, but it is speculative. My take.

[Fuchs]

Philosophy and science will probably evolve to the point where the net benefit or loss can be known.

So long we should at the very least acknowledge the components of victory and not allow the costs to be lost out of sight.

We should also be aware that reaching a (possibly evolved) war goal doesn't necessarily mean to be successful (at the national level) or to have won.

Sometimes it's best to acknowledge that further action is likely to hurt more than to help - and to stop dreaming about potential benefits and accept the hardships of reality 'like a man'.

[marct]

Hi Fuchs,

Philosophy and science will probably evolve to the point where the net benefit or loss can be known.

Actually, we can "know" them right now. The problem isn't in the knowing, it's in a) the way of knowing (it's a probabilistic sheaf of potential costs) and b) the communicating (most people have a really hard time thinking in probabilistic sheafs).

[jmm99]

You can estimate the costs-benefits of two (or more) courses of action before you decide on which one to follow. Basically, in law or military matters, that is a "fuzzy logic" problem, with some neural networking (real and artificial) tossed into the mix.

Once the course of action is excuted (and it may change in plan over the course of its execution), the situation has been changed by the course of action. So, merely resurrecting the alternative course of action (and its costs-benefits ab initio) could be very far off what would have happened if that course of action would have been pursued.

I suppose that experience might suggest a ballpark solution, but any exact comparison is at best "fuzzy". As is said, the essence of law is experience, not logic - and military decisions are probably similar.

[slapout9]

More. Much more with what happens here...

Yes there is a lot more. For a system to survive it must accurately understand reality and adapt to it. So where to start? Since we are approaching the anniversary of 911 and AQ was the original enemy I will begin there. We have never understood AQ as a system and we are hurting ourselves by not doing so. AQ is a system... an organization and before you can really begin to change it you have to understand how it really operates.

What is often missed is that AQ is TERRAIN independent. You can invade A'stan and stabilize A'stan but in the end you have not done much to remove AQ as a threat because they do not need A'stan to do what they do. A large part of their Attack was planned in Germany and The United States should we invade Germany and the US....do we need to stabilize these countries

AQ operates very much like the Mafia which was an Italian Organization based on kinship that was camped out in the United States.....right in the middle of all that democracy and infrastructure and modernization. None of which stopped them from doing what they do. None of that will stop AQ either. When we begin to attack AQ as an Organization and the "whole organization" we will start making some headway.

As for A'stan there is no rational reason for staying there but there is a moral reason. We broke it.... we need to fix it to the bare minimum... as in put it back like it was before (kinda like what Ken said earlier) no multi-million dollar electric plants, that is for them to do. Get over demonizing the Talliban. The Talli-Banksters on Wall Street are a far more serious threat to the US.