Winning the War in Afghanistan

[William F. Owen]

WILF would be my hitman if sh*t hit the fan.

Seriously, you could not hire a worse hitman! More likely to hurt myself than anyone else these days, and not that skilled even back when it mattered!

[jmm99]

deceiving .....

Which seems a good point to keep in mind when considering the topic at hand.

[tequila]

This debate on strategy in Afghanistan is NOT an either/or of Occupy with Pop-Centric COIN versus simply leaving and only conducting limited CT.

What BW is describing (I think), is a softer, lighter footprint and indirect approach. Instead of masses of foreign soldiers conducting COIN and SFA, we go back to the traditional SF role of FID as seen in the Phillipines and Colombia where civilian and military advisors quietly advise the HN government. It takes a lot longer to do, but it is more effective. Simultaneously, we allow the other SOF elements to stalk the enemy at night.

v/r

Mike

That makes a bit more sense than Krulak's prescriptions.

I agree that from a standpoint of military and political endurance, this is much more doable than pop-centric COIN.

However, I think it fails to take into account the ability of the Taliban and its motives, as well as the possible reaction of Pakistan and Iran. The GoA is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy at the moment in the international arena and a slow-motion destruction of said legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan public. The withdrawal of foreign forces will mean in reality handing on-the-ground control over entire provinces of Afghanistan over to the Taliban and its allies. It is difficult to see how the GoA can survive in such a state.

Such a GoA would likely be forced to bandwagon support from what commanders it could bribe or manhandle to its side. Iran, and more importantly, the Pakistani military establishment, would seek out similar allies to entrench their own interests. Large segments of Pakistan's military appear to believe that Pakistan's interests are best served by aligning with the Taliban, the HiG, and the Haqqanis rather than the GoA.

The examples of El Salvador, the Philippines, and Colombia lack the troublesome neighbors that Afghanistan has, as well as the centrality to the jihadi universe that Afghanistan represents. All three states were also far more advanced and able than the GoA or the Afghan Army and Police are ever likely to be, even with American assistance.

[wm]

To find the murdering sons of dogs who had attacked us, and to punish them for their actions. (Revenge)

If we wish to talk of strategic ends, then we ought to talk about the ends of punishment. Punishment is a means to an end--but what end and how good a means is it? By ends, I mean goals. In what follows, I think I'm espousing a pretty standard line found in HLA Hart's "'A Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment."
Punishment is usually done to achieve one of three ends/goals: revenge, rehabilitation, or remediation (we might also consider reparation, but that seems a sub-category of remediation to me).
Revenge is a poor motive for punishing--it tends to continue to pile wrong on to wrong (and treats other people as objects not as people--see Immanuel Kant's ethics for an explanation why this is immoral or at least amoral). And do we really feel better after the fact?
Rehabilitation is supposed to keep a perpetrator from recidivism--The only case of this working that I know of is to be found in Butler's fiction Erehwon (which happens to spell "Nowhere" backwards), where crime is actually a treatable disease like the measles.
That leaves us with remediation. I ask what could we have gotten out of aiding the Northern Alliance to help restore things to something like the status quo ante 9/11/2001.

Invading Afghanistan was a quintessential example of closing the barn door after the horse had already run away. Our response to 9/11 should have been something that made it clear in no uncertain terms to those who planned such activities that the US would not sit idly by while those of their ilk thought about occupying/bombing our embassies, bombing our ships in foreign harbors, or stealing our planes and flying them into buildings.
One doesn't show another that "crime doesn't pay" with crimes like those I just described. Instead one needs to interrupt the planning process, show that planning such a crime doesn't pay. And that cannot happen after the crime has been committed. So we need to be better at identifying plots and stopping them with actions of extreme prejuduice to the plotters. We don't do that with a large general purpose force tromping around another country dropping bombs and shooting missiles at suspects fleeing the scene of the crime. Wedo that by cultivating relationships with people who sense that hurting others is a bad thing to do and getting them to tip us off whne they get word that someone else is contemplating doing that to us or those near and dear to us.

We need to focus on the populace. Whatever course is most likely to make the Afghan populace neutral to America, or perhaps even somewhat pro-America is what we should seek. Occupation rarely achieves that end.

Sounds like a variant on commmunity-based policing to me; how about you Slap?

[Ken White]

The whole idea is that we can send a few ODAs instead of a few Divisions to places like this where we have concerns that are important, but that for whatever reason are best managed with a light hand on the wheel.

Absolutely, totally agree -- and get a few more ODAs by dumping the strategic recon mission and the CIF. Put those missions in specially trained organizations and save the SF for their more important if less glamorous job. I look forward to seeing all that implemented.

Trust me, we understand moral obligation. We just don't think one should wear it like a badge of honor to cover motivations that are in fact something very different....

"We. We..." What is this we stuff...

Seriously, understand that you understand it is not so much a moral obligation as it was a commitment of the 'full faith and credit' of the US and I'm glad to hear that.

However, I do not understand the inference that the commitment is being fraudulently misused for other purposes. Could you expand on that for us?

You have elsewhere inferred that a precipitous withdrawal is to our strategic advantage but have never explained why that might be. You have also never stated whether you believe that such a withdrawal will incur a penalty affecting future US actions or, that if it does incur one it will be manageable. Any thoughts on those factors?

[slapout9]

Glad I could offer some humor to this otherwise serious debate. Eventually, I'm going to do a dissertation on this topic, game theory, and international relations using marraige, divorce, and arbitration.

BW is finishing up his plan which is pretty good from what I understand. Now, I'm ready for some SBW.

Slap- since you're taking a systems-based approach, I would suggest that you brush up on Mintzberg (the godfather of systems) and check out Dr. Jon Arquilla's work on the enemy as a social network- a more organic, open system. Besides that, you caught my attention with the Band of the Hand or paragraph one alpha- enemy situation.

Standing by for class.

v/r

Mike

Mike, you may have to wait a while as part of what you bring up will be in my article if Col. Gurney decides to publish it. I learned about organic systems thinking in 1963...1964?? so be patient.

Bob's World plan will be good. I was the one that originally posted his article for discussion and also got his email so he would join the SWC(which he probably regrets)
I agree with him most of the time but on some I don't.

SBW I should have posted that a long time ago, I needed a mental model of the Situation. I don't believe in planning in competitive/dynamic environments.....you'll just loose Dynamic Models can be useful.
As for class......go.... run to the video store and rent Band of The Hand this weekend..... you will like it and there will be many good lessons to learn. Let me know what you think.

[davidbfpo]

Citing WM and a Quote:

Originally Posted by Bob's World
We need to focus on the populace. Whatever course is most likely to make the Afghan populace neutral to America, or perhaps even somewhat pro-America is what we should seek. Occupation rarely achieves that end.

WM's question:

Sounds like a variant on commmunity-based policing to me; how about you Slap?

WM,

Community-based policing models do not conduct policing on the basis of changing how the population "feel" towards a foriegn power, even one present locally. Community policing tries to meet local public needs for law enforcement / security etc and what the state wants the police to deliver. Both sets of priorities vary - public nuisances preferred by the public over robbery for example, crimes that happen to others. There can be communication with the public, direct rather than via elected officers and trying to increase community-based provision of information.

INHO Afghan needs are reasonably well known: religion, social customs, security, justice, health, education and minimal state government.

In many places for all manner of reasons achieving this would mean our retirement, with more remote means to fight and deter local hospitality for our enemies - not their enemies.

This completly ignores the theory in community-based policing that the local population will provide the police with good, reliable information to target issues and individuals. An issue that rears it's head on SWC regularly; the 'Find' factor.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

At the end of the day, I am still not clear on what the Strategic goal is. Seriously, what is it?

1. AQ could work out of Canada or Pakistan, so going after AQ is not really a goal.
2. Stable A'Stan. OK, but why? See AQ? If it is just because saving Afghans is good, do we start on Somalia next?

A stable A'Stan requires defeating those who would seek to gain power by violence, and that can really only be done by violence, but at the heart of my slightly mis-represented "blood, fire and Pillars of Smoke," Irregular Warfare, I see violence as merely a instrument to Strategy, and Strategy instrumental to Policy..... so what's the policy and WHY?

[William F. Owen]

This completly ignores the theory in community-based policing that the local population will provide the police with good, reliable information to target issues and individuals. An issue that rears it's head on SWC regularly; the 'Find' factor.

Spot on. Exactly!

Armchair eh? Pretty good armchair from where I sit!

[jmm99]

WRT to AQ, there are four ends realized by hunting down and killing specific AQ leaders (or by accepting their surrenders if they are so inclined):

1. Retribution - yup, revenge, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. This may not satify jurisprudes, but it would satisfy a large percentage of our society. Since I believe that law reflects society (and is not based on jurisprudential logic), that is an acceptable end.

2. Reprobation - expression of and validation of society's disapproval of their acts. Again, an acceptable end if one accepts society as the source of law.

3. Specific deterrence - if they are dead or detained, they cannot repeat what they did. That is simply a fact.

4. General deterrence - I am not a particular fan of general deterrence in criminal law because many criminals do not think about the time they might spend for the crime, or ignore it. However, those who rationally look at potential consequences (e.g., a nation-state or a calculating non-state actor) might be a different story - and some here think so. A friend of mine said that we have capital punishment backasswards. It should apply to white collar crimes where the consequences are considered.

While criminals do rehabilitate, AQ leadership is not likely to convert (minor fish are another story).

Remediation is a non-starter.

PS: For a view of how the legal system, judges & lawyers actually operate, take a look at "FROM LEGAL THEORIES TO NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY REASONING" (only 11 pages).

[slapout9]

Sounds like a variant on commmunity-based policing to me; how about you Slap?

Community based policing works because..........WE KNOW WHO TO PROTECT. In A'stan we don't know who the enemy is, so how in the world can you know who to protect....you might be and at times probably are protecting the enemyDomestic Violence/Counter Stalking Ops would be a better model because you tell the victim/protectee right up front for this to work you must have their cooperation.



The Original concept of Problem Oriented Policing is better IMO....... similar to what they are calling Intelligence Led Policing.

[Ken White]

When you answer the call, you have no clue who's at fault, how it will go and who may end up going bonkers...

Better that friends and neighbors intervene early and low key to defuse the issues before they get to the 911 calling stage...

[jmm99]

here's my attempt at a very simplified Stalker-Victim network. Everyone but the police know who the Stalker is (if there is a stalker) - the police have to rely on cooperation from the folks (who may or may not be telling the truth).

A complete investigation would add police links to the alleged Stalker's friends and neighbors, as well as to the alleged Stalker - that part of the network not drawn. Ken's suggestion about letting the neighborhood handle the situation works for me.

Put a ? on each cooperation link because that is not assured.

[slapout9]

When you answer the call, you have no clue who's at fault, how it will go and who may end up going bonkers...

Better that friends and neighbors intervene early and low key to defuse the issues before they get to the 911 calling stage...

Ken,that is some pretty serious systems thinking. If you can engage the larger system that controls the smaller system you are way ahead of the game. Gee like all the countries surrounding A'stan

jmm99, I forget the exact number but about 80% of real stalkers are known to the victim usually an x-somebody. The TV type stalkers are out there but they are rare, but they are the ones you will usually see on TV reports. Your diagram is valid whether you know them or not.

[jmm99]

your correction of 80% X-Stalkers is well taken. Put ? on each evidence link as well.

My magnus opus ( ) on Astan is my next post.

[jmm99]

Primarily to BW & Ken, but to all others also.

---------------------------------------------------
Pursuit of Targeted Enemies

from BW
... 1. To find the murdering sons of dogs who had attacked us, and to punish them for their actions.

That mission has not been accomplished (my prior post on the four ends of punishment). That mission is not geo-focused since the targets have moved - and may move again and again. My take is: that mission should not be time-limited (the Scythian, Roman & Mongol dogged pursuits of specific enemy leaders are models - we could use a Subodai in charge of that project); and would be best done by my little belled cat (a hitman at heart), who seems not what he is (at heart).

What is the danger of dogged pursuits ? The danger is not in the pursuit of targeted individuals. The danger is in attempting to "take care" of all AQ, or all Taliban, or all terrorists. We have an example of that strategy. In 1649, as a culmination of a series of "beaver wars", the Iroquois destroyed the Huron homeland (near Lake Simcoe, Ontario). Not satisfied with that, they relentlessly pursued the Huron remnants in all directions as they fled to other tribes. As those refused to give up their "guests", the Iroquois attacked them in far flung efforts from the Mouth of the St. Lawrence, into the wilds of Ontario, and onto the Ohio valley and the Great Lakes.

In the early 1660s, the Iroquois had gone a few portages too far; and suffered two major defeats by the Ojibwe and their allies (the remnants of the tribes attacked by the Iroquois in the "Great Pursuit" of the Huron remnants) - one near Green Bay, the other at Iroquois Point near S.S. Marie. The net result of the Great Pursuit was devastation of Ontario, Lower Michigan, the Ohio Valley and a good chunk of Pennsylvania. It also resulted in the decline of the (then) Five Nations, both economically and militarily. So, that vignette should be a lesson learned.

In any event, the targeted AQ mission is not a reason for substantial force projection in Astan - the belled cat requires only his own little litter box and a good supply of yummies.

That brings me to BW's major question:

from BW
So, I ask this august group, those who feel morally compelled to hold this piece of dirt at all costs when no enemy action fixes us to it, nor does any critical interest become exposed to enemy action if we withdraw to better ground, which, exactly, of these two ends do you think we can either achieve or enhance by this plan??

I am not the best person to brief this point, which is really Ken's point - and, as to that, I'm not totally convinced. But, what follows are my thoughts.

---------------------------------------------
Compromise and "Saving Face"

My initial reaction to Ken's argument (that compromise is considered surrender) was that can't be totally right; but it isn't totally wrong - and that I've seen a better explanation elsewhere. I found it in my Manchu law book (S. van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China, 1966 - from a long ago Comp Law class).

The Chinese have two words that physically can mean "face"; but which non-physically form the CoG of their traditional village legal system.

The first is mien-tzu, which focuses on prestige and reputation; and as such can be accumulated (or diminished) by deliberate efforts. For example, mien-tzu can be increased by a series of successful kan-ch'ing transactions (private and personal relationships, economic and non-economic) - or decreased by a series of unsuccessful transactions. In short, mien-tzu is an intangible "stock of goods" which can be added to, or decreased, by degrees.

The second (and more important) is lien, which focuses on the image of good character and personal integrity. It involves the confidence that others have in the person with lien, and the confidence that person has, to conscientiously fulfil his social role - at whatever the cost to the person with lien. A necesary corollary is that higher demands are placed on those with higher social status. This last point is also made by the Chinese treatise on "Unrestricted Warfare" - the US (as a hegemon) has to comply with its own rules. So, this is not merely a theory of old Manchu law.

Unlike mien-tzu, lien is a quality which is kept intact or forfeited - one cannot have a little bit of lien. So, the question (rhetorical) was "since he doesn't care for lien, what can you do with him ?" And the answer is "nothing" - or in Manchu legal terms: pu-yao lien - not to want lien is a serious accusation meaning that the person does not care what society thinks of his character. That person is ready to obtain benefits in defiance of moral standards; and as to whom social sanctions have no effect because he does not recognize the rules of the game. Worse yet, if that person is in the habit of not wanting lien, his friends and neighbors cannot predict his future behavior. In the most extreme case, the person lacking lien becomes a pariah and outlaw.

What do mien-tzu and lien have to do with the concept of compromise - which is the key to settlement of Chinese village disputes; and, if properly done, does not involve loss of either mien-tzu and lien. Let's start with a very simple transaction - a loan from A to B. If B has to borrow, that is an admission of inadequate mien-tzu. So, we see the solution in what we call a simple promissory note:

B, being in need of money, borrows from A of X village with C as a middleman & witness, the sum of Y in principal and interest. This amount to be repaid on [date]. Oral agreements cannot be depended upon, therefore this written contract is signed.

/s/ Middleman C

/s/ Borrower B

What did the middleman (chung-jen) do for his 3% fee (his scribe got 2%) ? Simply stated, he negotiated the transaction - amount of principal and interest, due date, and his representation that A needed the money. If the loan was refused, the middleman was the scapegoat - and, if granted, was also responsible (in a moral sense) for the terms of the loan.

If the loan was not repaid, the original middleman (and perhaps added middlemen) entered the picture to arrange a settlement - often a compromise. In that way, the parties' positions were not cast in stone, but were the middleman's positions. Anyway, the middleman went back and forth (akin to a mediator) until a compromise was reached. In that compromise, mien-tzu might be gained or lost by one or both parties; but both parties retained their lien since the compromise was the middleman's moral responsibility.

So, that is why I suggested some form of Peace Enforcement as the Astan end goal, where the Astan govt, Pashtuns and Pakistanis are the parties to a negotiated settlement. And, where we (Coalition) are not parties to the negotiations. And, where we (Coalition) are not middlemen either. In short, we keep our nose out of the settlement negotiations - and any resultant compromises would be the responsibility of the middleman (e.g., Indonesia ?). In short, we should take a lesson learned from the Paris Accords and not try to be Kissengers.

If they don't start negotiations within a reasonable period (as determined by Slap ), we leave - except for the belled cat.

Isn't there something like a disappearing and reappearing cat ?

PS: When I bought the Manchu book in the 60s, softcover was $2.50 - now Amazon has it in hardcover for over $100. Ain't inflation wonderful - and going to get more wonderful unless we adjust our attitudes.

[Bob's World]

I think Ken and I have both gone on record as big fans of "dogged pursuit." Like so many things in life, HOW one does them is far more important that WHAT one does. (Think MLK's streetsweeper speech). America MUST be relentless in the pursuit of AQ, but we started big and got bigger. My vote is for smaller, more focused, less demands on our allies and less impact on the states and populaces where the action takes place. Be very clear that this is an enduring effort, that we are not going to either ask for permission nor apologize for our actions, but that we have a duty and that we will pursue it. Then hand the mission to a small, well resourced team of quiet professionals and let them do their job.

As to Afghanistan, I think America has an opportunity to have a great relationship with this country, and that there is at a certain core level a lot in common between the American spirit and the Afghan spirit. We just need to 'rightsize' the relationship. It takes a big man to admit ones mistakes and to start fresh; but usually such action draws far more respect than disdain. I think its ok to say "we made some decisions, that in retrospect probably weren't the best ones, and we need to readjust our position and policy here. I find it a bit crazy that we can double our effort with greater ease than we can half our effort. That bit of psychology probably explains why nations get sucked deeper and deeper into these situations until they either 'win' or 'lose.' I think we win by taking a more moderate course in support of the Afghan government (whatever that may become) and its people. Rightsizing our 'dogged pursuit' efforts enables this as well.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Slap

The Original concept of Problem Oriented Policing is better IMO....... similar to what they are calling Intelligence Led Policing.

Slap,

My impression from open sources from faraway is that in Afghanistan there's not that much intelligence at all levels. Yes, tactically we know the Taliban can fight - better - we cannot 'Find' them enough before they start shooting, laying IEDs etc.

The UK military in Helmand have pursued several approaches, each brigadier has a different emphasis (indicated recently in a SWJ article http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...c-communicati/ ).

I exclude the high value target (HVT) option which clearly can be successful, although I now note there are doubts over Rashid Rauf being killed in one strike.

The more I read here the deeper the quagmire appears.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Citing Slap

Slap,

My impression from open sources from faraway is that in Afghanistan there's not that much intelligence at all levels. Yes, tactically we know the Taliban can fight - better - we cannot 'Find' them enough before they start shooting, laying IEDs etc.

The UK military in Helmand have pursued several approaches, each brigadier has a different emphasis (indicated recently in a SWJ article http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...c-communicati/ ).

I exclude the high value target (HVT) option which clearly can be successful, although I now note there are doubts over Rashid Rauf being killed in one strike.

The more I read here the deeper the quagmire appears.

davidbfpo

Hi David, I have said this many times that one of the best lessons and one of the hardest lessons I learned was to get the criminal to come to you.

This is a quote from the article you cited.

“We are not talking here of a major military operation to take Musa Qala….The idea is to let the population of Musa Qala come to us”.


There is another article I am trying to find about an NGO worker that preferred to deal with DEA intelligence because they were better then the Military type

Also the only problem I see with your armchair is you need to come out of it more, your insights are excellent.

[marct]

PS: For a view of how the legal system, judges & lawyers actually operate, take a look at "FROM LEGAL THEORIES TO NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY REASONING" (only 11 pages).

Really nice article, JMM - I just assigned it to my students to read !