Winning the War in Afghanistan

[slapout9]

I was watching a special last night about A'stan and everywhere they went it was always Americans doing all the work while all these Young healthy males were sitting around talking,watching riding bicycles complaining about how bad things are. There were some ANA and ANP but not many.

Question? Where is the national mobilization program for able men? They don't have to stand alone...... but they have got to stand up.

[marct]

Hi JMM,

A more in-depth look at AI and actual legal practice is found in this 200+ page thesis, Neural Networks for Legal Quantum Prediction, Andrew J. Terrett (LL.M. 1994, UBC) - leave it to a Brit at a Canadian school. Good survey of the field up to early 90s (so, a bit dated)

Nothing like some light reading on a Sunday morning . I'm downloading it now...

Much of this, from the legal practitioner's standpoint, is pattern recognition - some implicit, some explicit. I have a case (that's a pattern). Have I seen similar patterns; if so, find them. Compare patterns - which ones are closest ? How does my pattern differ; how is it the same ? How can I develop my pattern ?
....
These same concepts may have some bearing on military and law enforcement solutions.

I think they do, and not only in those fields. What you are describing here could easily be a description of Anthropological fieldwork analysis and/or the type of Interdisciplinary research that I teach.

My bottom line is that, at least in law, there is no easy mechanical solution, where you can just check the boxes. Except, in easy cases; but lawyers do not get easy cases - those are resolved by the parties without need for much legal beagle input.

Hey, JMM, there is always an easy, mechanical solution available; it just doesn't usually achieve the results anyone wants !

[slapout9]

Afghan Police....do they really do this over there? Looks like Michael Jackson's Thriller Video with funny music.



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGppvNdXmT8

[Bob's World]

I'm positive that what happened in SEA after WW II is not the same thing that is occurring within some pockets of Islam today -- far from it and that's a dangerously flawed allegory that can lead to some bad misapprehensions.True and we have not done the response well though my perception is that is improving as more realize the truth of what you and Bob's World say -- it is neither an insurgency nor a religious movement though it has facets of both.Critical point. I agree we had a role -- even agree with the thrust of the Cato piece Bob posted -- but we cannot undo the past, a past that was created, with respect to US actions by our political processes and our domestic politics as much as for any other reason. Bob wants to forget that and fix our political process, so in my view his desires and your very valid question:have to start with fixing that political reality -- nothing he has said he wished to achieve will occur lacking that prerequisitie...

Ken is dead right. You can't change the past. But we must understand it. We also must understand that no amount of military effort can make bad policy work, and that if the policy makers want bad situations to be better they must change the policy first, and the military will work with alacrity to help them enact that policy.

Bottom line is we need to put the turd in the right punch bowl. The policy types are the ones who dropped it in the bowl, and they think they can simply hand that bowl to the military to take care of for them. Not that simple. No amount of good tactics or operational effort can make bad policy work. We can go out and beat down the symptoms of that bad policy, much like the British military did for 150 years, but at the end of the day your bad policy will prevail over such mitigating efforts.

DOD need to help the policy team understand the problem and craft new policy. Problem is that many in DOD who are in that feedback loop don't understand what we are dealing with either.


As to the comparison between post WWII SEA and Post Cold War Middle East, I stand by my assessment.

The populaces of SEA sought self-determination and sovereignty free of Colonial control, and achieved it. This is why the Muslim populaces of SEA are largely immune from AQ's message. Sure, there is some support, but they are out from under colonialism, so the causation that exists in much of the Middle East simply isn't there. Same is true in Iran. They threw off Western control when they tossed out the Shah. Sure, they still have poor governance, but populace recognizes that it is of their own choosing. The issue with Iran is very different, it is one of rising nationalism. Much as we see with Russia, India, and China. Historic regional powers rising as nations to seek roles that they see as more appropriate. That is a very important, and related, but very different dynamic. Rising populaces applying insurgency to seek self-determination in one cauldron of witch's brew. Rising nations seeking regional influence and nationalism in another cauldron of witch's brew. The US led West wishing that both would simply accept the roles we have cast for them as good guys, and wondering why there is so much friction aimed in our general direction. Hmmm.

Thing is, we are good guys. Good guys armed with sadly outdated policy and a crop of very successful Cold Warriors in DC that don't understand how dangerously outdated their thinking is. The new team of non-Cold Warriors in DC have good instincts, but they don't understand the dynamics of insurgency and nationalism that are driving these two cauldrons either, and are getting a lot of well intentioned, but I believe, very flawed advice.

I'd just like everyone to step back, and try to take an unbiased look at what is going on. It mirrors historic examples in many ways, but is new in how today's information age empowers non-state actors and populaces to be resistant to state-based controls.

Afghanistan is just a side-show to this much larger dynamic, and we risk losing the strategic bubble /big picture if we get sucked into the tactics of this little sideshow. As I have stated before, if the Decisive Point in the Middle East is anywhere, it is not Iraq or Afghanistan, nor is it Israel or Iran. I believe it is Saudi Arabia. Not that we must defeat anyone there, but that we must get our policy right there first. We must get straight with the government and populace of Saudi Arabia first, and the rest on the insurgent "cauldron" will follow. Similarly, we must also recognize and address the reasonable nationalistic roles of the rising states that I mentioned and make them allies, not enemies. This is all policy business. Instead we cast these all as threats and apply the military to them. That is very dangerous.

[slapout9]

Afghanistan is just a side-show to this much larger dynamic, and we risk losing the strategic bubble /big picture if we get sucked into the tactics of this little sideshow. As I have stated before, if the Decisive Point in the Middle East is anywhere, it is not Iraq or Afghanistan, nor is it Israel or Iran. I believe it is Saudi Arabia. Not that we must defeat anyone there, but that we must get our policy right there first. We must get straight with the government and populace of Saudi Arabia first, and the rest on the insurgent "cauldron" will follow. Similarly, we must also recognize and address the reasonable nationalistic roles of the rising states that I mentioned and make them allies, not enemies. This is all policy business. Instead we cast these all as threats and apply the military to them. That is very dangerous.

Yes, the power shift started with the Oil Embargo in the 1970's when Jimmy Carter called it the Moral Equivalent of War...which it was and still is. The highest National Priority is to get off Oil, Carter was the last President of the US to be able to say that we imported LESS oil when he left office then before he took office....and we have been going down hill ever since. He was the last President to have a true Strategy to deal with situation.....we haven't had one since.

[Surferbeetle]

Hey, I didn't say I hadn't been thinking about this stuff since they handed me a copy of "Street Without Joy" to read at the Q-Course back in '89, but yeah, from the time I read Ken's post it took about 10 to hammer out the key points.

And Its not about how long COIN takes, COIN is a continuous process for every government, just as "insurgency" is a continuous process for every populace. It's the great dance...

Its about understanding what our role, not executing COIN, but conducting FID with a tailored effort to assist the Afghan COIN; while continuing to work the shadows to deal with AQ. Smaller force that understands we can not even appear to be occupiers, and that any Afghan solution we enable is better than any US solution we build for them.

Once a Warrior King, Memories of an Officer in Vietnam by David Donovan

[Ken White]

... No amount of good tactics or operational effort can make bad policy work...at the end of the day your bad policy will prevail over such mitigating efforts.

I totally agree but I think there must be a mechanism to mitigate if not preclude bad policy and I'm unsure the US political system will afford that lacking a significant existential threat. Domestic politics drive our international relations and as I've tried to point out here on many occasions, the presumed policy continuity in the Cold War was a myth. The question is how do you get accurate assessments (themselves a problem) and vice -- reality -- through to the policy makers?

Recall also that all the policy errors of the last eight years have not been made by civilians; they were also made by uniformed folks in DC -- and Tampa, both buildings -- so while I agree with you in principle, how do you address this separate problem?

As to the comparison between post WWII SEA and Post Cold War Middle East, I stand by my assessment.

The populaces of SEA sought self-determination and sovereignty free of Colonial control, and achieved it...Hmmm.

They are different therefor they are alike -- okay...

Minor point, Iran does not have a new found sense of nationalism, that is a potentially dangerous policy mistake if it is a widely held view. Recall that not one but several Persian empires once stretched from Greece almost to China and often ruled the ME (many 'Arab' customs are in fact inheritances from the Persians). Iranian nationalism is far older than you and I and John T. Fishel combined -- and that's old.

Recall also that Persians think of Arabs as lesser beings -- and that Arabs know this and return the favor. The Afghans think both are pretentious snobs and they both think the Afghans are barbarians. The only unifying force across the region is religion, not any sort of nationalism, and that unity is extremely tenuous (and thus easily manipulated by those so inclined) and only prevails to present a united front of sorts to the hated Ferenghi.

Make no mistake; folks in that area are truly polite. They are also very pragmatic. Those two things cause them to be reasonable in polite western company -- but basically, they truly hate westerners and it's a lot deeper than colonialism.

All that makes me wonder how many policy makers are operating off flawed ideas. Flaws in judgment are endemic, none of us can have perfect information or insights and all of us need to listen to people who know and understand the area and processes with which we contemplate trifling.

History shows that in the US, such advice has virtually always been available -- and that it has routinely been ignored by policymakers and senior officers. My perception is that is mostly an ego problem. How do you propose to fix that problem whatever its cause?

Afghanistan is just a side-show to this much larger dynamic...

Totally true. But...

...and we risk losing the strategic bubble /big picture if we get sucked into the tactics of this little sideshow.

that is not necessarily true, there is a risk but it can be avoided and, I believe is being considered and will not have any significant effect on the main show. There is another risk to leaving too soon. Balancing those risks is the issue.

We must get straight with the government and populace of Saudi Arabia first, and the rest on the insurgent "cauldron" will follow.

I don't think that's correct. Wanting to be the center of thought and having the money to get close to that aspiration and actually being the center of thought are not the same things. Saudi Arabia is important, no question and its vast treasury is misused for many things but I do not believe the rest of the ME is as sycophantic as the Saudis would like or as many seem to believe. In my travels around that area, admittedly some time ago (but an area where change comes very slowly) I found the Saudis to be universally despised, gathering little or no respect and envied only for their wealth -- and thus a target for the pragmatic to obtain some of that wealth.

Nor do I think the ME is an 'insurgent "cauldron.'" It is today pretty much what it has always been, an area with a lot of humanity in a harsh environment who have adapted to that environment with their own methods of doing things (not least fighting...) and who have suddenly (for them) inherited a lot of oil money. In US southern terms, the whole area (save Turkey and Iran) are new rich white trash with a chip on their shoulder and a crazy Uncle in the cellar. Looking at them in that vein will give you a better perspective than most others, including the insurgent / nationalist bit. Xenophobic? Yes, quite. Nationalist -- not so much. That Xenophobia, BTW, is strongly ethnic or racial, thus the Persian / Arab (and Afghan...) divide.

The question all that raises is how many are developing policy based on flawed reasoning or inputs and how do we address that ancient and debilitating problem? How do we get policy that has widely diverse inputs and comes up with a best judgment consensus to present to decision makers?

Instead we cast these all as threats and apply the military to them. That is very dangerous.

I'm not sure that is the case so much as using the tool that found / discovered the issue to fix the 'problem' they found. That said, I agree it's ill advised if not dangerous. The question though is do we (the civilian policy makers) cast them as threats and apply the military or does the military discover the problem (because Congress has ruined the State Department and will not adequately fund them whereas the DoD has tons of unneeded money and has a less politicized reporting process) and then get told to handle it in the absence of anyone else having even a slight clue?

[Ken White]

Carter was the last President of the US to be able to say that we imported LESS oil when he left office then before he took office...

Not so much his doing as the result of the OPEC withhold to raise prices...

and we have been going down hill ever since. He was the last President to have a true Strategy to deal with situation.....we haven't had one since.

True, gotta give James earl credit for that -- but he gets an 'F' on execution. He got sidetracked on the Tehran Hostage problem which he woefully mishandled and sadly lost the bubble on oil independence. Pity.

Just as Nixon figured out early on after the Munich Olympics that Islamist terrorism was going to be a problem -- he got side tracked by Watergate. And Reagan figured out the US Voter had little appetite for getting involved in the ME thus, the Beirut debacles (plural). Bush 41 figured the cost of removing Saddam wasn't worth it; Clinton imposed his will on Bosnia and Kosovo to keep the US Europhiles on his side but had no will when it came to OBL & Co. or others from the ME.

All of which proves US domestic politics drive our foreign policy -- or lack thereof...

[slapout9]

True, gotta give James earl credit for that -- but he gets an 'F' on execution. He got sidetracked on the Tehran Hostage problem which he woefully mishandled and sadly lost the bubble on oil independence. Pity.

Bullseye! and we ain't had know respect since then!

[Ken White]

a lot of respect when I first went abroad in 19-ought-47. Lot of fear in some places, lot of desire for any money we might donate in others but not a lot of respect. Fortunately, most people are polite even if they don't like you -- that and we're big spenders. Always popular, that trait.

Unfortunately, we lowered the fear quotient after Korea, lowered it more after Viet Nam, put it in the cellar with Tehran and have just started pulling it back up to a decent level. If you aren't going to be respected and we are not, then best have a tiny bit of fear -- and uncertainty -- out there. Our low point in furrin popularity was in in about 75-76, started back up then Tehran took it back down. Been sort of in the sputtering mediocre range ever since with an occasional jump one way or the other. Iraq probably did more to ease that problem than most anything else in the last 30 years or so. Afghanistan may enhance or erase that beneficial result; we'll see.

Hard to get much respect when commerce is your over riding foreign policy goal and you're really up front about it -- the poor hate it 'cause you are costly, the wealthy hate it because commercialism is so crass.

Folks would respect us more if we did what other nations did; same goal but never, never publicly admit it. Honesty isn't always the best policy for some purposes...

[Bob's World]

This then is the core essence of my theory: The key to developing an effective solution lies in understanding the causation of the problem.

While the peripheral facts of the Far and Mid East are very different (cultures, ideologies applied, religion, etc) At the core the causation is the same: Both place had populaces placed under colonial control, and in both places after a major strategic shock event disrupted that colonial control, the populaces took advantage of the opening to seek self-determined governance and sovereignty.

This goes to why I believe Saudi Arabia is the Decisive Point. I don't give two damns about the Saudi royal family. In fact, I'm a little disgusted at how our fearful addiction to their oil has blinded us to allowing them to play us a suckers on a number of occasions and issues. But I digress. This is where Islam was born. It is symbolic. Bin Laden sees it as his main effort, and the Saudi populace has arguably be the most insurgent of all the populaces of the region for years (though ruthlessly and effectively suppressed in those endeavors). A Decisive point is where if one wins there, the rest will fall into place. The "victory" is not a military one at all. In fact, NO military should be used (other than as the credibility behind the President's play). If we can out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace, and we can respect their customs in the process; we can begin turning this whole thing around. It will disempower bin Laden's UW message; and allow this to degenerate into a handful of uncoordinated nationalist movements. Each can then be addressed separately as part of a coordinated scheme of engagement with the region.

As to the Iranians, I understand they are the historic big boys on the block; also that because of that it chafes all the more that they have been subjugated to Western colonial powers for the past several years. It doesn't have to be too old of a map to see that much of what we call "Iraq" and "Afghanistan" today, was and is considered to be part of "Persia." I am confident that Iran will rise again to dominate the politics of this region, and that that is not a bad thing. It is only a bad thing if we refuse to get over the fact that they tossed us out and continue to insist on seeing them as enemies or threats. I believe that both the Israelis and Saudis encourage that bad behavior on our part. We need to tell both of those allies to take a knee, and offer an olive branch to the Iranian people. Besides, when we do that it infuriates the hell out of their current government and hastens the advancement of that country to a much better government for everyone involved. To continue to snub them actually makes the current gang stronger.

Which brings us back to Afghanistan. What a great opportunity to mend our relationship with Iran by asking them to work with us to help finish our business and get out of there. This also disempowers Bin laden.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Ken:

(Referring to the Middle East) It is today pretty much what it has always been, an area with a lot of humanity in a harsh environment who have adapted to that environment with their own methods of doing things (not least fighting...) and who have suddenly (for them) inherited a lot of oil money.

Yes there are many countries in the region that have made a fortune from oil (from Algeria in the west to the UAE in the east), many others, often with large populations, have not been so endowed - notably Eygpt and Syria. Nor have the richer nations made investments that have alleviated the lot of the common people in those countries.

Just as Nixon figured out early on after the Munich Olympics that Islamist terrorism was going to be a problem

It would be a mistake to label the terrorism at the 1972 Munich Olympics as 'Islamist'; it was "hard line" Palestinian nationalists, 'Black September' that the PLO disbanded in 1974 and Islam was not an issue.

davidbfpo

[jmm99]

Hi Steve & all,

Your reminder of my post, Part of a larger picture ?, is on point. That post sums up the connection between the ISAF mandate - peace enforcement (Chap VII, UN Charter) and the OEF mandate (2001 AUMF). The two mandates can play together. It also sums up peace enforcement under JP 3-07.3: Joint TTP for Peace Operations. Peace enforcement is not a UN "blue cap" activity - it can have teeth - to be used with discernment to force the end goal, a diplomatic solution between the indigenous warring parties usually involving mediation. The content of that post should be added to "Step One".

Since "David Donovan" (a pen name for Terry Turner) was mentioned, a couple of quotes from him seem apt to this thread. From a 2008 interview:

Q: "Our guys read the newspapers. They resent being sent over here to die for nothing." More than anything else, Vietnam was the first really televised war. Are citizens able to appreciate why a war might be just? Or will they simply oppose all war, because war (like life) has many horrible aspects? When they do oppose wars, will they forever alienate soldiers as they did your fellow soldiers?

A: I think citizens can appreciate why a war might be just so long as the cause is sharp and stark. Pearl Harbor. The World Trade towers. Where the need for war is difficult to comprehend is when the war arrives due to reasons two or three times removed from direct effect on the country. We went to Vietnam because it was a proxy for our otherwise "cold" war with the Soviets and China. The rationale was hard to sustain as time went on and on with little consistent progress. Finally, someone realized that the South Vietnamese were never going to stand on their own, so we said, "enough already."

We went to Afghanistan as a result of 9/11. There has been little or no complaint about that. We went to Iraq under more dubious circumstances and there has been more and more complaint as the war has gone on and on. Americans see little if any affect of such a war on themselves or their aspirations, so most are now saying, enough already. I believe any war not the result of sharp and certain evidence of national harm will eventually, perhaps shortly, see opposition. That sharp and certain evidence of national harm might have to be an actual attack like Pearl Harbor or 9/11 before opposition will be quieted, especially for a long, enduring war.

I think those who oppose a particular war will always to some degree alienate the soldiers fighting it, even if on the surface the soldier understands that opposition. War is a visceral, life-changing thing. It is hard to always understand that those who oppose the war do not oppose you and the goals you are striving for. On the other hand, I do not think most soldiers are forever alienated. At least there is not a through-and-through alienation. They come to understand, if they did not understand already, that opposition to the war was opposition to policy, not opposition to them. Most learn to adjust.

and from one of his webpages:

Q: Do your experiences in Vietnam speak to the counterinsurgency effort being made today in Iraq and Afghanistan?

A: Absolutely. Anyone having read OWK would have been able to anticipate the difficulties imposed by cultural and religious differences when a western country goes to war in an eastern one. They should have known that local corruption would be a cancer eating at the heart of our efforts to rebuild and reconstitute such a country. They should also have known that westernized elites over-promise the democratic tendencies of their more traditionalist countrymen. Also, the traditions of tribe or village over country are difficult for westerners to give credence to, yet they are a part of the experience discussed in OWK. On the other hand, for the soldiers, especially soldier-advisors, in the current conflicts, I hope the incidents, emotions, and methods mentioned in the book can be some sort of guide. What is now called “asymmetric war” is at its heart counterinsurgency. It is small-unit, in-the-bushes warfare conducted in an atmosphere where winning the approval, even the affection of locals is vital to success. OWK is the story of one such war in one village, but its application, I think, is much more general.

Now, according to Kilcullen's book TAG (based on World Bank stats), there are 40,020 villages in Astan. While I doubt that the number 20 is accurate, 40,000 is a reasonable shot at the order of magnitude of the task that you, Steve, have assigned me.

Governance:

1. Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local governance elements.

2. Form of local governance is what it is...

3. Mike and DOJ friends examine existing system within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help to improve capacity of existing governance.

Marc would be a decent partner in that project, but please understand that the ghost of Saul Alinsky's methodology lurks in both of our closets. Speaking just for myself, that requires a bottom up - bubble up approach. Our approach in Astan has been to create a good paper system of governance (nice org charts), a top down - trickle down system.

To an Alinskyite, local governance is what it is all about. In effect, the organizing efforts at the village level (all 40,000 of them seem beyond present capabilities) must drive the organization of governance at the higher levels (district, province and national).

The problem with local governance in Astan is that it has been devestated by 40+ years of turmoil. Many of these problems are themselves tiny - in comparison to the regional strategic issues which BW and Ken have been discussing. E.g, two guys trade sheep, but one of the sheep is "defective". How does the guy with the bad sheep get what the parties consider fair justice ?

Another problem you might face with Marc and me is what we might do if the GoA partner is part of the problem and not part of the solution. All here might dwell on that question, which emerges as well in the more elegant area of regional geo-politics.

Have to run now.

Cheers

Mike

[Ken White]

This then is the core essence of my theory: The key to developing an effective solution lies in understanding the causation of the problem.

I agree. However, we do not seem to agree on what we believe are underlying causes.

...the populaces took advantage of the opening to seek self-determined governance and sovereignty.

This is an example -- sovereignity, yes. Self determined governance not so much; that's a western construct and both the Asian and the Middle Eastern ideas differ -- from each other and from the western model. Neither wants all that much 'self' in the equation and what they want that government to do varies significantly. Also, the Asians resented Colonialism -- the Middle east resents the west. That is a significant difference and if one misses that difference, one can head down the wrong path.

This goes to why I believe Saudi Arabia is the Decisive Point...This is where Islam was born. It is symbolic...

That's true. However, it is negated by:

If we can out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace, and we can respect their customs in the process; we can begin turning this whole thing around.

Possibly true -- but your "if" there's almost as big as the one pertaining to you getting the US political milieu to develop and stick to a long term grand strategy. I do not believe we have the time or the inclination to do that. If we could do it which is questionable at best.

It will disempower bin Laden's UW message; and allow this to degenerate into a handful of uncoordinated nationalist movements. Each can then be addressed separately as part of a coordinated scheme of engagement with the region.

First problem is that your idea IIRC got pre-empted by Abu Musab al-Suri in his writings and he urged a fragmented design that will negate your goal. A tenet of all that is no nationalist sentiment but Islamic passion instead.

That is not to say that what you suggest cannot be done, simply to preface my statement that is certain to be a very lengthy effort and the outcome would be doubtful.

As to the Iranians, I understand they are the historic big boys on the block; also that because of that it chafes all the more that they have been subjugated to Western colonial powers for the past several years.

They very much recall the empires and believe they merit more respect than they get from the west, no question. Not so on subjugation, though and the fact they have never been colonized is a point of pride with them.

If you meant our presence there when the Shah was in power, not true for the vast majority of Iranians, our footprint was light and so was the touch and they knew it. Even today most Iranians have no strong anti-US feelings. If you mean in recent years and the sanctions, they are not a significant problem to Iran and most there blame their own regime in any event.

I am confident that Iran will rise again to dominate the politics of this region, and that that is not a bad thing.

Interesting, they are too. Or at least they want that to occur. I doubt that will happen for a number of reasons. Just do the Math...

It is only a bad thing if we refuse to get over the fact that they tossed us out and continue to insist on seeing them as enemies or threats.

They didn't toss us out, we elected to leave after we totally screwed up following their faux pas in the Embassy takeover.

l Don't disagree with the intent but do not think it will afford the result you desire. Iran is as distrusted in the ME for reasons that go back centuries as we are in the wider world. Many in Iran have never forgiven the Arabs for the Islamic subjugation of their country -- one reason they are Shia -- they will tell anyone that; the Arabs know this. that's one reason I never worried about an Iranian dominated Iraq; won't happen.

To continue to snub them actually makes the current gang stronger.

In some respects. Sanctions never work, Iran, North Korea or Cuba, they're all dumb. However, I don't think accord with us makes a significant difference in Khameini's hold.

Which brings us back to Afghanistan. What a great opportunity to mend our relationship with Iran by asking them to work with us to help finish our business and get out of there. This also disempowers Bin laden.

Two very big mistakes.

The Pushtuns er, dislike, a good term, the Iraniha. Badly. The population of Afghanistan is only about 40% Pushtun and while the Tajiks and Hazara in Afghanistan would welcome more Shia involvement you would thus further fragment an already badly fragmented nation. Recall also that Pushtuns will say they are Pushtun first, Muslim second and then Afghan or Pakistani -- thus the 13M or so Afghan Pushtuns have about twice that many friends and relatives just south of the Durand line.

It would have a positive effect on Bin Laden's power, little as it really is, because he would mobilize a few more Sunni fundamentalists than he can today simply due to the fact that 'the Great Satan had allied with heretics...'

[slapout9]

Unfortunately, we lowered the fear quotient after Korea, lowered it more after Viet Nam, put it in the cellar with Tehran and have just started pulling it back up to a decent level. If you aren't going to be respected and we are not, then best have a tiny bit of fear -- and uncertainty -- out there. Our low point in furrin popularity was in in about 75-76, started back up then Tehran took it back down. Been sort of in the sputtering mediocre range ever since with an occasional jump one way or the other. Iraq probably did more to ease that problem than most anything else in the last 30 years or so. Afghanistan may enhance or erase that beneficial result; we'll see.

Yes, which is why I believe there is no military solution to the A'stan problem but there is a political solution. Our Grand Strategy should be to organize our national resources to where we have the fewest foreign dependencies possible, which will allow us to deal with other nations by choice, which will generate a better and more useful form of respect than just fear of a military strike.

[Bob's World]

"Self-Determination" may be a Western phrase; but when the asian countries got rid of the government chosen for them in exchange for one chosen by themselves, that is self-determination. Call it what you will.

Government imposed by others is rarely sustainable. When the countries in Africa struggle with or reject such Western imposed forms of governance we call them "failed" or "failing." Now THAT is a western construct.

I'm sticking to my guns on this one.

[Surferbeetle]

...in many of the places that I visit on Uncle Sugar's dime is described in the blog ALL=Afghan Lessons Learned for Soldiers

Just like 90% of the world's population, including our own, 90% of Afghans are simply trying to survive and feed their family. Nothing more. Nothing less. The difference is that Americans are trying to survive two car payments and a mortgage. Afghans are trying to survive nature itself. They aren't trying to earn $40,000/year. They're trying to grow enough food in the high desert to feed 2 wives and 10 kids.

I cannot tell you how to gain the loyal friendship of an Afghan and neither can they. I can tell you how to ensure you never gain that friendship and that is to attempt to change them. It is to demean them. It is to be rude to them. It is to try to game them.

They recognize insincerity like an animal recognizes fear.

Just a few rambling observations about our illiterate but highly intelligent, stubborn, and resilient friends. Ignorance is not stupidity.

[jmm99]

from Slap
Yes, which is why I believe there is no military solution to the A'stan problem but there is a political solution. Our Grand Strategy should be to organize our national resources to where we have the fewest foreign dependencies possible, which will allow us to deal with other nations by choice, which will generate a better and more useful form of respect than just fear of a military strike.

and yes.

[Ken White]

but when the asian countries got rid of the government chosen for them in exchange for one chosen by themselves, that is self-determination. Call it what you will.

No question. I misused your self determination to sort of mean 'open pure democracy' which wasn't what you said at all. My error. In my defense, I did say "...both the Asian and the Middle Eastern ideas differ -- from each other and from the western model. Neither wants all that much 'self' in the equation and what they want that government to do varies significantly..." So I understood what you meant even if I did use it incorrectly. Apologies.

The critical point that bears remembering in that paragraph of mine I quoted from is this: "Also, the Asians resented Colonialism -- the Middle east resents the west. That is a significant difference and if one misses that difference, one can head down the wrong path." May seem insignificant but it is not. Sort of ties into the rest of your last post:

When the countries in Africa struggle with or reject such Western imposed forms of governance we call them "failed" or "failing." Now THAT is a western construct.

Too true. Also note the African nations have the attitudes of both the Asians and the ME when it comes to their relations with Europeans and westerners in general...

[Ken White]

It would be a mistake to label the terrorism at the 1972 Munich Olympics as 'Islamist'; it was "hard line" Palestinian nationalists, 'Black September' that the PLO disbanded in 1974 and Islam was not an issue.

I should have said international terrorism originating in or from the Middle East, saying Islamist was simply laziness on my part.

Nixon convened a Cabinet committee to address the issue. This LINK leads to a news summary. The entire report makes some interesting reading. It may be declassified now but I can't turn it up. At the time many did not support it but it really did some useful work. My point was that all this did not happen and surprise the world, the potential problems were known in 1948 when the US Secretary of State told Harry Truman; "Mr. President, I serve at your discretion but if you insist we recognize the new state of Israel, I will not be able to vote for you in the next election." Forward to 1972 and the Nixon committee and its 1977 final report -- went downhill from then to 2002-3. No one should have been surprised.