Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

The problem with local governance in Astan is that it has been devestated by 40+ years of turmoil. Many of these problems are themselves tiny - in comparison to the regional strategic issues which BW and Ken have been discussing. E.g, two guys trade sheep, but one of the sheep is "defective". How does the guy with the bad sheep get what the parties consider fair justice ?

From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and were not constrained by Eurocentric concerns over equity and 'the rule of law.' Nothing wrong with the rule of law, it just doesn't have to be our version of law...

Another problem you might face with Marc and me is what we might do if the GoA partner is part of the problem and not part of the solution. All here might dwell on that question, which emerges as well in the more elegant area of regional geo-politics.

Why dwell on it -- it is a western imposition that the Afghans believed they were compelled to take in order to get some of the aid they desperately needed. It was a really dumb idea and the USA forced it down everyone's throat and we put one of Kipling's 'wily Pathans' in charge. He's being wily. What a surprise. They're untrustworthy. What a surprise. "The ANP tell the bad guys we're coming." What a surprise. There's corruption in the government. What a surprise. In one of my first dozen posts on this board over a couple of years ago I said, re the way things were then going in Afghanistan; "Welcome to South Asia." Still true.

Of course the GOA is part of the problem. We created it thus it's become our problem.

[jmm99]

from Ken
From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and were not constrained by Eurocentric concerns over equity and 'the rule of law.' Nothing wrong with the rule of law, it just doesn't have to be our version of law...

if it were the case.

The problem, as I understand it, was the destruction of Astan's local legal institutions which existed ca. 1970, under a loose form of monarchy which was slowly moving toward "modernity" (which possibly, but for the wars, would have developed its own Afghan form).

The Rule of Law has to be the rule of law indigenous to its subjects. I have been consistent with that theory in many posts - and have to be, given my belief that law "bubbles up" from the society who are subjects of that Rule of Law. Those subjects are also its creators.

Now, given the case at hand, if you have evidence that local legal systems, whether local Shura or local warlord, are actually working in Astan, I would like to see it and would be happy to be proved wrong. That situation, if applicable to a material portion of Astan's 40,000 villages, would give me much more confidence for the future than I have. So, please bring on any such evidence that shows a working local legal system in Astan.

------------------------------
Unfortunately, this is probably true, at least in part:

from Ken
Of course the GOA is part of the problem. We created it thus it's become our problem.

My take is that we do have an obligation to clean up the garbage in a neighborhood, even if (1) we should not have been in the neighborhood in the first place; or (2) if we were there for a good reason, we should not have littered the neighborhood. Our former friend Saddam Hussein was such garbage, which for that and other reasons had to be removed. The means used to clean the neighborhood need not be as extreme as that in Iraq.

But, our obligation to clean up our garbage is subject to a limitation. We have to forego that obligation if in doing so we will worsen the neighborhood's condition. I believe that Astan is very close to that tipping point.

[jmm99]

Thanks for the good link, A.L.L. = Afghan Lessons Learned for Soldiers.

It has two good map links, Afghanistan Topographic Maps & Afghanistan District Maps.

Best for your travels

Mike

[slapout9]

"Self-Determination" may be a Western phrase; but when the asian countries got rid of the government chosen for them in exchange for one chosen by themselves, that is self-determination. Call it what you will.

Government imposed by others is rarely sustainable. When the countries in Africa struggle with or reject such Western imposed forms of governance we call them "failed" or "failing." Now THAT is a western construct.

I'm sticking to my guns on this one.

Bifurcation systems remain integrated (whole) when they provide mutual benefit which is why they were caused to form in the first place. (the governed ....the government.... and the binding consent to be governed) When they don't they begin to bifurcate (split apart) as in the Civil War(war of northern aggression). Which is why it is total bullstuff that democracies are stable. They are designed to be unstable there is always a party that looses with the ever present idea to bifurcate (split off from the system) or become violent or start an insurgency. Which is why we usually cause most of our own problems in the world.

[Ken White]

"From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and..."

I do believe you missed the first part of my comment and that significant 'if.'

Which of course means that I do not have the foggiest idea how well the system that I know did work almost 40 years ago works today, else I might have made a more positive statement.

However, I'd hazard a guess that it works well in some places, less well in others -- and part of the 'less well' is due to ongoing conflict. Been my observation that no system of local government or law works that well when rounds get fired too frequently.

My take is that we do have an obligation to clean up the garbage in a neighborhood, even if (1) we should not have been in the neighborhood in the first place; or (2) if we were there for a good reason, we should not have littered the neighborhood.

But, our obligation to clean up our garbage is subject to a limitation. We have to forego that obligation if in doing so we will worsen the neighborhood's condition. I believe that Astan is very close to that tipping point.

In reverse order, probably not that near a tipping point IMO.

On governmental change, good wrapup on our errors on the front page of SWJ by one JT (LINK). He agrees with you.

I do not. I'm afraid it might create more problems than it solves, not least because it would likely dump some on the fence Pushtuns off said fence. My personal view is that it would merely shuffle one group of Afghans doing what Afghans do best for another group who would do pretty much the same thing, just with different people. Plus, like it or not, the wishes of NATO must be considered, no clue what their reaction might be.

Our obligation clean up our garbage is also, I am afraid, subject to not get done because governments are generally loath to admit they erred -- and we surely did err in forcing the Bonn meeting, a Constitution with glaring holes and a President we didn't understand all that well. Still, in this case we have a new US Administration that is busy repudiating all those things it inherited from its predecessor that said predecessor did not shrewdly lock in to tie the hands of the USG for many years in the future. Does Afghanistan fit in that category? Dunno. We'll see. My suspicion is that we'll just try to nudge the Afghans to do their own changing. Doubt it will result in much improvement...

Noticed that a move of all US elements to the East is being considered; that will increase pressure on some Pushtun heavy areas if true and it is done. It may also relive pressure on some others -- or allow for an Afghanization. Fun times in River City...

As an aside on Iraq and Afghanistan; those people haggle for sport -- we have absolutely NO business getting in haggling contests with them. They are not going to do things in the western way, period. Two Rudyard quotes:

"Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old."

"And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.""

[Bob's World]

Bifurcation systems remain integrated (whole) when they provide mutual benefit which is why they were caused to form in the first place. (the governed ....the government.... and the binding consent to be governed) When they don't they begin to bifurcate (split apart) as in the Civil War(war of northern aggression). Which is why it is total bullstuff that democracies are stable. They are designed to be unstable there is always a party that looses with the ever present idea to bifurcate (split off from the system) or become violent or start an insurgency. Which is why we usually cause most of our own problems in the world.

India like to promote itself as "The World's Largest Democracy!"

A savvy friend of mine pointed out, that the dark side of that proclamation is that they have the world's largest suppressed minority. This is a country with a number of smoldering powder kegs beneath it. The growing middle class is a hope for a stabilizing influence, but only if it cuts across the class and culture divides that define this power.

I mention this, because our course in Afghanistan has pressed hard into Pakistan; and that in turn begins to apply pressure on India. On more good reason to consider an appetite suppressant in our approach to Afghanistan.

[slapout9]

India like to promote itself as "The World's Largest Democracy!"

A savvy friend of mine pointed out, that the dark side of that proclamation is that they have the world's largest suppressed minority. This is a country with a number of smoldering powder kegs beneath it. The growing middle class is a hope for a stabilizing influence, but only if it cuts across the class and culture divides that define this power.

I mention this, because our course in Afghanistan has pressed hard into Pakistan; and that in turn begins to apply pressure on India. On more good reason to consider an appetite suppressant in our approach to Afghanistan.

Absolutely! Democracy promotes conflict it institutionalizes us vs. them.

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Governance:

1. Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local governance elements.

2. Form of local governance is what it is...

3. Mike and DOJ friends examine existing system within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help to improve capacity of existing governance.

Marc would be a decent partner in that project, but please understand that the ghost of Saul Alinsky's methodology lurks in both of our closets. Speaking just for myself, that requires a bottom up - bubble up approach. Our approach in Astan has been to create a good paper system of governance (nice org charts), a top down - trickle down system.

Oh, you're not speaking just for yourself there . It's not only the Alinski influence - there's also compelling theoretical reasons for it as well (e.g. Malinowski).

To an Alinskyite, local governance is what it is all about. In effect, the organizing efforts at the village level (all 40,000 of them seem beyond present capabilities) must drive the organization of governance at the higher levels (district, province and national).

Totally true. Still and all, the US went through exactly the same process, as did the UK and many other countries. At a systems analytic level, top-down organization only appears to be "stable" when there is a cultural belief in a major external threat (e.g. Russia), and even that requires a balancing act between the local and "national" levels of governance. This certainly isn't the case in Afghanistan, where both the cultural beliefs and the previous "national" governments beliefs were pretty much aligned around local (kin and para-kin) organization.

The problem with local governance in Astan is that it has been devestated by 40+ years of turmoil. Many of these problems are themselves tiny - in comparison to the regional strategic issues which BW and Ken have been discussing. E.g, two guys trade sheep, but one of the sheep is "defective". How does the guy with the bad sheep get what the parties consider fair justice?

Bingo. But, and this is really why it is important, the entire concept of legitimacy revolves around the perceptions of individuals that their minimum expected "needs" from a governance organization are being met. Given the Feds control over judging a sheep issue is anathema, since they all "know" that the Feds are a) corrupt, and b) shouldn't be that powerful anyway. Besides that, the Feds would take half the sheep as "costs" and they don't know the local context of the sheep in question.

Another problem you might face with Marc and me is what we might do if the GoA partner is part of the problem and not part of the solution. All here might dwell on that question, which emerges as well in the more elegant area of regional geo-politics.

LOL. Well, given my family background, I certainly understand the concept of a long revenge . The trick in so much of this is to figure out how to construct that revenge as non-kinetic; basically to exapt certain components of pastunwali into the political process. I have some ideas on that, but i won't put them up here .

Cheers,

Marc

[jmm99]

from Ken
"From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and..."

I do believe you missed the first part of my comment and that significant 'if.'

No, I didn't miss what you said. I did focus on the "if either were alllowed to operate". That meant to me that you believe the institutions exist, but are being prevented from operating by somethiing or someone (us ?).

Here is my understanding of how the local legal system operated about 40 years ago. Basically, it was a triangle of the village elders (local Shura), the local mullah and the local government official (who I suspect doubled as the local warlord). The local Shura would handle legal disputes not involving religious issues (e.g., property lines and bad sheep); the local mullah would handle religious questions (many family law matters) and the local warlord would handle matters dealing with the government. If a matter was important enough and crossed into all three areas, the triangle would get together over tea and arrive at a solution acceptable to them - and then have a big feast.

If that was close to what you observed 40 years ago, then we are on the same page then. It worked because it had developed over the course of centuries. After that, my understanding is that the centuries old system was destroyed because it was replaced by non-local mullahs (the Taliban of Mullah Omar's Emirate) in some places; and by many local dictatorial warlords in other places. The local Shuras lost their clout in those places

No doubt there are areas where the traditional system still works; but two generations of turmoil resulted in a situation where the traditional system cannot be restored by simply flipping a switch. It would have to be rebuilt from the ground up - and we (Coalition) are not the people to do it. We would try to impose a Western system of national courts down to the district level. In fact, there is a pilot program to that effect, which was initiated with great fanfare with a flag officer (JAG if I recall) cutting the ribbon.

My take is that a Westernized national justice system would have the same value to an Astan villager as the court of the hsien (district) magistrate had to a Chinese villager in Manchu times - for the reasons that Marc states:

Given the Feds control over judging a sheep issue is anathema, since they all "know" that the Feds are a) corrupt, and b) shouldn't be that powerful anyway. Besides that, the Feds would take half the sheep as "costs" and they don't know the local context of the sheep in question.

The Rule of Law has to be an Afghan solution; and on that I think we all agree.

As to Karzai, etc., I should have made my point more bluntly. Getting rid of Karzai by coup or otherwise would probably do much more harm than leaving him there. E.g., toppling Diem with a succession of coups by generals might be a lesson learned on point. That's what I meant by "tipping point" - as 1963-1964 was a "tipping point" in Vietnam. Which leaves me with the course of action to force negotiations between Karzai (Northern Alliance), Pashtuns (probably including some Taliban of various stripes) and Pakistan.

As to which, we (Coalition) should not be a party, because as the Man says:

As an aside on Iraq and Afghanistan; those people haggle for sport -- we have absolutely NO business getting in haggling contests with them. They are not going to do things in the western way, period. Two Rudyard quotes:

"Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old."

"And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.""

[omarali50]

cross posting from registan.net, basically triggered by the Zakariya article, but relevant here.
The whole "tribes" notion is such bull####. The "tribes" were never that coherent and have become even less relevant since the Afghan war started in the late seventies. Fareed Zakariya, unfortunately, has no idea what the hell he is talking about. The taliban have already overtaken the tribal structure. It is possible to talk of local warlords being paid off or otherwise coopted, but the notion that its time to bring back the sahibs from Nikalseyn sahib's heyday is just lazy and idiotic..and I believe that even in Nikalseyn sahib's day, the real issue was the ability of the British to deliver retribution for bad behavior and rewards for good behavior. As long as the taliban have the longer knives and longer memories, no tribe or warlord is going to get too far on their wrong side. When the other side has shows its able to deliver both carrots and sticks and preferrably do so without raping women and kidnapping boys, then the taliban will lose, otherwise they win (at least in their part of afghanistan). And if the taliban are the power with the ability to deliver retribution, then they will get all the money you pay out in subsidies and bribes as well. Power still grows from the barrel of the gun...The real question is: does the US have a legitimate interest that makes it necessary to win this war? and secondly, does it have the ability to do so even if it wants to? I am not sure about the first question, but rather more confident about the second (maybe because i have never been on the inside, so I dont know how bad things really are?). But in any case, Zakariya cannot have it both ways: to win, and not to have to do anything terribly hard in the process. That is not going to happen. The US can give up (of course, while trying to minimize the fallout of failure, but knowing that SOME fallout is inevitable) or it can commit to winning, which will not be easy and may include buying and selling "tribes", but cannot be achieved without showing who is boss where it matters i.e. in matters of life and death.

[jmm99]

A number of points accord with my armchair understanding of the Astan local situations (meaning that there are a multiplicity of local situations, not all the same):

from omarali50
... The taliban have already overtaken the tribal structure. ... As long as the taliban have the longer knives and longer memories, no tribe or warlord is going to get too far on their wrong side. ... And if the taliban are the power with the ability to deliver retribution, then they will get all the money you pay out in subsidies and bribes as well. ...

But then we reach your questions:

The real question is: does the US have a legitimate interest that makes it necessary to win this war? and secondly, does it have the ability to do so even if it wants to? I am not sure about the first question, but rather more confident about the second (maybe because i have never been on the inside, so I dont know how bad things really are?). But in any case, Zakariya cannot have it both ways: to win, and not to have to do anything terribly hard in the process. That is not going to happen. The US can give up (of course, while trying to minimize the fallout of failure, but knowing that SOME fallout is inevitable) or it can commit to winning, which will not be easy and may include buying and selling "tribes", but cannot be achieved without showing who is boss where it matters i.e. in matters of life and death.

I do not want you to address what you mean by "win" or "winning" because too many bytes have been spilled on SWC addressing the semantics of those terms.

So, what are your proposed courses of action toward whatever you define as the end state acceptable to you ?

In doing that you should take into account the capabilities (1) that are realistically available for use; and (2) that can be used within legal, moral and ethical constraints.

An example, as to the first point, is the First Indochina War (1946-1954), where France was considered the Goliath and the Viet Minh the David. True in the initial stages, but by 1954 the military strengths were very evenly matched - in fact, the VM probably had an edge. The point is that even a great power can only commit a percentage of its military forces to assist in overcoming an insurgency.

As an example of the second point, let us look at raw US "ability" to do things. The US could, for example, flatten every village and infrastructure on the other side of Hwy 1 by use of conventional munitions and, if those weren't enough, by employing tactical nuclear weapons. That would surely disrupt that area of the country - and create millions of new refugees among the survivors. That course of action would be illegal, immoral and unethical.

[slapout9]

As an example of the second point, let us look at raw US "ability" to do things. The US could, for example, flatten every village and infrastructure on the other side of Hwy 1 by use of conventional munitions and, if those weren't enough, by employing tactical nuclear weapons. That would surely disrupt that area of the country - and create millions of new refugees among the survivors. That course of action would be illegal, immoral and unethical.

But it sure would be effective

[Ken White]

If that was close to what you observed 40 years ago, then we are on the same page then.

and I think we are that on the whole topic...

[omarali50]

I do not want you to address what you mean by "win" or "winning" because too many bytes have been spilled on SWC addressing the semantics of those terms.

So, what are your proposed courses of action toward whatever you define as the end state acceptable to you ?

The short answer is: "I dont know". But you know there is going to be a long answer as well. So here goes:
1. I dont see how the US can turn around and say we are leaving anytime soon (next 2 years?). I dont think that is likely EVEN if it were the best course available.
2. I dont see how a pullout (any kind of pullout) will leave the afghan people in a better position, at least in the medium term. Any pullout will be followed by renewed civil war and massive killing.
3. I think the change of scenery in Pakistan (from the time when jihadi demos were organized in the main cricket stadium in Lahore, with posters all over town asking people to come and see mujahids rapelling down a wall and so on, to the current situation where SOME previosly beloved ISI assets, at least at foot soldier level, are being hunted down and their bodies are turning up lying around the byways of Swat) is due to American pressure and specifically the american presence in Afghanistan. If the US leaves, Pakistan could revert to the good old days, which is really bad news for India, but not just for India. Ordinary Pakistanis will pay a heavy price too.
So, you can see why I think its better if the US DOES manage to overcome the core jihadi insurgency and establish a semi-functional regime in Afghanistan before a pullout. Purely as an American, I am not sure, but as a Pakistani-American I cannot be too relaxed about the idea of a precipitate US departure.
How to "win"? Without knowing any inside details, I guess it would involve taking a realistic inventory of assets and enemies and prioritizing efforts. Which may be hard to do with an unweildy international coalition and massive bureaucratic and ideological blinders within the US establishment, but my guess is that if its done smartly, the US CAN do it..i dont think its unrealistic, but its likely to be hard and it would be a good start to know what the aim is, what the resources are, and what the priorities are going to be....This is just a collection of platitudes, but I do think its important to focus on tracking down and taking out particular leaders. Its a myth that every dead number three is immediately replaced by another number three. The issue is not who is number three now. The issue is establishing that being alqaeda or taliban number three is a high risk and low reward operation. What you are establishing is the notion that the govt (in this case, the afghan govt and its foreign supporters) has a longer arm and a longer memory than any particular gangster. That does not stop gangsters from existing, but it severely limits their ambition. Don Corleone buys judges and politicians and dreams of "senator corleone" but he is not out to overthrow the govt..that would be a step too far for him and his kind because the state has institutional resources that are much deeper and greater than his nimble but small operation. If you were fighting this war, wouldnt you have an intelligence detachment dedicated to collecting and sifting information about your opponents and building up a data base which may not hit paydirt on day one, but is eventually going to be overwhelming? firefights and FOBs are just part of the deal, its the inertia of the state that discourages rebellion and keeps things at the level of crimes rather than rebellion. What is being done about that part of the afghan state and can more be done? Again, I am focused on the fact that this kind of fluid situation where every adventurer is calculating the odds and switching sides four times a day is not sustainable and will end in disaster. Somehow, you have to move from this to a state where the default expectation is that open rebellion is just too costly...

[Dayuhan]

I googled US in the middle east and this article came to the top. I haven't seen it before, but agree with it completely. And it was written in 1991. This may help explain what I mean:

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1019

This article seems curiously non-specific, speaking in broad terms of policy trends without much in the way of clear examples of those trends and suggestions for alternative policies that coukd have been more effectively applied in those cases. The Iran example... well, yes, we all know our forbears pulled a naughty and it had consequences. There are some lessons to be learned there, for sure, but they are not universal or absolute. The only other concrete example the Cato piece cites is here:

President Bush's willingness to sacrifice American lives to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, to restore the "legitimate" government of that feudal monarchy, and to create a "new world order" proceeds logically from the premises and policies of past administrations.

This seems a quite peculiar criticism to me. The need to defend Kuwait was solidly grounded in both international law, which does not award sovereignty solely to democracies, and in American interest, which would have been ill-served by ceding Kuwait's oil reserves to Saddam and inviting a grab at Saudi Arabia. Kuwait's form of government is completely irrelevant: it may seem odd to us, but if the Kuwaitis accept it, that's hardly any of our business. Aggression is aggression, whether against a democracy or a monarchy. This piece seems an argument grounded primarily in an ideology of absolute non-intervention, a position that would be lovely if we were self-sufficient in all things and isolated from the world, but which is simply unrealistic in the actual world.

This then is the core essence of my theory: The key to developing an effective solution lies in understanding the causation of the problem.

While the peripheral facts of the Far and Mid East are very different (cultures, ideologies applied, religion, etc) At the core the causation is the same: Both place had populaces placed under colonial control, and in both places after a major strategic shock event disrupted that colonial control, the populaces took advantage of the opening to seek self-determined governance and sovereignty.

I agree that understanding causation is an important part of developing solutions. First we have to understand causation, and I'm not sure that the causative pattern you suggest is accurate. It's also worth noting that while examining causes is a useful part of developing solutions, even an accurate understanding of causes does not assuer an effective solution.

There is substantial evidence that Middle Eastern populaces prefer sovereignty and are suspicious of Western influence, which is why any attempt by the US or other Western actors to influence or pressure Middle Eastern governments is likely to meet substantial popular suspicion and resistance. It is rather less evident that there is extensive popular demand for "self determined governance" in any form that the West would recognize as such, and I think you may be imposing the Western notion that all people seek "democracy" on populaces that may not share it.

This goes to why I believe Saudi Arabia is the Decisive Point. I don't give two damns about the Saudi royal family. In fact, I'm a little disgusted at how our fearful addiction to their oil has blinded us to allowing them to play us a suckers on a number of occasions and issues. But I digress. This is where Islam was born. It is symbolic. Bin Laden sees it as his main effort, and the Saudi populace has arguably be the most insurgent of all the populaces of the region for years (though ruthlessly and effectively suppressed in those endeavors). A Decisive point is where if one wins there, the rest will fall into place. The "victory" is not a military one at all. In fact, NO military should be used (other than as the credibility behind the President's play). If we can out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace, and we can respect their customs in the process; we can begin turning this whole thing around. It will disempower bin Laden's UW message; and allow this to degenerate into a handful of uncoordinated nationalist movements. Each can then be addressed separately as part of a coordinated scheme of engagement with the region.

I see a fair number of unsupported declarations here, and I do not agree that Saudi Arabia is a decisive point, particularly for the conflict in Afghanistan, to which SA is decidedly peripheral. I also don't agree that US attempts to influence or pressure Saudi Arabia are needed or appropriate, which is a good thing, since we have no means at our disposal to apply such pressure.

How do you support the claim of an insurgent Saudi populace? If they are so insurgent, why is there no insurgency? Brutal suppression is not an adequate explanation: everywhere else we look, we see that brutal suppression of a truly popular insurgency only serves to inflame and exacerbate the insurgency. Why should SA be different? Are the Saudi security services really that magnificently efficient? Or is it possible that the populace in question is a good deal less insurgent than you think? Where and when have we seen the Saudis suppressing a widespread or truly populace-based insurgency.

We should also dispose of the notion that the Saudi government was imposed by the US or the West. It was not: the House of Saud has been a dominant political force on the peninsula for several hundred years.

I also cannot agree that we need to "out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace". I see no evidence that bin Laden is trying to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of the populace (and it should be noted that "the populace" is not a monolith with a single set of concerns). If bin Laden's message really represented the concerns of the populace he would have generated far more support and been able to muster something resembling an insurgency. The reality on the ground suggests that his message has a very powerful appeal to a very limited number of people, which is why it manifests itself as a terrorist group rather than as a mass-based insurgency.

Saudi Arabia did pass through a very difficult time, with a great deal of discontent, in the 90s. The primary cause was the oil glut, which had a devastating impact on the Saudi economy. It didn't help that the royals kept their personal spending rolling right along, and the presence of American forces gave religious radicals the leverage to suggest that the low oil prices and consequent economic miseries were somehow being imposed by the Americans. Despite this, bin Laden never gained sufficient influence to muster an insurgency. These conditions have already been reversed: the American forces are gone, the oil glut is a dim memory, the nation is awash with cash and the government is spending huge sums on public services, infrastructure, and job creation.

What "concerns of the Saudi populace", specifically, would you have us pressure the Saudi government to address? How, specifically, would we apply such pressure? I don't see that we have a great deal of leverage, or that the populace would appreciate our intervention. How do we even know what their concerns are?

I think you may be overestimating the degree of coordination in the various Middle East/South Asian insurgencies and nationalist movements, and I think it's very dangerous to assume that AQ is enabling these movements. I see the situation as the opposite: it is the nationalist movements and insurgencies that enable AQ. If we resolve these situations, each in its own difficult and gradual way, we deprive AQ of its raison d'etre. AQ was not born out of an insurgent situation in Saudi Arabia, it was born out of the jihad against the Soviets. Bin Laden tried to follow that up by creating an insurgency in Saudi Arabia, and failed. In order to survive as a relevant force, he needed an enemy: a jihadi is nothing without a jihad. Hence the attacks on the US: an attempt to draw the US into a conflict that would give AQ a continued reason to exist.

I don't see that we have to resolve anything in Saudi Arabia: a good thing, because it is not in our power to resolve anything in Saudi Arabia. We do need to resolve our business in Afghanistan and Iraq... and it would help a bit, if only in PR terms, if we were a bit less solicitous toward the Israelis. The West Bank settlements issue provides, I think, an excellent opportunity to show a little backbone in that quarter. They are not an existential or a vital security issue for Israel, and the US can and should apply some weight toward rolling them back.

Ultimately, though, Afghanistan is not about Palestine or Saudi Arabia, and anything we do there will be peripheral. There may be a few foreign fighters motivated by those issues, but without the core Afghan resistance they can do nothing: our problem is not the foreign fighters, it is the indigenous resistance. Afghanistan is about Afghanistan... and that's more than enough of a problem.

[Bob's World]

Many people see this in the same way you do. I don't. I'm comfortable with that.

I won't even try to convey the volumes of historical and theoretical information that would be required to bring you from where you are to where you can begin to understand where I am coming from. Keep reading, and asking questions, and challenging what others tell you things mean. That's what I did.

There's no right answer, but some are better than others.

[Dayuhan]

Many people see this in the same way you do. I don't. I'm comfortable with that.

I won't even try to convey the volumes of historical and theoretical information that would be required to bring you from where you are to where you can begin to understand where I am coming from. Keep reading, and asking questions, and challenging what others tell you things mean. That's what I did.

There's no right answer, but some are better than others.

Those thoughts didn't exactly spring from a vacuum: I've been through a fair bit of history and theory, and done business in the Gulf for many years. I know that on occasion we've waded into the region and messed things up, but I doubt that we can alter that by wading in again with the idea that we can set things right, or pressure others into doing so according to our prescriptions. Good intentions do not assure good outcomes, and the idea of the US trying to act as self-appointed spokesman for the Saudi populace strikes me as something that could yield all manner of unintended consequences, most of them undesirable and many of them downright horrible. I'd prefer to see less meddling, not more, and none at all until we've resolved our current entanglements.

I'm still very curious about what you'd like to pressure the Saudis to do, and what sort of pressure you think would yield positive results.

[Steve the Planner]

For every complex problem there is a pefectly simple solution that is entriely wrong. H.L. Mencken, The Baltimore Sage

I actually thought some of the earlier comments in this blog held a lot of insights.

Thinking about this problem in systemics: What kind of systems are we dealing with? Non-state, local/tribal, regional and cross-border, minimal governmental structures.

Somebody started out with the idea of closing off the Paki border, then a retort that (1) that is not possible; and (2) it is not desirable.

Then there was amish-mash of different ideas and strategies about how to "do something" or get out.

What systems dynamics approaches start with is an effort to identify all the basic complex systems and subsystems, and their interactions with each other. You start with what is there, not with what we would like it to be. You look at what's broken, not who is to blame. You figure out what the system (the peoples of these border and conflict areas) will realistically accept and the trade-offs associated with effecting your reasonably determined desired end states. Then you look for ways to modify, interact with, or improve the system's performance in some reasonably attainable manner not inconsistent with the desired end state.

I keep reading reports and opinions from some pretty well-informed folks about the various complex sub-systems, the minimalist governmental structure and resources, and the resourcefulness of opposition to us.

But nobody seems to have focused on putting a viable program or plan into motion that addresses the real system that is there, and what can credibly be accomplished by it. Just a lot of bits and pieces, and incoherent government-speak (or worse yet, military jargon). Folks bandying about old fashioned nation-state stuff about this country opr that country, and how to fix "it," when we all know that these kinds of places aren't really nation-states, and the problem definitions and solutions are well outside that kind of thinking.

Seems to me somebody ought to start defining these places based on the people (down to the smallest levels in the places that matter) that are there, what they are about, up to, or motivated by, and what, with our increasingly limited resources and capabilities, and the severe geography, weather, and economic limitations, we can realistically achieve.

Success in Afghanistan is a question, not an answer. What do we want to achieve in that real and complicated place, and how do we intend to attain it?

Steve

[Bob's World]

Those thoughts didn't exactly spring from a vacuum: I've been through a fair bit of history and theory, and done business in the Gulf for many years. I know that on occasion we've waded into the region and messed things up, but I doubt that we can alter that by wading in again with the idea that we can set things right, or pressure others into doing so according to our prescriptions. Good intentions do not assure good outcomes, and the idea of the US trying to act as self-appointed spokesman for the Saudi populace strikes me as something that could yield all manner of unintended consequences, most of them undesirable and many of them downright horrible. I'd prefer to see less meddling, not more, and none at all until we've resolved our current entanglements.

I'm still very curious about what you'd like to pressure the Saudis to do, and what sort of pressure you think would yield positive results.

The Saudi's need to listen to their own populace, and open that dialogue so as to develop some reasonable reforms. Currently, they are talking reform, but really have no incentive to surrender much if any of the total control that they have employed for generations to control this populace. The times are changing though. Its hard to keep the "boy down on the farm" once he's seen Paris.

The perception that Bin Laden tries to play up is that the King is corrupt, and worse has sold out to Western influence as manifested in the U.S. relationship; and that good Arabs must purge the peninsula of this apostate influence, and that to do so they must first break the support of the U.S. to the King.

I recommend that the US adopt about 80% of Bin Laden's message. I agree that we have become too involved in the politics of the region as part of our Cold War engagement and efforts to ensure the flow of oil; and that we too believe that the King should be more sensitive to the desires of his populace.

Then announce and implement a program of lessening out "footprint" in the country, while at the same time facilitating ("carrots and sticks" to get the King to the table) a series of meetings between the King and representatives of key interst groups in the Kingdom to discuss reform. By doing this we disempower bin Laden tremendously. There is no need for the US to actually participate in the talks, and best if we do not. Hell, let AQ send reps. I suspect that only moderate change will come from this, but it will be much more than what would come without it. As an example, many in the Kingdom want a judiciary free from the King's control. That would be a huge change forward. More importantly we facilitate a much more positive narrative for us while at the same time disempowering bin Laden's ideological message in a major way. There is no fast answer; but we must change our approach. Currently we call Saudi insurgent's "terrorists" and enable the King's efforts to ruthlessly suppress these popular movements in the name of GWOT. This empowers bin Laden's message.

When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.

Hopefully this helps highlight the type of efforts I mean. To over-engage to this end is as bad as the over-engaging that we have done to date in the other direction.

Once we make some progress here, we can add issues like greater Saudi effort on the Palestinian problem; or less support to AQ, etc.

[Bob's World]

that is, if you interpret the Commander in Chief's guidance:

[I]"Afghanistan: The President’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan will ensure that all elements of national power are engaged and integrated in an effort to defeat al Qaeda to prevent attacks on the homeland and on our Allies and partners. We are asking our friends and allies to join us with a renewed commitment. We also will regularly assess the progress of our efforts and those of the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan through clear measurements to ensure ongoing informed accountability."[/I]
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/defense/


To mean also defeating the Taliban, and also to build from scratch centralized democratic government and infrastructure provided by foreign hands, where no local hands have ever built it before...then yes, he will need far more than 21,000 additional men to accomplish the mission.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/2009091/a...us_afghanistan

"A properly resourced counterinsurgency probably means more forces, and without question, more time" and dedication, Mullen said.


Perhaps ADM Mullen is asking the wrong question of the wrong party. Clearly his commanders and staff have brought him a COA to execute the Commander-in-Chief's guidance that fails the "Acceptable-Suitable-Feasible" test.

Yes, asking the commander for more time, forces, and an expanded mission statement in order to make your COA pass the "Feasible" test is an option; but it still does not account for just how unacceptable both the current plan and the expanded proposed effort are to so many stakeholders; and "Suitable" is a criteria that should be open to debate as well, as reasonable minds can certainly differ as to the veracity of the proposed campaign plan.

I'm not judging, but if this was being played out at BN level, the company commander would be told to come up with a better plan before going to BDE to ask for this degree of expanded resources, authorities, and time.

(Besides, we aren't doing COIN in Afghanistan, its FID. Until we can identify the mission correctly, it stands to reason that the plan to execute it might be a bit off. Oh, and I would also suggest to the boss to change the criteria for AQ from "Defeat" to "Neutralize," as the pursuit of defeat brings far too many negative 2nd and 3rd order effects and is not necessary to achieve the ends of making America safe.)