Winning the War in Afghanistan

[raptor10]

That's interesting - isn't there a worry that if we accepted AQ reps in talks about grievances, it would legitimize their use of "irregular warfare" (a euphemism obviously).

[marct]

Hi Bob,

Most of what you say, snarkiness included , I agree with. I do, however, have a bit of a problem with this:

(Besides, we aren't doing COIN in Afghanistan, its FID. Until we can identify the mission correctly, it stands to reason that the plan to execute it might be a bit off. Oh, and I would also suggest to the boss to change the criteria for AQ from "Defeat" to "Neutralize," as the pursuit of defeat brings far too many negative 2nd and 3rd order effects and is not necessary to achieve the ends of making America safe.)

I used to argue that Afghanistan was FID / SFA, but I am now really having second (and third) doubts. FID (and SFA) seem to imply two criteria that I believe are missing from the current situation:

1. a (locally) "valid" (however we want to define it) HN government; i.e. one that s/b able to stand up without massive external support and resources, and
2. a situation where the HN government actually has some measure of control over the ROE.

Honestly, I don't really see either of these implied conditions being met, so I don't see how we can be said to actually be "doing" FID (or SFA). I don't think we have a decent alphabet soup acronym for this situation. What do we call it? Military-based social engineering on the cheap (MBSEC)?

[marct]

That's interesting - isn't there a worry that if we accepted AQ reps in talks about grievances, it would legitimize their use of "irregular warfare" (a euphemism obviously).

AQ, yes, the Taliban, no. If we focus on the basic mission, not the "mission creep on steroids" version, then the Taliban need to be part of the solution.

[slapout9]

But nobody seems to have focused on putting a viable program or plan into motion that addresses the real system that is there, and what can credibly be accomplished by it. Just a lot of bits and pieces, and incoherent government-speak (or worse yet, military jargon). Folks bandying about old fashioned nation-state stuff about this country opr that country, and how to fix "it," when we all know that these kinds of places aren't really nation-states, and the problem definitions and solutions are well outside that kind of thinking.

Seems to me somebody ought to start defining these places based on the people (down to the smallest levels in the places that matter) that are there, what they are about, up to, or motivated by, and what, with our increasingly limited resources and capabilities, and the severe geography, weather, and economic limitations, we can realistically achieve.


Steve

Excellant post.The only way out of this problem to is to begin looking and thinking of the situation as a system and not as Afghanistan, because Afghanistan doesn't exist in the System of Tribe-A-Stan.

[Ken White]

...Oh, and I would also suggest to the boss to change the criteria for AQ from "Defeat" to "Neutralize," as the pursuit of defeat brings far too many negative 2nd and 3rd order effects and is not necessary to achieve the ends of making America safe.)

I'm not even sure they can be neutralized, I'd settle for 'significantly disrupted.'

MarcT said:

What do we call it? Military-based social engineering on the cheap (MBSEC)?

That about sums it up...

[Bob's World]

Hi Bob,

Most of what you say, snarkiness included , I agree with. I do, however, have a bit of a problem with this:



I used to argue that Afghanistan was FID / SFA, but I am now really having second (and third) doubts. FID (and SFA) seem to imply two criteria that I believe are missing from the current situation:

1. a (locally) "valid" (however we want to define it) HN government; i.e. one that s/b able to stand up without massive external support and resources, and
2. a situation where the HN government actually has some measure of control over the ROE.

Honestly, I don't really see either of these implied conditions being met, so I don't see how we can be said to actually be "doing" FID (or SFA). I don't think we have a decent alphabet soup acronym for this situation. What do we call it? Military-based social engineering on the cheap (MBSEC)?

Their competence may well determine if they succeed or not, but it does not somehow transpose their role as the COIN executor to an outside FID provider. This is a ruthless business, and if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support. It happens.

This goes to the heart of what I call "populace-centric" approach. We cannot tie ourselves to some particular government, but must work with whatever government emerges to lead. Governments come and go, threats come and go, the populace endures. To step in to co-opt the COIN mission simply because WE as the outside FID provider want a particular government to prevail really violates our founding principle of Self-Determination and the inherent right of every populace to insurgency..

[jmm99]

OK, systems people, you have my attention. What does the system and its sub-systems look like ? Maybe a bulletpoint and/or chart for JMM types.

Sounds like a serious approach that will at least identify the components to a political-diplomatic solution.

Mike

[slapout9]

OK, systems people, you have my attention. What does the system and its sub-systems look like ? Maybe a bulletpoint and/or chart for JMM types.

Sounds like a serious approach that will at least identify the components to a political-diplomatic solution.

Mike

May be to late Afghan nationals are here with alleged links to AQ the real Enemy system! and were the target of a Anti-Terror Raid.....that did not have the best results. I was afraid that this was going to happen sooner or later. The way we have handled the whole situation almost made it inevitable, but I am keeping the faith

http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/15/...iref=hpmostpop

[jmm99]

I would be surprised if there wasn't a group of Astanis linked to AQ. This may or may not be a serious event - no bombs, no arrests.

A more important question (re: Astan itself) to me would be what Taliban groups are linked to AQ, and how strongly they are linked. What Taliban groups are not linked to AQ.

Thinking of chemical molecules (hey, they're systems, aren't they) - single bond, double bond, triple bond.

What Pashtun groups are linked to the Taliban, but not of the Taliban. What Pashtun groups are anti-Taliban. What Pashtun groups are simply neutral.

[slapout9]

I would be surprised if there wasn't a group of Astanis linked to AQ. This may or may not be a serious event - no bombs, no arrests.

A more important question (re: Astan itself) to me would be what Taliban groups are linked to AQ, and how strongly they are linked. What Taliban groups are not linked to AQ.

Thinking of chemical molecules (hey, they're systems, aren't they) - single bond, double bond, triple bond.

What Pashtun groups are linked to the Taliban, but not of the Taliban. What Pashtun groups are anti-Taliban. What Pashtun groups are simply neutral.

The big deal is they are doing it HERE! No bombs, No arrests because they got away The bigger point is this, as we prepare to surge in A'stan suppose they surge in America with AQ support......suppose they decide not to be good little enemy systems and stay in their country while it's blown up but decide to come HERE with an IED campaign. What would the 2nd and 3rd order effects be of just a single strike.....mass hysteria? stock market crash?
Insurgency warfare is based on infiltration they know how to run between the raindrops and we don't know how to stop that with any degree of certainty.

[marct]

Hi Bob,

Their competence may well determine if they succeed or not, but it does not somehow transpose their role as the COIN executor to an outside FID provider. This is a ruthless business, and if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support. It happens.

Can the US (and NATO) actually be said to be "outside FID provider[s]"? This gets to the heart of the lexical problem I have with this - the US put Karzai and the current gov't in place, both individually and as to its form. This was similar to what happened in Germany and Japan after WW II. But, having done that, it appears as if there is a stepping back and saying that "they" are independant. Put simply, the Karzai gov't and the current GoA is an imposed regime that you are now trying to define as internally legitimate. I sense a paradox here .

You go on to say that "if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support" and there are certainly precedents for that. The Taliban (greater popular support) ousted the Soviet backed GoA while the US (greater force) ousted the Taliban. My point here is that just by calling the current GoA "legitimate" and, as a result of that act of naming, saying that they hold the "role of COIN executor" doesn't hold water. It's not FID, although it may be FIDOS (Foreign Internal Defence On Steroids*).

This goes to the heart of what I call "populace-centric" approach. We cannot tie ourselves to some particular government, but must work with whatever government emerges to lead.

Does that mean that you would work with the Taliban? That's not, BTW, a joke, I mean it quite seriously. The way you have worded your comment implies that you are viewing US FID efforts as an outsourced, stance-neutral provider of military power rather than an effort with a specific, national policy objective.

Governments come and go, threats come and go, the populace endures. To step in to co-opt the COIN mission simply because WE as the outside FID provider want a particular government to prevail really violates our founding principle of Self-Determination and the inherent right of every populace to insurgency..

I agree that it does violate that principle, but that certainly hasn't stopped the US in the past and I doubt it will stop it in the future. If there was a fair and free vote in Afghanistan (not likely, but let's suppose...) that called for a withdrawl of all US and NATO forces, my gut guess is that it would win with a 65% in the affirmative. In that case, would you advocate withdrawl?

I'm really not trying to be a sierra-disturber, here, but I think it is absolutely necessary that people not get caught up in lexical illusions that end up causing major problems with missions.

Cheers,

Marc

*************
* With, I will note, a whole of government approach as in the whole of the GoA is a foreign creation.

[marct]

Insurgency warfare is based on infiltration they know how to run between the raindrops and we don't know how to stop that with any degree of certainty.

Yup. One of the ironies that Britain learned the hard way is that while a channel may prevent most types of invasions / attacks, it doesn't prevent all of them. The US is still learning that lesson (BTW, Canada doesn't seem to think that we need to, but that's another story ).

[wm]

Bob's World noted that the competence of a sitting government does not decide the mission. That is completely true in so far as the mission is determined without respect to the wishes of the country in which the mission is being performed. But when that happens, the correct name for any such mission is "aggression."

Earlier in this thread, we considered that the right analogy for Afghanistan as something like a domestic dispute that has slipped into significant violence. I'm thinking that Bob's World's latest forays would lead us to a situation akin to the Lincoln County Wars of the American West.

As MarkT alludes, to do what Bob's World posits is to make our "FID" forces little more than the hired guns used by one or another "cattle baron" to ensure grazing rights for his herds. That does not support the will of the people: we've got to consider the sod-busters, sheep herders and merchants in town in the equation too.

[marct]

Interesting article worth reading (from the SWJ blog & NY Times)

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/op...=1&ref=opinion

If there is any entity more reviled in Afghanistan than the Karzai government and coalition forces, it is the Taliban, so I never took these desperate exclamations to be literally true. But these outbursts reveal a disgust with the current government so pronounced it cannot be dismissed. And the international community’s reluctance to fight corruption head-on has inextricably linked it with the despised administration. As we continue to give unequivocal support to a crooked government, our credibility is greatly diminished and the difficulty of our mission greatly increased.

[Ken White]

Can the US (and NATO) actually be said to be "outside FID provider[s]"?

Lexically and honestly, No. Politically, it sort of has to be...

This was similar to what happened in Germany and Japan after WW II. But, having done that, it appears as if there is a stepping back and saying that "they" are independant.

Is not the difference that those two governments were defeated, modified and were retooled and allowed to continue to govern while we and others were Occupying powers? Whereas in Afghanistan the nominal but not totally accepted government of the day was defeated and actually departed (or hid themselves thoroughly) and thus there was a need for some form of government and that fairly quickly (which does not mean we did it right...) as we did not want to be seen or legally tabbed as 'an occupying power.'

My point here is that just by calling the current GoA "legitimate" and, as a result of that act of naming, saying that they hold the "role of COIN executor" doesn't hold water.

I'm not sure that's correct. What I am sure of is that the alternatives are probably worse. The real difficulty arises not from the legitimacy of the Afghan government, I think it's legitimate even if it is totally corrupt (Boy, what a surprise...) and I suspect most legal opinion would agree -- the UN seems to -- however the problem is that governments major partner happens to be a big, bureaucratic mono-whatever that does not play well with others. We want them to be in charge BUT to do everything our way, not a good plan with a proud and xenophobic people. Makes for an uneasy relationship (that's my understatement for the day).

...that called for a withdrawl of all US and NATO forces, my gut guess is that it would win with a 65% in the affirmative. In that case, would you advocate withdrawl?

See Iraq. I'm pretty sure we would go, quickly -- and heave a huge sigh of relief. There seems to be a belief by many that the US Army or the US in general wants to be in Afghanistan. My sensing is that's totally incorrect on both counts. Hmmm. I do believe that's two understatements today...

...but I think it is absolutely necessary that people not get caught up in lexical illusions that end up causing major problems with missions.

Lexical perhaps -- the larger problem is that we tend to cater more to domestic politics -- or to political illusion -- than to an accurate reading of the international situation in the use of force abroad. Not terribly smart on our part. Only the restraints imposed by Allies in WW II kept us from doing some dumb stuff *.

We're like a big, brash, dumb but not ill intentioned teenager, we can do a bit of damage unless a more sedate friend constrains us a bit. Get upset when told to cool it, too. Especially if we know we need to do that...

* I would be remiss if I did not also mention that they caused us to do some other dumb stuff. Fortunately, it worked out fairly well...

[marct]

Hi Ken,

Lexically and honestly, No. Politically, it sort of has to be...

Yup, I'd agree with that, although, speaking politically, I'm not sure how well the image would play out.

Is not the difference that those two governments were defeated, modified and were retooled and allowed to continue to govern while we and others were Occupying powers? Whereas in Afghanistan the nominal but not totally accepted government of the day was defeated and actually departed (or hid themselves thoroughly) and thus there was a need for some form of government and that fairly quickly (which does not mean we did it right...) as we did not want to be seen or legally tabbed as 'an occupying power.

It's an interesting problem. In both cases, although moreso in Japan, there was a lot of retooling. There was continued governing, but primarily at the local level under constant watch. In Afghanistan, OTOH, there was a very rapid more to create a "national" government after the defeat of the Taliban, but very limited moves to create local governments, for exactly the reasons you state. This situation, however, led to some serious problems.

While there was a "national" government, it had very limited local reach. Can a government be "legitimate" with such a poor grasp over its claimed populace? (If so, the Pretender to the Throne of Jerusalem may be wanting to talk with the DoS fairly soon). Part of the problem, IMO, was that there was a perfectly good "Government-in-Exile" that had a fair bit of support but for ideological reasons, they were left out in the cold. Given that, there is no way that the US/NATO could be viewed as much else than an "occupying power" since it obviously wasn't there to restore the "legitimate" government (in-Exile).

'I'm not sure that's correct. What I am sure of is that the alternatives are probably worse. The real difficulty arises not from the legitimacy of the Afghan government, I think it's legitimate even if it is totally corrupt (Boy, what a surprise...) and I suspect most legal opinion would agree -- the UN seems to -- however the problem is that governments major partner happens to be a big, bureaucratic mono-whatever that does not play well with others. We want them to be in charge BUT to do everything our way, not a good plan with a proud and xenophobic people. Makes for an uneasy relationship (that's my understatement for the day).

I'm not sure that all of the alternatives were worse; then again, I'm a great believer in constitutional monarchies . I certainly agree with your last point, and therein lies the rub and why I find it difficult to accept the outsourcing model Bob implied.

See Iraq. I'm pretty sure we would go, quickly -- and heave a huge sigh of relief. There seems to be a belief by many that the US Army or the US in general wants to be in Afghanistan. My sensing is that's totally incorrect on both counts. Hmmm. I do believe that's two understatements today...

Yup, and I suspect that there would be a huge sigh of relief if it happened in A'stan, too - at least until the international blame for the US breaking things and not fixing them started showing up (about 3 days after the withdrawl).

Lexical perhaps -- the larger problem is that we tend to cater more to domestic politics -- or to political illusion -- than to an accurate reading of the international situation in the use of force abroad. Not terribly smart on our part. Only the restraints imposed by Allies in WW II kept us from doing some dumb stuff *.

Agreed on the domestic politics angle; it's a problem all democracies have, and there's not much that can be done about it (as a related aside, I always loved the Plays of Aristophanes; they are worth reading given the parallels).

We're like a big, brash, dumb but not ill intentioned teenager, we can do a bit of damage unless a more sedate friend constrains us a bit. Get upset when told to cool it, too. Especially if we know we need to do that...

I think the best comment I can make here is "No Comment" .

[jmm99]

This is my personal take, which I've had since 9/11.

1. We must expect attempts at violence in the US by AQ, either directly, via supported groups or by persons who are simply thinking in parallel with AQ.

2. So far, the violent incidents have been few (e.g., the DC snipers & the Arkansas shootings by "parallel thinkers"); and a number of plots have been foiled.

3. We cannot expect this successful record to continue without a serious incident happening. It will occur. Homeland security will not be perfect.

4. How people react will depend on the person. If you were terrorized by 9/11, you probably will be terrorized by the event which will surely happen. If you were intensely angered by 9/11 without feeling terrorized, the same emotion will probably flow from that event.

5. I (and every US citizen, for that matter - some will disagree with this), since 9/11, have sent hundreds of thousands of guys and gals into situations where they don't have our at home luxuries and are subject to far greater risks than we have at home. So, it is time for the homeland to grow up about risks of violence.

6. I don't suggest we adopt the mentality of a herd of prey stalked by predators. But, I do suggest that, besides the logical COA to arrest or kill when we can, we realize that AQ (as it presently stands) is not an existential threat to the US. It is simply a threat.

End sermonette.

[Bob's World]

That's interesting - isn't there a worry that if we accepted AQ reps in talks about grievances, it would legitimize their use of "irregular warfare" (a euphemism obviously).

Codified it in our Declaration, and employed it to seek a change of governance.

The value of having AQ at the table is that it would most likely highlight how extreme some of their positions are in the context of the conservative changes that most of the populace prefers. It also takes away the propaganda tool of their being able to claim that they still represent what the people really want and that they are still being denied by a sham process hosted by the Apostate Government and shaped by the West.

Besides, you can't fully appreciate crazy until you put it in the context of sanity.

[Ken White]

This situation, however, led to some serious problems...Part of the problem, IMO, was that there was a perfectly good "Government-in-Exile" that had a fair bit of support but for ideological reasons, they were left out in the cold. Given that, there is no way that the US/NATO could be viewed as much else than an "occupying power" since it obviously wasn't there to restore the "legitimate" government (in-Exile)...at least until the international blame for the US breaking things and not fixing them started showing up (about 3 days after the withdrawl).

True on problems, some foreseen, some not. All predictable.

Also obviously correct on the 'legitimate' government issue but that was always as much a non-starter as not toppling the Taliban. I suspect the moral there is be careful what you want, you may get it.

On the withdrawal, that international opprobrium was, I suspect, why we elected to stay instead of departing after toppling. In my personal view, that was not adequate reason to stay -- nor is it adequate reason to not withdraw. The nominal reason we stayed, 'to deny safe haven...' has now become the real reason we cannot withdraw. The fact that staying will lessen (but not eliminate) international blame for the existence of halitosis and other things that are the responsibility of the US is just a bonus.

[Bob's World]

Hi Bob,



Can the US (and NATO) actually be said to be "outside FID provider[s]"? This gets to the heart of the lexical problem I have with this - the US put Karzai and the current gov't in place, both individually and as to its form. This was similar to what happened in Germany and Japan after WW II. But, having done that, it appears as if there is a stepping back and saying that "they" are independant. Put simply, the Karzai gov't and the current GoA is an imposed regime that you are now trying to define as internally legitimate. I sense a paradox here .

You go on to say that "if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support" and there are certainly precedents for that. The Taliban (greater popular support) ousted the Soviet backed GoA while the US (greater force) ousted the Taliban. My point here is that just by calling the current GoA "legitimate" and, as a result of that act of naming, saying that they hold the "role of COIN executor" doesn't hold water. It's not FID, although it may be FIDOS (Foreign Internal Defence On Steroids*).



Does that mean that you would work with the Taliban? That's not, BTW, a joke, I mean it quite seriously. The way you have worded your comment implies that you are viewing US FID efforts as an outsourced, stance-neutral provider of military power rather than an effort with a specific, national policy objective.



I agree that it does violate that principle, but that certainly hasn't stopped the US in the past and I doubt it will stop it in the future. If there was a fair and free vote in Afghanistan (not likely, but let's suppose...) that called for a withdrawl of all US and NATO forces, my gut guess is that it would win with a 65% in the affirmative. In that case, would you advocate withdrawl?

I'm really not trying to be a sierra-disturber, here, but I think it is absolutely necessary that people not get caught up in lexical illusions that end up causing major problems with missions.

Cheers,

Marc

*************
* With, I will note, a whole of government approach as in the whole of the GoA is a foreign creation.

We just have to face the fact, that sometimes things will not go the way WE want them to go. Cold War engagement to contain was all about exerting control. We have come to see exerting our will and control as the model for success today as well.

I suggest that it is not, and that we better serve our national interests in the emerging security environment by learning to be the outside enabler of choice, to be the facilitator of evolution vice the obstacle. We often refuse to recognize governments that rise to power in ways we object to. I just don't see where that position has helped us to stabilize those regions and advance our interests. In fact, usually the opposite occurs.