Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

Bob's World noted that the competence of a sitting government does not decide the mission. That is completely true in so far as the mission is determined without respect to the wishes of the country in which the mission is being performed. But when that happens, the correct name for any such mission is "aggression."

Earlier in this thread, we considered that the right analogy for Afghanistan as something like a domestic dispute that has slipped into significant violence. I'm thinking that Bob's World's latest forays would lead us to a situation akin to the Lincoln County Wars of the American West.

As MarkT alludes, to do what Bob's World posits is to make our "FID" forces little more than the hired guns used by one or another "cattle baron" to ensure grazing rights for his herds. That does not support the will of the people: we've got to consider the sod-busters, sheep herders and merchants in town in the equation too.

Picking sides is risky business. So is remaining neutral. Fact is, we are involved, so now that we are in the middle of this range war, how do we use our wherewithal to stabilize it as quickly, and peacefully, and equitably as possible without making it a solution of our forming and choosing in the process? This is the challenge.

[slapout9]

Link to a memo by a former FBI agent on the real reason we are in Afghanistan and why we are not to going to leave.


http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feat...02/06/05/memo/

[Ken White]

His complaints that is...

The pipeline issue has been bruited about for years, the fact that UnoCal, Kalzay and the Clinton and Bush Administrations all did what he says they did is also old news. He says:

"The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands."

Okay, par for the course in our not too swift and not too diplomatic efforts to insure free trade (preferably on US terms or else...). We've been doing that for over 200 years. However, he then says:

"It shows al-Qaida's keen interest in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations and raises new questions as to whether the U.S. military threat to the Taliban in July 2001 could have prompted al-Qaida's Sept. 11 attack."(emphasis added /kw)

Um, I love it when the FBI, adds 2 and 2 and gets 7.6. Given that they tell us that the preparations for 9/11 started in late 1998 or early 1999 I'm unsure how he arrives at that conclusion that a July 2001 'threat' could or would precipitate anything to do with 9/11. They were into the execution phase before Bush was inaugurated...

I do agree with his last sentence, though:

Would that U.S. intelligence agencies' investigations into al-Qaida activities in the months before Sept. 11 had such a productive ending.

As to 'it's all about the oilll...' being the reason for entry and for staying, part of it, not all by a long shot.

[slapout9]

Ken, I think we are there for the oil (and some other stuff) but don't misunderstand I think the pipeline is a good thing, it will bring stability and money to the area if the darn thing ever gets built. So the trick is to get Tribe-a-stan to support Pipeline-a-stan and we all live happily ever after plus that will shut out a lot of AQ influence over the Talliban.

[Dayuhan]

Link to a memo by a former FBI agent on the real reason we are in Afghanistan and why we are not to going to leave.


http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feat...02/06/05/memo/

A fascinating exercise in disinformation, and obviously an effective one.

The word "pipeline" rings an immediate and reflexive bell, and unless you've taken the time to dig into the issue a bit, it's very easy to reach all the wrong conclusions.

The "revelation" that AQ was monitoring the Taliban's pipeline negotiations is hardly earthshaking; my personal reaction was along the lines of "duh". The negotiations were anything but secret, they were widely reported at the time. There was quite vocal opposition in the US, particularly from women's groups, who were fairly irate at the idea of US companies doing business with the Taliban (back then American liberals didn't like the Taliban). Of course AQ would take an interest in their chief protector negotiating with their chief enemy, and of course they would monitor that situation: it would be more surprising if they hadn't been monitoring the situation.

Many people have reached the conclusion that the US was pressuring the Taliban to accept the pipeline project, and that the Taliban were resisting. This is simply wrong. The Taliban badly needed the revenue and were actively pursuing the project, even sent a delegation to Texas to negotiate. The US was trying to steer the project to Unocal over a competing consortium (all governments of industrialized countries do this, some much more aggressively than the US), but there was no need to persuade the Taliban to pursue the project; they were already on board. The pipeline was not derailed by Taliban resistance, it was derailed by US and later UN sanctions, which would have made it illegal for Unocal to even talk to the Taliban.

The real disinformation comes here:

The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands.

This is, of course, literally true. The author doesn't come out and say it, but the implication is that the US was threatening violence if the Taliban didn't allow Unocal to build the pipeline, a rather bizarre notion, since at the time US law would not have allowed Unocal to build the pipeline. In reality, the threat of violence and the pipeline deal formed a carrot-and-stick package aimed at persuading the Taliban to turn over bin Laden and sever relations with AQ. The package was simple: if the Taliban turned over bin laden and broke with AQ, the US would lift sanctions and allow the pipeline deal (and potentially other business) to proceed. If not, military reprisals were on the table.

The notion that we are in Afghanistan "for the oil" simply doesn't stand up to examination. The pipeline would have carried natural gas for the Pakistani market, not for the US. It would have been a big deal for the Taliban - any source of hard currency would have been a big deal for the Taliban - but the amount of gas involved was far to small to have any significant impact on the global market, and the project was far to small to drive major action. The US did see the pipeline as a useful lever to move the Taliban to a more moderate stance, and as a potentially nice little carrot to toss to a smaller US company, but if you look at the actual size of the project, the idea of it serving as a major casus belli is really pretty absurd.

[slapout9]

Dayuhan, you did see the clarification I posted later? I think it is a good idea for A'stan as it provides some revenue and stability as opposed to their drug crop.

Ken, I think we are there for the oil (and some other stuff) but don't misunderstand I think the pipeline is a good thing, it will bring stability and money to the area if the darn thing ever gets built. So the trick is to get Tribe-a-stan to support Pipeline-a-stan and we all live happily ever after plus that will shut out a lot of AQ influence over the Talliban.

[Dayuhan]

I agree that it would be a good thing for Afghanistan... and for Pakistan, and for Uzbekistan. It's not the reason we're in Afghanistan, though, and Bush was not threatening the Taliban to force them to accept the pipeline project.

I do think that the prospect of the Taliban striking a deal with an American company would have been a very upsetting prospect for bin Laden and AQ, and might well have motivated them to press on with attacks against the US. As the Taliban settled into the role of government there would be a natural need to deal with things like revenue and investment, and that need would tend to bring more moderate and pragmatic individuals forward. AQ would not have seen this trend as anything positive, and would surely have wanted to disrupt it.

[Greyhawk]

The Salon article is certainly interesting - but can anyone point to an (online) translation of the referenced Atef memo? My search turns up nothing, though apparently it was also an exhibit (Government's Exhibit 300B-T) in US vs Osama (or Usama) bin Laden et. al.

[slapout9]

The Salon article is certainly interesting - but can anyone point to an (online) translation of the referenced Atef memo? My search turns up nothing, though apparently it was also an exhibit (Government's Exhibit 300B-T) in US vs Osama (or Usama) bin Laden et. al.

Greyhawk, might try researching John O'Neil this guy is really an unsung hero of the whole Counter Terrorism/911 event. PM jmm99 on research for legal documents.

[slapout9]

For every complex problem there is a pefectly simple solution that is entriely wrong. H.L. Mencken, The Baltimore Sage

I actually thought some of the earlier comments in this blog held a lot of insights.

Thinking about this problem in systemics: What kind of systems are we dealing with? Non-state, local/tribal, regional and cross-border, minimal governmental structures.

Somebody started out with the idea of closing off the Paki border, then a retort that (1) that is not possible; and (2) it is not desirable.

Then there was amish-mash of different ideas and strategies about how to "do something" or get out.

What systems dynamics approaches start with is an effort to identify all the basic complex systems and subsystems, and their interactions with each other. You start with what is there, not with what we would like it to be. You look at what's broken, not who is to blame. You figure out what the system (the peoples of these border and conflict areas) will realistically accept and the trade-offs associated with effecting your reasonably determined desired end states. Then you look for ways to modify, interact with, or improve the system's performance in some reasonably attainable manner not inconsistent with the desired end state.

I keep reading reports and opinions from some pretty well-informed folks about the various complex sub-systems, the minimalist governmental structure and resources, and the resourcefulness of opposition to us.

But nobody seems to have focused on putting a viable program or plan into motion that addresses the real system that is there, and what can credibly be accomplished by it. Just a lot of bits and pieces, and incoherent government-speak (or worse yet, military jargon). Folks bandying about old fashioned nation-state stuff about this country opr that country, and how to fix "it," when we all know that these kinds of places aren't really nation-states, and the problem definitions and solutions are well outside that kind of thinking.

Seems to me somebody ought to start defining these places based on the people (down to the smallest levels in the places that matter) that are there, what they are about, up to, or motivated by, and what, with our increasingly limited resources and capabilities, and the severe geography, weather, and economic limitations, we can realistically achieve.

Success in Afghanistan is a question, not an answer. What do we want to achieve in that real and complicated place, and how do we intend to attain it?

Steve

Awhile back I think it was Bill Moore that said COIN is really population and resource control. I would go for the resource systems first.
In priority:
1-water
2-food
3-shelter
4-medical
All surrounded by a security perimeter. Controlled by a local Governor with a US military counterpart who was good at staying behind cameras instead of in front of them.

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

The priorities from Iraq were:

Water

Energy

Mobility-freedom of exchange/markets, security/viability of movements in a classical economic geography sense

All as a precondition for essential services (including security), economic and agricultural restart, and governance.

In Afghanistan, where subsistence is, perhaps, more important than trade there is some tweaking to do, but my general understanding of the econ/ag strategy is to move beyond subsistence-level activities, which implies a substantial regional mobility system, and, in turn triggers the priority for energy availability.

Once the above three are assured, self-improvement starts to become viable and sustainable.

Steve

[slapout9]

Mobility-freedom of exchange/markets, security/viability of movements in a classical economic geography sense

Steve

I think that is a mistake. Connecting the system comes after the Guerrilla Warfare problem has been brought under control. My Opinion anayway. Think of "Safe Places" first.

[omarali50]

cross posting from another thread about Pakistan:There may be situations where immovable objects face unstoppable forces with tragic results. The writers of this report assume that "countries and their interests" are natural and eternal categories, but such may not be the case. I would submit that Pakistan has already lost control of the Islamic Emirate and does not possess the military force or the political will to reconquer it on its own terms. Eventually, it will settle for a strategy of holding the "settled areas" and I would not be surprised if one day the indo-tibetan border police is being asked to come and help defend Islamabad. Stranger things have happened. The US will inshallah create a reasonable facsimile of a regime in Afghanistan and this regime will contend with the Islamic Emirate for territory and influence for the next generation or so. China, US, EU, even India, will continue to subsidise corrupt "pro-western" regimes in Pakistan and Afghanistan and will wait for time to work its healing magic. This is the best case scenario. Other possibilities include the humiliation and withdrawal of the great satan, followed by an orgy of violence and an expanded Islamic emirate surrounded by India, China and other local powers and at war with all of them. OR, if India and China fail to cooperate, China may use rump Pakistan or the islamic emirate to humiliate and destroy India, but will be left holding the most explosive bag in history, allowing the United States to recover from its near-terminal decline while China tries (unsuccessfully) to pacify Southwest Asia. OR, we could see the triumph of rationality and peace will reign as Pakhtuns buy Chinese HD players to play Indian movies while eating Ramen noodles. My apologies for being flippant, but its than kind of day...

[tequila]

Feeling the blues today, omarali?

I don't think we've reached the point of Pakistani state collapse quite yet. The Pak Taliban cannot advance anywhere the Pakistani Army isn't willing to concede - i.e. non-Pashtun areas. I have yet to see any real danger of Punjabi jihadists like Jaish e-Mohammad or Lashkar i-Jhangvi being able to take on the Pakistani Army in any way - posing a terror threat is not the same as being able to topple the state. The idea that these groups would be able to destroy the state, never mind replace it with an "emirate" of any kind, seems quite farfetched.

[Steve the Planner]

Absolutely. Makes no sense until some level of fighting has ceased.

But effective reconstruction isn't really going to work until you get it: safe travel routes for critical market movements. In Iraq, the Pipeline Exclsuion Zone, a linear fort along the pipelines, made movement safe.

So do you fight a general war, or prioritize efforts to things like safe convoy movements, or PEZes?

Critical questions: What needs to be moved, from where to where, how do you secure it?

Steve

[slapout9]

In Iraq, the Pipeline Exclsuion Zone, a linear fort along the pipelines, made movement safe.

Steve

Linear Fort.......no problem..... works for me. For some reason when I say a defensible perimeter people jump to the conclusion that it is round, like a moat or something or a wall. It may in fact be a very odd shape, depends on what you are trying to secure. It may be a wall, a fence,a ditch, a soldier with a pair of binoculars, it may be all of those but it needs to be defensible. To me COIN is a big access control problem. Let good people into the safe place, keep the bad people out of the safe place and in the kill zone.
The safe place needs to be self sustainable or as close to that as possible.


Further thoughts. EBO which is a bad word now a days. Time is the ultimate enemy, the longer it takes you to achieve the desired effect the greater the chance that it will go wrong or the enemy will adapt. So here is how I look at things offensively against the enemy..... impose operational paralysis. defensively........ deny operational paralysis to the protected population. Target wise here is what I look at:
1-kenetic...instant
2-air(as in breathing)...minutes
3-food....weeks
4-shelter months
5-medical.....wild card minutes to months

[omarali50]

Feeling the blues today, omarali?

I don't think we've reached the point of Pakistani state collapse quite yet. The Pak Taliban cannot advance anywhere the Pakistani Army isn't willing to concede - i.e. non-Pashtun areas. I have yet to see any real danger of Punjabi jihadists like Jaish e-Mohammad or Lashkar i-Jhangvi being able to take on the Pakistani Army in any way - posing a terror threat is not the same as being able to topple the state. The idea that these groups would be able to destroy the state, never mind replace it with an "emirate" of any kind, seems quite farfetched.

Tequila, I did not mean that the emirate has replaced Pakistan. I refer to the Taliban ruled area of FATA as the Islamic Emirate (their own preferred term, and we should always respect people in this matter, if they call it myanmar, we call it myanmar..). THIS islamic emirate is very much in existence. My "best case scenario" assumed that this emirate will remain confined to more or less its current boundaries and Pakistan will shrink to the "settled areas" of NWFP and Punjab and Sindh,with ongoing insurgency in balochistan. Thats all. Not a collapse of the state. Cheers.

[jmm99]

US v Bin Laden (Embassy bombings) was filed in the Southern District of New York (main webpage).

Find Law has an index to some of the trial record, which you will find here - mainly transcripts of the trial.

Many court records (if electronically filed or scanned) are available via PACER - see SDNY PACER service here.

PACER is an acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records and, it permits account holders to view documents that have been filed within the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (ECF) System. It also permits the public to query this database for a particular individual, case name, and other case information.
....
PACER provides access to the case summary, docket entries, and copies of documents filed in federal cases. If a paper document is needed, or if a case cannot be located when searching by case number, party name, or using the U.S. Party Case Index (USPCI ) then contact the Court to request a court record.

But as the above says, some records have to be requested the old-fashioned way.

Sign up for a PACER account at the PACER Service Center. Registration is free - charges are $0.08 (8 cents) per page downloaded (if less than $10 per year, the charges for that year are waived).

-----------------
PS: to add a 6. to Slap's targets:
....
6. Governance and Rule of Law - decades to centuries.

[Greyhawk]

US v Bin Laden (Embassy bombings) was filed in the Southern District of New York...

etc. - good intel, much appreciated. Will see if I can acquire target.

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

For agricultural reconstruction purposes, it is important to remember that farmers have a critical movement before and after crops. They don't need a permanent safe road, but a safe route movement at crop cycle times.

Pre-US, Northern Iraq was arguably no safer than today, so there were set times and rendevouz points where farmers would meet up with a police/military escort to move crops to market. The road was not safe, nor did it need to be, on a permanent basis---just needed safe movements to market at critical times.

So, the drone has two weakness: It can see more than a human analyst can follow 24/7, and, while it sees, it doesn't always know what its looking at---a wedding party, a gathering of farmers with crops to move to market, or a rally point of bad guys.

Better to understand critical movements, then lay on the route clearance, surveillance, protection when it is needed. Triage is not general on a permanent basis, but linear security for critical movements, when they are needed.

Linear forts like the PEZ aren't bad, but in Iraq, they failed to truly optimize the concept. Not just pipelines and power lines, but a secure land bridge: a road down the center with trailer/connex/oil storage terminals at critical locations.

Steve