Winning the War in Afghanistan

[jmm99]

The example I gave:

What if your indigenous valley folks hate the Karzai governmental like poison; dislike the "Taliban" (different herds of them), but don't hate them as much; don't like AQ at all (a bunch of intervening Arabs who are nuts); are only interested in the almost complete automony of their little series of inter-connected river valleys; and don't really care about whether AQ or "Taliban" exist in other parts of the country - so long as they do not bother the valley folks.

is much the same as what the CIA and SF found in the Central Highlands.

Their highlands tribes were non-Vietnamese, were treated badly by both the Saigon and Hanoi folks, and harrassed by the VC. The VC were the bigger enemy to those tribes. The project fell apart once the Saigon folks were brought back into the picture and the national government was re-imposed.

The bottom line is that, if the masses (in a region) really dislike the national government and if the foreign assistence forces are constrained to enhance the national government in that region, Mao-type (Saul Alinsky community organizing ) simply won't work.

That is especially so where the anti-government forces, also in that region, have a strong security presence and are more than willing to apply authoritarian methods.

The alternative is then to apply a "population-centric" approach, which has its harder and softer takes in many flavors. They also use much of Mao's 7 steps, but apply them in different orders.

---------------------------
Long Wiki article on 2009 Astan Election. Peter Galbraith (brother of Slap's economics guru) was fired by the UN - I'll go with Galbraith's take on the election.

IEC Election Results (with a nice interactive map). Karzai lost in most "Northern Alliance" provinces; he won in Pashtun provinces (the questioned votes). Very regional and ethnic from all appearances; but a province by province study would have to be made.

[jmm99]

From the IEC link:

Karzai won in 20 of 34 provinces, with a national margin of 1,500,000+ (54.6%). I called one province a tie; so, 13 for his opponents.

What follows are his winning provinces, sorted by % of vote for Karzai, with his approx. margin over the next candidate.

Paktika 180,000+, 91.1%
Kandahar 200,000+, 87.6%
Helmand 100,000+, 83.7%
Khost 90,000+, 83.0%
Kunarha 89,000+, 82.8%
Nimroz 40,000+, 82.3%
Paktia 170,000+, 82.2%
Laghman 70,000+, 79.9%
Nangerhar 255,000+, 76.2%
Farah 50,000+, 71.9%
Zabul 9,000+, 69.7%
Urozgan 18,000+, 69.1%
Wardak 30,000+, 63.6%
Juzjan 35,000+, 58.4%
Faryab 50,000+, 57.4%
Kabul 160,000+, 55.0%
Herat 45,000+, 48.6%
Ghazni 12,000+, 46.9%
Sar-i-Pul 10,000+, 45.5%
Logar 12,000+, 43.1%

Nite, folks

[Watcher]

Hi guys longtime lurker first time poster....im just a mid 30's civie and wannabe fitness instructor never been in a uniform (doesnt that involve pressing?).


Saw this today on the crossfit mainsite - a insightful overview of tribal mindset as pertains to the Afghan campaign...and some suggestions as to changing direction over there. Thought you gents might be interested


"Its the tribes stupid" -

Part1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioCcO...layer_embedded

Part2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eePwG...eature=related

Part3
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-e6P...eature=related

Part4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YdeH0...eature=related

Part5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJsB9...eature=related


More here -

http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/


Probably not news to most of you guys (Afghan central government has not managed to exert effective influence across the whole country etc), and that ISAF/NATO should have realistic goals and expectations . I believe Rory Stewart has been saying similar as well....

[tequila]

Argh.

Stay away from Pressfield unless your mind absolutely needs comfort food. He's the historical equivalent of a bag of Doritos.

Read Foust or Bleuer in your internet downtime. Read Maley and Dorronsoro and Grima-Santry if you want to really start learning something.

[Watcher]

Shouldve known you guys had seen his works before

Cheers for those links Tequila!

[William F. Owen]

Argh.

Stay away from Pressfield unless your mind absolutely needs comfort food. He's the historical equivalent of a bag of Doritos.

Concur. Simplistic and inaccurate. Essentially, if the "tribes" are on your side, "tribes" are not a problem.

[Steve the Planner]

Finally, we are talking about Saul Alinsky and community engagement processes. All the civil/mil jargon stripped of.

Planners, as a profession, are all about community engagement. While we usually cite our own, and particularly non-military, sources, exercises and practices, I believe the anti-military bias that has been discussed prevents many from understanding that reconstruction, post-conflict stabilization, hearts-and-minds, and even SF are all really about the same thing. We are all in the same business.

On a tangent, I am not big on including an extensive quote, but this, from the recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee deliberations on Pakistan Aid provides compelling expert testimony on the Afghan issue:

Milt Bearden is a former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad.

"The Soviets spent 10 years, with an average troop strength of 120,000," said Milt Bearden. "This was always enough to fuel an insurgency that matched every effort that they put out to quell the insurgency. But it never, ever was enough to defeat that insurgency."

Bearden said there will always be enough ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan who view any foreign force as an occupation and who will engage U.S. troops on the battlefield. The former CIA officer spelled out his view of how likely a surge in U.S. military forces would be to succeed.

"There is no, in my opinion, there is no possibility for the United States to provide enough troops in Afghanistan to pacify the situation," he said.

Another expert at the hearing, Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, also said: That a U.S. military escalation would be unlikely to succeed and would intensify rivalries in the region, such as the one between India and Pakistan. Lodhi warned of other negative consequences of a military surge in Afghanistan on Pakistan.

"It will lead to an influx of militant and al-Qaida fighters into Pakistan".

Lodhi warned that a surge in U.S. troops would enhance the vulnerability of U.S. and NATO ground supply routes throughout Pakistan, and would likely mean more Afghan refugees pouring into Pakistan.

She said, most importantly:

"It could endanger, erode and unravel the key public consensus that has been achieved in the past one year to fight the militancy."

Lodhi said a fragile consensus has been formed among the general public in Pakistan to fight against the Pakistani Taliban.

Steve Coll, President and CEO of The New America Foundation, a Washington-based public policy institute, agreed with the other panelists at the hearing that neither an abrupt withdrawal of all U.S. forces nor a troop surge is the answer.

Coll said there is a more sustainable solution, and he hopes it is the one President Obama will choose.

"It would make clear that the Taliban will never be permitted to take power by force in Kabul or major cities," said Steve Coll. "It would seek and enforce stability in Afghan population centers, but emphasize politics over combat, urban stability over rural patrolling, Afghan solutions over Western ones. And it would incorporate Pakistan more directly into creative, persistent diplomatic efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the region."

http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-10-01-voa53.cfm

[William F. Owen]

F

Milt Bearden is a former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad.

"The Soviets spent 10 years, with an average troop strength of 120,000," said Milt Bearden. "This was always enough to fuel an insurgency that matched every effort that they put out to quell the insurgency. But it never, ever was enough to defeat that insurgency."

IIRC wasn't the US reason for supporting the insurgency, that if they did not, the insurgency would be defeated? - and would have been without massive external aid?

[slapout9]

The bottom line is that, if the masses (in a region) really dislike the national government and if the foreign assistence forces are constrained to enhance the national government in that region, Mao-type (Saul Alinsky community organizing ) simply won't work.

jmm, A Mao type organization is what the Taliban is! That is why they are winning. Their primary weapon is political (Sub Rosa to Religion) the fighting is just one small portion.

For us to succeed we have to figure out "whos cheatin who" and gain counter popular support. That will not be easy nor conventional.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APRTH...eature=related

[William F. Owen]

jmm, A Mao type organization is what the Taliban is! That is why they are winning.

Moa (Tse-tung) formed highly codified and organised units, with strict operational regulations. He was also an adherent of Clausewitz, and saw conventional operations as the only way to achieve decisive political effect. "Guerilla warfare" was merely a precursor to conventional and decisive operations. Is this the Taliban's plan?

Their primary weapon is political (Sub Rosa to Religion) the fighting is just one small portion.

Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means?

[slapout9]

Moa (Tse-tung) formed highly codified and organised units, with strict operational regulations. He was also an adherent of Clausewitz, and saw conventional operations as the only way to achieve decisive political effect. "Guerilla warfare" was merely a precursor to conventional and decisive operations. Is this the Taliban's plan?

Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means?

1-Yes he did and each unit had a political commander as well as a military commander. Like the Taliban and the connection to their madrassas a religious/political organization with military capabilities. As TX Hammes has pointed out Guerrilla Warfare is evolving, they don't need a conventional Army to achieve their goals.

2-surprised you ask that, as you have said many times war is politics carried on with different means. Or as Mao said political power comes from the barrel of a gun.

[jmm99]

as to this:

from Wilf
Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means ?

Since we both follow CvC and the Taliban are engaging in warfare, their end has to be political. As to means, military (violence) is an obvious means used.

Based on GEN McChrystal's report, the Quetta Taliban has established "shadow governments" in the regions they control, and in some of the areas controlled by other Taliban groups (p.15 of report). The portion of Astan controlled or contested by the Taliban, or not controlled by ISAF (two different metrics) is redacted (see attached snip from p. 15). So, another means is political.

-------------------------
As to this:

Steve the Planner
Finally, we are talking about Saul Alinsky and community engagement processes.

A number here have studied Alinsky's methodology, and we occasionally rear our heads (or posteriors). Good quote from Milt Bearden (and, in brief to Wilf, the direct support for the anti-Soviet insurgency came from Pakistan via ISI links - sound familiar ?).

Following Alinsky (cf. Mao, Giap, Lenin), the solution has to be bubble-up, indigenous and long-term - although all recognized the possibilities of some events akin to "punctuated equilibria" (e.g., insurrections, but in the context of underlying mass movements).

As Wilf can tell you (and cite valid historical examples), there also are various top-down solutions which can work in certain contexts. Bearden seems to think not for Astan. Steve Coll seems to be suggesting an enclave or demographic lines solution (both suggested, but rejected, in Vietnam).

Whatever the solution, it has to solve the key problems as perceived by the Afghanis (see attached). While the largest % problem is security (military and paramilitary areas), the remaining problems are largely civil.

The appearence of high prices (inflation) as a double-digit problem in 2008 is interesting, because the same thing happened in South Vietnam as our force levels increased.

The Asia Foundation has an Astan Section.

Have to run now and attend to my "day job" - if I can recall what that is.

Cheers to all

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

JMM99

Here's my two cents from a piece I'm submitting to the WP (who knows if it would ever get published?)

Steve

A Plan For Afghanistan?

October 6th is Planner’s Day on Capitol Hill, when state and local planners will descend to meet with their local representatives on a host of domestic planning, project and program issues.

Sometimes invisible, planners typically work behind the scenes to research and orchestrate community engagement to develop and implement the mundane but critical plans, regulations, budgets and projects to implement, enforce and deliver communities’ needs and visions, through effective and comprehensively planned, phased and budgeted projects and programs which minimize waste, and through a well-defined and generally transparent process which, on the whole, resists and precludes major corruption.

Their subject field is defined by highly technical work in Geographic Information Systems (GIS), engineering, environmental, and systems sciences. Still, to the greatest extent possible, a planner’s role is to interpret the complexity and define relevant choices for decision-makers and the public.

Typically, behind-the-scenes planning only enters the press sphere in the context of heated community debates over a proposed plan, but it is that context, community engagement focused on vetting and resolving future plans and activities, even where controversial or complex, that underscores the complexity and importance of the planning process. The planners’ role is to create and support that public process, and the means and ends of, hopefully, comprehensive, effective, and cost-controlled implementation.

What does domestic civilian planning have to do with the big foreign policy and defense issues before the Nation’s Capitol today? Everything.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently hosted a panel of experts on Pakistan and Afghanistan. At that hearing, Foreign Policy expert Steve Coll described the counter-productive effort of more troop deployments, yet the need to assure the Taliban never regained control of Afghanistan’s capitol.

He went on to describe a proposed strategy, grounded in the need to enforce stability in Afghan population centers, with emphasis on politics over combat, urban stability over rural patrolling, and Afghan solutions over Western ones.

Coll has described an end, but not a means.

Brush aside all the military and foreign policy jargon used in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and you are describing the state of US civic affairs in the Tammany Hall days: major corruption, billions of dollars of waste on unneeded, ineffective, and ill-conceived piecemeal public and private projects and programs, and a complete lack of effective public engagement. The US Afghan reconstruction effort, as presently divided into discrete cones of economic, governance, democracy building, civil affairs, and managed by competing, and often conflicting, US agencies, NGOs, and international donor agencies, assures the delivery of disjunct chaos, and contains no possibility for progress.

Last week, a Special Forces veteran was explaining the importance of Saul Alinsky and community engagement on Small Wars Journal. So, where is this headed?

The irony is that the military is chock-full of civilian planners designing, maintaining and budgeting the continuous operation of vast and increasingly complex military base infrastructure, negotiating substantial impacts on adjacent communities, and routinely applying community engagement processes. Like Anthony Hopkins’ butler character in “Remains of the Day,” the planners are the butlers making possible the complex systems, infrastructure and buildings in which military and foreign affairs experts are increasingly debating how to do what those butlers do every day---keep the house running.

Afghanistan, as anyone familiar with it knows, is just too broken, backwards, and diffuse to lend itself to ready reconstruction, temporary “quick hit” projects, and passing military and foreign aid initiatives. So stabilizing Afghanistan, or just a few key urban centers, is a big, deep and complex challenge requiring substantial research which has not yet been done, and development, with realistic Afghan participation, of an overall multi-phased and hierarchically prioritized strategy. In Iraq, like Afghanistan, our efforts routinely focus on “quick hits” and “low-hanging fruit” that often prove unsustainable and ineffective. Progress can be made, but “more of the same,” delivered by our current structure of competing, conflicting, and uncoordinated efforts and staffing, even if “re-labeled” as planning and planners, will only produce more of the same.

When Planner’s day unfolds on October 6, 2009 with domestic planners coming to the Hill for their own domestic issues, perhaps it would make sense for military and foreign affairs leaders to ask them how they do what they do, and what lessons can be learned to close our substantial gaps in a critical component of the “big picture” strategy in Afghanistan. Knowing how to solve a problem is a big step on the road to a viable solution.

Stephen Donnelly, AICP, is a Planning Consultant from Crofton Maryland. He served as Senior Urban Planning Adviser to the State Department during the 2007/2008 Civilian Surge in Iraq, and will be on the Hill for Planner’s Day. He is a member of the American Planning Association, and its Institute of Certified Planners.

(Rights reserved)

[Fuchs]

Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means?

* coercion
* demonstration of power
* recruitment propaganda


Their art of war isn't much advanced on the operational level, though.
Some of their action are counter-productive. Attacking the Germans up north, for example. It harms them more than it helps.

[jmm99]

Good fortune in getting your piece published.

Sadly, I have to agree with this:

Brush aside all the military and foreign policy jargon used in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and you are describing the state of US civic affairs in the Tammany Hall days: major corruption, billions of dollars of waste on unneeded, ineffective, and ill-conceived piecemeal public and private projects and programs, and a complete lack of effective public engagement. The US Afghan reconstruction effort, as presently divided into discrete cones of economic, governance, democracy building, civil affairs, and managed by competing, and often conflicting, US agencies, NGOs, and international donor agencies, assures the delivery of disjunct chaos, and contains no possibility for progress.

Civil affairs in Astan are a big mess. I suspect that the Astan debate will be resolved in the end by domestic policy considerations, which also have to address something of a big mess and which count higher in the polls.

[davidbfpo]

From JMM earlier:

IEC Election Results (with a nice interactive map). Karzai lost in most "Northern Alliance" provinces; he won in Pashtun provinces (the questioned votes). Very regional and ethnic from all appearances; but a province by province study would have to be made.

Thanks for the link. Can anyone here offer an explanation on why so few people across the country voted in the provincial elections? It is very marked.

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

All insurgency is politics, intra to a state. Otherwise, it isn't insurgency.

Thus, the Taliban is insurgency.

All UW is politics as well inter to a state, otherwise it isn't UW.

Thus, the AQ operation is UW.

The religious flavor of the ideology applied is simply a handy tool to the two political operations above. None of this is about religion, but religion is essential to making it happen. As an insurgent leader, or a UW leader, you select an ideology that speaks to your target audience and that takes a position that your target government is either unable or unwilling to co-opt. This is the nature of the game.

[Steve the Planner]

Somewhere I read, take the taliban out of the equation, and Pashtuns would still be opposed to our entry into their country.

Under that theory, even without the Taliban, the answer is still not on the table.

In some strange and not foreseeable reality, I wonder which of Afghanistan's many "countries" would step in even if the Afghan Taliban was gone. This is a very complex world with it's own intricate extra-national dynamics.

Back to all politics is local?

Steve

[Bob's World]

Like Gen. Odierno noticing recently that when there is less US presence in Iraq there is less resistance to US presence in Iraq. Hmmm.

Now, while we are dealing with what is primarily a resistance insurgency in Afghanistan we look to increase the primary motivation to the insurgency: US presence.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

I don't know why it is so hard to understand.

On the civilian side, I would sit at a meeting with a provincial DG, who, as a Sunni returned from Dubai to help rebuild his country, had personal reasons for opposition to the US, but, after return, was even more deeply offended by the foolishness he witnessed among US reconstruction and military folks in his AO. They treated him, and his aids like fools, or children to be "helped," (shades of recipient vs, participant). So, despite his abundant capabilities and superlative technical education, he responded, at best, in the way they expected.

Had he been an Afghan tribal leader versus a trained and committed government professional, it would be easy, from his perspective, to understand how resentment and frustration could boil over to something more emotive. Clearly, we have to understand more about how our hosts perceive our actions.

I once worked on a private sector project with one of the biggest jerks you could find. He was fond of recommending to other people that they read "How to Win Friends and Influence People" to improve THEIR people skills, and continually found more and more people who, in his opinion of their reactions to him, needed that advice. Go figure.

Steve

Sometimes, we create the results we must live with.