Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Steve:

I think the decision brief would be slimmed down to 40 slides with 150 back up slides.

[Steve the Planner]

Right, but only after days of fiery debate. Not to mention an endless effort to add just one more bullet point to the slides (How small can we make the text and still call it a power point? 6 pt?

Steve

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Pol-Mil FSO:

I have to disagree with the contention that the Taliban are basically no different from any other insurgent group in past history. I believe that T.X. Hammes is on to something, especially his point about what he labels as the "generational" mismatch between the two sides in a conflict.

The insurgents in Afghanistan are using standard fare insurgent tactics that have been tried and tested by many other insurgent groups over the years. Insurgencies are a form of political warfare and the two examples you listed as new are in fact very old, and reinforce GEN McCrystal's observations.

Insurgents have used talking points throughout history, this is part of the political mobilization process. The only thing new now is that they can propagate their talking points to a global audience through the cyber medium. The fact that insurgents use talking points shouldn't surprise anyone. The point that they were sophisticated perhaps indicates that the PRT really doesn't know their enemy at all, thus they underestimated them?

In 2008, Canadian officials discovered that at least half of the National Solidarity Program projects in Zhari District in Kandahar Province had apparently been compromised by the Taliban.

GEN McCrystal addressed this issue in his assessment, and it high time we wake up to the reality of this type of warfare. Our focus generally tends to be on the overt guerrilla warfare piece, while the enemy's main effort is actually focused on political organization (normally clandestine at first) so they can establish control of the populace (that key terrain we're both fighting over). Of course the insurgents are going to attempt to: infiltrate our programs, influence elections, establish shadow governments and courts, etc. IMO opinion our intelligence completely misses the boat on this, because they are largely focused on finding combatants (IED cells for example). While that must be done, if you only recognize the combatants as the enemy, you are missing the focus on the more important aspects of this conflict, because you're ignoring the enemy's underground political structure. So once again, I offer that the PRT's surprise shouldn't have been a surprise at all.

Bernard Fall wrote an article (sorry, I only have a hard copy, and I can't find it at the moment) about communist subversion in Vietnam and noted that the Americans frequently underestimated the amount of control the communists actually had over the people in various villages because they were using the wrong metrics (I'm paraphrasing). He suggested asking the people who they pay their taxes to (the VC or the government) and who appoints their teachers to determine who was actually in control. We need to ask the same type of questions, such as if an Afghan in this village commits a crime, who will punish him? If the answer is Taliban run Shari'a courts, then the government doesn't have control (or they have incomplete control).

I'm an advocate for refocusing our counterintelligence personnel on rooting out this type of infiltration instead of looking for IED cells. Not a popular opinion, but we have other personnel who can track down the IED cells.

Getting back to T.X. Hammes' point about a generational mismatch, I like to use the following joke: What would happen if Mullah Omar and COMISAF put out edicts to their subordinates to compose a piece of music? In the Taliban case, they would round up some musicians and tell them to write a piece of music. It probably wouldn't be very sophisticated, but it would be done quickly and would be recognizable as music. On the other hand, if the ISAF staff was given this tasking, the first thing they would do is to create several cells of at least 25-50 officers each. One cell would analyze the history of music composition, one cell would analyze the structure of musical notes, another cell the psychological effects of music, etc. After several weeks of exhaustive work the staff would deliver several alternatives to the commander, none of which would be recognizable as music, at least not to Afghans. I think the Taliban is inside the ISAF OODA loop, and not just in the IO area.

Well said, and what you're describing can be called "skilled incompetence". I just read about this in an article/study on DoD's failure to rapidly adjust to the IED threat.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

In short it involves skilled personnel making decisions using routine systems/processes (doctrinal systems for example), while completely missing the context of the problem, thus skilled personnel frequently come up with incompetent solutions, which is what your joke implied. Too bad we're so hamstrung by our doctrine and bureaucratic procedures. In a free market system, you would ask your 18-22 y/o kids in the units to work with their Afghan partners to write songs, and they wouldn't be tested by our staff or approved by the Ambassador, but rather by the market (the Afghan people). The songs that are popular will spread widely, the ones that don't hunt will flop. We know how to do this in the real world, but once you enter the U.S. military and other U.S. government organizations decision making process you almost enter a level of control similiar to the communist system. Control is perceived to be more important than results. Anyway, my two cents.

[William F. Owen]

1That is my point to?! the Talban are not any different. The evolution part as it relates to Mao is that it is not going to be necessary to have a formal uniformed military force to achieve your objectives.

Well nor did the Irish in 1921, the Jews in Palestine in 1948, or Castro in Cuba. Again, not new. I see no evolution.

2-I don't understand all this IW,UW,FID,COIN stuff it is all the same to me. My definition of Guerrilla Warfare or Irregular warfare comes the SOE Syllabus on Irregular Warfare (declassified and for sale in the UK don't have a link; linked added: http://www.amazon.com/SOE-SYLLABUS-L.../dp/190336518X and not cheap).

Concur and thank you for the link.

Irregular warfare has 3 objectives, to achieve control of the Political, Economic and Military functions of the target Country/area. The methods are propaganda, sabotage,espionage,passive Resistance,secret armies and Political-Military uprisings.

OK, so how does Irregular Warfare differ from regular in terms of "objectives."

My differentiation of Regular and Irregular is the Classical "Small Wars" construct of one or more parties to the conflict, not being Regular Military Force.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by JMM,

is that "irregular threats" can be disruptive and deadly; but they generally are not existential, unless they can reach the winning conventional phase (which requires them to either develop adequate conventional forces, Mao and Giap; or link-up with external conventional forces - the end game in old FM 31-21). Apparently, the intel folks in Bob's shop would disagree (are they in the mindset that we are akin to the Cuban Batista regime, which did fall without a conventional military phase ?).

It might be more accurate to state the insurgents will adapt whatever strategy is required to achieve their objectives, than state that they have to resort to "conventional" warfare. Conventional warfare simplifies the nature of the conflict to a conflict between opposing military forces (rarely is any conflict confined to such simple terms, but especially not this one), but this is a war focused on winning control of the populace (coerced or otherwise). I don't believe Mao called it conventional war, but rather something along the line of war of movement, or the strategic offensive phase. The intent of the phase is to defeat the remaining military forces and establish political control, if you execute too early you get your butt handed to you (e.g. the Tet offensive). Where Mao may have been more effective than we are in general (in this type of war) is that his military and political apparatus were largely integrated (one organization). On the other hand we're still struggling with how to make our interagency process work. In the mean time we attempt to separate the military from the political approach. It shouldn't be a surprise that our influence operations are so flawed.

Getting back to your question, do BW's analyst's think the insurgents can win without resorting to conventional war? I doubt that BW's analysts are of one mine, but historically I suspect there are more examples than Castro's surprise rise to power where insurgents won without resorting to a so called conventional warfare phase.

They can wage two types of strategies (or three if they combine the two) where conventional warfare isn't necessary. The first is to wage a war of attrition (simply create an unacceptable level of casualties). Second, they can wage an exhaustion strategy, which is focused on depriving the enemy of the resources he needs to continue the fight (Sherman's March). In theory, in some irregular warfare scenarios it is feasible that the insurgents could isolate the governing power from local and international support. I have no idea if this is the Taliban's plan, but from the limited reading I have done on this conflict it appears that the Taliban is waging a war of attrition against the U.S. and ISAF, which if effective will enable a strategy of exhaustion against Karzai's government (if he is cut off from substantial international aid).

Like many here I sometimes have a hard time distinguishing the sometime blurry lines between COIN, UW, IW, regular warfare etc., because most conflicts don't fit nicely into any one box. I generally find those who argue hardest about a particular definition are not the warriors on point, but rather the resource staffers who are attempting to protect their organization's interests. Perhaps a necessary evil in our system, but in the end it probably does more harm than good.

Recent history in simple terms (experts on this conflict please correct me if I'm wrong):

"various" Afghan insurgent movements with substantial support from numerous countries defeated the Soviets waging an attrition strategy against the Soviets.

then the groups were no longer unified, but the strongest tribe (the Taliban with support from Pakistan) shifted gears and waged a war of exhaustion against the government left in place, and since the Soviets cut off the support required, they couldn't hold the line, much like us pulling the rug out from underneath the S. Vietnamese.

The final fighting was pretty much peer to peer fighting (rather than truly pitched conventional battles). I'm not aware of any real large battles at this point?

When we first entered Afghanistan late 2001 in response to 9/11 we waged a hybrid of UW and conventional warfare. The Taliban and Northern Alliance were pretty much peer competitors at this point of the conflict, but the fire power we brought to bear on the enemy (conventional) quickly changed the calculation.

After the Taliban large maneuver forces were ousted they resorted to insurgent tactics against our occupation and then against Karzai's government. I believe with ample support from foreign donors.

If we're not careful we risk repeating history, if the world pulls out it will be very difficult for the current government to hold against an insurgent movement with substantial external support.

That's a long answer to your question, but the answer is "yes" it is possible to win without resorting to large scale conventional fighting if the government forces are not motivated to fight. Is it likely? Don't know.

[Fuchs]

I wonder why the idea that guerrillas need to go conventional to win on their own persists.

Unconventional warfare have proved its ability to restrict conventional forces - even into their bases.

Unconventional warfare has also proved its ability to cause mass desertion (break the enemy's will) at least among domestic conventional opponents.

There's no need for going conventional if you can gain control of 95% of the country and destroy conventional opfor without.

[Bob's World]

I suspect our heavily doctrinal approach to sequential phases for operations causes us to mirror image that onto Mao's three phases. The key is to understand the fundamental principles of insurgent warfare, but to always remember that there are no rules, no timelines, no movement sequentially through phases. Success can occur in any phase for the insurgent, and he is always seeking success, not the next phase.

The phase just helps understand what he is doing to succeed, not what he must do next to succeed.

Good COIN is like good yard work. No matter how great your yard looks on Saturday afternoon when you've just "finished" and put your tools away, it will start to look ragged in a few days without constant maintenance. It is not a failure of the yard that causes this to occur, it is the nature of things. One can blame the sun, the rain or invading insects, but they too are part of the natural process that one is attempting to "control" through their gardening efforts. Virtually every Gardener understands this, yet virtually every politician for some reason does not.

Here is a chart I've put together that tries to capture the essence of what I believe to be the essence of insurgency:

[William F. Owen]

Good COIN is like good yard work. No matter how great your yard looks on Saturday afternoon when you've just "finished" and put your tools away, it will start to look ragged in a few days without constant maintenance.

So again the Governance stuff? Defence is good yard work, so is politics. Politics is the root cause of conflict. You can get "insurgencies" caused by any brand of politics that can be advanced by violent means. - same as any war.

[Bob's World]

So again the Governance stuff? Defence is good yard work, so is politics. Politics is the root cause of conflict. You can get "insurgencies" caused by any brand of politics that can be advanced by violent means. - same as any war.

The advancement of politics is rarely the problem, as a wide range of political beliefs and perspectives are advanced every day in every country. Again, it is the nature of things.

It is the "failure" of the existing governance in some important way, like a break in one's skin, that allows such an advancement of politics to invade an otherwise healthy governmental/popular body; and left untreated it will fester and spread. Without that break in the skin, most such advancements cause no harm. Do you blame the virus when you have a cut that gets infected? Do you attempt to defeat the source of the virus? Or do you blame yourself for not being wise, or diligent enough to do the basic things that one knows they must do to avoid infection, or once infected, to address one's own body in such a way as to defeat the infection and repair the breach that allowed it in in the first place.

"Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature. Insurgency has a unique nature that must be understood and addressed that has nothing to do with size. A conventional conflict can be very small or very large, same with insurgency; yet both are very different in nature for all of their often similar qualities and appearances. Likewise, the presence of violence is not the key distinction either. Violence is like the infection, it lets you know you have a problem, and it will kill you if you do not treat it quickly and properly. But understanding the cause of the infection is essential to determining the proper treatment and preventing future episodes of the same.

[Bob's World]

In the introduction to "Low Intensity Operations," Frank Kitson wisely noted that "In writing on this subject, the most difficult problems concerns the matter of terminology."

He specifically then went on to address the logic behind his approach to such internal, populace-based conflicts in a state, distinguishing first between those aimed at "...overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do." (Subversion and Insurgency); vice similar appearing popular movements aimed at " ...a protest against the actions of some non-government body, or possibly as a demonstration of solidarity with a group or cause elsewhere in the world." (Internal Security Operations)

To ease discussions of the first situation, he broke a continuum of action into two parts, using the "use of armed force" as the dividing line between Subversion and Insurgency. On the chart I offer to the SWJ community for consideration, this is where one moves from Phase 0 to Phase 1.

My concern with Kitson's approach, while I agree with his logic, is that it leads some to see subversion and insurgency as different things, rather than as different stages or manifestations of the same thing.

I can provide the full paragraph, and it is definitely worth sharing, but my dogs are informing me that they need to go outside, and I want to take care of that before they advance to insurgency...

[William F. Owen]

"Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature. Insurgency has a unique nature that must be understood and addressed that has nothing to do with size.

Well if I were King, "Small Wars" would be "All Wars." - maybe it's a good thing I am not!
However, I find "small" useful, IF uniquely associated with irregular forces, and thus irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is not defined by the policy it is seeking to advance. - merely by the nature of who is doing the advancing. - Thus "Insurgency" as a description relates the political nature of what is being attempted. I am by no means sure that this qualifies it as unique or distinct.

He specifically then went on to address the logic behind his approach to such internal, populace-based conflicts in a state, distinguishing first between those aimed at "...overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do." (Subversion and Insurgency); vice similar appearing popular movements aimed at " ...a protest against the actions of some non-government body, or possibly as a demonstration of solidarity with a group or cause elsewhere in the world." (Internal Security Operations)

OK, but how does that help? Seems to me that you mostly have both on-going at the same time. Strangely UK operations in Ulster were deemed ISO and not COIN. Context? Definitions?

To ease discussions of the first situation, he broke a continuum of action into two parts, using the "use of armed force" as the dividing line between Subversion and Insurgency.

With which I am very happy and where I began (though I did not know it at time) 25 years ago.

I can provide the full paragraph, and it is definitely worth sharing, but my dogs are informing me that they need to go outside, and I want to take care of that before they advance to insurgency...

Ahhh.... Dogs = Simple Insurgency. Wives = Complex Insurgency.

[Ken White]

Bob's World, I think you're the only Attorney I know who's an absolutist...

Here are two bullets from your chart above:

Any effort that targets violence but not poor governance will produce a temporal effect.

Any effort that targets poor governance will produce enduring peace.

By temporal, I suppose you mean a transient time less than eternity, thus I can agree with the first item as that time could be from days to centuries...

The second time, OTOH, is quite difficult to accept -- you can 'change' the governance to suit one generation and that new model may not suit the next generation -- or new immigrants, a significant economic change, fomentation by neighbors or others. I do not believe you can assert enduring peace without qualifiers.

""Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature."

Have to agree with Wilf, war's war. Small Wars as an indicator of amount of effort applied should make you a happy camper -- your prescription is for just that, Small Wars to preclude big ones.

My concern with Kitson's approach, while I agree with his logic, is that it leads some to see subversion and insurgency as different things, rather than as different stages or manifestations of the same thing.

Perhaps but what if you fix the problem at the subversion level and thus preclude the insurgency? Ala your example of the Civil Rights Bill?

[Bob's World]

As Kitson said, much of the debate lies in the definitions...

By "temporal", I mean that all one has accomplished is create a strategic pause while the festering causation regenerates whatever the "defeated" elements are to the subversion/insurgency. Could be more fighters must be recruited or even born and raised; or a new ideology; or new leadership. Like the weeds in ones poorly maintained garden, all you have to do is do nothing, and these things will emerge naturally.

By enduring, I mean that you have done the hard work to establish your garden, and with committed continued diligence in recognition that this is a job that is never over, you have enduring peace. Clearly the enduring effort of the governance must evolve along with it's populace or it will begin once again "to fail" / become "poor governance" and the seeds of subversion will find root yet again. To assume that what worked 50 years ago will work today, even with the same populace is a bad assumption indeed.

And yes, it is very popular to see all warfare as warfare. It is also historical fact that insurgent warfare is long and drawn out, and more often dosed with temporal suppression of the militant arm every few years for this very fact. I recognize this, but reject it. It is time to evolve and become more efficient counterinsurgents by holding our civil leaders to the ownership of both the prevention and the cure as the core of their day to day duties.

But we will never get there so long as those of us who are supposed to understand warfare the most pay more attention to what the media, politicians and academia tells us than what we can learn quite well from our own engagement and study. It seems that most are too blinded by what they "know" to see what they must in order to "understand." For example, knowledge born of hard years in Iraq is terrific, but only if it is applied toward a larger understanding of insurgency, not used to define insurgency.

If my role is to be a modern day Don Quixote on this mission, I'm comfortable with that; because to paraphrase much of the senior leadership in DoD "Some windmills just need killing."

[Bill Moore]

"Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature. Insurgency has a unique nature that must be understood and addressed that has nothing to do with size. A conventional conflict can be very small or very large, same with insurgency; yet both are very different in nature for all of their often similar qualities and appearances. Likewise, the presence of violence is not the key distinction either. Violence is like the infection, it lets you know you have a problem, and it will kill you if you do not treat it quickly and properly. But understanding the cause of the infection is essential to determining the proper treatment and preventing future episodes of the same.

You captured my concerns about the phrase "small wars" perfectly. It also leads to what GEN McCrystal has called a "culture of poverty" in our response, because we understand the scale of the conflict. A tip of the hat to you.

However, I suspect by your last sentence you mean the government has failed the people, thus the proper treatment is good government. There are many historical examples to support this argument, but like others I believe you're too much of an absolutist on this theory. Until convinced otherwise I'm convinced that a reasonably successful government can experience insurgencies. Hostile parties to the government can engage in subversion through propaganda to create the illusion of bad government, while at the same time using coercion to rally support. The insurgents have no intention of ruling more effectively, they simply want to rule. One size doesn't fit all, you wrote that above, but I don't think you mean it.

[Bob's World]

"Temporal" occurs when just addressing the insurgent and not the poor governance that gave rise to him. It in effect, pushes the plot of the populace straight down in a reduction of violence, with no corresponding reduction in material poor governance. As soon as this artificial suppression is lifted (the end of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia; the removal of Saddam in Iraq, etc) the populace pops straight up into its "natural" state of insurgency.

For "enduring" both the poor governance and the insurgent are addressed together, pushing the plot of the populace down the inclined axis, into phase 0, where it then must be constantly tended to to keep it there.

While I do not recommend it, one could also ignore the insurgency and simply address poor governance, the violence will linger, but ultimately fade away along with it purpose for existing in the first place.

Best, however, to address both together; but probably better to not engage the violent actor at all then to employ to much state violence against ones own populace in the pursuit of ending the illegal violence. Best to error on the side of too little state violence than too much.

[Ken White]

And yes, it is very popular to see all warfare as warfare.

Not a question of popular, it's just reality. If it's violent, it's war, if not, it's something else.

It is also historical fact that insurgent warfare is long and drawn out, and more often dosed with temporal suppression of the militant arm every few years for this very fact. I recognize this, but reject it.

So do I. Have rejected it and fought it for over 50 years -- hasn't done a whole lot of good.

It is time to evolve and become more efficient counterinsurgents by holding our civil leaders to the ownership of both the prevention and the cure as the core of their day to day duties.

That's why it hasn't done any good...

Two problems with that last. First, while the smack at the Politicians is well aimed, deserved and highlights a much needed change; our -- the military -- performance also needs to be improved considerably by rejecting some old dogma and adopting a more comprehensive education and training program. The Armed Forces -- all -- are far from blameless in this mess...

Secondly, the US in particular has a significant problem due to its governmental structure and processes has and will have difficulty implementing the changes, civil and military, you desire -- until your strategy addresses that impediment, there will be little if any improvement.

But we will never get there so long as those of us who are supposed to understand warfare the most pay more attention to what the media, politicians and academia tells us than what we can learn quite well from our own engagement and study...

Amen! It simply requires doing what's right instead of what's expedient or what someone says 'the Boss wants.' Bosses who say stupid things are part of the problem but most of 'em have someone nearby who's supposed to keep them from stepping on their string too often...

Failure comes when the watchers do not tell the Emperor/Empress he or she forgot his or her shorts.

That's part of the military problem, people unwilling to speak truth to power; the civil problem is more complex because Congress is deeply involved; they have impacts on many things and too often not at all favorably.

If my role is to be a modern day Don Quixote on this mission, I'm comfortable with that; because to paraphrase much of the senior leadership in DoD "Some windmills just need killing."

Yes they do; having slew a few, I'm for Don Q in all his manifestations. Just that there are really a lot of windmills and best to kill the ones that most need killing, those whose death offers the most benefit...

[slapout9]

Again, not new. I see no evolution.

No it is not new. Mao was just my start point. For a better explanation of evolution read TX's book "The Sling And The Stone" he traces it out rather well I think.

[slapout9]

OK, so how does Irregular Warfare differ from regular in terms of "objectives."

My differentiation of Regular and Irregular is the Classical "Small Wars" construct of one or more parties to the conflict, not being Regular Military Force.

1-It doesn't it is the methods that are different.

2-The problem with the classic definition is both(more) parties could all be Irregular.

[slapout9]

Where Mao may have been more effective than we are in general (in this type of war) is that his military and political apparatus were largely integrated (one organization). On the other hand we're still struggling with how to make our interagency process work. In the mean time we attempt to separate the military from the political approach. It shouldn't be a surprise that our influence operations are so flawed.

Hi Bill, exactly! add to that a "department of criminal revenue raising" and you have a strong, survivable,tough organization.

[slapout9]

My concern with Kitson's approach, while I agree with his logic, is that it leads some to see subversion and insurgency as different things, rather than as different stages or manifestations of the same thing.

Absolutley! that also applies to a lot of gangs and criminal organizations.