Winning the War in Afghanistan

[William F. Owen]

No it is not new. Mao was just my start point. For a better explanation of evolution read TX's book "The Sling And The Stone" he traces it out rather well I think.

Read the book. Argued with the author. 4GW is a forcing mechanism, that is very comfortable with poor history, and some evidence free statements.

1-It doesn't it is the methods that are different.

2-The problem with the classic definition is both(more) parties could all be Irregular.

1. OK. That makes sense.
2. That's not a problem. It's still Irregular warfare, as in the Congo.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Your point on the direct relationship between governance and conflict is right, but I take exception to the good vs. poor construct. I think the right construct is effective vs. ineffective, with the caveat that there are some very effective and stable governments that are neither good, nor just in our sense of the term.

Still, we are back to the weakest link...our civilian effort.

In Baghdad in May 2008, some of the biggest civilian noise was about "budget execution." We had worked to jam through the Iraqi local/provincial governments a raft of "projects" (schools, clinics, etc...) which the Iraqis would not execute.

In May, I attended an Iraqi national planning conference where the story was, in fact completely different, and in so many ways, logical from their perspective.

First, we brought a Div-level military governance LTC with us so that he could see the arguments and issues. They were very nice and diplomatic to him, thanking him for his service and interest, but emphatic that they could not have a uniformed soldier in the conference. They got him earphones, and set him up in the lobby of Al-Rasheed with coffee, snacks etc. He and everybody else understood, but the barrier between military and civilian self-rule has it's inherent limitations.

Second, like most conferences, the work really gets done on the formal and informal level.

On the formal level, what was going on was "reinstatement" of the well-known and well-established Iraqi process for submitting projects through ministries for national consideration based on a clear and coherent criteria, and supporting documents. If a school project was requested, it had to be supported by convincing demographics, with recommended siting, staffing and cost issues (Having spent years in state processes in the US, the process is the same as used everywhere by government professionals).

On the informal level, there were two pronounced issues. One was that the project lists flowing from the provinces were, in many instances, incompetent, unnecessary and wasteful (Sounds like the Special Investigator for Iraq's conclusion, too.) Two was that Iraq's national treasure and future should not be squandered on these projects, which, in many ways, were viewed as the locus, if not cause, of widespread corruption.

So here were listening to serious Iraqi technocrats arguing the exact defects that many understand, yet, arguing, debating and resolving a way forward, grounded in their prior formal processes for project review based on specific project justification---similar to that used in the US. The sentiment was that using these formal processes was the only way to break the back of corruption, and restore focus and sanity to a national reconstruction future.

We can continue to argue that Iraqis are corrupt and unable to execute, but there is an alternative explanation. Maybe, by ignoring their historical processes, we opened a Pandora's Box of corruption and ineffectiveness, and the bad guys (institutional forces to delay our projects) actually had some sound reasons for their actions. Better to stop or delay stupid projects to use the money later (after the American influence is gone).

Without dispute, Afghanistan's processes are totally different than Iraq's but grounded in their own well-established processes. Once you break out of them, you get either tremendous waste, fraud and ineffectiveness, or, like Iraq, you get well-intended people trying to stop them for good reasons (they are not projects consistent with "Afghan" interests and processes).

If the measure is effective governance, the question is whether we try to promote and enhance what they have and do, or whether we try to change things (nation-building?). (Recipient vs. Participant).

I get the sense that we are not, to date, effectively engaging them, but that if all of our independent "projects" played out, there would be no more effectiveness, and perhaps, less.

Whether we like it or not, it is a very big leap between ineffective and effective governance, and there is not much history of us "creating" effectiveness where it did not exist before.

But governance is a key.

Steve

[Bob's World]

Steve,

I very intentionally adopted the "Good/Poor" Governance over "Effective/Ineffective" Governance to attempt to highlight the critical difference between the two.

In fact, my biggest concern with the current approach proposed for AFG. is that it is rooted in the belief and committed to a heavy US effort of producing "Effective" Governance.

While "Poor Governance" (see my two-part test) is likely often to be a sub-set of "Ineffective Governance," the fact remains that Ineffectiveness of itself does not produce insurgency, nor will the creation of Effectiveness defeat or prevent insurgency.

Often populaces with incredibly ineffective governance (like say, Bangladesh) are relatively stable because from the perspective of the populace they have "good governance."

Or, as in the American Revolution or Civil Rights movement; you can have incredibly effective governance, and yet if some distinct segment of that effectively governed populace perceives that it is experiencing "poor governance (intolerable conditions to them, and no legitimate recourse to address) you have causation for insurgency; requiring only motivation (ideology, leadership, key event, etc) to light the spark and set it in motion.


As Americans you can't help but see the ineffectiveness of governance in the countries where we show up to help deal with that nation's insurgency. I know it is incredibly difficult to see the forest for the trees, so to speak. We also tend to use a "made in the USA" ruler to measure and assess what is broken and how it needs to be fixed.

The wildcard, is that by over-engaging, not only are we possibly not even addressing the "right" issues as we expend ourselves addressing such huge problems; we also reinforce the perceptions of US legitimacy over the HN government, which then adds us to the target list of any insurgent movement that is out to change that governance.

By taking a smarter, more tailored, less invasive approach, I believe we get closer to achieving the ends we seek. This gets to the difference in the "Populace-Centric" approach that I have written about and the "Population-Centric" approach promoted by CNAS and currently in vogue with our senior leaders.

My model simply recognizes that the populace is the enduring element in any state, and that we should focus our engagement with their government to force/enable evolution of governance to better support the populace. Population-Centric seems to be far more on supporting the government, making it more effective in servicing and controlling the populace. I just don't think the latter approach will work, and it makes it very risky that we get too tied to a new crop of "friendly dictators" that at the end of the day we'd rather not be associated with. Stick with the populace, and work with whatever and whoever they put in power.

This requires us to give up some control over the process; which is critical, but we hate to not control what we know we have the ability to control. The question becomes do we have the right to control.

Cold War containment was rooted in exerting control around the periphery; so we have a habit of seeing this as both natural and the right thing to do, I just think it is far less valid in today's environment, and far less appropriate to today's threats.


(Sorry for the long, rambling reply, but I am working on several other things, so this was just a quick burst)

[davidbfpo]

A German authored report on Afghanistan, from a new think tank (est. May 2009), the author has worked in country too and on a quick skim a good read: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=114

From the site:

In this first Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) report “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency. Causes, Actors and Approaches to Talks”, author Thomas Ruttig – an Afghanistan expert working on and in the country since 25 years – seeks to unpack the complexities of the insurgency in Afghanistan and develop a sophisticated approach to ‘talks with the Taliban’.

The report shows that the insurgency is not just ‘terrorist’. Many fighters are driven by internal Afghan problems: bad governance, alienation and an increasing sense of occupation. Amongst the Taleban, as the insurgency’s core, there are pragmatic elements. There is an internal debate and some Taleban look for a political solution.

The report recommends to explore how contacts can be developed without compromising progress made in Afghanistan since 2001. The international community needs to urge the Afghan government to take the lead in a coordinated and consistent strategy of ‘talks’ and reconciliation efforts. This strategy must include: options for outreach to all components of the insurgency; the establishment of ‘red lines’ (or principles of engagement) for negotiations; viable mechanisms that sustainably and honourably can absorb and integrate reconciled individuals and groups socially and politically. It needs to be embedded in increased efforts to enhance good governance at the national and sub-national levels in Afghanistan and working with Pakistan. All policies should be informed by the acknowledgement that Islamic terrorism cannot effectively be fought through alliances with Islamist extremists and corrupt politicians.

davidbfpo

[jmm99]

for the link to the AAN "Tabiban Report", which does answer in part COL Jones' question asked here:

I would be curious though to see what percentage of the insurgent populace believes that their primary objective is the removal of the Americans and their allied military presence?

While the report has no quantitative metrics, it does address the question in a qualitative manner.

Other than motivations and objectives (which seem to vary), I found these snips interesting.

p.10

Organisationally, the insurgency is segmented and consists of seven armed structures: the Islamic Movement of the Taleban, the networks of the Haqqani and Mansur families in the South-East, the Tora Bora Jehad Front (De Tora Bora Jehadi Mahaz) led by Anwar-ul-Haq Mujahed in Nangrahar (Eastern region), HIG, small Salafi groups in Kunar and Nuristan provinces (Eastern region) [28] and, as a new phenomenon, a number of not inter-related local exmujahedin groups that (or whose historical leaders) had been pushed out of power, are taking up arms and starting to adopt Taleban-like language and behaviour.

[28] Official name (Society for the Invitation to Quran and Sunna). This group already established an Islamic mini-state in Nuristan in the 1980s. Its current leader Haji Rohullah joined the post-2001 process but was later arrested and detained in Guantanamo. It is registered as a political party in Kabul.

This may place the current events in Nuristan in a better perspective.

and:

p.14

Structurally, the Taleban can be described as a model of concentric circles. There at least three circles around a core that mainly consists of a small number of commanders around Mulla Omar that joined the movement early on and are mainly from the South, most of them ideologically motivated former mujahedin commanders with a basic religious education: (1) an inner ring of fighters that follow those ‘Kandahari’ and other commanders and are mainly recruited from their own tribes; (2) around that, a ring of indoctrinated madrassa students (the ‘original’ taleban) and foreign jehadis who are the rank-and-file fighters; (3) an outer ring of marginalized Pashtun tribesmen with local grievances, loyalties and interests (the majburi and ‘anti-corruption Taleban’) as well as hired fighters who join because of unemployment and poverty.

Slap may find this interesting.

[Ski]

There is an excellent book by Stathis Kalvas called The Logic of Violence in Civil War. It was one of the first books we read in SAMS this year. I highly recommend it to use a potential framework for Afghanistan and Pakistan wars and how they are being conducted.

It doesn't hold all the answers, no theory or book is capable of such a thing, however, it may help you understand the war(s) in Afghanistan.

(Added)Links: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Log...e_in_Civil_War and http://www.amazon.com/Violence-Cambr.../dp/0521670047

[Bill Moore]

Posted by BW's

As Americans you can't help but see the ineffectiveness of governance in the countries where we show up to help deal with that nation's insurgency. I know it is incredibly difficult to see the forest for the trees, so to speak. We also tend to use a "made in the USA" ruler to measure and assess what is broken and how it needs to be fixed.

The wildcard, is that by over-engaging, not only are we possibly not even addressing the "right" issues as we expend ourselves addressing such huge problems; we also reinforce the perceptions of US legitimacy over the HN government, which then adds us to the target list of any insurgent movement that is out to change that governance.

http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7237

Definition:
Good governance is characterised by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, etc.

Context:
Good governance refers to the management of government in a manner that is essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law.

IMF, 2007, Manual on Fiscal Transparency, IMF, Washington DC, Glossary.

While agreed good governance by this definition would take the wind out of the sails of many conflicts (but not all, it still doesn't the reality of intolerance and hate), how in the world do "we" enable another country to achieve this? This seems to be the essence of your population-centric argument. Is there is a historical record that supports the argument that outside intervention can facilitate this? If this isn't possible, then does the our current COIN doctrine fall flat? Assuming we're focused more on U.S. interests, does the investment in a COIN approach justify the expense?

Granted the answer could vary case by case, but there seems to be school of thought out there that we need to conduct global FID/COIN. If it takes several billion dollars a year to address the good goverance problems in Afghanistan, then it is reasonable to assume that the "current" approach is not feasible on a global scale. What are the realistic alternatives?

[Bob's World]

Bill,

I use the definition for GG and two-part test that I provided earlier in this thread. I realize this is a commonly used term, and probably has many "official" definitions. I would never promote taking on the task of the definition that you provided, as it is the entirety of "Effectiveness" plus "Utopia"! (Even SF couldn't make that happen )

No, my definition and test trys to narrow this down to what I see as most important to address to have the best shot at defusing the violence in an insurgency and bringing it into phase 0 zone of normal ups and downs.

The key is to use polling of the populace as your primary metrics. Actually, I created a model for for this type of targeting that JSOTF-P has been employing for determing what projects to take on, where, etc for best effect. Coltroup briefed it at the last PASOC. He seemed to be pleased with the results, but you have better data than I do in that regard.

[davidbfpo]

Bob,

You cited:

The key is to use polling of the populace as your primary metrics. Actually, I created a model for for this type of targeting that JSOTF-P has been employing for determing what projects to take on, where, etc for best effect. Coltroup briefed it at the last PASOC. He seemed to be pleased with the results, but you have better data than I do in that regard.

This question deserves it's own thread and so created on: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8600

davidbfpo

[Steve the Planner]

CSIS held an event yesterday with Congressman Adam Smith who laid out a very cogent argument for: Why Afghanistan?

In it, he clearly explains that Afghanistan is a unique environment for AQ training and operations base for a number of reasons. Somalia, Yemen, etc., have AQ but Afghanistan is as close to a home as they have ever had.

http://csis.org/event/congressman-ad...nd-afghanistan

One subject I believe he addressed correctly and deeply was the failure of our civilian component. We are not doing development intelligently.

Of course, the lynch pin of Congressman Smith's strategic imperatives, is the need for a credible government partner. Afghan leadership is critical.

Recent disclosures today of the UN vote analysis, gradually leaking out, raise continue to raise questions of substantial vote fraud.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...100603816.html

So, how do we get there?

[omarali50]

I just posted this on another thread, but it looks relevant here:
Lets not forget what the regional stakes are. Being the "biggest tribe" is not just about Afghanistan. In fact, I would submit its not even primarily about Afghanistan. Why is the US IN Afghanistan? Why should the US care who rules Afghanistan and who is the biggest tribe there? I think NOW THAT ITS THERE, one of the big reasons to stay and win is because it shows regional powers who is the biggest tribe. And IF one buys into the whole superpower deal, then that is much more important than showing some small villages who the biggest tribe is. You can see this dynamic in action in Pakistan right now. The Pakistani army has looked at Obama's good hearted wavering on Afghanistan and reached the (probably correct) conclusion that this particular American tribe is outa here in the not too distant future. Hence the reluctance to accept Kerry-Lugar conditionalities about the role of the army in Pakistan AND about Pakistani efforts to use jihadi proxies against India. On both these counts, GHQ now seems to think they can get America to blink (again, I think they may be right; the first has not historically been an American priority, always loved military dictators in third world countries, and the second is India's headache, not America's). The sticking point right now is the "good taliban" (just my guess, I have no inside info) and GHQ may be calculating that if they hold out long enough, Obama will accept the good taliban at least in Eastern-Southern Afghanistan and a few years later the good taliban can take care of the rest of the country, by which time American troops will be gone and no one will care.
Personally, I am not sure this is a correct assessment and even if it is, the net result is going to be a huge disaster for the region (where an American victory would be painful for some egos, but a net positive for the long suffering people of the region). But the american tribe is fast losing credibility and that means that eventually the coming civil war will be fought between India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China and their proxies. Thats bad for the region, but if I was an American officer, my main concern would be "If we are not going to win this tribal war and act all superpowerish, then we shouldnt be sacrificing men just to make it look good for a few years". Go in, or get out. NOTE: this is not an endorsement of a particular "surge" or COIN or whatever. I am not an expert on those tactical issues. Whatever works, you guys can sort it out. I am just looking at the forest, not the trees...

[Steve the Planner]

In a previous message, I cited a CSIS Event with Congressman Adam Smith.

The link takes you to CSIS's Event page.

Looks like "The Jeff Show," a silly cyberterrorist submittal, has overriden the Video link.

You can still use the Download link to get the Congressman's excellent comments.

Cyber terrorism by silly folks. Who knew?

[Steve the Planner]

OK, so CSIS got punked.

They sent the following:

"Hi Steve,

There was a problem with our host (blip.tv) feed. This has now been fixed.

http://csis.org/event/congressman-ad...nd-afghanistan

Sorry for the inconvenience."

When I heard Congressman Smith's presentation (Armed Services/Intel), I thought: "Wow, for the first time, someone has presented the argument for Afghanistan in a simple compelling manner that anyone could understand."

Some here may quibble with points, and he probably could only say half of what he knows, but it was just damned good.

He also addressed the catastrophic civilian reconstruction side: Blunt, conclusive, and no comfort whatsoever to our military colleagues who are clearing over and again because nobody stepped behind then to effectively hold or build. Like he said, post-conflict reconstruction needs to be disengaged from State and placed under NSC along with the funds to support it---to plan and coordinate efforts.

Reasons: It is too important. State has another important mission: State has other important missions---diplomatic. US AID is just a contractor conduit, and doesn't have the expertise.

And he fielded a lot of other good questions, too.

Didn't know him before, but I would vote for him now. Do I have to move to Washington State, though? (I better ask a governance person?)

Steve

[Surferbeetle]

If the measure is effective governance, the question is whether we try to promote and enhance what they have and do, or whether we try to change things (nation-building?). (Recipient vs. Participant).

I get the sense that we are not, to date, effectively engaging them, but that if all of our independent "projects" played out, there would be no more effectiveness, and perhaps, less.

Whether we like it or not, it is a very big leap between ineffective and effective governance, and there is not much history of us "creating" effectiveness where it did not exist before.

But governance is a key.

Steve,

Several points of agreement here.

The phrase Good Governance as I have often seen it executed sets my teeth on edge. I'll paraphrase..."If it's not based on Thomas Jefferson it is not Good Governance." We seem to rarely take the time to survey and assess what exists on the ground and craft a way to engage the existing structure, instead we seem to like to start over by writing a new constitution and electing new faces and then we wonder why everybody is all riled up

[Steve the Planner]

Governance?

Yesterday, the Institute of Peace released a long awaited guide to post conflict reconstruction.

I usually have a lot of respect for their work, but not in this case. First, they described governance in the context of providing basic and essential services, then, somehow, at the implementer stage, it got lost in the foolishness of diplomats and US AID. Kinda forgot about engineers, repairmen, construction experts, public administration, budgeting, logistics, warehousing and distribution--- all the technical stuff on which basic and essential services are based.

As for Afghanistan, I increasingly see the likelihood of a call for a national Loya Jirga, and an end to the "American Way"---constitutions, one man-one vote (early and often?), presidents and the like. Then they can get back to figuring out how to build a minimal government consistent with their minimalist goals and history.

Steve

[Rex Brynen]

The New York Times has just started a five part series by reporter David Rohde, who was kidnapped by Taliban forces in November 2008, and held for more than seven months before he escaped. Particularly noteworthy was the media blackout during his abduction.

It promises to be a fascinating account, but this quote--which has profound repercussions for COIN strategy in Afghanistan--particularly caught my eye:

Over those months, I came to a simple realization. After seven years of reporting in the region, I did not fully understand how extreme many of the Taliban had become. Before the kidnapping, I viewed the organization as a form of “Al Qaeda lite,” a religiously motivated movement primarily focused on controlling Afghanistan.

Living side by side with the Haqqanis’ followers, I learned that the goal of the hard-line Taliban was far more ambitious. Contact with foreign militants in the tribal areas appeared to have deeply affected many young Taliban fighters. They wanted to create a fundamentalist Islamic emirate with Al Qaeda that spanned the Muslim world.

I had written about the ties between Pakistan’s intelligence services and the Taliban while covering the region for The New York Times. I knew Pakistan turned a blind eye to many of their activities. But I was astonished by what I encountered firsthand: a Taliban mini-state that flourished openly and with impunity.

You'll find Part One of his NYT account here.

[jmm99]

The Haqqani group (see also Khalis) has been closely tied to AQ and is probably closer to AQ in ideology than some of the other Taliban groups.

The concept of a fundamentalist Islamic emirate spanning the Muslim world (and in fact Worldwide) is scarcely new in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It predates AQ by decades and goes back to just before WWII, Sayyeed Abdul A'la Maududi, "Jihad in Islam". Maududi's relatively mild manner of argument, and his apparent reasoned invocation of the Koran and strict Sharia law (he was a valid SME on both), seems to be generally ignored for more recent and more radical exponents of the extreme takfiri school.

Frankly, Maududi (if active today) would scare me more than the AQ spokesmen, who suffer from an excess of integral rigidity:

pp. 26-27, 29-30 pdf

A WORLD REVOLUTION

It must be evident to you from this discussion that the objective of the Islamic ‘ Jihād’ is to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about a universal revolution. Although in the initial stages it is incumbent upon members of the party of Islam to carry out a revolution in the State system of the countries to which they belong, but their ultimate objective is no other than to effect a world revolution.

No revolutionary ideology which champions the principles of the welfare of humanity as a whole instead of upholding national interests, can restrict its aims and objectives to the limits of a country or a nation. The goal of such an all-embracing doctrine is naturally bound to be world revolution.

Truth cannot be confined within geographical borders. Truth demands that whatever is right on this side of the river or the mountain is also right on the other side of the river or mountain; no portion of mankind should be deprived of the Truth; wherever mankind is being subjected to repression, discrimination and exploitation, it is the duty of the righteous to go to their succour.

The same conception has been enunciated by the Holy Qur’an in the following words:

"What has happened to you? Why don’t you fight in the way of God in support of men, women and children, whom finding helpless, they have repressed; and who pray, "O God! liberate us from this habitation which is ruled by tyrants". (4: 75)
....
The Terms "Offensive" and "Defensive" are Irrelevant

If you carefully consider the explanation given above you will readily understand that the two terms ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ by which the nature of welfare is differentiated are not at all applicable to Islamic ‘Jihad’. These terms are relevant only in the context of wars between nations and countries, for technically the terms ‘attack’ and ‘defence’ can only be used with reference to a country or a nation. But when an international party rises with a universal faith and ideology and invites all peoples as human beings to embrace this faith and ideology and admits into its fold as equal members men of all nationalities and strives only to dismantle the rule of an opposing ideology and set up in its place a system of government based on its own ideology, then in this case the use of the technical terms like ‘offence’ and ‘defence’ is not germane.

Even if we stop thinking about these technical terms, the division of Islamic ‘Jihad’ into offensive and defensive is not admissible. Islamic Jihad is both offensive and defensive at one and the same time.

It is offensive because the Muslim Party assaults the rule of an opposing ideology and it is defensive because the Muslim Party is constrained to capture state power in order to arrest the principles of Islam in space-time forces. As a party, it has no home to defend; it upholds certain principles which it must protect.

Similarly this party does not attack the home of the opposing party, but launches an assault on the principles of the opponent. The objective of this attack, moreover, is not to coerce the opponent to relinquish his principles but to abolish the government which sustains these principles.

I have to add that Maududi was equally committed to the political effort and the military effort. Both were part of the same struggle (jihad).

[davidbfpo]

A US Army publication, with no protective markings, appeared on 16th October 2009 on the www.cryptome.org website entitled: Afghan Commander AAR Book Currahee Edition (Pub. Sept. 2009). Has some interesting reflections on service in Eastern Afghanistan. Too large to post here.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Once again this UK website reminds us that the current campaigning on both sides of the Durand Line has strong historical roots: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...air-power.html

Yes air power is cited.

Just a few selected quotes from the article:

History, however, should tell us that this rugged land is never going to be subdued, and certainly not by the relatively modest force at the disposal of the Pakistani government, a mere 30,000 or so being one of the smaller "armies" that have sought to subdue even a fraction of the territory being currently assailed.

What, in effect, the Pakistanis are attempting – or being expected – to do is revisit the "Forward Policy " adopted by the British in 1849, one of active intervention in the region with an aim permanently of subduing the warring tribes.

This resulted in a series of costly military expeditions which met with very little success, leading to a more laissez faire revision, known as the "Close Border system" – one of containment, where the tribes were bribed to secure their good behaviour, and punished by punitive expeditions when they caused trouble – a policy known by its critics as "Butcher and Bolt", so-called because there was no attempt to maintain a permanent military presence.

(Near the end)Back in the early 1900s, a crusty British general, Andrew Skeen, wrote a guide to military operations in Waziristan. His first piece of advice: "When planning a military expedition into Pashtun tribal areas, the first thing you must plan is your retreat. All expeditions into this area sooner or later end in retreat under fire". It took us a century to understand the limits of our own power. It looks as if those same lessons are being re-learned.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

As ever Steve Coll is on target and this time President Karzai:

The (Taliban) manual might be risible if the Taliban’s coercive insurgency were not so effective. Afghanistan’s self-absorbed President, Hamid Karzai, might even consider leafing through it; if he could account for his citizenry’s appetite for justice and security half as adaptively as his enemies do, Barack Obama would not be struggling so hard to locate the “good war” he pledged to win during his campaign for the White House.

More pithy comment on: http://www.newyorker.com/talk/commen...taco_talk_coll

(Not behind a pay wall - well for me).