Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Dayuhan]

We have created a monopoly of governance in Afghanistan, and then enabled the formalization of of that monopoly when we oversaw, supported, and protected a sham of an election that elevated our hand-picked man to the Presidency, and led to the production of the current constitution that vests all patronage from the District level and above in that same man. In this land, such a monopoly of governance and patronage means a corresponding monopoly on economic opportunity as well.

We didn't create the monopoly of governance, that's implicit in Afghanistan. It's the way they govern. We can't simply decree that henceforth there shall be inclusion and shared power... or rather we can decree it, but nobody's going to listen.

We have created and dedicated ourselves to the preservation of an illegitimate monopoly on governmental and economic opportunity in Afghanistan.

That we did do, foolishly IMO. I'm not in a position to declare anything "legitimate" or "illegitimate" in Afghanistan, and I'm not convinced that any American is in that position, but we did put one faction in power and invest ourselves in keeping it there. Not a good idea.

Now we act as a conduit to bring an increased Indian presence into Afghanistan. Sure Karzai welcomes them, because he knows the US will ultimately depart, and he also knows that India will stay.

Are we doing that? How? I've yet to see any evidence that the US is acting as a conduit to build Indian influence. As others have said here, the Indians are quite capable of pursuing their own interests with or without our help or approval.

That knowledge enables Karzai to continue to avoid the one thing that must be done to bring any hope of stability to this region: Break down the monopoly on governance and allow legal competition for influence and political and economic opportunity in Afghanistan.

How are we supposed to do that? By decreeing what shall henceforth be considered "legal competition"?

I think you vastly overestimate the US ability to reshape Afghan political culture and change the way Afghans govern. We can't do that. They can, over time and through an evolutionary process, but it won't happen because we want it to happen.

What we could have done was to simply provide evidence to whoever was going to monopolize power (it was always going to be somebody) that attacking us or our allies or sheltering those who do would produce immediate and horrible consequences.

We could have done that and left. We obviously can't know how that would have played out, but it's hard to see how it could have been worse.

[Ken White]

Anything Mr. Rumsfeld says is primarily intended to make Mr. Rumsfeld look good. In this case it is "See! If we'd done what I wanted to do we wouldn't be in this mess."

Easy for you to say. I believe the reality is different and I for one certainly agree with what he wanted to do in 2001 versus what anyone says today. Regardless, it is a fact that had we not stayed...

There was no chance we weren't going to stay in Afghanistan in some measure after the anti-Taliban forces kicked out the Taliban with the help of US airpower. It was felt that one of the primary reasons 9-11 came was because AQ found a congenial home in Taliban run Afghanistan and one of the primary reasons Taliban was running Afghanistan was because we stopped paying attention to the place after the Soviets left. So we were going to stay on.

I understand the thought process on the part of the "fpe," its hangers-on and fellow travelers that led to our staying. I have no question that going into Afghanistan in 2001 was really necessary, not just desirable -- and that on both strategic and tactical bases. We went in the and the guys did well and then, as I said "Unfortunately, G. W. Bush, good Christian he, was convinced by a number of the humanitarianly inclined foreign policy 'elite' ( "fpe" - lower case, advisedly...) in Washington to stay and bring a failed State into the World Community." That was a poor decision, understandable on the face but wrong on the strategic merits in almost all senses. I've been watching and participating in that foolishness for a good many years. It is terribly flawed logic and does more harm than good, almost always.

The "fpe" and it's allies are some conflicted folks. They espouse humanitarian interventions to protect the locals from themselves and then want to dictate how said locals behave. Fascinating. To say we, the US should dictate to folks that certain "...things should be done as we wish you to do them is in your best interest and that's why we came here to save you" would be knee slapping hilarious if it weren't so sad and didn't do so much damage to the US and to the locals the "fpe" crowd wants to save. I become more convinced as time passes that all that is less about 'saving' others than it is about dictating to others how they should behave in a "Nanny knows best" mode and an effort to make themselves feel better.

Other nations have a right to their interests and way of life and it is not up to us to prescribe nirvana. Bob's World is correct, we need to break that foolish, dangerous and ill affordable addiction. The World has changed and we are way behind the power curve.

If we hadn't stayed on, the Taliban would have been back shortly since they just moved across the border. That would have amounted to trading a raid for a raid leading to more raids probably. Sort of medieval.

So? Trick to that is to make your raids hurt more than theirs, easily done -- unless the raiding instrument either (a) gets bogged down or (b) is so poor at execution that it fails to achieve a required level of hurt. Of those, 'b' is a capability issue and we have deliberately not developed that as fully as we should due to the "fpe" objecting to that as 'not nice' (and the ostensible leaders of the raiders being unduly risk averse in the upper -- not the lower, actually do it -- echelons).

Far more regrettably, 'a' is often a conscious decision will fully undertaken for dubious reasons as opposed to being an inadvertent occurrence. That would be the Afghan issue...

I don't think NATO's involvement is inimical to NATO's interests at all. It is critical if NATO is to survive as an alliance. Refusal of the alliance to support its most important member in the face of an attack would have meant the end of the alliance. Involvement in Afghanistan may be inimical to individual country's interests, but to the alliance, no.

I believe there are several stretches of reality there. Inimical is an opinion, we can differ. Criticality to NATO survival is also an opinion and we differ on that as well.

Stretching Article 5 as the US did and you support was IMO very ill advised. I will certainly acknowledge that, since we stayed, it was politically a smart move on several levels and that is in some senses beneficial to the alliance. That does not make the staying beneficial to us or the alliance.

You seem to be an interventionist as are many members of the "fpe." While I have no problem with intervening or with violence if the results will be beneficial for the US, I strongly object to such activity when the results will be detrimental and / or the cost benefit ratio is quite poor -- not a little poor but quite poor. I even more strongly object when the nominal results are unachievable or will do more long term harm to the US and when the cost-benefit ratio is quite averse. If as is often the case it can be reliably predicted that such interventions will likely worsen the state of the local populace then the action is even more objectionable. That was and is the case in Afghanistan and is also the case with Libya. The "fpe" OTOH relishes interventions that spread sweetness and light and 'improve' the state of the masses as they see it. They're most always wrong. That, again, was and is the case in Afghanistan and is also the case with Libya.

The "fpe" and the pro intervention always crowd, accompanied and encouraged by those in the DoD and DoS establishments that see such efforts as budget, power and prestige enhancing who ally with them and come up with some really fascinating rationales to justify them -- and expand them with mission creep beyond all recognition or logic. JFK's rather foolish "...bear any burden..." collection of bravely spoken words have much to answer for.

[Infanteer]

What we need is a strong Afghan ruler, in the mold of Hussein or Gaddaffi, or Stalin...

Karzai could probably be strong, but we hamstring him with our Western civility. If you look at the long line of Pasthuns who have ruled from Kabul, none have ever ruled by winning the hearts and minds of their unruly cousins in the South....

Moderator's Note: a number of the following posts appeared on the thread The UK in Afghanistan and were moved 7th August 2011 to this more appropriate, general thread on Afghanistan.

[ganulv]

Karzai could probably be strong

The bipolar issue is a bit Cromwellian, I suppose.

but we hamstring him with our Western civility.

Not necessarily untrue, but I do think there is a ton of crosstalk when words like ‘civility’ and ‘brutality’ are used in a cross-cultural context. The rulebook in the contemporary Western world is certainly different than in Central Asia and the Middle East. What is happening in Syria right now seems pretty sickening to most Western sensibilities, and I think not just because of the carnage involved but because most Westerners are of a mind not so much that carnage is always unacceptable but rather that carnage done in that particular fashion is always unacceptable. That seems fine to me so long as Westerners do not pat themselves too hard on the back about not perpetrating brutality (and I am not suggesting that you are doing that in the above post, Infanteer). As someone who has lived in a place where people went to bed at night with a justifiable fear that men dressed in black might break down their doors and drag them away to a hole in the ground before daybreak I do not care for the way night raids in Iraq and Afghanistan are consistently portrayed as benign technical affairs to the American public. Which is not to say that there is no argument to be made for such a strategy, just that Westerners should make an effort to face up to the fact that their chunk of the world is in on nasty things, too.

In Middle America the boogeyman is a Muslim wearing a bomb vest; in rural Afghanistan he is a Christian with a SCAR. If the residents of both places were able to take seriously that each others’ fears are legitimate we all might be in a better place. Don’t mean to drag the thread off topic; climbing off my soapbox now.

[JMA]

What we need is a strong Afghan ruler, in the mold of Hussein or Gaddaffi, or Stalin...

The US had one in Egypt and see what happened to him.

Seriously though the Edward Luttwak perspective is just about right... that is why the West can't win in Afghanistan.

[TDB]

The US had one in Egypt and see what happened to him.

Seriously though the Edward Luttwak perspective is just about right... that is why the West can't win in Afghanistan.

He seems to be suggesting a carrot and stick method to COIN. Well that throws up a few issues, our western liberal ideas would not permit out soldiers to carry the stick. I would search for it but lack the energy, a few years ago footage emerged of British soldiers beating Iraqi youths who had thrown stones at them and had been rioting at the same time shots were fired at said British troops. This didn't go down too well on the homefront, in an age of 254 hour rolling media and wikileaks such stick methods would get out. Of course it can be said that this wouldn't matter if the method achieved results. I'm sceptical of this, i feel that having seen how Afghan public opinion turned swiftly against an abusive Afghan government and security apparatus, then the result would be the same.

[Bob's World]

Afghanistan needs a strong ruler who is picked by Afghans for Afghans, in a system not shaped or manipulated by outsiders.

They actually had that in Mullah Omar, but we didn't like the fact that he refused to violate Pashtunwali and give us AQ as we demanded. I suspect he had no idea how serious we were, and I am sure we had no appreciation for how important Pashtunwali is either. A tragic failure to communicate.

Stability demands reconciliation, but reconciliation currently demands swearing an oath of loyalty to the current constitution and is denied entirely by those deemed to be "beyond the pale". I cannot help but think of a similar offer made to Josey Wales and his fellow guerrillas in that Clint Eastwood classic.

The best thing the west could do to get a strong leader in Afghanistan is leave. If what we have created there is sustainable it will endure. If it is not it will evolve or be replaced. Then we must have the humility and honor to work with whomever emerges and whatever form of government these people opt to create for themselves. If they saw value in what we have been selling these past 10 years, they will retain those aspects they liked all on their own. It won't look like what Western politicians and diplomats would want, but then, it isn't their call.

[JMA]

Afghanistan needs a strong ruler who is picked by Afghans for Afghans, in a system not shaped or manipulated by outsiders.

Bob, just how was Mullah Omar 'picked' by Afghans?

[Bob's World]

Bob, just how was Mullah Omar 'picked' by Afghans?

That was an internal transition when the Taliban ran off the government that the Soviets had put in place. Sure, Pakistan supported that play, nothing is ever simple, but I don't think Pakistan was nearly as prescriptive as the various European/Western interlopers have been.

Just because sometimes a populace has to use bullets rather than ballots to elevate a government of their own over one imposed upon them, does not mean it is not a popular decision. Afther all, it is a much more significant commitment to self-determination to join a revolution than it is to drive down to the local fire station and cast a vote.

[JMA]

He seems to be suggesting a carrot and stick method to COIN. Well that throws up a few issues, our western liberal ideas would not permit out soldiers to carry the stick. I would search for it but lack the energy, a few years ago footage emerged of British soldiers beating Iraqi youths who had thrown stones at them and had been rioting at the same time shots were fired at said British troops. This didn't go down too well on the homefront, in an age of 254 hour rolling media and wikileaks such stick methods would get out. Of course it can be said that this wouldn't matter if the method achieved results. I'm sceptical of this, i feel that having seen how Afghan public opinion turned swiftly against an abusive Afghan government and security apparatus, then the result would be the same.

The moral of this story is that you can't win an insurgency by throwing money at the population while the insurgents execute anyone and everyone who 'cooperates' with you.

The 'war' was won in 2001 and that's when the US should have exited with the warning that if you let AQ back and start the poppy nonsense again we will be back with more of the same. But some smart guys had another plan...

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

I have moved many of the recent posts to this thread, from The UK in Afghanistan, as it is a far better place for them.

Meantime carry on. Yes, I cannot alter the post's title.

[Bill Moore]

This ties in to the recent postings about the grim NIE, and I think we'd all stand to gain something from re-educating ourselves about what was going on during the 2006-2008 window.

While I am generally negative towards our strategy or lack of one for Afghanistan, there is still a possibility that we'll eventually stumble into something that looks like success over time (assuming we lower our ambitions on what success means). We're not the only ones subject to exhaustion. We're not leaving in 2014, we're just pulling out most of the conventional combat forces, which may allow us be successful (or more accurately allow the Afghans to be successful). We'll still be pumping money in, training Afghan security forces, and special operations will still be putting pressure on the Taliban until we get tired, and since that is affordable option it may last a while.

The Taliban must be confused about all this, at least the senior ones. In the mid 90s we reached out to them. I doubt that we liked them, but they were useful partners to pressure Iran and for suppressing the narcotics trade. And reportedly supported a joint U.S./Saudi venture to develop a pipeline there. I can see why Pakistan feels betrayed, but even they should understand that 9/11 changed everything, but it does seem like we may over conflated the Taliban with Al Qaeda. Providing protection is not the same as supporting transnational terrorist activity. None the less, 10 plus years later everything has changed, and if they weren't a direct enemy before (rather just a friend of our enemy) they definitely are now.

If we live long enough, and get to read a more dispassionate and accurate history of this war decades down the road it may start making sense. I'm not sure there were any particular turning points during our war, I think they happened prior to the war.

[jcustis]

If we live long enough, and get to read a more dispassionate and accurate history of this war decades down the road it may start making sense. I'm not sure there were any particular turning points during our war, I think they happened prior to the war.

I don't think we are going to gain a more accurate appreciation down the road, but rather revisionism, slanted to support politics, ego, and to protect folks' necks.

We gained a more nuanced understanding of Vietnam through the Pentagon Papers and other reams of classified paperwork from the war years. The history is more delicate and fragile nowadays. The number of operation orders, emails, and briefings hanging out on classified servers is mind-boggling, and chunks of it get lost every day. Blow an external teradrive or two, and three years and five unit rotations are gone like so many candles blown out.

Some serious questions need to be asked though, about what could have been if NATO wasn't forced to slug it out pretty much on its own for so long, and we had simply committed the forces earlier, or said to hell with troop ceilings, or had a totally different approach once Karzai's aims came into focus.

[jcustis]

During a search for the posts on the Dutch role I found this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=dutch


I have just finished reading those two pages of posts and linked-in articles. Stunning...just plain stunning, when one looks at the proclamations five years ago, and what has transpired since then. I know it's a lot more than just this quote, but reading this takes me way back, to a time when I was just coming off my second Iraq deploy and thinking about my third. Afghanistan was a distant blip on my radar. And then, there it was.

NATO's commander here has set a six-month deadline to reverse a Taliban insurgency terrorizing southern Afghanistan or risk alienating Afghans undecided about whom to support.

British army Lt. Gen. David Richards said his troops must prove to Afghans in the south that the fundamentalist Islamic militia won't be able to undermine the democratically elected Afghan government or stop efforts to rebuild the shattered country.

Only 10% of the south's population supports the Taliban, Richards said, citing Afghan government surveys. In an interview, he said 70% won't declare their loyalty until they “see which side will win. They can't wait forever. We've got to show them we will win.”

Nearly five years after a U.S.-led campaign ousted the Taliban government that had sheltered al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, Richards' troops have launched “Operation Medusa” in Panjwayi district in Kandahar province. The campaign aims to quell the Taliban's aggressive new offensive. NATO reported that more than 200 Taliban fighters were killed in the first two days of Medusa, which began Saturday.

The fighting also has brought NATO casualties. Monday, two U.S. warplanes mistakenly strafed NATO troops in Panjwayi district. A Canadian soldier was killed, said Maj. Scott Lundy, a NATO spokesman. A British soldier was killed in a suicide bombing in Kabul, the British Defense Ministry said. More than 130 NATO and coalition troops have died this year, the Associated Press reported, more than in all of 2005.

NATO took over responsibility for southern Afghanistan from the United States on July 31. As early as this month, NATO will take over for the U.S.-led multinational coalition in eastern Afghanistan...

This ties in to the recent postings about the grim NIE, and I think we'd all stand to gain something from re-educating ourselves about what was going on during the 2006-2008 window.

[Entropy]

During a search for the posts on the Dutch role I found this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=dutch


I have just finished reading those two pages of posts and linked-in articles. Stunning...just plain stunning, when one looks at the proclamations five years ago, and what has transpired since then. I know it's a lot more than just this quote, but reading this takes me way back, to a time when I was just coming off my second Iraq deploy and thinking about my third. Afghanistan was a distant blip on my radar. And then, there it was.



This ties in to the recent postings about the grim NIE, and I think we'd all stand to gain something from re-educating ourselves about what was going on during the 2006-2008 window.

Welcome to my world. Afghanistan has always been my theater and my cynicism is fueled by the strong sense that Afghanistan policy is just like the movie "Groundhog Day" except we don't get a clean start at each iteration yet we still forget everything we've done before.

[davidbfpo]

A short comment on KoW blog by a Human Terrain analyst who has been in Helmand Province for the Spring and Summer, which opens with:

I spent my spring and summer in southern Helmand conducting research. The population’s prescience was unnerving.

Right or wrong, unfounded or founded, the locals overwhelmingly saw the war with the Taliban as yet to come. The tired and sometimes clumsy argument in London and Washington that the Taliban will pour over the Afghan borders upon NATO withdrawal is alive and well around the town centers, wells, and mosques of Marjah and Garmsir. The locals truly believe that Pakistani Taliban—madrassa students and patient trainees ready to die—will storm across NATO-built highways in civilian trucks wave after wave, undaunted by death.

Which ends with:

...NATO should focus precious assets on countering-radicalisation to stave off the effects of impending Taliban expansion. Empower indigenous resiliencies. The ideological Taliban will probably return again strongly. Afghans at every level of society—not just in the security services—must be ready.

Link:http://icsr.info/blog/Counter-Radica...he-War-to-Come

From this faraway armchair I do wonder if the legend or customary dislike of all Pakistanis by Afghans has changed. Secondly, whatever local or national security forces are in place say by 2014 they will carefully observe which "way the wind is blowing" and decide what they will do. Empowering indigenous resiliencies could be very temporary.

[Ray]

Here is one of the way to win:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVuI4A1ka6U

Sanjit 'Bunker' Roy (born 2 August 1945) is an Indian social activist and educator. In 1972 he founded the Barefoot college in Tilonia, Rajasthan. The Indian non-governmental organization was registered as the Social Work and Research Centre.

Bunker Roy was born in Burnpur Bengal, present-day West Bengal. His father was a mechanical engineer and his mother retired as India's trade commissioner to Russia.

He went to the Doon School from 1956 to 1962 and attended St. Stephen's College, Delhi from 1962 to 1967. Both institutes are the Ivy League of India.

He earned his master's degree in English. He then decided to devote himself to social service, to the shock of his parents.

He has trained Aghan and even African illiterate women to electrify their villages with solar energy and other village help amenities!