Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Surferbeetle]

but in the meantime, I've been mulling a passage from FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (p.16):

I'm not picking on this particular interim work, since the concept is all over the place. I've had some difficulty getting my arms around the questions I want to frame. The focus deals with the political effort side of the ledger.

I've put my off the top of my noodle comments in quotes to separate them from the questions.

1. If we posit that the political effort is the greater part of "best practices COIN", who (military or civilian) performs that effort ?

Mike,

The USAID website on PRT's may be of interest:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been the primary vehicle for the delivery of U.S. and international official foreign assistance outside of Kabul, particularly in unstable provinces. They are joint civilian-military operations that were established at the end of 2002 to improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in the provinces.

A PRT typically consists of... military personnel, a USAID field officer and a DOS political officer. Many also have a USDA advisor.

The US DoS PRT website has job listings/descriptions and the following:

PRTs are a key element in a broader coordinated civil-military strategy, which includes continued Coalition combat operations, expansion of NATO/ISAF, implementing international donor development assistance, training and deployment of Afghan national army and police units, and diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors.

PRTs focus on a range of activities relevant to their environment, including:

* Establishing and maintaining good working relationships with key government, military, tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces.
* Monitoring and reporting on critical political, military and reconstruction developments.
* Supporting Afghan authorities in providing security for activities such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga, presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia forces.
* Assisting in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan national army and police units located in the provinces.
* Working closely with the UN and other donors providing development and humanitarian assistance.
* Implementing assistance projects that address local needs and gaps not filled by other donors, and focusing on building Afghan capacity.

[jmm99]

than I expected at the end of 2003. So, you and others here can take credit for that.

My questions were more addressed to the political side of "best practices COIN" in general. I see some disconnects in the concept as laid out in FMI 3-24.3. For that matter, I see the same disconnects in the 1980s Summers-Krepinevich debate, and the current Gentile-Nagl debate - all very interesting from a military standpoint (the military effort); but without any real consideration by any of them as to the political effort required.

Most particularly, what do you do with an incompetent (corrupt, etc.) HN government ?

---------------------------------
I'd quibble about what what "expeditions" and "expeditionary forces" do. Of course they can invade with the purpose of occupying the country - we seem to be fixated on that, as opposed to a punitive raid no matter how gigantic it might be. FM 27-10 (par. 352 explains the distinction).

Coincidentally, I was just re-reading parts of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. At p.91, he deals with War Plan Green (a war with Mexico). We've had war plans for Mexico since the 1800s, but by 1922 the Mexican army was so weak that War Plan Green was changed to Special Plan Green, an occupation plan not unlike what we intended for Iraq: the army would establish a government, reform the education and legal systems, employ honest police and civil servants, with the clear and expressed US intention to create "peace and good order."

Now, it came to pass in 1924 that Special Plan Green was war gamed; and, surprise, the most probable COA for the Mexicans was not to resist the main invasion columns, but to wait a while and then engage in guerrilla warfare, etc. The majority staff conclusion was that the occupation would morph into a long, slow and frustrating unconventional war.

So, in 1927, Special Plan Green was amended to provide for a rapidly moving direct attack with the purpose of deposing the Mexican government, and then immediately withdrawing. The plan required that it be made clear that it did not intend a military occupation, was not an operation against the Mexican nation, but was an operation against the Mexican government.

OK, in Linn's terminology, I'm just a dinosaur "Guardian" of the "Never Again but" school, who apparently sees disconnects where others don't.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

I've nothing against PRTs, nor against District Reconstruction Teams as recently floated. But, let's talk politics.

You and I start the Good Guys Party (since I use "guys" without gender distinction, we aren't male chauvinists, but are competent, honest and filled with integrity). So, how do we handle Michigan ? Well, we set up a PRT in Lansing. Will that win any elections ? Not in my experience.

So, we up the ante and set up DRTs in each county. Will that do better in elections ? Sure, but it is not the complete answer.

The answer is that you set up committees in every city, village and township - and then get down to neighborhoods (election wards, precincts). If you doubt me, ask Karl Rove and David Axelrod.

Thus, the political effort (just as the military effort) must reach down into the villages in each area which you want to secure. We win if we can keep ourselves and the villagers safe and if we have the better political message. If the political message is lousy (incompetence, corruption, venality), the political game is lost - regardless of how good the US is, cuz the HN "goodness" is the key variable.

That doesn't mean the insurgency cannot be defeated - you just use brute, overwhelming, authoritarian force and kill all the insurgents (and to make sure, use Giap's - better that 10 innocents die than one counter-revolutionary escapes). I don't think that can be our game plan.

Like I said, just an old dinosaur.

Regards,

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

...during the day/night fish shift change (dawn and dusk) one needs to watch for sharks. Learned that particular bit of info one day after asking some of the locals why I was always the only one enjoying the water when the sun came up and everybody else was on the beach. Successfully surfing a Political 'Break' may be even more dangerous

Mike,

Let's see what we can do to avoid the sharks...

I've nothing against PRTs, nor against District Reconstruction Teams as recently floated.

Successfully and consistently addressing political considerations in an AO requires at least a baseline organizational design and depending upon importance, it may require one that is specifically tailored to the AO. Embassies, Consulates, DRT's, PRT's, CMOC's (Civil Military Operations Centers) are all attempts to answer the mail at some level be it Strategic, Operational, or Tactical. Successfully completing the mission is of course more important than organizational structure, however staffing and resourcing are deeply intertwined in completing the mission.

Dr. Lew Irwin's/COL Irwin's paper Filling Irregular Warfare’s Interagency Gaps and USN LT (O-3) Welle's paper Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan Creating Unity of Command are a couple of deep papers which examine how to optimize organizational designs for political and other important considerations. I have downloaded them both, given them the once over (300+ wpm), and will continue to mull them over as they are both keepers...

You and I start the Good Guys Party (since I use "guys" without gender distinction, we aren't male chauvinists, but are competent, honest and filled with integrity). So, how do we handle Michigan ? Well, we set up a PRT in Lansing. Will that win any elections ? Not in my experience.

For this particular exercise I'll defer to your regional experience (sociology: key informant) with the caveats that we have established a shared understanding/consensus with regards to a stakeholder analysis of the region, a shared understanding/consensus as to the extent of wasta mobilized by the region, a a shared understanding/consensus of the key plank or two upon which the Good Guys Party is organized around (updated Manicheism? ), and our shared marketing analysis/efforts seem to indicate that we understand/can reach the demographics of whom we wish to influence.

So, we up the ante and set up DRTs in each county. Will that do better in elections ? Sure, but it is not the complete answer.

The answer is that you set up committees in every city, village and township - and then get down to neighborhoods (election wards, precincts). If you doubt me, ask Karl Rove and David Axelrod.

You are of course correct for Michigan, however we are ~7,000 miles away and very short on political experts who speak the local language and understand the local culture. Time for Git-R-Dun in my view we are back to the PRT and ePRT...

Thus, the political effort (just as the military effort) must reach down into the villages in each area which you want to secure. We win if we can keep ourselves and the villagers safe and if we have the better political message. If the political message is lousy (incompetence, corruption, venality), the political game is lost - regardless of how good the US is, cuz the HN "goodness" is the key variable.-emphasis SB

I am an advocate of oil-spot theory having both studied it as well as executed practical applications of the theory during OIF 1. Tailoring staffing and resourcing for our grid square/province in Afghanistan will be key to any future successes...

That doesn't mean the insurgency cannot be defeated - you just use brute, overwhelming, authoritarian force and kill all the insurgents (and to make sure, use Giap's - better that 10 innocents die than one counter-revolutionary escapes). I don't think that can be our game plan.

Killing the hard-core insurgents is an integral part of the plan my friend, but it's not the only part of the plan. Those folks will try and kill every last one of us and so we will do what we must to ensure that this does not occur while simultaneously implementing the additional lines of operation/lines of action required by the mission

Best,

Steve

[jcustis]

4. Oil spot theory presupposes active and effective development of the secured terrain. In 2006/7/8, that was not a realistic prospect. Except for road-building, pretty much all development efforts during this period were abject failures.

As many of you already know, I am spinning up for my next deploy, and it will be to Afghanistan. I will work much in the same vein that I did last time, as the lead for the non-kinetic effects team. As such, I am very interested in precisely what these abject failures were, and why, since development along the essential services line of operation will be a focal point.

[jcustis]

History, as short or as long as it can seem, can easily be forgotten. In this case, I never even knew it to be true in the first place, as I either had not seen this story or simply was caught up in the shock of 9/11:

Taleban authorities in Afghanistan say calls to surrender alleged terrorist Osama bin Laden are a "pretext" to destroy Taleban rule in Afghanistan. About 1,000 Afghan Muslim clerics have gathered in Kabul for a meeting to discuss the fate of Osama bin Laden, who is wanted by the United States for his alleged role in the attacks on New York and Washington.

In a defiant speech read out to the clerics, the Taleban supreme leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, said the enemies of Afghanistan view the Taleban Islamic system as a thorn in their eye and are seeking to finish it off.

In his speech to the gathering of the shura (council), Mullah Omar said Osama bin Laden is just the latest "pretext" being used by the enemies of the Taleban to destroy their rule. Mullah Omar said he wished to assure the United States and the rest of the world that Osama bin Laden had not used Afghan territory as a base for attacking anyone. However, the reclusive Taleban leader also repeated his offer of talks with the United States to settle all outstanding issues.

President Bush rejected the call for talks, saying now is the time to act.

There is a bit more at the VOA link: http://tinyurl.com/yfnw5xg

Was it hubris or vengeance that drove Bush's response? Could our nation have afforded then to open dialog to Omar, or had the issue become overcome by events? What if the august body of this Council had existed back then?

A choice was made back then, but I believe that this snippet documents an opportunity we need to go back to, if we are to achieve a decent interval in Afghanistan.

[jmm99]

Hi Steve, the Shark Killer

I've downloaded the two articles and will read them. My eye caught the chart in Welle's article which outlines C-M co-operation (proposed for ISAF), which is:

C-M Org Chart Astan.jpg

similar to the Vietnamese Pacification Program (including CORDS), except that a Vietnamese chart would have gone down another level to the villages. In Vietnam, the villages were where the action was at.

The VPP was reasonably successful in some areas (especially in the agricultural effort of introducing multi-cropping rice, etc.). It might have been successful (the "might" because of the problems with GSV governance), if the South had not been hammered by Northern invasions (1968, 1972 and 1975). So, thought BG Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs - 7mb DL. See this post, CORDS-Phoenix - the South Vietnamese View.

However, as you correctly point out:

Successfully completing the mission is of course more important than organizational structure, however staffing and resourcing are deeply intertwined in completing the mission.

and:

... however we are ~7,000 miles away and very short on political experts who speak the local language and understand the local culture.

I'd add this up and infer that we (US civilian and military) are not capable of performing the political mission cuz we don't have the horses (political experts on Astan).

If that be so, then who will handle the political effort ? A rhetorical question, since the Astan government seems to get the ball by default. Is that government capable (competent, etc.) to prove itself the better alternative to the folks in the Astan villages. So far, it has not, even in so-called "secure" provinces (e.g., Kunduz).

-----------------------------
That current-events issue leads into my more general problem with FMI 3-24.3 and many proponents of "best practices population-centric COIN". Specifically, the mantra seems to me to be that: it doesn't matter what kind of HN government we have to deal with because by application of "best practices COIN" we can execute our mission. That's the only way I can read this:

1-18. Commanders must be prepared to operate within a broad range of political structures. The Host Nation’s form of government may range from a despotic dictatorship to a struggling democracy. Commanders at all levels, including platoon leaders and company commanders, need to recognize the importance of establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces the legitimacy of the HN government.

Maybe you are going in that direction when you say:

Time for Git-R-Dun in my view we are back to the PRT and ePRT...

Originally Posted by jmm99
Thus, the political effort (just as the military effort) must reach down into the villages in each area which you want to secure. We win if we can keep ourselves and the villagers safe and if we have the better political message. If the political message is lousy (incompetence, corruption, venality), the political game is lost - regardless of how good the US is, cuz the HN "goodness" is the key variable.-emphasis SB

I am an advocate of oil-spot theory having both studied it as well as executed practical applications of the theory during OIF 1. Tailoring staffing and resourcing for our grid square/province in Afghanistan will be key to any future successes...

Now, I too like "oil spots" (key incumbant strategic base areas - adding some jargon); but that does not really answer my lines which you bolded. Sure, you as a CA officer and your team probably would execute your particular mission successfully (how's that for confidence in you); just as our member Mike in Hilo executed his mission well in his particular area of Vietnam. But, that does not equate to success nation-wide.

Looking back at Southeast Asia (yes, I'm back to the Jurassic again), I see failures in China and Vietnam (where the incumbant governments were not up to the political and military efforts), and successes in Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia (where the incumbants were up to those tasks).

Perhaps, the paradigm has changed and the "worth" of the HN government is not material to the end result - and that well-executed TTPs can overcome the HN government's deficiencies. If so, FMI 3-24.3 and "best practices population-centric COIN" do not suffer from "disconnects" ("contradictions" as Giap might well say). That really is my bottom-line question.

Best as always

Mike

[jmm99]

Jon,

There were a number of back-channel US-Taliban contacts before and after 9/11 re: extradition of UBL and where he should be tried. The Taliban proposal (IIRC post-9/11) was an Islamic court under Sharia law. Efforts by both the Clinton and Bush II administrations went around in circles. Steve Coll covers some of this in Ghost Wars; and also Mike Scheuer (Anonymous) in his books on UBL.

IMO, based on what I've read and the Web stuff I was following at the time, there was nothing there which we would want to go back to. Present negotiations (via proxies) with the Taliban might be another story; but the Taliban are pretty rigid (especially if they think they are winning and inflicting more pain than they are suffering).

My best shot at creating a time machine to move SWC back in time to 2001.

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

Present negotiations (via proxies) with the Taliban might be another story;

That's more along the lines of what I meant. Current efforts are my concern for the most part..

Taleban leader Mullah Omar gets on message with speech aimed at West.

The Taleban’s reclusive leader has rejected President Karzai’s call for peace negotiations, which were made last week at his inauguration for a second term.

Instead, Mullah Omar issued his own “state of the nation” address yesterday, apparently designed to exploit public unease in Western countries over the Afghan war, and before an expected announcement next Tuesday that the Obama Administration will send up to 35,000 reinforcements. The 3,000-word speech attributed to Mullah Omar was distributed by e-mail in three languages — English, Pashto and Dari — by the Taleban’s propaganda wing. It addresses nine different audiences, in at times idiosyncratic English, including a call to the “Freedom loving people of the West”.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6932459.ece

If I read Omar one layer deep, the talk/offer of peace negotiations at Karzai's second inauguration do not square well with talk of a surge, and stand to embolden the Taliban to continue to effort against the imperial invader. If this be the case, then we have a lot of work ahead of us...but then again, we all already know that.

[davidbfpo]

I admire Tim & team's reporting, which is on the ground and often non-kinetic:
http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2404 They are currently visiting Nimroz province with no ISAF or GIRoA presence, to pursue a local project.

Tim cites two UK writers: the former BBC war correspondent, Robert Fox, in this:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...thdrawal-folly

I liked these closing lines:

The problem is that the argument is likely to be won and lost in the dining rooms of London and Washington and not in the fields and bazaars of Afghanistan. This is being conditioned by the enormous gap of perception between the metropolitan commentators at home and the reporters and workers out on the ground here. We are not so much worlds apart, but operating on different planets.

Not to overlook the Taliban working with communities approach (which is rarely reported here):

The township has its own community council. But seven weeks ago the Taliban kidnapped its head, then executed him out in the desert, and shot two other councillors in their office.

Secondly Adam Holloway, who Tim states is:

a British (Conservative) MP who has made several trips to Afghanistan traveling both inside the official security bubble and outside the wire....who has consistently demonstrated sound judgment, professional leadership, integrity and an inordinate amount of common sense

The article (via Michael Yon) is:http://www.michaelyon-online.com/ima...pedinsofar.pdf (from a UK think tank site)

Adam Holloway is a known critic of what has happened (as posted before) and here is one paragraph:

Apart from top-down nation building, the fatal flaw of General McChrystal’s strategy. is the idea that “Afghan National Security Forces” will somehow bring order to the Pashtoon areas.
They won’t. They’ll be seen as outside occupiers.

Nothing startling on a first read.

[jmm99]

This:

from David

Not to overlook the Taliban working with communities approach (which is rarely reported here):

The township has its own community council. But seven weeks ago the Taliban kidnapped its head, then executed him out in the desert, and shot two other councillors in their office.

was work for an "armed propaganda team" in Giap's parlance. If you can't convert them, kill them. The Taliban pay attention to villages, especially to non-Taliban oriented local government in villages. Works if the killings are selective and create more fear than enemies.

We don't need "armed social workers", but do need more "armed political workers" - but, only a limited number of ODAs exist.

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

Apart from top-down nation building, the fatal flaw of General McChrystal’s strategy. is the idea that “Afghan National Security Forces” will somehow bring order to the Pashtoon areas. They won’t. They’ll be seen as outside occupiers.

Guys, so besides the routine IO/psyop drivel, how do we counter this reality, in concrete terms?

I'm looking for ideas here, so that my key leader engagement script doesn't come off as the routine party line, "Well you know, the government is working to improve things, and the army is a key part of that. You need to be patient with them."

Official graft and corruption had a history behind it in Iraq, but unless I am reading things wrong, the Pashtun are either 1) just plain fed up with it in their areas, or 2) it has grown in a scale so great that it cannot be overlooked. Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

[slapout9]

jcustis, I don't know how much of this will help but what I would do is collect as much back round Intelligence on the Key Leaders as possible. Then look for surfaces and gaps in his personal life! Influence him on a personal level (help or hurt) before I would start talking about the Party Line so to speak.

[jcustis]

jcustis, I don't know how much of this will help but what I would do is collect as much back round Intelligence on the Key Leaders as possible. Then look for surfaces and gaps in his personal life! Influence him on a personal level (help or hurt) before I would start talking about the Party Line so to speak.

Indeed! Thanks for reminding me of that aspect. Always go in knowing more about him and what he wants than he does.

[Surferbeetle]

Guys, so besides the routine IO/psyop drivel, how do we counter this reality, in concrete terms?

I'm looking for ideas here, so that my key leader engagement script doesn't come off as the routine party line, "Well you know, the government is working to improve things, and the army is a key part of that. You need to be patient with them."

Official graft and corruption had a history behind it in Iraq, but unless I am reading things wrong, the Pashtun are either 1) just plain fed up with it in their areas, or 2) it has grown in a scale so great that it cannot be overlooked. Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

Jon,

David's link for Adam Holloway's points on Afghanistan was worth the read.

My to-do list for a deployment includes:

1. Prepping my team.

2. Gaining an understanding of at least the governance, economic, and security systems before deploying.

3. Continually updating my understanding of at least the governance, economic, and security systems once I am on the ground.

4. Regularly reconciling my to-do list, timeline, and cost estimates with that of my internal and external customers.

You know as well as I do that it just sounds simple and easy...I'll send along a pm

Steve

[slapout9]

Indeed! Thanks for reminding me of that aspect. Always go in knowing more about him and what he wants than he does.

Remember the 3 F's his family,,,,his friends,,,,his finances. Try to understand how everything You do impacts him or family or friends or his money/power base. If it benefits him he will probably support it, if it disrupts any of his personal systems he will fight you John Robb did a post recently along these lines called social system disruption....worth a read. Truth in lending he posted my 5 rings analysis so I am not an innocent bystander.......but I belive in it. If I get time I will PM you later(maybe tomorrow).

[jcustis]

Remember the 3 F's his family,,,,his friends,,,,his finances.

I thought there was an "M"...for mistress? I remember very clearly that you wrote (must be a few years on by now) that if you found who they were sleeping with, you could get an 'in" to the bad guy.

This is funny too, as I just read an old Michael Yon post today that discussed the brothel(s) of Tal Afar and how information was gained from them.

[slapout9]

I thought there was an "M"...for mistress? I remember very clearly that you wrote (must be a few years on by now) that if you found who they were sleeping with, you could get an 'in" to the bad guy.

This is funny too, as I just read an old Michael Yon post today that discussed the brothel(s) of Tal Afar and how information was gained from them.

JC,I told you I was going to send you a PM.......guess I don't have to now It was actually the fourth F...... who is fugging who. IMO opinion the world revolves around money,drugs,guns and women not necessarily in that order. Here is an idea.....introduce the women to birth control.....they want have to worry about another mouth to feed.

[jmm99]

and don't really need to know. Based on your question from your last deployment, you will count sheep - didn't know that Bates had a course in animal husbandry.

However, I posit that the team will be Marines; hence riflemen and capable of protecting themselves and others. So much the good. I also posit that non-kinetic might mean more contact with ANP than ANA. Hence, as to this:

from Jon
Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

I can't speak to the ANA, but since Steve (Surferbeetle) assigned me the task of looking at the ANP and the rest of the Astan Justice System, I did - here are the official assessments for the ANP, prosecutors, judges, at this post, The dumb lawyer again. Four fairly short reports, which suggest you would probably be better off without ANP in your sector (yeah, there probably are exceptions).

One of the provinces studied (all then considered "secure") was Kunduz. For the latest in ANP developments in Kunduz, see this post, Taliban in Kunduz. Not a pretty picture. Your Marines would probably make better cops, providing they have interpreters who speak the local dialect (an important point made by Adam Holloway, a good read cited by Steve).

Beyond that, I've learned that both Huey Long and J. Edgar Hoover bequeathed to Slap their books of TTPs in digging up dirt on notables; and that Steve has duly placed in coded form the concept of the Continuing Area Study Assessment:

from SB
4. Regularly reconciling my to-do list, timeline, and cost estimates with that of my internal and external customers.

Cheers

Mike

[Entropy]

There is a bit more at the VOA link: http://tinyurl.com/yfnw5xg

Was it hubris or vengeance that drove Bush's response? Could our nation have afforded then to open dialog to Omar, or had the issue become overcome by events? What if the august body of this Council had existed back then?

A choice was made back then, but I believe that this snippet documents an opportunity we need to go back to, if we are to achieve a decent interval in Afghanistan.

To add to what's already been said, much of the diplomatic summaries have been declassified and are available on the GWU archive.

This one, prepared in July 2001, provides a good short summary of all the diplomatic contacts.

I'm looking for ideas here, so that my key leader engagement script doesn't come off as the routine party line, "Well you know, the government is working to improve things, and the army is a key part of that. You need to be patient with them."

Official graft and corruption had a history behind it in Iraq, but unless I am reading things wrong, the Pashtun are either 1) just plain fed up with it in their areas, or 2) it has grown in a scale so great that it cannot be overlooked. Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

This poll from earlier this year should provide some good source material for you to work through this problem. PM will be sent shortly with some additional info.