Winning the War in Afghanistan

[jcustis]

Based on your question from your last deployment, you will count sheep - didn't know that Bates had a course in animal husbandry.

Not certain on the sheep counting this time...maybe predominantly goats .

The focus of my team will be along the lines of operation that are less concerned directly with security, and yes, we will predominantly be Marines at the fore Imagine if you will the ringleader who has to supervise the synergy between folks like PRT reps, information operations and pysop, security forces development, USAID, intelligence types, and others, as that synergy applies to my particular patch of dirt.

During my last deploy, the sheep bit was a function of our recce efforts to determine the health of the livestock husbandry efforts south the Euphrates River Valley. We were looking at facilitating an Iraqi veterinarian to come in and provide care. Alas, we picked everything up and moved to just west of Tal Afar and there were few flocks left anyway due to the drought!

Thanks for the links, as well as yours Entropy.

[Surferbeetle]

I can't speak to the ANA, but since Steve (Surferbeetle) assigned me the task of looking at the ANP and the rest of the Astan Justice System, I did - here are the official assessments for the ANP, prosecutors, judges, at this post, The dumb lawyer again. Four fairly short reports, which suggest you would probably be better off without ANP in your sector (yeah, there probably are exceptions).

One of the provinces studied (all then considered "secure") was Kunduz. For the latest in ANP developments in Kunduz, see this post, Taliban in Kunduz. Not a pretty picture. Your Marines would probably make better cops, providing they have interpreters who speak the local dialect (an important point made by Adam Holloway, a good read cited by Steve).

Beyond that, I've learned that both Huey Long and J. Edgar Hoover bequeathed to Slap their books of TTPs in digging up dirt on notables; and that Steve has duly placed in coded form the concept of the Continuing Area Study Assessment:

Mike,

Meant to thank you for that legal study regarding the gridsquare a while back ....

...and I note that you have been paying attention as well, Civil Affairs is a fun job, and we are always looking for sharp lawyers/judges if we ever get around to direct commissioning highly experienced talent like we did in WWII please keep us in mind...we can always use help with the rule of law portion of the assessment (JAG usually hoovers you guys right up)

Best,

Steve

[jmm99]

"direct commissioning" sounds like a good idea - three conditions:

1. Strip away 35 years from age.

2. Waive a couple of physical requirements (which would be immaterial to legal work).

3. Airline ticket to destination.

I wouldn't be too much of a pig - GS 15 equivalent would seem adequate (O-6 grade equivalency according to the General Schedule).

An interesting dream.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Beyond that, I've learned that both Huey Long and J. Edgar Hoover bequeathed to Slap their books of TTPs in digging up dirt on notables

Cheers

Mike

All rumors they cain't prove a thing

[Steve the Planner]

Jmm's comments is so easy to minimize in the Giterdun spirit.

"Most particularly, what do you do with an incompetent (corrupt, etc.) HN government ?"

Where does the "What we do" fit in vs. the "What they do and don't do.

I hate to play tough love in this thing, but once we enter a landscape we tend do either dominate it or displace others.

The Lansing Michigan problem is not whether we could get elected---we show up with big guns. It is whether we could wisely administer after dominating.

In Iraq, I knew two ag guy in the same PRT. One was the master of getting DoS grants to send Iraqis to Jordan to learn how to farm. Same guys over and over again, all part of the same click of Tikrit "farmers." Of course, he spent weeks each year escorting them to the courses. A genuine expert on Jordan's nightlife and attractions.

The other was the actual dry land farming expert who spent his time out in the field, mostly in and around Tuz Khormatu. He would spend a dime of US money, and believed in kicking and prodding the actual large farm owners into gear, and helping where he could to help the locals to arrange irrigation system repairs, etc..., through their local to provincial gov structure. He also tried to serve as an effective sounding board for their decisions, and, when it fit in, an advisor on how to do things better. (He was always ordering ag books, old and new, from Amazon (on his own nickel)).

The one was very well thought of by DoS, continued for an extra tour, and by now, is probably already in Afghanistan arranging junkets to Thailand to teach locals how to raise hot peppers. The other quit in disgust, and probably would never have been extended anyway. He is very happy back home in AZ.

(In fairness, some of that provincial effort for Tuz was only accomplished through our D-9's but the point was they used their government to get it done (Always nice to have a DivEng and construction battalions at your back!).

The basic give them fish problem.

Custis. I assume you are like my dry land farmer friend, but, unlike him, the US is about to say: Do it now, and Do it fast!

The temptation to do it fast and wrong is ever present, but, I believe will be more so in 2010 Afghanistan.

Good luck, and stay safe. Might see you there if I can find a billet that I believe will allow me to do some good (not just cash in hours).

Steve

[jcustis]

the US is about to say: Do it now, and Do it fast!

The temptation to do it fast and wrong is ever present, but, I believe will be more so in 2010 Afghanistan.

Aye...I'm not looking forward to the conditions and measures of effectiveness attached to the surge. I am further concerned that an exit strategy might be appended to the magic number of troops that is totally irrelevant to our task and purpose but makes the task that much more difficult.

[jmm99]

Indeed we do - go again.

Let me make it very clear that I am well aware of how to do it by domination using the biggest bore cannon. The basic technique is to establish a very authoritarian dictatorship, have a damn solid state security service and eliminate all dissent. Those governments are the least likely to have insurgencies - many valid studies on that. In fact, they fare even a little bit better than established democracies.

Insurgencies are most likely to occur in the middle ground of authoritarian governments who are incompetent in rigorous state security (usually because they have misallocated resources), and struggling democracies who are also incompetent in rigorous state security (which contradicts the kind of democracy we see in established democracies), and are also incompetent in providing the governance we see in established democracies.

My question was directed not to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "big bore domination" approach, but to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "best practices COIN" approach, where the narrative is supposed to be a key element. My question boils down to whether the "best practices COIN" methodology has any real application where the narrative is factually lousy (the HN government is simply bad news).

Your Iraq example of the Ag "expert" and Ag expert (which you have posted before) is a good one, but it does not bear on my question. It does bear on the competency of one facet of a counter-insurgency effort. The Ag "expert" made it look good to his superiors (and got promoted) by generating chaff. He also exemplifies the "top down" approach. The Ag expert got out in the field and down to the people (employed a "bubble up" approach), was basically ignored by his superiors and retired. My vote is cast for the Ag expert in the field; and his efforts had nothing to do with "big bore domination".

So, back to where I started:

If the HN government does not provide "good governance", what aspects of "best practices COIN" are useable and what are not ?

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

My question was directed not to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "big bore domination" approach, but to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "best practices COIN" approach, where the narrative is supposed to be a key element. My question boils down to whether the "best practices COIN" methodology has any real application where the narrative is factually lousy (the HN government is simply bad news).

Bingo!!! Therein lies a hurdle I find myself thinking about daily.

[Steve the Planner]

jmm:

That same issue of good governance vs. big bore seems to be bubbling to the surface again in Jordan.

Does the King, once again, dismiss the troublesome legislature, and act by fiat, or push for new elections---sure to recreate a similar troublesome legislature.

The reports seems to wander between complaints about the entrenched, ineffective and corrupt government vs. more "public participation" with subtantial potential for underlying volatility.

Who's right, who's wrong, who knows?

Interested in seeing the amswers to your question.

[jmm99]

in another thread at this post; as Jon has here as to the general question.

So, here is the general question and the specific sub-questions which are on the floor:

as quoted by Jon

My question boils down to whether the "best practices COIN" methodology has any real application where the narrative is factually lousy (the HN government is simply bad news).

and

as summed by STP

1. What if the HN government is a bunch of knockleheads themselves ?

2. Is a Strategy of Tactics ("best practices COIN") capable of defeating the insurgency under that condition ?

3. If so, what is the recipe ?

As to the recipe (another way of expressing it in my post above)

If the HN government does not provide "good governance", what aspects of "best practices COIN" are useable and what are not ?

Discuss - for the benefit of Jon and others who are or will be in the line of fire.

Regards

Mike

[Eden]

All great questions, JMM. I wish I had the answers.

A couple of random thoughts, though. It seems to me that the most difficult form of counterinsurgency is that of third-party COIN, where a foreign power provides the bulk of the resources (military and economic) to fight an insurgency on behalf of an embattled host nation government without direct control of that government. I think this is a relatively recent phenomenon - at least, I can't think of many examples prior to the Cold War. Perhaps some of the historians could help me out.

Before then, third-party counterinsurgents inevitably took control of the host nation, de facto or de jure. It was a simpler time, and it seemed ridiculous to expend resources in far away places without any direct benefits accruing. Nowadays, in the West at least, it seems immoral to expend blood and treasure in the pursuit of simple self-interest - it requires a higher moral purpose, such as bringing democracy, freedom, protection of the weak, etc.

This creates the first conundrum of third-party COIN: forcing the HN government to behave in a way it is not disposed to do, without appearing to reduce it to puppet status.

Now, HN governments often behave in ways we don't like because they understand things we do not: unspoken local rules of conduct, the efficacy of bribery to get things done, the power of brutality to effect change in behavior, etc.

This leads to the second conundrum: forcing the HN to behave in ways acceptable to us without fatally weakening it.

I'm not saying it is impossible. We may have pulled it off in Iraq; time will tell. I'm not sure employing COIN 'best practices' is a useful line to pursue in seeking the answers, because I don't believe there are a set of universally applicable 'best practices'. Each insurgency is unique. However, even assuming that each insurgency is, in fact, a soluble problem, it is safe to say that remolding the military and the political philosophy of the host nation is going to be a long-term effort. If I could turn the clock back to 2002 in Afghanistan, for instance, I would have created an Afghan Army and police force with American officers and NCOs. By now we would have grown a corps of indigenous senior sergeants and field grades capable of leading battalions. By 2022, we might be able to turn the whole mission over to home-grown generals. I would definitely have grown the government from the bottom up, rather than the top down - again, by 2022 you might have a cadre of politicians ready to lead at the national level.

Which leads me to the third conundrum: How do you get the third-party nation to eschew the 'quick fix-low cost' approach and commit to the long-term program required for third-party COIN?

[jmm99]

These:

from Eden
This creates the first conundrum of third-party COIN: forcing the HN government to behave in a way it is not disposed to do, without appearing to reduce it to puppet status.

Now, HN governments often behave in ways we don't like because they understand things we do not: unspoken local rules of conduct, the efficacy of bribery to get things done, the power of brutality to effect change in behavior, etc.

This leads to the second conundrum: forcing the HN to behave in ways acceptable to us without fatally weakening it.

are valid points, particularly with respect to the Narrative that will gain the support of the Assisting Nation's population for the AN's intervention. To folks in the US, helping a fledgling democracy sells better than supporting a despotic dictatorship.

My questions leave that AN Narrative on the shelf (for the moment) and focus on the HN Narrative (truthfully told[*]) which the HN population will find acceptable. The importance of the HN Narrative may well depend on which facet of the political effort is one's focus.

For example, I've focused on civil affairs stuff that I have some feel for: the local governance system (village councils and local liaisons with higher government) and the criminal and civil justice system. I'd include in those systems, law enforcement and state security services reaching the local level; as well as tax collecting, and population and property census, services.

With respect to those systems, my conclusion is that the HN Narrative, not only in words but in practice, must be acceptable to the HN population and is absolutely essential to any kind of "success" in those areas; except in the case of a harsh authoritarian regime [**]. If that HN Narrative does not exist (the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads), the systems in my limited area will not develop in 18 years, much less 18 months.

Civil affairs work in other areas might tolerate a more flexible Narrative. Perhaps, agricultural and other local development projects (if competently executed) fit that category. Those here who have dealt with those projects should have the lead in pontificating on the importance and flexibility of the HN Narrative to that kind of project. I'd suspect that the educational system would be a very complex area with respect to the HN Narrative and its narrators, since schools and school teachers are key insurgent targets.

And, Eden, your third point:

from Eden
Which leads me to the third conundrum: How do you get the third-party nation to eschew the 'quick fix-low cost' approach and commit to the long-term program required for third-party COIN?

is situational dependent.

Once upon a time, I was in conference with a judge when another lawyer asked for a minute to tell the judge a case (a real stinker) had to be tried, saying: "Judge, some cases shouldn't be settled and should be tried." The judge answered: "Some cases shouldn't be brought."

And so it goes with third-party COIN.

Regards to all

Mike

------------------
[*] If "truthful" seems subject to debate, one might add "accurate". The idea in any event is that the HN Narrative (information, propaganda, psychological operations) must be White (truthful, accurate) from White (overt from HN outlets) by White (overtly accepted, issued and executed by the HN government). That is following John Fishel, to whose expertise there I yield. The HN Narrative should not be a disinformation operation (Black or shades of Grey); nor, for that matter, should the AN Narrative (addressed to its population); authoritarian regimes excepted.

[**] A harsh authoritarian regime may allocate resources (above the Subsistence Level tolerated by its population) to enhanced state security services and propaganda (White, Grey or Black). The Haiti of Papa and Baby Doc, and present North Korea, are extreme examples.

[jcustis]

Well, hurrying up and getting it done was clearly evident tonight in the President's speech. If I were the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I'd dispense with all previous planning factors, source the manpower for a single team, and put that team on a 18 month rotation and call it a day.

[slapout9]

Something else is going on in the backround, we are not going to do the traditional clear,hold and build. Just my opinion but he (POTUS) seemed like he didn't believe his on speech.

[jcustis]

I think he fully believes it. I felt that he aimed well when trying to tell the Karzai govt. that it is now living on borrowed time.

[jmm99]

from here, dealing with the civilian side of the ledger (the political effort and narratives):

Second, we will work with our partners, the UN, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.

This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Karzai’s inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. We will support Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas – such as agriculture – that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They have been confronted with occupation – by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand – America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect – to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.

Two points. One is that we should see soon whether the anti-corruption and anti-incompetence narratives are put into practice. I wonder (a serious question) whether there is a competent team to prosecute, and a competent court to try, a governmental corruption case ? I will await the mass indictments and firings with bated breath.

I'd also expect that "immediate effect" civil affairs programs are linked to an 18-month schedule. Interesting that the President mentioned only one specific program - agriculture. Jon, indeed, you may soon be counting goats.

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout wrote:

"Something else is going on in the backround, we are not going to do the traditional clear,hold and build. Just my opinion but he (POTUS) seemed like he didn't believe his on speech."

Get out your map, and look at the President's last major foreign visits/visitors.

It ain't that complicated, but it ain't in Afghanistan.

They don't call a pawn a pawn for no reason. Afghanistan itself is the sideshow to the Big Game about border turf and regional spheres of influence.

I don't know what cards are going to turn out of the deck in which order or hand, but it is pretty obvious which cards are in the deck. India, China, Russia to play against Pakistan 1 (military) and Pakistan 2 (civilian) and Pakistan 3 (Quetta), to play, in turn, against AQ, with Afghanistan as the pawn. The US wants to be the dealer, as long as its public will let them play.

Nobody has scheduled the Loya Jirga (with Taliban) yet, but ... the Tents are on the field.

Maybe even a regional international conference (I don't think they took the plastic off that deck yet)?

The deck is cracked open. We'll just have to wait to see the game play out.

[jmm99]

The President framed AQ as the Main Adversary; that the 2001 AUMF continues in effect; and that he wants them gone. The Taliban were not so much declared an enemy as a power to the armed conflict that has to be roughed up for 18 months to lessen its rigidity to sitting at a negotiating table.

Nothing of great comfort to the Karzai government (partner, not a patron); nor to "nation builders" (that was excluded) - and the "civilian surge" seems to aimed at a minimalist, shorter-term effort.

Looks most like a "Peace Enforcement" military effort, with some future commitment expected to take AQ down (which would require some base areas, if that take down doesn't occur in the 18 months). If that could be accomplished, I'd find that a very acceptable result.

Actions will speak much louder than words.

Regards

Mike

[Presley Cannady]

I think he fully believes it. I felt that he aimed well when trying to tell the Karzai govt. that it is now living on borrowed time.

In a country where "official in exile" might as well be boilerplate on a resume, just what leverage does Washington have on Karzai?

[Steve the Planner]

Presley:

That, I believe, is one of those quizzical problems that logically arise from something discussed on another thread. COIN may be fine for Americans to do in America, or Afghans to do in Afghanistan, but what happens when you are trying, as a foreign force, to oppose an internal opposition to a fundamentally flawed central government?

The recent Guardian article that Amb. Holbrooke was unsuccessfully shopping a proposal for NATO to appoint a caretaker czar for Afghanistan, as a bypass to Karzai and Eide, sounds like a signal for current bad actors to grab what they can before they become "Minister-In-Exile."

I'm fairly comfortable with the regional game they are going to play---maybe even demanding Bin Laden's head on a plate as a condition for not giving Afghanistan to India (the partner that builds)---but, I assume the Afghan piece will be aplus/minus strategy depending on what can be accomplished before the Big Game plays elsewhere.

Steve