Winning the War in Afghanistan

[jmm99]

Taking a look at the map in the BBC piece linked by Wilf here, I noticed Kurram Province (Agency) sticking out like a sore thumb; and that it was not mentioned by MG Abbas:

In the capital, Islamabad, on Thursday, Maj Gen Abbas, head of public relations for the Pakistan army, told the BBC: "We are not going to conduct any major new operations against the militants over the next 12 months.

"The Pakistan army is overstretched and it is not in a position to open any new fronts. Obviously, we will continue our present operations in Waziristan and Swat."

What's interesting about Kurram is that the Pakis were conducting operations in Kurram last month, Pakistani troops kill 15 militants in Kurram Agency.

And, of course, Kurram made the news in Feb 2009 (FP one of many), Tuesday Map: Osama bin Laden's current location.

For all the tea leaf readers

Mike

[reed11b]

We are in the trap of if we just work harder we can make this go away. Perhaps. Far better to work smarter.


Now we have extended this Afghan Pyramid scheme all the way up to Kabul. Every district Governor, Police Chief, etc is appointed by a patron in Kabul, and that patron must receive his payments for that appointment. No longer does the money rise to the District level and sprinkle about. It now rises to the national level and disappears. This is not better.

We have helped to create an official government in our image, but have dropped it into Afghanistan. The Afghan people don't need an "official" government; they need a "Legitimate" government. Pause and ponder that thought. It is a critical one. The Afghan people, all people, need a "legitimate" government. That is one that they see as being of, by and for them. One that has a source they recognize. What others think is moot beyond words.


We can "win" here. We can help end this insurgency too. But more military or civilian effort working harder is not the smart way to get there. The smart way is to focus first on creating more legitimacy of government on Afghan terms, not Western terms; and then build from there. Without that foundation of legitimacy, history does not offer good odds for quick success.

Hey look at that, we agree on something. We did the same thing in Iraq when we took actual grass roots efforts at creating democracy by the Iraqi's and invaladated them and appointed intertrim leaders. Societies were strong central goverments are culturaly acceptable (South America for example) this tactic may work, but in the middle east we have to value the nature of the society we are working with. In Social Work we call it "meeting the client were they are at".

Will they cure the disease of poor governance that gives rise to insurgency? Of that I am less optimistic.

This I am far less sure about. Still not sold that all (or even most) insurgency is directly connected to "poor" goverance.

Reed

[omarali50]

I think the insurgency and governance are separate issues, related in some ways, but separate.
The insurgency is the problem ISAF can possibly help to solve. Governance will improve with time once its clear that come hell or high water, the insurgency is not gonna win, so everyone has to get off the fence and make deals.... For the insurgency to win, you need a base, a central organization, sustained source of funds (you need much less for an insurgency to splutter along, but that is not the issue), all three securely in place, you have an aura of inevitability. All three are currently headquartered in Pakistan; if they move to Afghanistan while ISAF is still there, their job is much harder. So long as they are secure in Pakistan, its a mathematical certainty that they will win (at least in the Pakhtun hearltand) because there is just no way a foreign force is going to stay forever, so everyone has to hedge their bets accordingly. If they are forced out of Pakistan, then their chances are dramatically reduced, especially if the current Afghan regime continues to get outside support on a massive scale at the same time.
Once the insurgency has lost its sheen of inevitability, its much easier to convince people to rearrange governance a little better. Since western "experts" are almost guaranteed to make a bad situation worse, their best bet is to do LESS in detail and let Afghans sort things out, make deals, do whatever it takes. But the foreign devils still have to pay for it because no one else has the money...
Make sense? no? yes?

[davidbfpo]

If this is actually true, then it would seem to be a very significant problem.

Now I've found the US correspondent for The Daily Telegraph has filed this: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...this-year.html

A longer BBC piece: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8472986.stm and opens with this:

With its announcement that it will launch no new offensives against the Taliban in 2010, Pakistan's army appears to have opened a new innings in its favourite game with the West

Perhaps I should amend my old adjective of 'Stop, start' to 'Stop, wrangle, start'? Apologies I do not follow cricket as the use of a cricket term would be better.

[Bob's World]

I think the insurgency and governance are separate issues, related in some ways, but separate.
The insurgency is the problem ISAF can possibly help to solve. Governance will improve with time once its clear that come hell or high water, the insurgency is not gonna win, so everyone has to get off the fence and make deals.... For the insurgency to win, you need a base, a central organization, sustained source of funds (you need much less for an insurgency to splutter along, but that is not the issue), all three securely in place, you have an aura of inevitability. All three are currently headquartered in Pakistan; if they move to Afghanistan while ISAF is still there, their job is much harder. So long as they are secure in Pakistan, its a mathematical certainty that they will win (at least in the Pakhtun hearltand) because there is just no way a foreign force is going to stay forever, so everyone has to hedge their bets accordingly. If they are forced out of Pakistan, then their chances are dramatically reduced, especially if the current Afghan regime continues to get outside support on a massive scale at the same time.
Once the insurgency has lost its sheen of inevitability, its much easier to convince people to rearrange governance a little better. Since western "experts" are almost guaranteed to make a bad situation worse, their best bet is to do LESS in detail and let Afghans sort things out, make deals, do whatever it takes. But the foreign devils still have to pay for it because no one else has the money...
Make sense? no? yes?

We call it "Insurgency and counterinsurgency" because we look at it from the perspective of the government.

Looked at from the perspective of the insurgent you could just as easily call it "Governance and countergovernance."

But that isn't very sexy, and the boys at Leavenworth would start to question why they were writing a military manual for such an operation, and why the State Department or Justice wasn't the lead. Wouldn't want that to happen. There is violence involved, so Defense must be the lead, right?

Well, at least one reasonable mind differs with the majority opinion on that point.


I think the biggest mistake we make is that we try too hard to separate the two; to focus on defeating the insurgent for daring to counter the governance; instead of assessing more pragmatically the true nature and causation for the iinsurgency that you are dealing with. To make the main effort addressing the shortfalls of governance, and the supporting effort aimed at dealing with the insurgent in a manner that never forgets that insurgents are also citizens and are related and connected to law abiding citizens throughout the land. Calling them "insurgents" makes it easy to forget that essential fact.

[omarali50]

We may differ only in details or not at all. Maybe its just semantics. My point was not that governance does not matter, but that governance is very hard to improve when the other side has military momentum and seems to be the guaranteed eventual "last man standing" and its historically something the US embassy doesnt do very well...i.e. manipulate and manage local politics.

Its not that governance is not needed. Its that governance is not the American imperialist's best suite. So, trying to be pragmatic, we try to do as little damage as possible in the governance area by trying to do fewer silly things.... and still help improve governance.
Meanwhile, killing people is actually something the military does pretty well and if Pakistan can be prevailed upon to move these people into Afghanistan, then the killing part can become easier. When people are getting killed, THEY will come up with better answers to the question of how deals are to be made....but, keep in mind that I am a total armchair amateur and am floating balloons partly to clarify my own thoughts and hear better thoughts from other people.

[Rex Brynen]

The latest Afghanistan reports from CSIS:

If Petraeus and Eikenberry Can WinImplementing the Strategy in Afghanistan
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Jul 14, 2010


Afghanistan: Campaign Trends
Jul 14, 2010

The latter has the usual interesting data on attacks (depressing), governance (depressing), SOF activities, etc, etc.

[davidbfpo]

An offside viewpoint:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...an-afghanistan

Overoptimistic calculations by western powers estimate that we are losing the war in Afghanistan. Far from it, we are losing the whole of Asia and, what is even worse, the credibility of the Alliance and the values it defends.

(Later)
Most of Asia is sitting on the stands of the Afghan stadium watching this absurd game and sounding their vuvuzelas. NATO and the US are defeating themselves at a very low cost for competing powers.

[Rex Brynen]

An offside viewpoint:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...an-afghanistan

Beware anyone who describes "Asia" as if it were a single, like-minded entity...

[Fuchs]

This is maybe a stupid question:

Why did the West never apply a "Hydra" strategy in PsyOps and policy?
I mean, we could have pledged publically (and told all Afghans about it) that we would send ten new soldiers for every KIA and two new ones for every WIA.
Add in a thorough information on the size of Western military establishments and the claim that we've proved superiority over Russians historically.
After every KIA and WIA, let new troops arrive - as pledged - and spread the word, including some increased activity.

This might have discouraged them to some degree.

[Fuchs]

*bump*

Still interested in an answer.

[jmm99]

doing pretty much this:

from Fuchs
... we would send ten new soldiers for every KIA and two new ones for every WIA.

in Vietnam.

It didn't discourage them, but it did a pretty good job on us.

So currently, our (US) deployment to our KIA ratio is about 100:1 - well ahead of your curve.

What exactly is your point - a whack the mosquito game scenario ?

Regards

Mike

[Tukhachevskii]

This is maybe a stupid question:

Why did the West never apply a "Hydra" strategy in PsyOps and policy?
I mean, we could have pledged publically (and told all Afghans about it) that we would send ten new soldiers for every KIA and two new ones for every WIA.
Add in a thorough information on the size of Western military establishments and the claim that we've proved superiority over Russians historically.
After every KIA and WIA, let new troops arrive - as pledged - and spread the word, including some increased activity.

This might have discouraged them to some degree.

Could you ensure that the media was on side (for a change) and prevent them from exploiting this information, in the WORST posible way, to our ownpeople? No. I don't think you could. So on the one hand our own publics, who tolerate the campaign (not war) in Afghanistan, precisely because we (the UK that is, not sure about the US) have built up some immunity to the campaign and, though not totally for the campaign, aren't willing to topple governments over it either. When we start to treat it like a proper campaign as part of a proper war (yes, we ARE at war!) support may wane. Especially if they think that society is being mobilised for war. However, in a different vein, conducting the kind of IO tactics you are suggesting would in real terms also tie our own hands behind our backs; if the threat/bluff fails then we have to honour the pledge and escalate. Alternatively, if they call our bluff and we fail to back up the threat we hand a propaganda (and stratgeic) victory to our enemies which would dwarf anything that came before it ( i.e., the "defeat" of the USSR). Then the unmentionables really do hit the fan. Just my thoughts.

[Fuchs]

Well, considering that we deployed more than the rule would have required - there could not have been any "tie our own hands" effect.


Doing something by accident is also not the same as creating predictability.
How could any Afghan claim to fight against foreigners if every "success" only leads to more foreigners in the country?

I aimed at creating a dilemma that discourages a specific kind of violence.

It cannot work if nobody knew about the dilemma, of course.

[JMA]

This is maybe a stupid question:

Why did the West never apply a "Hydra" strategy in PsyOps and policy?
I mean, we could have pledged publically (and told all Afghans about it) that we would send ten new soldiers for every KIA and two new ones for every WIA.
Add in a thorough information on the size of Western military establishments and the claim that we've proved superiority over Russians historically.
After every KIA and WIA, let new troops arrive - as pledged - and spread the word, including some increased activity.

This might have discouraged them to some degree.

...because even the Afghans would have been able to call the est's bluff.

It would have been better to promise that for ever ISAF KIA there would be 100 Taliban KIA... and then prove that it was not an idle threat.

The Taliban are fighting the war like in the wild country they live in while the West is trying to fight it with the same ROE they would have if fighting in the UK or the US.

No possibility of a military victory. It all now depends upon a face saving disengagement.

[JMA]

So currently, our (US) deployment to our KIA ratio is about 100:1 - well ahead of your curve.

Regards

Mike

Mike, is this 100:1 kill ratio verifiable?

[JMA]

Well, considering that we deployed more than the rule would have required - there could not have been any "tie our own hands" effect.

Doing something by accident is also not the same as creating predictability.
How could any Afghan claim to fight against foreigners if every "success" only leads to more foreigners in the country?

I aimed at creating a dilemma that discourages a specific kind of violence.

It cannot work if nobody knew about the dilemma, of course.

I think you have to realise that there is no chance of westerners winning the hearts and minds of Afghans. Once you have come to that obvious conclusion then you deal with the population in a manner that in order to get rid of you they have to submit.

They have no respect for ISAF, a little fear perhaps but no respect. How could they possibly have respect for a force that allows them to continue to cultivate poppies which end up as heroin on the streets of the west?

How can tribal warriors, way behind on the development curve, have respect for fighters (ISAF) who through their ROE give the appearance of soft and weak soldiers?

How can ISAF expect respect when they are seen to be propping up an illegitimate, corrupt and non representative government?

Ask the Afghan villagers to give you an example of what would indicate that ISAF meant business, ask them to tell you what the indications would be if ISAF were in fact "winning" the war.

[tequila]

It would have been better to promise that for ever ISAF KIA there would be 100 Taliban KIA... and then prove that it was not an idle threat.

The Taliban are fighting the war like in the wild country they live in while the West is trying to fight it with the same ROE they would have if fighting in the UK or the US.

The problem is finding the 100 Taliban to kill for every Western soldier killed.

Of course we could resort to the Soviet method of assuming non-aligned Afghans = Taliban. Working under that assumption, the Soviets came very close to the 100:1 kill rate. If you throw in the crippled and the expelled, they far surpassed it - some estimate that between 1/3rd and 1/4th of the civilian population became refugees.

The problem became that the Afghan will to fight remained unbroken. A safe area consisting of the entire nation of Pakistan proved impossible to resolve.

[Fuchs]

JMA; three failures on your part:

1) How could it have been a bluff? We deployed more additional troops since 2005 than the Hydra strategy would have required (assuming the same KIA/WIA as without the strategy).

2) jmm99 did not claim a 100:1 kill ratio. Read again.

3) Your last post is unrelated and entirely unable to argue against the Hydra strategy.



@jmm99: It's more like 60:1 actually, and that ignores the WIA.

[jmm99]

and this:

from Fuchs
We deployed more additional troops since 2005 than the Hydra strategy would have required (assuming the same KIA/WIA as without the strategy).

was my point.

I did not say "kill ratio". I cited 100:1 as our (US) deployment to our (US) KIAs (ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA). If it works out closer to 60:1, so be it. As time passes, that ratio will get smaller as our deployment reaches its upper level ceiling.

That ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA was in that same ballpark for Vietnam - which was the only point I wished to make.

Regards

Mike