Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Entropy]

Fuchs,

Your entire scenario rests on the assumption that increasing troop levels in response to our casualties (combined with an IO campaign) would discourage the Taliban or Afghans from fighting. That's a bad assumption.

It further rests on the assumption that the people in the US and other coalition countries would accept such a "strategy" for the commitment of forces. That is at least a questionable assumption if not downright politically impossible.

Finally, had your calculus been instituted at the beginning, it would have added about 33k troops since 2001. We now have about three times that number current in Afghanistan and the Taliban don't seem very discouraged.

[Fuchs]

Hmm, to me it seems pointless to kill one if that spawns ten more.
I couldn't claim to fight against the foreign presence if every action of mine actually increases their numbers.
Pissed off elders would become even more pissed off if every action against foreigners merely increases their numbers and activity.
And by the way; the strategy would not need to completely discourage violence. It would already be a success if it reduces violence.


The domestic policies part shouldn't be much of a problem. The parliaments could simply authorise xy,000 troops and the head of state only deploys z,000 at first. Increasing the contingent maximums has been possible even in Germany where most people resent the ISAF participation. The involved Western governments didn't really bother much about their constituents opinions in the last years.
So where exactly is the domestic political problem with the strategy?


Again - we established no systematically discouraging, in advance known element to discourage them.
What we did was like a tax hike of 1,000 bucks months after you caused a car crash. This does of course not discourage reckless driving, especially not if the connection is not made visible.

Now imagine a fine of 5,000 bucks for every car crash you cause - without chance to appeal, and effective within days.

[JMA]

and this:



was my point.

I did not say "kill ratio". I cited 100:1 as our (US) deployment to our (US) KIAs (ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA). If it works out closer to 60:1, so be it. As time passes, that ratio will get smaller as our deployment reaches its upper level ceiling.

That ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA was in that same ballpark for Vietnam - which was the only point I wished to make.

Regards

Mike

I'm trying to get my head around these figures.

The Brits claim a kill ration of more than 100:1, the yanks the same but Fuchs says it more like 60:1. Lets see.

Brit casualties KIA (as at 23 June) 269. That would mean they killed 26,900 Taliban.

The US casualties KIA (as at 2 July) 841. That would amount to 50,460 Taliban KIA.

A total of 75,000 plus Taliban KIA? Hmmmm...

[JMA]

I'm trying to get my head around these figures.

The Brits claim a kill ratio of more than 100:1, the US the same but Fuchs says its more like 60:1. Lets see.

Brit casualties KIA (as at 23 June) 269. That would mean they killed 26,900 Taliban.

The US casualties KIA (as at 2 July) 841. That would amount to 50,460 Taliban KIA.

(figures from Wikipedia)

A total of 75,000 plus Taliban KIA? Hmmmm...

[JMA]

JMA; three failures on your part:

1) How could it have been a bluff? We deployed more additional troops since 2005 than the Hydra strategy would have required (assuming the same KIA/WIA as without the strategy).

2) jmm99 did not claim a 100:1 kill ratio. Read again.

3) Your last post is unrelated and entirely unable to argue against the Hydra strategy.

@jmm99: It's more like 60:1 actually, and that ignores the WIA.

Fuchs I like your "hydra" idea but I'm afraid it would not be possible as the West does not have the stomach for such a prolonged game of brinkmanship.

Also there is no point in putting more troops into a conflict where even though you have air and artillery support available the restrictions on it use render it ineffective in the broadest sense. And that the ROE demand that ISAF forces have to deal with the enemy as if they were arrested in New York City for a traffic violation. You find a guy with GSR on his hands an hour after a contact and you have to process him through the system where by paying a bribe he can be out by morning. Can't understand this obsession with taking prisoners.

Then what of the Keystone Cops outfit called the Afghan National Army? All 134,000 of them. What exactly have they guys achieved?

I'm not talking about the soldiers here when I say the politicians and the generals do not have the stomach for a war. Nothing will be achieved in the end and the Afghans will claim to have seen off another invasion of their homeland.

A variation on your "hydra" concept would be the use of "surges" in areas where ISAF (and ANA) KIA have occurred.

[JMA]

The problem is finding the 100 Taliban to kill for every Western soldier killed.

Agreed. With the current ROE the chance of that happening is zero.

But they are out there and can be found if the military is tasked to go after them rather than "hold ground" through a string of Beau Geste type forts.

[Fuchs]

I'm trying to get my head around these figures.

The Brits claim a kill ratio of more than 100:1, the US the same but Fuchs says its more like 60:1. Lets see.

Brit casualties KIA (as at 23 June) 269. That would mean they killed 26,900 Taliban.

The US casualties KIA (as at 2 July) 841. That would amount to 50,460 Taliban KIA.

(figures from Wikipedia)

A total of 75,000 plus Taliban KIA? Hmmmm...

JMA, you need to read & understand accurately.

I did not write about a 60 kills : 1 kill ratio.
I did write about a 60 soldiers in theatre : 1 KIA among them.

[JMA]

JMA, you need to read & understand accurately.

I did not write about a 60 kills : 1 kill ratio.
I did write about a 60 soldiers in theatre : 1 KIA among them.

Thank you for correcting me on that.

Now how is that stat meaningful? How is it calculated? Averaged over the years? For the month of July 2010 only? What?

[Fuchs]

It's relevant as the Hydra strategy proposed 10 additional troops per KIA and 2 per WIA.
The historical factor 60 clearly shows that the strategy alone would not have required us to deploy more than we did, nor would it have overextended us to date. This falsifies about half the contra arguments which I heard over the last months.

Btw, the Hydra strategy would not exclude the possibility of additional deployments, especially not in regions without substantial previous presence of Western forces.

[Entropy]

Fuchs,

Again, this "hydra" strategy rests on a bevy of false assumptions.

And, let's consider 60 new troops for each KIA instead of 10 - that would get us up to 116k troops which is in the ballpark for what we have now. What happens to your strategy when our capacity to supply troops is exceeded or when we deploy the maximum number of troops we possibly can and the Taliban still aren't discouraged from fighting us?

I'm sorry, but this whole idea is ridiculous.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs,

Again, this "hydra" strategy rests on a bevy of false assumptions.

And, let's consider 60 new troops for each KIA instead of 10 - that would get us up to 116k troops which is in the ballpark for what we have now. What happens to your strategy when our capacity to supply troops is exceeded or when we deploy the maximum number of troops we possibly can and the Taliban still aren't discouraged from fighting us?

I'm sorry, but this whole idea is ridiculous.

In worst case, it happens the same as when we reach the maximum deployment strength without the strategy. Well, except that without the strategy, you get no benefits from it.

You made the classic conservative's mistake, as it's been observed millions of times with innovations and reforms:
An alternative does not need to be "perfect" - it only needs to be "superior" in comparison with the status quo in order to be preferable.

Two scenarios both having the same limitation does not in the least argue against the superiority of the alternative scenario.

In fact, I can point at advantages from the hydra strategy; the chance that decisionmakers are impressed by the dilemma and partially or completely discouraged.
You need to identify more important disadvantages (relative, not absolute!) to disqualify the strategy.

[JMA]

It's relevant as the Hydra strategy proposed 10 additional troops per KIA and 2 per WIA.
The historical factor 60 clearly shows that the strategy alone would not have required us to deploy more than we did, nor would it have overextended us to date. This falsifies about half the contra arguments which I heard over the last months.

Btw, the Hydra strategy would not exclude the possibility of additional deployments, especially not in regions without substantial previous presence of Western forces.

What would these additional troops do?

[Entropy]

Fuchs,

You can't show that a "hydra" stategy would be better than the status quo when you can't even show that it would have the effect you believe it will have. My whole point here is that there is nothing to indicate that such a strategy would discourage the Taliban from fighting. This is particularly true of the leadership which is relatively secure in Pakistan. That is what disqualifies the strategy. The entire premise is, at best, unsupported.

An alternative does not need to be "perfect" - it only needs to be "superior" in comparison with the status quo in order to be preferable.

That's fine. The problem is that you haven't demonstrated that your idea is comparatively superior - you've only, and repeatedly, asserted that it is. And when the ratios you've submitted are examined and calculated against real KIA and WIA figures (as I noted earlier), it demonstrates that had your strategy been put into effect it would not have made a difference. Current troop levels already exceed or are at the approximate level you say is required based on your ratios and the Taliban do not seem to be dissuaded from fighting.

[Fuchs]

OK, he problem is apparently to understand the mechanism.

First of all: Discouraging TB (and the other present hostiles) is not the only desired outcome. There's also a possible effect on supporters and neutrals.
Just about everybody dislikes the presence of foreigners would have his own check whether he likes the violence that seems to inevitably pull more foreigners into the country or not.

OK, scenario.

A few insurgents (TB or other) sit together with local elders.
The insurgents attempt to win over the locals and motivate them for the resistance against infidel foreigners. It's obvious; the proposed approach is lethal violence.
The elders report about what they heard; the foreigner's pledge that they would move in ten soldiers for every KIA and two for every WIA. They also report that the foreigners claimed to be part of an alliance that has more than three million soldiers.
The insurgents reply that this is all lies and propaganda.
A few IEDs, rocket and rifle attacks later, the insurgents return and meet again. They tell about oh-so great battles and six kills (two in reality). The elders tell them the foreigners paraded yesterday in front of their camp and welcomed dozens new soldiers. This morning, there was already a patrol in the village with several new soldiers - all of them still in different, very clean uniforms.
The elders and insurgents discuss local affairs and the foreigners.

Two months later, there were additional KIA, WIA and many new soldiers, increased patrol activities and the insurgents were also hit by some strikes.
The insurgents come again to the village in order to secure the support and to address some civil issues. The elders are not happy with the developments. Every action only seems to bring more foreign troops in. The lethal violence seems to be counterproductive. They keep discussing. In the evening, the insurgents have secured the elder's support, but had to promise to attack ANA, ANP and contractors instead of the foreigners. Meanwhile, the elders join other elders from the region and launch a diplomatic effort in order to reduce the unwanted foreign presence.

Months later, some lackeys of the mayor of Kabul report about increasing stress with insurgents. It's 2006 now and Karzai decides to pay less attention to political conflicts and more on the Taliban. The Kabul faction is taking the brunt of the insurgent's pressure and has to become seriously involved instead of counting almost only on foreigners to fight for them.

Is it now understandable? I don't suggest that the dumb pawns in the TB ranks be discouraged. I don't expect TB leaders to become doves.
There is a moral effect if you face a Hydra, though. The futility of chopping off even more heads is too obvious if you don't know how to burn the wounds.


@Entropy: "...it would not have made a difference". In troop levels maybe not. The war isn't about troop levels, though. It's not about us. You used a completely irrelevant metric for favourablity. You also assume that troops have the same deterrence effect no matter what strategy. That is exactly what I am pointing at as false. A different strategy could have had a much greater psychological effect with less troops simply because a different strategy could have aimed at such an effect.

The lack of inventiveness, brilliance and success on the operational and strategic level in Afghanistan is extremely embarrassing.

@JMA: That's irrelevant / off topic to the question relating the Hydra strategy.

[tequila]

Your scenario is predicated on the large increase in soldiers being out and about in the countryside, actually being visible to villagers on a daily basis --- rather than the actual reality of ISAF being concentrated in FOB-tastic clumps, with the majority never leaving the wire.

[Fuchs]

Yes, it works best with outposts.

Nevertheless, there ought to be some visibility any way. You just need to make the reinforcements visible.
At the very least, it should make clear to anyone that killing does not reduce, but increase numbers.

Do good and talk about it!

[tequila]

I think any positive effects from such a policy would be from the actual presence of the troops in the villages, in terms of security provided and resulting Taliban killed or deterred, rather than from any said influencing effect.

Unfortunately current NATO/ISAF policies would seem to prevent any such deployment.

[Entropy]

Fuchs,

Your scenario simply does not reflect reality in Afghanistan.

If some coalition troops die to an IED on some isolated stretch of road, or in a sparsely populated agricultural area, or in the middle of an urban area, where do you parade these shiny new troops to impress the locals? How do you know you are showing them to the right people? "You just need to make the reinforcements visible." That is simply wishful thinking.

There are well over 30,000 settlements of various sizes in Afghanistan. Almost 2,000 of those are in Kandahar province alone. How many of those can we provide enough presence to generate the effects you cite? The answer is not very many, even if we get everyone off the FOBs.

Another problem is your assumption that the village elders will be able to negotiate with the Taliban. While that can happen in some instances, the vast majority of village elders don't have the pull to negotiate the Taliban into leaving foreign troops alone. In most cases there is no negotiation. The locals have nothing to bargain. Independent minded or pro-coalition leaders are likely to find themselves killed.

Most Afghans are very adept fence-sitters. If you think some new troops in shiny clean uniforms will get them off the fence you are mistaken.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to KoW and a provocative article by a completly unknown writer, with a very brief bio, with six embeds in Afghanistan and so IMHO the right to comment on COIN:http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/n...Violence_Grows

Taken from the start:

Now is the right time to consider more radical points of view — including the most radical I know, that we ought to withdraw from Afghanistan precisely in order to enable the Afghans to defeat the Taliban.

This position used to be a fringe belief. It runs directly counter to the dogma of COIN that the more troops you put among the people, the more secure the people feel, and the more they will reject the insurgents. But it answers a doubt that has grown in my mind over the course of six embeds with American troops. I’ve observed that the more activity we undertake, the more SIGACTS (violent incidents) occur in a province or district. This in turn makes the locals doubtful about the benefits of an American presence.

[William F. Owen]

Hat tip to KoW and a provocative article by a completly unknown writer, with a very brief bio, with six embeds in Afghanistan and so IMHO the right to comment on COIN:http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/n...Violence_Grows

To quote the article,

“I asked the commander when his men were getting hit by the enemy and he said, ‘When we go out on a patrol.’ And I said, ‘Well, if you stop patrolling, you won’t get hit.’ And he said, ‘But my job is to patrol, to show American presence, to find the bad guys, to interact with the locals.’ And I said, ‘No, that’s not your job. Your job is to increase security in Afghanistan. If your sending your men on patrol increases violence, you’re not doing your job.’”

That is garbage. The job of an Army is to destroy the armed opponent. That may include conducting "Security Operations" and "good" Patrolling (as opposed to stupid) is essential to that.
Standing still, doing nothing, is always bad.