Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

http://www.marines.mil/news/publicat...%20Warfare.pdf

On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung is worth a PhD in COIN simply in the reading of Captain (1940) and Brigadier General retired (1961) Samuel B. Griffith's outstanding introductions.

So many passages from both his lengthy introduction and Mao's base work jumped out at me with special meaning for today.

Regarding the dichotomy I see in the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, that I have frequently described as having two tiers, an upper tier revolutionary movement among the leadership taking sanctuary in Pakistan, and a lower tier resistance movement among the rank and file fighters in Afghanistan:

"THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE between patriotic
partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla
movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological
content that always distinguishes the second.
A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity;
it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary
guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.
A resistance is rarely liquidated and terminates when
the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates
only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent
government or is liquidated.
Historical experience suggests that there is very little
hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement
after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the
sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population.
The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a
decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.
in addition to an appealing program and popular support,
such factors as terrain; communications; the quality
of the opposing leadership; the presence or absence of
material help, technical aid, advisers, or "volunteers" from
outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative
military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent
government are naturally relevant to the ability of a
movement to survive and expand."

[Dayuhan]

Regarding the dichotomy I see in the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, that I have frequently described as having two tiers, an upper tier revolutionary movement among the leadership taking sanctuary in Pakistan, and a lower tier resistance movement among the rank and file fighters in Afghanistan:

That begs the question of how the two tiers can be disaggregated. If the generally local issues motivating the bottom tier - the guys actually fighting - can be resolved, the top tier is no threat at all.

I quite agree with Mao here:

a revolutionary movement terminates only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent government or is liquidated.

I see little to no chance of appeasing the ideological revolutionary core of these insurgencies: they will only stop fighting when they seize complete power or are liquidated. They will not be content with "participation" unless it's seen as a step toward full control. They are not fighting for a voice, they are fighting to be the only voice. They want power, and they are not about to share it.

The actual fighters, now there's a different story. Find out what they want, give it to them, and see what happens... they're the ones taking the risks, after all, and they aren't the ones who would be getting the big rewards in the event of victory. They are not fighting for the right to sit in the big chair and call the shots; that's not an option that will be open to them in any event. They need some motivation to fight, and that motivation may be addressable and resolvable.

[Bob's World]

Well, this is Griffith's assessment of what he learned from his time with Mao's movement and a lifetime of service and study, writing this as part of his intro to a 1961 re-release of his transition of Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare."

My take is that the top drives the bottom; the Revolution drives the Resistance; not the other way around. To attempt to resolve the resistance movement in an effort to resolve the overall insurgency is therefore an act in futility. One's very presence to execute such engagement adds fuel to the resistance even if executed in a very "population-centric" way. Far more so when executed in a "Threat-Centric" or "counter-guerrilla" way. IMO, this is the principle flaw with our current operational design in Afghanistan, is that we do not recognize this dichotomy for what it is, and we do not appreciate the futility of leveraging heavy engagement of any nature against the resistance while leaving the revolution and the issues driving the revolution intact.

The best we can hope for is some temporary suppression from such engagement. Perhaps that is the plan, and perhaps that is enough. Frankly, I find it to be more than a Little disingenuous to the populaces of all of the Coalition nations if that is the case. I prefer to believe we are merely ignorant and blinded by our biases.

As to Griffith's assessment on the Revolution I am less pessimistic than he is. Certainly if one is committed to preserving the status quo of governance and defeating the illegal revolutionary challenger, I believe he is right. Liberty can be delayed, but not denied. (Recognizing that the leaders of the "liberation" may well, and often do, deny liberty in their own way to the very populace who carried them to victory. Malign actors exploit such events, but they do not cause them.)

I believe, and historic examples bear this out, that if the government commits itself to true change on the actual issues driving the insurgency, the government can win the competition for the support of the populace and the revolution will fade to where it is no longer a threat. Today we see many Arab governments attempting this very maneuver. Most, however, are merely throwing expensive bribes at their people and pointedly avoiding the types of substantive reforms that could quell the rebellions and save their regimes. This is what the Saudis are doing, and I predict they will fall if they do not seriously consider and adopt substantive reforms.

But not all revolutions are "all or nothing" for the people who support them. Sure, the leaders may well want it all and will take it all if the government falls, but the government can win back the populace with reforms far short of capitulation.

Our very commitment to the protection of GIRoA enables them to avoid making such reforms. Perhaps after we leave GIRoA will get serious about providing good governance to their entire populace, but I doubt it. They will attempt to continue to suppress the rebellion on their own, and then when it is far too late they will offer far too little, and they will fall.

Too bad, as it is avoidable. In Afghanistan, and across the Middle East where "Arab Spring" and "Fighting Season" are beginning to bloom.

[Dayuhan]

Liberty can be delayed, but not denied.

Revolutionary leaders rarely fight for liberty. They fight for power. The populace that supplies the fighters may very well be fighting for a perception of liberty. That's a difference that can be exploited to pry the two apart.

if the government commits itself to true change on the actual issues driving the insurgency, the government can win the competition for the support of the populace and the revolution will fade to where it is no longer a threat....not all revolutions are "all or nothing" for the people who support them. Sure, the leaders may well want it all and will take it all if the government falls, but the government can win back the populace with reforms far short of capitulation.

This is exactly what I'm talking about and trying to recommend. You don't win back the populace by dealing with the revolutionary leaders, though. You also don't win them back by shooting them, or trying to protect them from themselves. You win them back by addressing and resolving the local, immediate grievances that they are fighting over. Changes in the capitol often won't do that, because the capitol is very far away and what happens there often has little to no impact on life in the field. Forget about a nation-wide populace, because there isn't one. Find the reasons why the fighters in any given place are fighting... address those reasons, and you may get them to stop fighting.

In a centralized, capitol-based urban revolt like those of the so-called "Arab Spring" (worth recalling that after spring comes summer, and summer is hot) the central government is the issue. In decentralized, rural-based revolution the insurgent leaders have to leverage local issues and concerns to draw support for their campaign to take power. Shuffling the deck chairs in the capitol won't change that. It often won't even be noticed in the countryside. Targeting those local issues does get noticed.

Take away leaders, new leaders emerge. If the fighters see their local concerns addressed and stop fighting, the leaders became a bunch of toothless old men yapping hysterically in the distance. It can happen; I've seen it happen at close range. Whether or not it can happen in Afghanistan is another question, but it seems worth a try.

Changes in the capitol may be needed to effect change in the countryside... but change in the capitol can't be seen as an end itself. If it doesn't effect change in the countryside - and in decentralized societies change in the capitol often means nothing in the countryside - it won't accomplish anything.

Of course if the issue driving the actual fighters is our presence, rather than what happens in Kabul, we're in a bind.

I still think trying to reform Afghan governance, trying to get Afghans not to govern as Afghans govern, or trying to create a western-style democracy in Afghanistan were fool's errands from day 1... but we never seem able to just make a point and leave.

[JMA]

Revolutionary leaders rarely fight for liberty. They fight for power. The populace that supplies the fighters may very well be fighting for a perception of liberty. That's a difference that can be exploited to pry the two apart.

[snip]

I still think trying to reform Afghan governance, trying to get Afghans not to govern as Afghans govern, or trying to create a western-style democracy in Afghanistan were fool's errands from day 1... but we never seem able to just make a point and leave.

At last.

I finally find two paragraphs (above) from you that I can fully agree with.

I thought I should mention this.

[jcustis]

This is exactly what I'm talking about and trying to recommend. You don't win back the populace by dealing with the revolutionary leaders, though. You also don't win them back by shooting them, or trying to protect them from themselves. You win them back by addressing and resolving the local, immediate grievances that they are fighting over. Changes in the capitol often won't do that, because the capitol is very far away and what happens there often has little to no impact on life in the field. Forget about a nation-wide populace, because there isn't one. Find the reasons why the fighters in any given place are fighting... address those reasons, and you may get them to stop fighting.

I think the unique thing to the Afghanistan issue is the simple fact that before the coalition set down stakes in the country, the people didn't have any grievances. They seem to have been more than happy to plod along, eking out a bare existence (for those in the hinterlands) and living under the rule of the Taliban. It was better than the chaos and anarchy of multitudes of warlords pitted against each other. That was the true instability.

Taking the Northern Alliance out of the equation, that's pretty much what I have seen. They'll be more than happy to tell you how appreciative they are that you lifted the yoke of the Taliban off of their shoulders...and then they'll ask for a handout. Before we arrived and started prodding around in the poppy fields, and building schools and clinics and slapping plaster up to repair mosques, the people probably could have cared less. The Taliban were bad guys, but from the Afghans perspective, "he's MY bad guy, and you have no business over here trying to tell me what to do."

The "angry brothers" are fighting for two reasons and two reasons only, TCAF assessments about causes of instability be damned. They fight to protect the drug nexus (therefore not a source of instability in the mind of the average poppy sharecropper) and they fight because the coalition is rooting around in their lands, patting children on the head, taking pictures like it's a safari, setting up district councils because we believe that type of representation is good for them, forcing other norms on their culture, putting our women in homes to talk with Afghan women while the men are in the fields, and enticing complicity with a few shots from a vet here and there, or a few ailments resolved with two Tylenol and a bit of cooing from a doctor.

We struggle forward with, frankly, our collective heads up our asses over the issue of drugs and their production. I've stood in fields of marijuana as tall as a standard American ceiling. Could I cut it down and destroy it where it grew? No...not in our mission profile and not covered by any number of policies that were often unclear, arbitrary, and ignored the reality that our district produced 1/4 of the poppy in Helmand, and therefore (IIRC) 1/4 of the poppy in all of Afghanistan. Interdiction during the distribution phase was allowed, but the mission was made more difficult by the fact that the drugs were mobile by that time. Although the governor pushes his alternative crop agenda, the poppy continues to grow. It will expand, or at least stay at current levels, unless there is a blight or the coalition and GiROA can wipe the Taliban off the face of the map, but the people in the dusty villages don't see the wind blowing that direction right now. Sit and talk with an Afghan academic or elite, and most researchers are going to get the answer that the educated Afghan thinks they want to hear, time after time. The narrative vibrating at the local level tells a totally different story.

The people who need to see and hear what is truly going on at the local level don't get out to where they need to, and don't talk to the people they need to, at the right time or in the right places. The coalition troops do, but even they get a sham of a shura, too often, that is orchestrated to deliver a mix of what they think we want to hear, and what the opportunist in them tells them they can squeeze out of us. You get the true gems when you visit a man after he has spent the day in his fields, and share a bit of hospitality in the way of chai on a woven mat outside his compound, when the night air has cooled and the children feel more like dozing than peeking around corners. When he is not afraid that a neighbor will snitch on him, he will often tell you many surprising things that crush perceptions you've held the entire deployment.

I've held the Afghan male to task for not getting off of his knees on this board before, criticizing him for not finding an AK or a pistol and putting a bullet in the head. of the next Taliban who saunters into his neighborhood to collect a tax, or murder a khan, or post a night letter. I've also thought that they were riding the fence very well, but now I am not so sure. Their learned helplessness in the face of the Taliban is depressing, but I've recently spent a lot of time thinking about the matter, and I don't think it's because they are helpless and scared. They simply don't see the Taliban as the source of instability that we do. Our value system and framework for analyzing the problem is flat out wrong, but what the hell, there's money to be spent, and so we gloss over what is right in front of us, patrol until the unit replacing us sends its first echelons into country, and then we go home, forget what we learned, and re-deploy with a new command team and new philosophies.

The fighters are fighting us because every 7-12 months, a new band of invaders arrive and start the cycle all over.

PS. And don't even get me started about the civ-mil divide occurring on the ground. I would prefer to grab a handful of members from the Council, pay you $150,000 of my tax dollars to work the problem, and let you have at it.

Of course if the issue driving the actual fighters is our presence, rather than what happens in Kabul, we're in a bind.

I still think trying to reform Afghan governance, trying to get Afghans not to govern as Afghans govern, or trying to create a western-style democracy in Afghanistan were fool's errands from day 1... but we never seem able to just make a point and leave.

No way I would ever argue with that Dayuhan, because that's exactly what it happening on the ground.

[Ray]

My take is that the top drives the bottom; the Revolution drives the Resistance; not the other way around. To attempt to resolve the resistance movement in an effort to resolve the overall insurgency is therefore an act in futility. One's very presence to execute such engagement adds fuel to the resistance even if executed in a very "population-centric" way. Far more so when executed in a "Threat-Centric" or "counter-guerrilla" way. IMO, this is the principle flaw with our current operational design in Afghanistan, is that we do not recognize this dichotomy for what it is, and we do not appreciate the futility of leveraging heavy engagement of any nature against the resistance while leaving the revolution and the issues driving the revolution intact.

This is an interesting take that is very pertinent in attempting to solve insurgencies.

However, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, as far as I understand, it is not a homogeneous 'revolution'. While the core issue may be common, the tribal interests of each region or even sub region, possibly takes predominance within the structure of the 'core interest'.

Therefore, not only the core issue has to be addressed, but also alongside this, the tribal 'interests' of each region or sub region has to be addressed so that a more cogent response can be structured. I would not know if you all would understand, but each tribal leader has this 'Khalifa' mindset; in simpler terms it means that the world revolves around him wherein the temporal supersedes the spiritual!

This, possibly, is what makes the approach to the campaign complex and difficult.

To add to the problem is the interest of neighbouring nations, on both sides, who because of regional and religious or sectarian affinity regularly churns sentiments that appeal to the regional and religious or sectarian interests.

As to Griffith's assessment on the Revolution I am less pessimistic than he is. Certainly if one is committed to preserving the status quo of governance and defeating the illegal revolutionary challenger, I believe he is right. Liberty can be delayed, but not denied. (Recognizing that the leaders of the "liberation" may well, and often do, deny liberty in their own way to the very populace who carried them to victory. Malign actors exploit such events, but they do not cause them.)

I believe, and historic examples bear this out, that if the government commits itself to true change on the actual issues driving the insurgency, the government can win the competition for the support of the populace and the revolution will fade to where it is no longer a threat. Today we see many Arab governments attempting this very maneuver. Most, however, are merely throwing expensive bribes at their people and pointedly avoiding the types of substantive reforms that could quell the rebellions and save their regimes. This is what the Saudis are doing, and I predict they will fall if they do not seriously consider and adopt substantive reforms.

One wonders how far one can compare Afghanistan with the Arab countries, where some sort of a revolution is underway.

While the Arab countries have modern infrastructure, are more educated and are aware of the happenings in the outside world, I wonder if the Afghans have the same advantage. Therefore, to expect a people who are basically illiterate and have never has experienced the instruments of modernity and hence having little need of 'creature comforts' to emulate the Arab revolution, maybe a trifle too early in the day.

A people who have history no idea of 'liberty' in the western sense of the word, would hardly be concerned about liberty (in the western sense of the word) coming instantaneously or being delayed.

Just to explain with a simple example.

While the world laments that a vast majority of those living in third world countries work and live under $2 a day and are horrified. However, the flipside is that it really is not horrifying in real terms. $2 may fetch little in the US, but it is somewhat adequate (with a pinch) for for a person from the the third world. And if the family works and each fetches $2 at the end of the day, it sort of works out. This also explains why there family planning exercises flounder and why child labour, much that it is distasteful to the West, flourishes.

In short, to address Afghanistan, one has to think like an Afghan to fight an Afghan, rather than superimposing western modes to combat the situation.

[M1]

I have been meaning to mention this for awhile. This morning's NYT reminded me.

Remember how many of the suicide attacks against American and Iraqi forces in Iraq were attributed to terrorists "wearing Iraqi military uniforms", implying that enemies were simply putting on military or police uniforms to gain access to conduct their attacks?

I did a piece on SMC (!!pNSFW!!) http://swedemeat.blogspot.com/2006/1...orm-story.html in 2006 expressing my skepticism about such representations.

I've since received confirmation of our suspicions, follow up investigations nearly always ID'ed the perp[s] as real members of the security forces.

The media have been regurgitating the same narrative in Afghanistan https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/w...ghanistan.html:

It was the latest in a string of attacks targeting Afghan government and military officials in what the Taliban have called the beginning of their spring offensive. On Saturday, a suicide bomber killed five NATO service members in eastern Afghanistan A day earlier, a suicide bomber killed the police chief of Kandahar Province. In both attacks, the bombers were dressed in Afghan army or police uniforms.

The same motive for the media manipulation is in play. To acknowledge that enemies have infiltrated our only hope for a decent exit from the war (such as it is) would cast some doubt about the strategy we are hanging our hats upon.

This is far from our only problem in Afghanistan. Pak sanctuaries, Afghan gov incompetence (and corruption), challenges in getting enough warm bodies to join Afghan mil and police, and dwindling options to address all of these issues are certainly more serious obstacles.

But deluding ourselves is rarely a recipe for success in any endeavor.

[Bob's World]

In short, to address Afghanistan, one has to think like an Afghan to fight an Afghan, rather than superimposing western modes to combat the situation.

If this is your take, and it is a reasonable one, then it sounds like something best left to Afghans. Who will prevail? Ahh, that it the $64000 question that keeps us stuck to this tar baby that we have created.

Once we get comfortable with the understanding that we really don't have any vital national interests at stake that demand us staying and artificially propping up a particular solution, the sooner we can evolve to more reasonable approaches.

Governance is a a market economy. The best might not prevail, but the strongest will. If that too turns out to be bad new challengers will emerge. Right now we are propping up an artificial solution that is failing the governance "market" model. Kind of like the Fed printing cash or bailing out banks at home. Maybe Afghanistan is so important it warrants such artificial measures that create long-term risks for short-term gains. Maybe not. Reasonable minds can indeed differ.

Personally, I think walking away has to be on the table as a real option. If we do not put it there then Karzai and GIRoA have no incentive to truly seek to govern the entire populace. They will just keep serving the Northern Alliance populace and excluding the rest.

[Tukhachevskii]

Governance is a a market economy.

Explain (please).

[omarali50]

The way I see it, this is the "cunning rationality of history" at work (to use Hegel's phrase). Let us say that a subsistence economy and a medieval ideology (talibanish Islamism) exists in a country surrounded by slightly more advanced (or, dont use the word "advanced" if it sounds too Whiggish to you, say "sophisticated") societies, in a world with several MUCH more advanced (sorry, "sophisticated") societies hungry for raw materials, access, imperial dreams, whatever. What is going to happen? Some locals will be enrolled as agents of the more sophisticated societies as they expand into what they see as a vacuum. These more sophisticated societies will use their proxies to advance what they regard as "their interests". They will get into fights with each other. Their actions AND the desire of the primitive locals for some of the "cargo" occasionally parachuted in will upset the status quo...its inevitable. There IS no Afghan way of life that will survive in some museum watched over by benign protectors from the rest of the world. The only question is, who upends what part of the status quo and how.
Btw, the "status quo" does not mean the 1999 Taliban. They would just be one step on the road to upending the status quo that has been unwinding itself for 200 years. You can never go home again. But of course, the US army can definitely go home. Let the Chinese and the Pakistanis and the Indians and the Russians pay for their own fights..
There is another layer to it (among many others): Some of the super-sophisticates may have evolved their own crude way of maintaining bare-minimum worldwide order. Maybe that is why they are there, to make sure newbies like Pakistan and India don't upset the applecart and start fires that will effect everyone in the long run. But if that is the case, then wouldnt it be helpful to make this a bit explicit and have everyone contribute to the maintenance of world order? Or is it the case that the big boss (even though running short of cash) has no mechanism for thinking that clearly? In which case the cunning rationality of history may have "other ways to make you talk"...

[Fuchs]

Explain (please).

There are indeed theories that treat governance like an economic system. Please note that "economic" in this context is a scientific term and means the avoidance of waste.

There is for example an economic and political theory of bureaucracy and elections can be analysed in economic terms (especially the optimisation of votes, which is very similar to siting a shop).

[Pete]

I've also thought that they were riding the fence very well, but now I am not so sure. Their learned helplessness in the face of the Taliban is depressing, but I've recently spent a lot of time thinking about the matter, and I don't think it's because they are helpless and scared. They simply don't see the Taliban as the source of instability that we do. Our value system and framework for analyzing the problem is flat out wrong ...

During the Civil War many people in my local area didn't like it when either army was in the neighborhood -- it usually meant that your split-rail fences would be used for firewood, your barn would be dismantled for its lumber and your livestock would be consumed. Athough this was a strongly pro-Southern area there is circumstantial evidence that the local town of Inwood founded in the 1880s as a station along a new railroad line may have been named after a Union provost marshal of that name who operated here during the spring of 1865. By then the area was infested with deserters from both sides, freebooters and loosely-affiliated guerrilla bands. The locals may have been grateful to see some law and order restored even if it was a Bluecoat who was doing it.

[Tukhachevskii]

There are indeed theories that treat governance like an economic system. Please note that "economic" in this context is a scientific term and means the avoidance of waste.

There is for example an economic and political theory of bureaucracy and elections can be analysed in economic terms (especially the optimisation of votes, which is very similar to siting a shop).

I am well aware of the various economic theories of governance, thank you. I want to know what Bobsworld is talking about in plain English.

[jcustis]

Our very commitment to the protection of GIRoA enables them to avoid making such reforms. Perhaps after we leave GIRoA will get serious about providing good governance to their entire populace, but I doubt it. They will attempt to continue to suppress the rebellion on their own, and then when it is far too late they will offer far too little, and they will fall.

Despite the greatest degree of seriousness on the part of GIRoA, it will never get past the tribalism, corruption, deceit, and apathy to make a difference, at least not until tens of years have past and the people have succumbed to the pain.

By that point, it will require a warlord/dictator to rise up and rule through the way of the gun, not by the true ballot. GIRoA will be largely irrelevant at that point.

[Bob's World]

Explain (please).

I mean that if the people don"buy" it, it won't endure. You cannot force a failed model forever, ulitimately the customer has the final say, and will switch brands if the current brand is unable or unwilling to evolve to suit the current situation.

This is one reason I find major fault in arrogant concepts such as "government having a monopoly on violence." Legal violence, perhaps, but the people always have the option to step outside the law to break up such monopolies that are employed to force failed models.

[Dayuhan]

I mean that if the people don"buy" it, it won't endure.

The problem, as in so many other places, lies in getting the various factions that constitute "the people" to "buy" the same product. If the prevailing pattern is that you either rule and kick ass or someone else rules and you get your ass kicked, it's hard to sell any faction on a system that doesn't involve them ruling.

I think we've learned enough to abandon the idea that America can adjust other political cultures to suit our interests... but i could be wrong!

[Pete]

The only reason I post Civil War anecdotes in this thread is because they show the ambivalence of civilian populations for military forces operating in the area where the local people live. They're all-American tales too, stuff that really happened around here.

When the Confederacy and its units began falling apart in the Spring of 1865 many soldiers, particularly cavalrymen, "Headed for the Hills," in this particular case in eastern West Virginia about three miles from the Virginia state line. They thought they could wait things out here to see if things improved for the Confederacy. However, armed men without rations or forage did what they had to do to eat and feed their horses, so honorable soldiers who had decided to lay low for a while eventually turned into de facto vagabonds and criminals.

That's where Captain Inwood, the U.S. Army Provost Marshal came in. There were U.S. Army garrisons in Martinsburg, WV 12 miles north, and also 12 miles south in Winchester, VA. The route of travel between the two places, the Valley Pike / U.S. Route 11, was relatively unpoliced until Captain Inwood came along. But he quickly restored a measure of order to the area. His contribution may be the reason the town of Inwood, WV has the name that it does.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/...119874414.html

14 APR

The Turkish foreign minister has confirmed that preparations are underway for opening an office in Turkey for the Afghan Taliban. During a recent visit to Turkey, the president of Pakistan, together with his Turkish counterpart, made a commitment to support political initiatives to end the war in Afghanistan. Ankara has been calling for talks with the Taliban, and having strong ties with both Afghanistan and Pakistan is seen as a key element in facilitating talks.

For now, the Taliban is sending out conflicting messages over whether it would be prepared to talk. But Ankara is reportedly using all its diplomatic influence to find a political solution to the conflict. That stance is supported by the Turkish former civilian head of NATO-led forces in Afghanistan, Hikmet Cetin, who says talking with the Taliban is a necessity

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php...show_article=1

20 APR

ISLAMABAD, April 20 (AP) - (Kyodo)—The top U.S. military officer on Wednesday confirmed reports that the Afghan Taliban would be setting up an office in Turkey, Pakistani private television channel GEO TV reported.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...prss=rss_world

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari was to arrive in Turkey late Monday, and Afghanistan is expected to be high on the agenda of talks. Any solution to the Afghan conflict would likely require the support of Pakistan, and in particular elements of its security forces that are believed to have links to insurgents in Afghanistan.

Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, coordinator of the Eurasia Strategic Research Center, a research center based in Ankara, said the opening of a Taliban office in Turkey would boost the legitimacy of the insurgents.

“The idea also signals that there is an agreement with Pakistan over integrating the Taliban into the political system in a new Afghanistan,” he said.

[Steve the Planner]

Custis:

Wow! Very heavy and insightful.

Bill:

The whole story and history along the old silk road just never got onto US radar screens, but its is the erf of these places.

Connecting each other together is what they are about. We are just something the anti-bodies will eventually reject.