Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bill Moore]

Connecting each other together is what they are about. We are just something the anti-bodies will eventually reject.

But, but, but if we build more schools and roads maybe they'll like us and want us to stay????

Steve, good catch on jcustis comments above, I think they were pretty much on target. Assuming that is the truth, then what is the correct strategy to achieve our objectives and relieve the Afghan people of ISAF's occupation like activities?

[Dayuhan]

what is the correct strategy to achieve our objectives

What are our objectives? It started out with "disrupt, deny, defeat AQ", but it seems to have crept on to something entirely different. Hard to form a strategy to achieve an objective if we haven't got a clearly delineated and achievable objective in mind.

[Tukhachevskii]

I mean that if the people don"buy" it, it won't endure. You cannot force a failed model forever, ulitimately the customer has the final say, and will switch brands if the current brand is unable or unwilling to evolve to suit the current situation.

This is one reason I find major fault in arrogant concepts such as "government having a monopoly on violence." Legal violence, perhaps, but the people always have the option to step outside the law to break up such monopolies that are employed to force failed models.

I see. You were speaking metaphorically rather than applying some economic model of governance to a situation I didn't think was appliacable. Thanks for the clarification.

[AdamG]

(CNN) -- The commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan is warning troops of increased high-profile attacks over the summer, calling on NATO-led forces to balance its tactical needs with those of the civilian population.

It is likely that insurgents will pursue high-profile attacks this summer in an attempt to demonstrate their ability to strike, Gen. David Petraeus said in a memorandum to the International Security Assistance Force.

http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapc...ies/index.html

WASHINGTON -- As fighting and casualties in Afghanistan's war reached an all-time high, U.S. soldiers and Marines there reported plunging morale and the highest rates of mental health problems in five years.

The grim statistics in a new Army report released Thursday dramatize the psychological cost of a military campaign that U.S. commanders and officials say has reversed the momentum of the Taliban insurgency.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/0..._n_864370.html

[Ray]

The elimination of Al Qaeda is not going to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” terrorist networks bent on striking on cities in the US and its Nato allies. This would require relentless counter-terrorism action across the Durand Line. Given the heavy dependence of the Americans on the Pakistanis for logistical support to transport supplies through Pakistani territory, such action would be unthinkable just now. But, with an estimated 50 per cent of supplies now coming through Russia and Central Asia, this dependence on Pakistan will become much less important in coming years as American troop levels in Afghanistan are significantly reduced. In such a scenario, the US will be more open to effective counter-terrorism action across the Durand Line, as Vice-President Joe Biden and others like Ambassador Robert Blackwill have advocated. The US is negotiating a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan, which will enable a residual military presence even beyond 2014. Its provisions will be important in outlining long-term American objectives.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/338013/F...ghanistan.html

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Watandost for highlighting a Canadian article on the apparent strategy, using the two 'police' generals General Daud Daud in the north and the promotion of Brigadier-General Abdul Razik in the south:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...2047158/page1/

Some choice comments by others and this stark IMHO paragraph:

Having failed to establish a working government in many parts of Afghanistan, NATO is increasingly dependent on so-called strongmen, commanders whose power comes not only from their affiliation with Kabul but from militias, tribes and, often, the narcotics trade.

[davidbfpo]

Following the Canadian trail I read this article, which includes a short commentary on Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles's book, which has been commented upon before and elsewhere on The UK in Afghanistan thread.

A partial quote:

Such a military-focused approach risks making Afghanistan safe not for better governance, but for the warlords and narco-Mafias whom the Taliban originally targeted when they took power in the mid 1990s. Once again, the poor Afghan people could be the losers.

There's a reference to a previously unheard book by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, researchers who have lived in Kandahar since 2006 and have published their substantial research as 'An Enemy We have Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan 1970-2010'.
IIRC some here are critical of their previous work.

(this) offers a rigorous and detailed description of this problem.

They note, first, that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have almost nothing to do with each other any more, beyond some money being channelled to one faction of Taliban fighters. The Taliban, extremely distrusting of foreigners, tend to hate al-Qaeda, which has no Afghan leaders.

But, they warn, this could change if the senior leadership of the various Taliban groups is obliterated: “The new and younger generation of Afghan Taliban is more susceptible to advances by foreign jihadist groups including al-Qaeda … Current policies pursued by domestic and international actors – led by the United States – are a key factor driving the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda together.”

Link:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...rticle2037846/

[davidbfpo]

A lengthy article which is upbeat and cites a variety of sources, including two ministers sacked by Karzai:http://www.economist.com/node/18681871

The sub-title is:

It’s been a long slog, but Afghanistan may at last be able to contemplate more stable government.

[davidbfpo]

An odd story from a previously unknown source, Gareth Porter of IPS, who let's say has some "baggage" for his unconventional views and is being circulated in the UK by a Muslim think-tank.

Opens with:

During his intensive initial round of media interviews as commander in Afghanistan in August 2010, Gen. David Petraeus released figures to the news media that claimed spectacular success for raids by Special Operations Forces: in a 90-day period from May through July, SOF units had captured 1,355 rank and file Taliban, killed another 1,031, and killed or captured 365 middle or high-ranking Taliban.

(Continues)..But it turns out that more than 80 percent of those called captured Taliban fighters were released within days of having been picked up, because they were found to have been innocent civilians, according to official U.S. military data.

Link:http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56038

IIRC Afghan detainees in the field are usually transferred to Afghan custody after a short period, maybe 72hours and I do not follow why those captured were treated differently - except it is a JSOC operational process.

[jmm99]

I read the same Porter article - the term "innocent civilian" is intriguing.

Here is the story on detention in Astan (current as of last year), Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff A. Bovarnick, Professor and Chair, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia (JUNE 2010, THE ARMY LAWYER, DA PAM 27-50-445).

As to the ISAF vice USFOR-A (OEF) distinction (pp.13-14, footnotes in original omitted below):

A. Combat Operations in Afghanistan ISAF/NATO and U.S Forces–Afghanistan/OEF

Because the 2 July 2009 detention policy is explicit in its application, it is informative to describe the units operating in Afghanistan. On 30 June 2010, General David Petreaus was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the dual-hatted Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the International and Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Although they fall under the same commander, USFOR-A and ISAF operate under two different detention paradigms. As described in detail below, the 2 July 2009 policy for the new DRBs only applies to USFOR-A/OEF units. This section provides a brief explanation of the ISAF detention policy, which is separate and distinct from the USFOR-A detention policy. The majority of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (78,430 out of approximately 95,000) are assigned to ISAF, which operates as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO) mission in Afghanistan.

The remaining 17,000 or so U.S. troops fall under USFOR-A and continue to operate under the authority of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Currently, USFOR-A is made up of U.S. Special Operations Forces (the capturing units), Joint Task Force 435, which runs all detention operations in Afghanistan (discussed in detail below), and other critical enablers, such as route clearance and Palladin units. The 2 July 2009 detention policy does not apply to roughly 80% of U.S. troops operating in Afghanistan.

As described later, USFOR-A can send captured personnel to the DFIP whereas ISAF units (including the U.S. forces assigned to ISAF) cannot. Since December 2005, all ISAF units have been required to turn captures over to the Afghans within ninety-six hours of capture.

In early 2010, complaints from U.S. units (assigned to ISAF) surfaced over this relatively short time period to turn captured personnel over to Afghan authorities. In March 2010, in response to these complaints, the Secretary of Defense extended the period to fourteen days, thus authorizing the U.S. caveat to the ninety-six-hour rule for U.S. forces assigned to ISAF. The ninety-six-hour rule is still in effect for non-U.S. ISAF units.

All insurgents captured by ISAF troops must be turned over to the Afghan National Security Directorate (NDS), either within ninety-six hours for non-U.S. ISAF units or fourteen days for U.S. ISAF units. The NDS is Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency with jurisdiction over all insurgent and terrorist activity.

In essence, the NDS has the right of first refusal to accept the transfer of captured personnel believed to be insurgents or terrorists. In addition to the personnel that might be expected to make up an intelligence agency, the NDS also has a staff of investigators that specifically work to prepare cases for prosecution within the Afghan criminal justice system. Currently, a team of Afghan prosecutors and judges with special expertise are temporarily assigned to work exclusively with the NDS to coordinate this effort to try suspected insurgents and terrorists under the appropriate Afghan criminal laws within the Afghan criminal justice system. Each province in Afghanistan has at least one judge and several prosecutors assigned to work on NDS cases.

I expect LawVol knows the current conditions better than anyone else at SWC.

[Ray]

Britain cannot risk early military withdrawal in Afghanistan, Liam Fox says


Britain will need a strong and ongoing military presence in Afghanistan after the formal withdrawal of Nato forces if the country continues to pose a threat to national security, Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary said.......

He added: “We came to Afghanistan because of a national security imperative. Whatever the humanitarian justification we must not lose sight of that.

“The history of Afghanistan teaches us that a security vacuum causes untold problems beyond its borders.

We can’t let Afghanistan become an ungoverned space. We will still be involved in development and reconstruction after 2014, we will still have a partnership role with the security forces.

“It is impossible to predict the numbers we will keep here. It will depend on how security situation will change. But if there is still a wider security threat then we may need a stronger security presence.......

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-Fox-says.html

[Steve the Planner]

Ray:

Regrettably, here's one good after action report on our "ungoverned spaces" efforts:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...kVH_story.html

[Ray]

Is this the one?

The link was on:

In Baghdad, control remains elusive

This is a good link to check the British Army (informal) ARRSE link and threads on Afghanistan.

http://www.arrse.co.uk/afghanistan-144

[davidbfpo]

Professor Paul Rogers comments, sub-titled:

The United States's narrative of progress against the Taliban faces uncomfortable realities on the ground - and unexpected resistance in Washington.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-ro...6-19%2005%3a30

What I found interesting was his analysis that attacking Afghan state targets was likely to grow, alongside the hardy perennial of insurgents hiding amongst the local population.

Which made me wonder if VIP attacks of late are intended to remove capable opponents before a negoitation and ease the way for traditional Afghan ways of settling disputes afterwards, in which violence historically was minimal. Yes, seen from a faraway "armchair" and ignores the fact that traditional ways often expire in conflict.

[Ray]

Taliban Evoke a Vietnam Flashback

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...YWORDS=taliban

[Ken White]

The US media has been trying to evoke Viet Nam for ten years. Their stupid and wrong headed beliefs in this have affected some folks in the services. Fortunately, most have enough sense to realize there are few similarities other than some of the weapons used -- and the flawed tactics...

[JMA]

The US media has been trying to evoke Viet Nam for ten years. Their stupid and wrong headed beliefs in this have affected some folks in the services. Fortunately, most have enough sense to realize there are few similarities other than some of the weapons used -- and the flawed tactics...

Ken, the simple truth is that "winning" in Afghanistan is no longer considered possible and now it is just a matter of a US withdrawal in a face saving manner (if that is possible) if not leave like the Soviets did.

[Dayuhan]

Ken, the simple truth is that "winning" in Afghanistan is no longer considered possible and now it is just a matter of a US withdrawal in a face saving manner (if that is possible) if not leave like the Soviets did.

The pre-mission creep objectives have been largely accomplished, the post-mission creep objectives are not likely to ever be accomplished. What's to stick around for?

If "winning" is achieving one's objective, then the first step toward winning is selecting an achievable objective suited to the tools you have at your disposal. Removing the Taliban from power and disrupting AQ's Afghan operations were achievable goals suited to accomplishment by the US military. Installation of a western-style democratic government in Afghanistan was not and is not an achievable goal suited to accomplishment by a military force.

[Bob's World]

For what it's worth, I put this out on the street a while back. It is part of the discussion currently on the hill as politicians and policy makers grapple to craft solutions to a problem they do not well understand, that in turn the believe they can sell to their constituency back home.

(There are aspects of my proposal, such as not calling what we are doing in Afghanistan a "war" that causes such a radical change of perspective that many can understand, but struggle with how that makes them look when it goes to their electors back home).

http://www.scribd.com/doc/50971058/E...in-Afghanistan

[Fuchs]

The pre-mission creep objectives have been largely accomplished, the post-mission creep objectives are not likely to ever be accomplished. What's to stick around for?

Oh is that so? Quel surprise!

Maybe it's about time to look back several years and remember who said that all along? Because next time, their voices should be weighed heavier!


It's been obvious that everything post early 2002 in Afghanistan has been stupid waste of resources; many people knew it, many have raised their voice. Most were not able to think rationally about AFG.

Even back in 2008/2009 such an opinion still had to argue against 4-6 disagreeing voices in this forum.

And I'm not talking about myself - I am irrelevant.
There were timely warnings about Iraq invasion and there were warnings about the Afghanistan occupation - they were ignored. It's a failure of the society, and said society has to learn or else it will fail again and again and again. All delusion about being exceptional doesn't help here.

Not to learn kills people in droves.


Now everyone go back and look up who was smarter years ago already. Look up the few warning voices in newspapers, in academia, in bureaucracies.
And next time listen to them!