Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

Ken, the simple truth is that "winning" in Afghanistan is no longer considered possible and now it is just a matter of a US withdrawal in a face saving manner (if that is possible) if not leave like the Soviets did.

It was never possible. I've been saying that since early 2002 when what we wanted (not necessarily needed) to do there was effectively completed. We should not have decided to stay because once we did we locked ourselves in to a no-win situation.

Unfortunately, George W. Bush forgot his job as POTUS and recalled that he was a good Christan and did the Christan thing, he decided to 'fix' what 'we' had 'broken.' There were four big flaws in that.

- The job of POTUS is to take care of US interests, humanistic follies and US domestic political concerns as well as personal beliefs can be -- should be -- considered but net cost should be weighed against benefits. He did not accept the cost-benefit analysis which pretty much predicted what has occurred though it underestimated those costs. He made a poor decision...

- The possibility of our being able to 'fix' it in less than two generations -- if ever -- was microscopic at best.

- The 'we' gets transmogrified in affairs like this. The US DoD has a vested interest in creating conflicts and places to go, things to do. We as a nation too often succumb to that interest and poke into things we should not and yet we do not have the political will (we here includes uniformed and civilian 'politicians' and their ilk...) to use force properly so we end up doing a poor job -- and get way with it... That same organization has a 'can do' attitude and will salute and say "Yes, Sir" while marching over a cliff. It is reluctant to say that some things are not possible or not with the tools available so the relatively ignorant civilian masters give a flawed task and the Armed Forces will try to execute even if they do not have the wherewithal to do it. G.W.B. said "go forth and do great things" and few if any said "Boss, that is really stoopid..."

- We did not break it, it was already broken.

So we got engaged where we should not have in a manner that we had earlier proven was totally futile and not appropriate to the US and I've been saying since '02 that we'd get out based on the US electoral cycle. Just as we 'got out' of Iraq and elsewhere...

We're slow learners, we have no continuity mostly because of oversize egos so we love to reinvent the wheel, because, after all the "They failed but we're smarter so we can do it correctly" attitude, while very human, has adversely affected nations for years. See socialism...

[Dayuhan]

- The 'we' gets transmogrified in affairs like this. The US DoD has a vested interest in creating conflicts and places to go, things to do. We as a nation too often succumb to that interest and poke into things we should not and yet we do not have the political will (we here includes uniformed and civilian 'politicians' and their ilk...) to use force properly so we end up doing a poor job -- and get way with it...

I don't really think the impetus toward prolonged occupation and "nation-building" efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan came from DoD, vested interests or not. I recall the main agitators there being a civilian clique, actually rather small and with no significant constituency. They just happened to be on the spot post - 9/11 with an explanation and a plan, which nobody else was offering. It wasn't a very good plan, but it was superficially attractive: it was big, it could be made to sound noble, and it involved smacking around a bunch of Muslims, a significant domestic political imperative in those days. GWB bought it, and the rest is history.

I wonder if the Michael Ledeens of the world ever go back and read the tripe they published in those days...

There were timely warnings about Iraq invasion and there were warnings about the Afghanistan occupation - they were ignored. It's a failure of the society, and said society has to learn or else it will fail again and again and again. All delusion about being exceptional doesn't help here....

...Now everyone go back and look up who was smarter years ago already. Look up the few warning voices in newspapers, in academia, in bureaucracies.
And next time listen to them!

I was one of those voices, though on a completely irrelevant scale. As you say, nobody listened. Maybe they will in the future, though I doubt it. Not that I expect the US to take on another regime change/occupation/nation building sequence any time soon, but we'll likely find some other stupid thing to do.

For what it's worth, I put this out on the street a while back. It is part of the discussion currently on the hill as politicians and policy makers grapple to craft solutions to a problem they do not well understand, that in turn the believe they can sell to their constituency back home.

(There are aspects of my proposal, such as not calling what we are doing in Afghanistan a "war" that causes such a radical change of perspective that many can understand, but struggle with how that makes them look when it goes to their electors back home).

I quite agree that good and inclusive governance would solve Afghanistan's problems. i just don't think the US has the ability to impose or create good and inclusive governance in Afghanistan.

I still don't know why so many Americans seem so surprised and so offended that Afghans installed as a government by Americans still govern like Afghans. Who would possibly have expected that?

[Ken White]

I don't really think the impetus toward prolonged occupation and "nation-building" efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan came from DoD, vested interests or not. I recall the main agitators there being a civilian clique, actually rather small and with no significant constituency. They just happened to be on the spot post - 9/11 with an explanation and a plan, which nobody else was offering. It wasn't a very good plan, but it was superficially attractive: it was big, it could be made to sound noble, and it involved smacking around a bunch of Muslims, a significant domestic political imperative in those days. GWB bought it, and the rest is history.

I wonder if the Michael Ledeens of the world ever go back and read the tripe they published in those days...

DoD (minus a few...) and the Army wanted little to do with Afghanistan and nothing to do with Iraq.

However, that vested interest primes the pump and gives civilian deciders -- Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 42 , Obama and all their hangers-on a big toy with which to play. And play they will.

If DoD would put the national interest ahead of their budget, manpower and general clout, we'd all be better off. Of course if the policy wonks, ala Ledeen or Nyel and crews would do the same, who knows what might happen. I'll not hold my breath waiting for either thing to occur...

[Dayuhan]

Of course if the policy wonks, ala Ledeen or Nyel and crews would do the same, who knows what might happen.

Wonks? Wonkers? For all these years I've been writing those words with and "a" instead of an "o". Guess I had it wrong... maybe.

[Ken White]

Two coins of the same side -- or something like that...

[Bob's World]

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/as...923580846.html

An interesting article on several levels regarding a growing IDP problem and also a blaming of ALP.

Some quick takes: If so many people leave where we "C-H-B" one must ask why? Why do the poulaces fear being brought under GIRoA control?

Blaming ALP: Karzai hates this element of now official security that arguably draws more patronage to local (below district) leaders than to him through his appointees.

[Steve the Planner]

Don't disagree with much of what was said, but, in an appropriate after action autopsy of both Iraq and Afghanistan, in my view, would indicate that many things could have been done better, with less loss of life and limb, less waste of money and resources, and more effective engagement of Iraqis and Afghans in shaping a post-departure environment that was more beneficial, and less conflict-ridden.

As one whose belated mission was not to win in Iraq, but to help extricate us from it, I absolutely believe that same fresh wind needs to blow through the Afghan mission: Given the new resources and time frame, what can be accomplished in this limited period to improve the post-departure environment in the process of our relatively rapid wind-down?

That is a very different problem/objective/mission fraught with relevance even to the likes of Fuchs. OK, now we are leaving. What is our best path for Afghans?

Chaos. Mass retaliations. Renewed factional and regional conflicts. Institutional and society collapse. Economic decompression (the bends). Potentially millions of civilian refugees trapped in between the next round of the Big Game.

These are, by default, likely outcomes absent some very serious thinking, planning and execution.

With "winning" now off the table, what to do next?

[Dayuhan]

Why do the populaces fear being brought under GIRoA control?

Do we know that GIoA control is what they fear?

Maybe they run because they don't want to be in a contested area where the GIRoA rules by day and the Taliban rule by night. That's like being the puck in a really nasty game of hockey: everyone slaps you around and when the game is over you're left out in the cold. I can imagine people wanting to bail.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

You mean the GIRoA that includes, or excludes, the wayward cousins?

The one that embraces or enshrouds women?

The one whose army includes or excludes Talibs?

It's defies credibility, at this late stage, that a serving US officer does not understand Afghan resistance to centralized government control under the Karzai regime.

But seriously folks, that ain't gonna happen during our watch.

Like you said: "Don't put me and my family in a firing line" is a pretty good survival strategy.

[Steve the Planner]

The recent IDP report raises troubling contradictions in the US's perception of the security value of local police, and the refugee agencies reports to the contrary.

More troubling is the food report---that instead of feeding 7 million (one quarter of Afghanistan's putative population, UN only has funding for less than 4 million.

In Iraq, we were faced with a devastating drought, but the solution mandated improved logistical relief strategies, since some minimum level of water was always available.

In Afghanistan, if only enough food aid for "women and children," the result is, regrettably, predictable, including a substantial renewal of illicit activities, social instability, and economic disruption.

As a social analyst, I would be much more concerned with food shortages than Pakistan (where, arguably, the same problem exists), and its military threats. 450 rockets ill-targeted rockets can not do as much damage as 3 million newly-starving refugees.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan:

You mean the GIRoA that includes, or excludes, the wayward cousins?

The one that embraces or enshrouds women?

The one whose army includes or excludes Talibs?

It's defies credibility, at this late stage, that a serving US officer does not understand Afghan resistance to centralized government control under the Karzai regime.

But seriously folks, that ain't gonna happen during our watch.

Like you said: "Don't put me and my family in a firing line" is a pretty good survival strategy.

When it comes to people leaving town and becoming "internally displaced", my gut feel is that it isn't about resistance to or fear of the Karzai government (or anyone ese), and that who includes, excludes, shrouds or embraces who. It's probably more about folks seeing a big fight coming and not wanting to be in the middle of it.

I have to wonder, on a local level, how many are really resisting centralized government and how many are backing the side they think is most likely to win. As you suggest, survival strategies often trump the question of what future anyone wants for the country. In general, not getting killed today has a higher priority than what sort of governance one thinks is best for the country... especially when you assume as a given that all governance is bad, and the best one can hope for is something least bad for you.

[Steve the Planner]

"...all of them imaginary."

[Bob's World]

This article makes a bold leap in connecting IDPs to an ALP program that is less than a year old. Seriously, someone is grinding an ax or using this reporter as a hand puppet.

As to why people leave their homes during the clear phase, that is obvious. No one want to have their family in the middle of a fire fight. Why they don't return is another matter entirely.

Land disputes are one of the biggest issues in Afghanistan. Every time the regime changes (and it has changed pretty often over the past 20 years) there are radical changes of patronage winners and losers. The losers who can leave, leave; The winners then move in and take over the good land, jobs, etc. Rich farm land such as lies along the Helmand or the Arghandab rivers, where much of our C-H-B operations have taken place, served to evict non-Northern Alliance patrons for replacement by those more in favor with the current regime. If anything, ALP is an obstacle to GIRoA being able to evict people from their homes to award some more favored tribe or family.

This article pokes a sharp stick at ALP and night raids; while not a fan of night raids, I suggest one gets closer to the truth when they follow the money, and money in Afghanistan follows the patronage and follows the land.

[Fuchs]

Rich farm land such as lies along the Helmand or the Arghandab rivers, where much of our C-H-B operations have taken place, served to evict non-Northern Alliance patrons for replacement by those more in favor with the current regime. If anything, ALP is an obstacle to GIRoA being able to evict people from their homes to award some more favored tribe or family.

Wait !

Do you say that NATO is enabling now what if fought against in 1999 ?

Does this mean now it's according to our own assertions legit to bomb us?

[Bob's World]

It is lost to most, and beyond comprehension to westerners who is first in right on these land ownership matters. But we essentially enabled the current big shuffle the day we sided with the Northern Alliance to pursue our own ends in Afghanistan, so that horse is long out of the barn.

Only through reconciliation that leads to some future shared governance will this issue ever be reolved. I would not take any odds as to when that happens though. Certainly nothing we are currently supporting with GIRoA is directed toward breaking this age-old cycle, thus the enduring insurgency...

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Land tenure by political favor is not a viable way forward, whether in the past, present or future.

It undermines that basic concept of community essential to a stable society.

[Bob's World]

Bob:

Land tenure by political favor is not a viable way forward, whether in the past, present or future.

It undermines that basic concept of community essential to a stable society.

And yet it happens over and over again in Afghanistan.

How does one possibly arrive at a "just" resolution when vitually every title of any value could be disputed by previous owners or their heirs who have reasonable claims that they were illegally disposessed of their land?

A good laydown from this report:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3E2AD065B3616B2D802570B7005876F4/$file/Land_disputes_NRC_june04.pdf



"The underlying causes of land and property disputes

The main causes of land disputes in Afghanistan can be summarized under the following headings:

· Conflict. Since the invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979 Afghanistan has experienced 25 years of almost continual conflict that has caused millions of people to flee from their homes. During their absence, these people’s land and property was often occupied, or bought and sold and now, as they return home, they are demanding its restitution.

· Regime changes. Successive governments have violently replaced one another over the last 30 years and different regimes have pursued different land policies, often based on rewarding their own supporters through favorable land allocations.

· Unclear ownership. The unorganized land registration system, the large number of missing title deeds, and the fact that disputed land has often been sold many times over, makes it very difficult to determine who owns what.

· Reliance on customary documents and mechanisms. Many land and property transactions take place without being officially approved by the courts, using customary documents or traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as Shuras and Jirgas.

· Land shortage. Only 12 per cent of the land area of Afghanistan is suitable for arable farming. A further 45 per cent is currently being used as pastureland by both settled and nomadic farmers, but tenure arrangements over pastureland are often unclear and disputes are frequent. Land pressure is exacerbated by Afghanistan’s high birth rate and the rapid return of so many refugees in 2002.

· Landlessness. A large number of people in Afghanistan have no land and when they return back from exile they sometimes occupy other people’s land, or government-owned land because they have nowhere else to go.

· Tribal and ethnic disputes. Competition for scarce resources, such as land and water, is often linked to ethnic or tribal tensions or to other political conflicts.

· Corruption. There are numerous reliable reports that members of the judiciary and executive organs are abusing their positions for personal or political interests, or due to pressure exercised by other powerful members of society.

· Lack of a rule of law. Even where the courts, public authorities or customary dispute resolution mechanisms issue fair decisions there is no guarantee that these can be enforced. A large number of powerful commanders, and their supporters, consider themselves to be ‘above the la w’ and the lack of an effectively functioning legal system means that many people rely on the use of force to settle disputes."

[Fuchs]

And yet it happens over and over again in Afghanistan.

How does one possibly arrive at a "just" resolution when vitually every title of any value could be disputed by previous owners or their heirs who have reasonable claims that they were illegally disposessed of their land?

Communist land socialization. Communist laws also work against Sharia.
Man, the commies were about to fix Afghanistan in '79???

[Pete]

Chaos. Mass retaliations. Renewed factional and regional conflicts. Institutional and society collapse. Economic decompression (the bends).

At least it would be them doing it to them, not us. I doubt Afghanistan can be turned into a functioning country.

[Dayuhan]

And yet it happens over and over again in Afghanistan.

Exactly. It happens over and over, predictably. That's the way the political culture is structured.

What baffles me is why anyone would think we could change that by decree, or that Afghans installed as a government by Americans would cease to govern like Afghans and start governing like Americans. They won't.

We can't change the way Afghans govern. They can, but they will have to do it their own way, it will take time, and there will be violence involved. That was built into the picture from the start, our problem is not the way they govern, but our failure to recognize that reality and plan around it from the start. That's something we'd do well to remember in places like Libya.

Democracy cannot be installed. It has to grow, and that growth is a long and tortuous process.