Winning the War in Afghanistan

[ganulv]

Just curious about all these contradictory frameworks. If Afghanistan is actually a fractured (valleys), regional, or multi-ethnic non-melting pot, what exactly drives and supports the all or nothing framework of "Taliban vs. Non-Taliban."

Why not, for example, just arm the hell out of the other minorities, then get out of the way.

One of the members of the faculty of my graduate program recommended the following course of action in
an article published ten years ago:

It is for this reason that priority should not be given to the question of who will rule Afghanistan. Instead, we must ask how should a post-Taliban Afghanistan be governed? Any attempt to re-impose a strong centralized regime controlled by a single family, clan, tribe, or ethnic group, whether Pashtoon or non-Pashtoon, must be and will be strongly resisted. Strong, centralized regimes in multi-ethnic societies such as Afghanistan tend to breed nepotism, cronyism, and internal colonialism by the ruling clique.

Instead, the international community should encourage and empower a government that builds on and recognizes the crucial role of the self-governing local communities that emerged in the period of anti-Soviet jihad during the 1980s. They should encourage a government which accepts the principles of community self-governance at the village, subdistrict, district, and provincial levels, and is committed to the formation of a broad-based federal structure that reflects the ethnic composition of Afghan society as a whole.

The local autonomy and political integrity of every segment of Afghanistan’s ethnic and sectarian social mosaic must be guaranteed by a new national constitution and a decentralized federal governance structure. Only then will it be possible for the peoples of Afghanistan to begin rebuilding their shattered communities and regain their self-confidence in a democratic, multinational Afghanistan.

And here is his take on things eight years later.

[omarali50]

One obvious problem is that people actually DO want to have some trade and travel outside their own valley and some protection from brigands next door. Total anarchy is very tiresome. So tiresome that when the taliban enforced order, it was welcomed in many parts of the country. A broader division into Northern, Herat, Hazara and South-Eastern Afghanistan is possible, but since borders are not defined, will inevitably lead to war. Also, the small but influential educated population does have a notion of "Afghan" identity and some degree of patriotic feeling for a united Afghanistan. Finally, while Islamic solidarity is not enough to solve all problems, its appeal for newly "educated" madressah and school graduates is sufficient to ensure that it too will be used as a basis for a more ambitious program of unity.
A united Afghanistan under a reasonable and not too locally intrusive regime is the best option. The current flawed regime COULD evolve into a workable arrangement although its not an easy job. This difficult job becomes practically impossible if neighbors devote considerable resources to undermining it and provide a safe haven and a viable alternative waiting in the wings...but maybe it cannot be fixed. There is no law saying everything WILL be fixed.

[Steve the Planner]

Ganulv:

I was involved in an Int'l Reconstruction Forum Last Night---Post-Disaster.

How do you find ways for government to create the minimum framework for reconstruction---in order to empower communities to take it from there.

Too much government will trounce recovery, make people and communities stand aside of bicker over: Where is mine?

Omar:

I think its is the basic concept of economics that drives and supports inter-community relations, that later becomes something recognized as a country, or in the worst case, creates targeted purposes for the basis of a meaningful relationship between nation, community and people.

I grow tomatoes in my valley. Two valleys over is a city that needs my products. How is this going to get worked out?

If the army from some pother city or region comes and plops itself down in the middle of the road, all three valleys could get screwed. What purpose does it serve that supports each community, or meaningfully protects some interest of two from the interference by a third?

That exchange and resolution process is how towns and areas become regions, regions become states, and states devised compacts that equate to nation.

Americans don't understand that in 1950's US, to drive from Washington to Norfolk was impossible: One local speed trap after another; everybody's brother-in-law needed the cash from wary travelers. So you took a Night Boat back and forth on the national waterways.

The compact of federal roads not locally policed was an underpinning of the Interstate system, but was not painless along its route, where many places were bypassed and the old ways collapsed. That system, and the compacts and changes that made it work, did not happen overnight, had an important and valuable purpose, and left some in the dust.

Development and Planning are about choices, which inherently include winners, losers and consequences.

None of this stuff has been broached in Afghanistan (and may never be on a national basis). A federal road, free from local obstructions and bandits (legal and otherwise), let alone an international one, becomes essential at some point for prosperity across Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (and the points North and South), but the compacts have not emerged yet as locally, nationally or internationally supported venues.

I have actually always been intrigued by the Pashtuns as some of the last of the mohicans---valley warriors with no future and lots of challenges---trying to rely on their intimidating geography, customs and practices to keep the old ways unimpeded, but they have been in constant spurts of confrontations with foreign powers of all varieties.

As more resources are found and exploited, the Hindus River Valley packs with people, the international region presses forward, their gooses are cooked if they don't (a) change to carve out a realistic accommodation; or (b) assimilate into undifferentiated existence. Just the way it is.

21st Century is not the 18th, and they are not fighting Flashman and the sporadic British excursions into their homeland. History, population pressure, economic geography, and resource demands will run them over, but it ain't going to be smooth and easy for anyone.

[JMA]

Dahuyan's point about classic colonialism is strong, but why would China want the trouble or bother of managing "Afghanistan." They just want unfettered access and influence over the resources that matter to them (which are not really national, are they?).

In Africa, they are not out to control deserts or cities (no governance interest whatsoever)---just the resources.

The people, within what ever "terms of trade" allow, and protection of China's interests from harm, are free to do what ever they want culturally, socially, religiously, and politically.

It seems to me that because the 'western' approach in places like Africa (in general) and Afghanistan is totally insanely incompetent that somehow (mainly seemingly because it is different) the Chinese approach is smarter.

The Chinese approach has not been tested. When the regimes (who have been bought by the Chinese) fail to protect the Chinese 'investments' (which are being more readily seen as the looting of national resources) or the regime changes and the new one also wants a piece of the action we will see how the Chinese react. Of course one would expect western countries to throw the odd spanner in the works to make it more difficult for the Chinese.

I would be cautious in presenting the once isolationist Chinese as savvy international players.

[JMA]

Ganulv:

I was involved in an Int'l Reconstruction Forum Last Night---Post-Disaster.

How do you find ways for government to create the minimum framework for reconstruction---in order to empower communities to take it from there.

Too much government will trounce recovery, make people and communities stand aside of bicker over: Where is mine?

At last some sense is being spoken at these talk shops.

Pity no one had the smarts to realise this 50, 30 or even 20 years ago.

The traditional donor nations have a lot to answer for due to the devastation caused by past policies.

Hint: if no local empowerment exists before a natural disaster none must be expected immediately thereafter. To try to establish this post natural disaster (and probably against the wishes of the government exercising central control) is plain ridiculous.

[Fuchs]

I'm a bit surprised by a small wave of very optimistic reports from Afghanistan (British area) - by persons who are almost certainly not planted for propaganda (I knew them a bit for a while).

These reports are about how things are turning - not merely because of higher force density, but especially in regard to examples of motivated and capable AN forces and civilians turning their backs on the TB.


Now I do wonder whether these anecdotes represent something larger. After all, there are still more than enough bad news.

[davidbfpo]

Fuchs,

Could you provide links to:

.. a small wave of very optimistic reports from Afghanistan (British area) - by persons who are almost certainly not planted for propaganda...

[davidbfpo]

JMA posed an important strategic question, albeit with application beyond Afghanistan:

The Chinese approach has not been tested. When the regimes (who have been bought by the Chinese) fail to protect the Chinese 'investments' (which are being more readily seen as the looting of national resources) or the regime changes and the new one also wants a piece of the action we will see how the Chinese react.

This issue appeared once briefly at an Oxford conference on international terrorism, in the Africa session; remarks were made about the Tan-Zam railway and the social consequences with dual heritage / mixed race children.

We may have a test case in Zambia, where in a democratic election the new President has indicated a different stance on foreign investors:

..he has frequently criticised foreign mining firms - often from China - about labour conditions. While the party has disputed media reports that it is anti-Chinese, his election is likely to shake up the way contracts are awarded, our correspondent says.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15039094 For more on the new President: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15034694

[Steve the Planner]

David:

Good catches.

I just don't believe that the "Chinese" model is, in fact a development model.

It is a completely gratuitous and self-serving "economic" model intended exclusively to meet Chinese resource objectives (Did I say "purely market-based?).

If they, like our US industries in the 19th Century, need a railroad, they will get one built or more elsewhere. The railroad was not built to promote development outside the context it served. It was not built to win any hearts and minds (COIN), and it had no external purpose, objective or intention.

It did, however, have consequences, positive and negative, across the economic landscape.

To the extent that local and domestic "costs" increase in these resource areas, they will simply move on to other places. It is pure self interest.

The question of whether this tried and true economic model creates significant political consequences, induces or sustains local corruption and bribery, disenfranchises some, eradicates others, and, in the end, is sustainable or desirable, is a completely different matter.

Basic self-interest, as with China, is a negotiated and usually pretty transparent process with a host country, region or area. For them, the equation is simple, but that does not mean that it is for the counterparty,nor that there are not substantially different (or even more important) internalized counterparty issues.

Apples and Oranges cannot be interbred, but they can, sometimes, make a good fruit punch (or go stale).

[Steve the Planner]

PS:

In the next month, the planning profession has upcoming three interesting talks at the National Building Museum: One on the Legacy of Jane Jacobs; one on recent economic sustainability issues (against ever-changing dynamics); and one on urban sustainability issues. The focus, as always, is on how to effectively engage communities to attempt (always attempting) to tackle their ongoing (they NEVER go away) problems.

Aren't these, somehow, something that COIN should learn to understand and embrace if it is to accomplish its intended goals?

The World really doesn't change just because the Pentagon creates acronyms (and budgets) for it.

[JMA]

JMA posed an important strategic question, albeit with application beyond Afghanistan:

This issue appeared once briefly at an Oxford conference on international terrorism, in the Africa session; remarks were made about the Tan-Zam railway and the social consequences with dual heritage / mixed race children.

We may have a test case in Zambia, where in a democratic election the new President has indicated a different stance on foreign investors:

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15039094 For more on the new President: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15034694

Zambia is a worthy case study to watch in this regard.

This article Thanks China, now go home: buy-up of Zambia revives old colonial fears has some interesting comments:

First the 'Oops' moment (when they realise they jumped from the frying pan into the fire):

"Our textile factories can't compete with cheap Chinese imports subsidised by a foreign government. People are saying: 'We've had bad people before. The whites were bad, the Indians were worse but the Chinese are worst of all.'"

...well as they say in the classics... you make your bed now you must sleep in it.

Then a more cerebral argument:

"The government needs to be very clear about what kind of investment it wants. If it's just shipping out resources and shipping in cheap goods and people that's not to our benefit. We in Zambia need to be very careful of this new scramble for Africa. What's happening is that the Chinese are very aggressive. They have a strategic plan."

For those with a greater interest in this aspect:

China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Zambia

[ganulv]

Ganulv:

I was involved in an Int'l Reconstruction Forum Last Night---Post-Disaster.

How do you find ways for government to create the minimum framework for reconstruction---in order to empower communities to take it from there.

My limited knowledge of the history and current situation in Afghanistan (some of it second hand, most of it from a greater remove) leads me to believe that the average Afghan has good reason to be suspicious of the motives of the national government. If this is indeed the case, I would think that large scale infrastructure programs and extensive training of the ANP are doomed to fail (not necessarily forever, but at least as long as the distrust of the/a national government remains).

In the effort to provide the right answers the asking of the right questions may have been overlooked. There has been so much discussion of Afghanistan as a failed state (a mouthtalk term if ever there were one) that the fact that Afghans seem to do well enough at governance at more local levels seems to be being too often overlooked. Really, does it get much more patronizing than to look at local communities that survived the Red Army and the Taliban and think that government in a box giftwrapped with Western paper is the answer to what ails them? Now, if the fact is that some of us think their societies are broken because of the way women are treated then we are dealing with questions of relative values and that’s a horse of a different color.

[davidbfpo]

The issue of 'How will China react to lost investments?' is now in a separate thread as it deserves one and not to be lost within the Afghan conflict. Link to new thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14271

[Steve the Planner]

ganulv:

Problem definitions are job one: What, exactly is the problem for which resources are to be addressed to obtain progress.

We continue to ask the wrong questions, then provide sometimes weird and changing resources that do not seem to create the progress towards the ever-changing goals.

Here's a simple problem definition/goal statement: eradicated AQ; AQ equals Taliban.

Solution: Nuclear, chemical and biological assault on large swaths of Afghanistan and Pakistan; leave no stone unturned and salt the fields (Carthage).

Another: Segregate the the Taliban from AQ.

Solution: Targeted strategy to make it more trouble than its is worth.

Another: Assist Afghan civil society (primarily sub-national) in limiting the dilatory effects of radical Taliban activities (AQ, international attrocities).

Solution: Incremental, nuances and long-term civil engagement (Strategic patience) in support of sub-national systems while increasing the "costs" and "consequences" (limited military) for those involved in supporting dilatory activities.

Another: Create a new Afghanistan modeled on delusions of nebulous Western goals applied to a different society, place, culture and economy.

Solution: Scratch head, pour in endless resources, change strategy often. Do the same over and over.

[Ken White]

Go, smite the bad actors mightily, leave, tell the UN to fix it, send money.



Far more effective and much cheaper (in all aspects, including human misery and injury) than most PC alternatives.

[omarali50]

Ken, a lot of the disagreements are due to difference in opinion regarding who the bad guys are; Are they some crazy arabs who happen to have found a base in Afpak? or are they the entire top-to-bottom network of Islamist warriors who operate with and without state support and patronage? Or are they just the high level ideologues and organizers within the state who operate the network (meaning one can leave the foot soldiers alone and go straight for the head)? or just the particular people involved in plotting and carrying out a particular attack?
In my own view, changing the strategic direction of the Pakistani military was more important than finding and killing any particular crazy Arab (because without state support this is just a minor headache and not worthy of a trillion dollar bondoogle). I also think this was possible...maybe is still possible. In this view, I remain in a minority even on this forum.
Over to Robert sahib

[Ken White]

Are they some crazy arabs who happen to have found a base in Afpak?

White's Apothegm.

...the entire top-to-bottom network of Islamist warriors who operate with and without state support and patronage?

With: Diplomacy backed by White's Apothegm, robustly applied -- once or twice, won't have to do it often after the first couple.

Without: Better Intelligence, robust covert action bribed / coerced / somehow obtained -- or not, circumstances dependent -- cooperation / concurrence from the hosting government(s). Again backed by White's Apothegm.

We (the US) are not stupid (though there are pockets of ignorance in high places) but we are hide bound and inflexible. We are also entirely too internally focused politically. We have folks capable of adequate flexibility but the system will not unleash them due to said ignorance, conservatism and it cannot or will not anticipate foreign problems because it is too self involved...

Or are they just the high level ideologues and organizers within the state who operate the network (meaning one can leave the foot soldiers alone and go straight for the head)? or just the particular people involved in plotting and carrying out a particular attack?

Yes and 'C', both of the above...

In my own view, changing the strategic direction of the Pakistani military was more important than finding and killing any particular crazy Arab (because without state support this is just a minor headache and not worthy of a trillion dollar bondoogle). I also think this was possible...maybe is still possible. In this view, I remain in a minority even on this forum.

Allow me to join you in that possibly minority position and posit that our big mistook was conflating Afghanistan (Problem B) and Pakistan (Problem A). We also put 'B' before 'A' and that wasn't wise. Pakistan should've been engaged long before we did (another thread, that...) and more cooperatively. Afghanistan should have been hit when it was or even earlier (not like we didn't know there were problems brewing there...) and been clear of US troops by, say, January or February of 2002.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

Right.

So, instead of one problem set, now we have two:

How to back out of problem B (Afghanistan) so that we can refocus on problem A (Pakistan)?

How to do this while placating the internal politics that misled to B in the first place?

[ganulv]

How to back out of problem B (Afghanistan) so that we can refocus on problem A (Pakistan)?

How to do this while placating the internal politics that misled to B in the first place?

I have no idea how much it would mean in real terms at this point, but recognition of the Durand Line by the Afghan government would not hurt matters. It might be a nice goodwill gesture to a government that tends to have hang-ups with unrecognized borders. But who really knows how the string-pullers would react? As Ken said, that’s another thread.

[Ray]

It is an interesting suggestion that that the Durand Line be recognised.

Even when there was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and were backed by Pakistan, they rejected the Pakistan Govt's suggestion that the Durand Line be recognised.

It is obvious that the Afghans are not willing to reconcile to the fact that the Pashtun community is divided by a line.

The fact that there was little control over the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa apparently has given rise to the idea to the Pashtuns that there never was such a line and so it can never be.

The Chinese model, while assisting in building infrastructure, is basically modelled for Chinese economy boost and that the countries being assisted are slowly realising, giving grounds for discontent.

In Africa, the mass influx of Chinese petty businessmen who are driving the locals out of business through sharp practices and cheap Chinese goods is another aspect that is causing serious issues with the locals.

The Chinese, not used to the laid back ways of the locals towards building infrastructure, are using Chinese labour. This too is causing heartburns.