Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bill Moore]

Steve, you provided a great justification for specialists in general, but tapped danced all around my question and didn't provide an answer. We clearly provided all the specialists you mentioned above and more, what we didn't have was a capable generalist to pull them altogether in a cohesive way. More importantly, the nations we invaded didn't have that person or persons, or perhaps our actions prevented them from achieving power.

[JMA]

We certainly have; should've learned from Viet Nam that such interventions are foolish. We did, a bit and other than a few little aberrations, we avoided any major commitment along those lines for 30 years. Hopefully, within the next 30 -- and with two strikes to learn from -- we will grow a bit smarter. So there may be no "will."

The interventions are only foolish because the generals are not allowed to win. Can't remember anywhere where the US forces were defeated.

I don't agree on either count. "It is going to be used" is awfully positive and while you may be correct, I would hope -- as I said above, -- we get a bit smarter. There are other, better ways to handle such situations.

The capability doesn't have to built, it has to available which is not the same thing. Adjustments to training, some underway should be adequate IF they are not halted.

I said the capability is needed because it is going to be used again and again. You disagree. Your disagreement is based on the hope that this is not true or that despite when you know the need is coming that you should not prepare accordingly?

Politicians get smarter? Individually yes, they are like coyotes but rather than smarter they get more cunning. The problem is that just when a president starts to be in a position to learn from his screw-ups a new one is elected and he brings along a whole entourage of smart guys who have all the answers. When they had a good few thousand soldiers killed and/or maimed they move on and the cycle repeats itself. Its the US electorate that needs to get smart.

We've been in several wars that weren't expected. They didn't all come in irregular form, think Korea and Kuwait...

Then you use the balance of the active and reserve forces (all 2.5m of them - remember I said select and train 0.5m (half active, half reserve) to train for irregular wars).

We have had a skill deterioration, no question. That is entirely the fault of the training establishment who took decent training programs and tossed them to adopt the atrocious Task, Condition and Standard process, probably so someone could say he brought great change on his watch. We have -- too slowly -- learned that was indeed a mistake and the Army is now groping for a way to fix their problem without admitting they used a flawed process for 30 years. That's the bad news -- the good news is that some units transcend that norm and can and in fact do those things, though there are not enough of them.

Come on Ken we live in the ear of the spin doctor. No problem for them to sell change on the basis that with the 21st Century have come new challenges which the military must adapt to. My fear would be that after 30 years there is no one left who remembers how it should be done.

Maybe, maybe not. Probably not. The tour length is a Congressional issue...

Congress again? Remind me who the enemy is again?

No it isn't. Even dumb politicians eventually learn a little, even dumb American politicians whose egos do not allow the reading of history -- the Army needs to point that out (acknowledging that dumb Generals are another story...).

As I said (above) the politicians rotate so there is always a new crop of guys with big egos who know everything.

As I told you long before it started -- and he isn't surrounded by military advisors. By law, he only has one -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He talks to others on occasion but my impression is he talks and they listen...

You were correct with your knowledge of how things work in the US, I was wrong in thinking that because the boys off that carrier could have wrapped it all up over a weekend that would be the preferred option.

I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief. Hitler thought that because he was head of state he somehow inherited the powers of a master military strategist - and see where that got him. The same bloated ego seems to be the problem with US Presidents. I sympathise.

Same rank. There's some slight merit in what you say but it's far from totally accurate. It's also far more complex than moral courage -- the degree of military subordination to civilian authority in the US is hard for many from other nations to fathom. It has a very pernicious effect...

Well it seems the US general staff is full of "yes sir, yes sir, three bags fill sir" types. What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? "

I can agree with the sentiment and all it conveys but must point out that nowadays those Battalions come from different units, frequently from different nations and small wars are only fought by all those Battalions if their higher headquarters and / or nation allow them to fight and do not otherwise intrude too heavily...

What, Perfesser, is your solution to that little rub?

Don't complicate it Ken, play to your strengths. All you have to really worry about is what you have control over. Don't concern yourself with the token gesture forces from nations who are just going through the motions.

But remember:

* If the government you are supporting is corrupt or illegitimate or both,

* If the local government's troops are crap or non-existent,

* If your commander's hands and those of his troops are tied by political limitations and RoE,

* If your military deployments lack continuity at all levels,

* If the war is seriously unpopular at home,

... then you have no chance of success!

[Dayuhan]

The interventions are only foolish because the generals are not allowed to win. Can't remember anywhere where the US forces were defeated.

Interventions in support of unpopular, inept, unsustainable governments that have little or no capacity to sustain themselves, without popular support at home are foolish no matter what you allow your generals to do. Even if you manage the temporary "win" of a transient military defeat of the insurgents, you still don't achieve the long term objectives, because those rely on a local capacity that doesn't exist and that you don't have the power to bring into existence.

The only non-foolish thing to do in these cases is to avoid any long-term involvement. If there's something there that really needs to be done, do it and get the hell out. Once you choose to stay, you're in the merde no matter what your strategy and tactics are. Strategy and tactics are the servants of policy and if the policy goals are unachievable (e.g. "install a sustainable western-style democracy" in Afghanistan") no strategy or tactics will make much difference.

I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief. Hitler thought that because he was head of state he somehow inherited the powers of a master military strategist - and see where that got him. The same bloated ego seems to be the problem with US Presidents. I sympathise.

Fortunately our foolish Presidents drag us into survivable conflicts. If we'd had a Hitler we'd have charged off and fought with the Soviet Union and China instead of meddling in little messes, and there would likely not be a United States today.

What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? "

That option was of course available, but it would have left the US in the completely unacceptable position of being responsible for the aftermath. Next thing you know we'd be backing an unpopular and unsustainable government with little or no capacity to sustain itself against any number of insurgents, with little or no popular support back home: foolish. Much better to have it the way it went. Of course it's a mess and it will continue to be a mess; post-Daffy Libya was always going to be a mess. It's not our mess, and that was the critical objective that had to be met.

[Ken White]

The interventions are only foolish because the generals are not allowed to win. Can't remember anywhere where the US forces were defeated.

Awright. Great! Unbelievable -- but you're finally coming to understand the problem...

I said the capability is needed because it is going to be used again and again. You disagree. Your disagreement is based on the hope that this is not true or that despite when you know the need is coming that you should not prepare accordingly?

Don't be snide and condescending, that's unnecessary. Not based on either -- it's based on a broader understanding of US policy and polity than you have or seem willing to accept. We do a lot of stupid things for a variety of good and bad reasons but we aren't therefor necessarily stupid and we do learn, if slowly.

I see glimmers of hope in that direction -- the one potential flaw is the 'do good' mentality. Those squirrels are quite dangerous (see Libya...).

Politicians get smarter?... Its the US electorate that needs to get smart.

Not so. They're smart enough -- but they tend to be far too tolerant of well known political foibles. That seems to be happening. Let us pray iot does.

...No problem for them to sell change on the basis that with the 21st Century have come new challenges which the military must adapt to. My fear would be that after 30 years there is no one left who remembers how it should be done.

In order, yes but the US Army is absolutely and insanely determined to never admit it makes mistakes. Everyone in the Army knows that's foolish and most Civilians know that also, yet they persist. It's one of their biggest flaws.

That last is more than a valid concern and it is evident that it has already occurred. Too many are reluctant to look at how things were done (or more importantly, why...) but a few are researching. The Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group is a repository of knowledge and good sense due to its wise use of retired persons as contractors and it is trying to affect training. It is moving to TRADOC and that has potential to be beneficial. There are other pockets of rediscovering basics and common sense, we can only hope they are encouraged and grow. Too early to tell but at this point the prognosis is marginal trending to favorable. We'll see.

Congress again? Remind me who the enemy is again?

They mean well, really -- but warfighting is WAY down their list of priorities while the happiness of Mom and Pop, the Voters, are way up on that list.

You were correct with your knowledge of how things work in the US, I was wrong in thinking that because the boys off that carrier could have wrapped it all up over a weekend that would be the preferred option.

Those days are gone, period / full stop. They have been for over 30 years and you missed it at the time because you were busy. Two important points; that pertains not just to the US; and that reality MUST be a part of planning.

I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief...I sympathise.

Thank you, we need all the help we can get on that score. Egos are a terrible thing...

My personal belief is that there should be no Commander in Chief. The Government should give its order to a Director of Military Operations who must give a minimally directive mission to geographic or type Commander who will design and execute plans to accomplish that mission. Not to be, I don't suppose, we must have bureaucracy...

Well it seems the US general staff is full of "yes sir, yes sir, three bags fill sir" types. What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? "

The system has always kept those guys (and there are always some stooging about...) under tight control. That control always existed and has since well titled Mad Anthony Wayne retired. It has tightened over the years with only rare exceptions, generally during the Civil War and to a lesser extent in WW II. Since then and particularly since Viet Nam for a variety of both Army and Societal reasons it has worsened, I foresee no major reduction barring an existential war.

...play to your strengths. All you have to really worry about is what you have control over. Don't concern yourself with the token gesture forces from nations who are just going through the motions.

I presume the personal pronoun is directed at the US. I agree with you but US consensus on that score is lacking due to an absence of need to focus. Each situation is different and as you know, politics of the day hold sway. It is critical that non-US observer bear in mind that US foreign, defense and military policy is almost entirely driven by American domestic politics. Little -- too little -- attention is paid to the realities internationally.

But remember:
* If the government you are supporting is corrupt or illegitimate or both,
* If the local government's troops are crap or non-existent,
* If your commander's hands and those of his troops are tied by political limitations and RoE,
* If your military deployments lack continuity at all levels,
* If the war is seriously unpopular at home,

... then you have no chance of success!

Amazing!!! Absolutely correct (and thus my preference for avoiding such doomed escapades).

After two years you've finally learned the things you blithely ignored that I tried to tell you at the outset...

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

I suppose the issue of specialist and generalist has to do with the task at hand.

I spent enough time in Iraq with the truly magnificent men from Ft. Campbell to know that, within their military tasks, the breadth and depth of their training and expertise made them both capable specialists and generalists.

Where, I believe Dayuhan, Ken and I may differ with you is the nature and purpose of the task.

If, after 2003, Iraq was about transition to civilian control, OR long term administration of a failed state, the SF specializations and generalizations are not the key issue in answering basic next step questions?

How many Americans does it take to change an Iraqi lightbulb?

My guess? About 37. First, a response team to take out the anti-US sniper who shot out the light bulb (plus the ground clearance, air support, TOC oversight, and medevac system). Second, the bulb insertion team (plus all of the above). Last, the logistical chain to deliver the light bulb.

How many Iraqis does it take to change an Iraqi light bulb? One. Either they get it from the government (which might not function), or they buy it on the bountiful black market, then screw it in. Note: Any Iraqi with electricity for a light bulb has already had multiple interactions with the black market to fuel and/or operate his generator. A light bulb is a non-issue.

The inherent problem in this math is not a military one, and little of SF expertise can solve it. Possibly quite the opposite---that failing to solve it induces the need for SF fingers in the dyke that would otherwise not be necessary.

How many Americans does it take to change an Afghan light bulb?

Probably a lot more, especially in places where the theory of a light bulb has yet to become a reality.

Specialists in what?

Generalists in what?

[Surferbeetle]

Bill,

So why no unambiguous, beyond a shadow of a doubt, ‘success’ recognizable to all in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 2008-2009 Financial Meltdown, and the current global fight against The Great Depression # 2?

• Has the Mandate of Heaven been bestowed on current leadership (at various levels in our various homelands)?

• Does the institution of Democracy, or our daily choices, provide us with regular chances to do better?

Jim Collins’ Level 5 Hierarchy is interesting to think about when observing foreign and domestic leadership at all levels:

• Level 1: Capable individual. Make contributions through talent and work ethic

• Level 2: Contributing team member. Work effectively with others and contribute to the achievement of group objectives.

• Level 3: Competent managers. Organize people and resources to accomplish predetermined objectives

• Level 4: Effective leaders. Present clear and compelling vision and lead groups to high performance standards.

• Level 5: Executive. Build greatness through a combination of will and humility.

King, W.J., The Unwritten Laws of Business, 2007, Profile Books, LTD, London (Originally published in 1944)

• However menial and trivial your early assignments may appear, give them your best efforts.

• Demonstrate the ability to get things done.

• Develop a “Let’s go see!” attitude.

• One of the first things you owe your supervisor is to keep him or her informed of all significant developments.

• Be as particular as you can in the selection of your supervisor.

• Promises, schedules, and estimates are necessary and important instruments in a well‑ordered business.

• In dealing with customers and outsiders, remember that you represent the company, ostensibly with full responsibility and authority.

[carl]

Mr. Jones and Ken:

At the risk of you guys hunting me down and killing me while I sleep, for you to reject the 3 examples I gave is sophistry. In the cases of the Philippines and the USSR, you impose a definition of victory that is impossible to achieve and in the case of Malaya, you are quibbling about precise definitions.

In the Philippines, we took over from the Spanish, quashed a rebellion, established authority in all the islands and maintained it until we gave it up as we, eventually, planned. We were not driven out. In fact during the war, the Filipinos fought, pretty hard, on our side. That is a clear and decisive victory...unless you decide that only transformation of the Philippines into Switzerland in the Pacific constitutes victory.

As far as the various components of the USSR go, they were all firmly part of that empire until that empire collapsed from within. They didn't cause that empire to collapse, only took advantage of a dissolution that was caused by other factors. To say "describe today's USSR" is like saying (exaggeration for effect alert!) Rome didn't do so hot because France isn't part of Italy now.

In Malaya, a large army of British people defeated an insurgency by some Malayans. It doesn't matter on whose letterhead the orders were written. The fact that the British had complete control is also irrelevant when judging if their efforts can be judged a success. If anything it is a lesson to be learned.

All 3 fit, wealthy, large forces, bureaucratic.

What concerns me though is to dogmatically state that it can't be done might be used as an excuse to forget about something that is hard to do and hard to think about, like we did after Vietnam. It didn't work out so well for us so we just refused to think about it, actively forgot what we learned and told ourselves that was ok because it would never happen again. It did happen again. "It" will always happen again and we have to keep what we learned from being forgotten.

[Ken White]

However, let me first apologize for my lack of clarity -- as my question was stated, your answers of the Philippines and Malaya count -- I still disagreee about the USSR.

...for you to reject the 3 examples I gave is sophistry.

Your opinion, I for one disagree. Let me repeat the question:

"I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting."

Notice there are two questions, we're only working on the first. Aside from the fact that the US at the turn of the 19th Century was big but far from bureaucratic, the fact is that the rebellions in the Philippines continued until we handed over total sovereignty in 1946 -- and continue to this day. However, for the reasons you state, you can call that a 'win' and I'll plead guilty (as I did the last time we did this) for not fully stating my question and putting a 'post WW II' limiter on it -- I did that last time but won't this.

I do not concede on the USSR, they kept a lid on it but their dissolution is part proof they did not win.

...and in the case of Malaya, you are quibbling about precise definitions.

Not really but then again, yes. Again my lack of properly framing my question which should have read:

"I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any intervening large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation in another nation since World War II. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting. (bolded changes to reflect what should've been asked but was not -- my error. )

So you're correct on the Philippines and Malaya. However, I will point out that your counter question on Malaya was "I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not." My answer was not a discounting of Malaya as a win but a (poorly worded) attempt to explain why not; you wrote it doesn't matter on whose letterhead orders were written but it does, a great deal -- because as you also say "If anything it is a lesson to be learned." What I attempted to do was turn that around and say it was a bad example for that very reason -- if you aren't THE government, many things become infinitely more difficult.

In the USSR where the Soviets were the government, they still were not totally successful -- though ala your Philippine example, a lot of those folks did fight for the USSR during WW II -- a lot also fought for the Germans...

What concerns me though is to dogmatically state that it can't be done might be used as an excuse to forget about something that is hard to do and hard to think about, like we did after Vietnam. It didn't work out so well for us so we just refused to think about it, actively forgot what we learned and told ourselves that was ok because it would never happen again. It did happen again. "It" will always happen again and we have to keep what we learned from being forgotten.

I don't believe either Bob'sWorld or I are being dogmatic. We are simply saying one has to choose one's battles -- and we've made some very dumb choices. We can do better. "It" indeed will always happen again and I know we are both aware of that -- the issue is not whether "It" will happen, the issue is how best to respond to "It."

Historically, intervention with a large military force has not been successful. Historically, intervening with military force for 'humanitarian reasons' has also generally done more harm than good. You and I differ on that and we can continue to do so.

[Bill Moore]

So why no unambiguous, beyond a shadow of a doubt, ‘success’ recognizable to all in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 2008-2009 Financial Meltdown, and the current global fight against The Great Depression # 2?

Why? One could argue we had lost the moral high ground by invading Iraq, and any leader that supported our invasion would never be perceived to be legitimate to the Iraqi people who suffered terribly from the invasion and ill planned follow up from the initital combat successes. Whether you concur or not with the justification for invading Iraq, the Iraqi people with the exception of the Kurds, have been pretty disappointed in the results.

In Afghanistan we didn't (and probably still don't) understand what we were getting into, and in a way we lost the moral high ground again when we shifted from our justifiable efforts to kill of AQ to fighting an insurgency focused on ousting a foreign occupier and what is perceived to be their puppet government.

It isn't simply economics, so the light bulb really doesn't matter, what matters is what the people want, yet we refuse to listen and instead insist on telling them what they want, thus your example of 37 people required to change a light bulb.

Seasoned Special Forces Soldiers do have a specialty that is useful, it's called listening to the locals and trying to understand them, versus the opposite approach of trying to force them to understand us and adapt to our norms.

However, I'm not making an argument for SF to be the lead, even that won't undue the damage of ill conceived policy.

[Bob's World]

Any country where the government is required to "defeat" a violent insurgency or two every generation is a country where the causal roots have never been seriously addressed. Suppression of those who dare to complain is the essence of European/US colonial "COIN." It is time to evolve. Pop-Centric COIN was a stab at such evolution, but the authors and proponents of those tactics never really understood and accepted the roots of insurgent causation in government. They continued to blame the populace, but merely offered softer approaches to bribe rather than suppress revolt. Neither approach is likely to produce enduring effect, and of the two, at least violent suppression has a proven track record of being relatively cheap and good for a decade or generation of relative stability.

This is a good summary of the post-WWII insurgencies in the Philippines, but in truth there has really only been one insurgency, and it has been radiating out from government since the Spanish planted a flag. Swapping that flag for a US flag changed nothing, nor has changing that for a Japanese or now local homegrown elite leadership either.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...ilippines.html


"Peasant revolt is historically endemic to the Philippines despite the differing nature of the insurrections it is the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military that remains the main cause of unrest. Luckily for the Philippines governments the nation has remained low on the list for any countries wishing to supply arms to the rebels and luckily for the rebels the US was frightened of any further involvement following Vietnam. Despite the end of the Marcos regime the insurgencies still rumble on and seem to do so unless the social and economic and political structure of the Philippines changes radically. “Philippine history shows that rebellions can be suppressed but rarely eliminated for long “ (Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, R.J Kessler)"

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

The first draft of history can sometimes be messy, as can second and third drafts.

Saddam drove the Iran-Iraq War where arguably more than one million people were killed. Then he destabilized the international system by savaging Kuwait, despite some argued legitimate arguments blown far out of proportion. As the sheets rolled back on Iraq, the full body count of Iraqis buried in pits by his regime is well beyond 200,000. What, exactly, is the body count needed to trigger an extra-national response in a nation that, by geography and history, is truly an Armegeddon (a dangerous cross roads) for the world?

Having said that, our Tonkin-like approach to obtaining world support for action against Saddam, improperly driven by the US domestic blood of 9/11, and our lack of understanding for What comes next, created a profound and disturbing basis for the entire affair.

Afterwards, while we can ###-for-tat various faults and failures (Bremer did it, de-Baath was a disaster, etc...), the bottom line os that our "Failed State" strategy of US colonialization was catastrophic. Especially in light of profound Iraqi history of opposing foreign intervention.

How that post-conflict administration did or did not open the gates of hell are another ###-for-tat argument given the open civil war and US opposition that followed.

Then came the 2007/2008 surge which I believe is, today, still little understood, especially by those of us on the ground who could not see the forest for the trees in front of us. Regardless, by the end of that Surge, Iraqi will for self-determination returned, together with the minimum capacity to pursue, obtain and enforce it via their SOFA terms. We were "unfriended" so that they could get on with their own history.

Each of these things--- underlying justification, false pretexts, delusional "Failed State" administration strategies which undermined Iraqi self-determination, civil war and opposition to colonialization, the path to the end (2007/2008 Surge), the end itself (SOFA and SOFA implementation), and what comes next---are all, in many ways, linked but independent components for analysis.

Where, exactly, military specializations played, or could have played different roles, is an open question.

I personally believe that the end really began in mid-2008 when the Gates Pentagon, Big Army and Petreaus understood and embraced the imperative of Iraqi self-rule, overriding the failed neo-colonial program.

SF, and the targeted killings of bad actors, was a huge (if not decisive) factor in 2008---all happy talk and window-dressing about COIN aside. Note: Decisive given many other factors already played out (Ethnic cleansing, power politics, etc...).

Given the past, I rejoice in the end (at last) so that the rest can be reconciled to arm-chair analysis and the subsequent drafts of history, recognizing that the final drafts may look very different when the dust settles.

There are many lessons for Afghanistan, despite that the problem sets and solutions are very different.

SF is a great tool---where it fits.

[Fuchs]

OMG, Americans.
Censoring "###", but nine year olds shoot with assault rifles.



Test:"boob for tat"

[Ken White]

OMG, Americans.
Censoring "###", but nine year olds shoot with assault rifles.

Jeez -- I got my first rifle for my eighth birthday. Are we slipping or what...

[Steve the Planner]

Fuchs:

Apparently it was automatic. One slip on your name and, ooops!

[Bill Moore]

SF, and the targeted killings of bad actors, was a huge (if not decisive) factor in 2008---all happy talk and window-dressing about COIN aside. Note: Decisive given many other factors already played out (Ethnic cleansing, power politics, etc...).

We actually did more of that in 2007, and while highly effective at suppressing the enemy, in what way was it decisive? We created space, but what was done with the space in a political sense that consolidated Iraq as a nation? Decisive is a misleading term in our doctrine at the operational and strategic level. As you said,

Note: Decisive given many other factors already played out (Ethnic cleansing, power politics, etc...).

It isn't history until the event has passed, and in the case of the Iraq war it has not passed. Although major U.S. military forces are no longer a direct factor, Iraq is still adapting to the new reality.

The Arab Spring is not history, the nations are still adapting to a rapidly changing reality.

Afghanistan is not history, it is still on a continuum of chaos since the USSR invaded.

You're sadly right that many of us are now sitting back in our arm chairs reflecting on the conflicts we were involved in (and all of us are limited to seeing the trees, despite our claims of seeing the forest), while those afflicted are still suffering terribly and we're wondering what objectives we achieved that were truely in our national interests outside of putting a major hurt on AQ in Afghanistan in the early years.

We can all come up with reasons, such as geopolitical depth, influence in a strategically important region, etc. that in the end may be the best we can hope for. The grand political-social experiment has largely failed.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

Right. Terminologies.

One way or another, this Iraq war ends when there is no longer a US troop presence. No soldiers, no war.

Iraq has been the site of many wars, and the facts and factors that have driven them in the past are still a continuing risk.

My take is from one who's sole mission, as a civilian, was to end US engagement, and my cohort left shortly after the SOFA was executed.

SOFA was the definitive Iraqi historical document by which that country acted to end US troop presence, and return to it's long and dangerous path of self-determination.

On a list of ten decisive factors that supported the SOFA, without SF in the north (Right, 2007 & 2008), the cascading effect of continuing instability, lack of effective government control raises doubt about whether the SOFA may have been executed when it was, or whether we might still be arguing about troop assignments for next year. To me, that is decisive.

What actually occurred during the Surge, for my purposes, was that Iraqi confidence in self government, or exhaustion of continuing conflict and US involvement (makes no difference to me how it is characterized), got the job done.

My take on what it was about is probably very different from that of the units that were in motion, but, I think that is just a few more trees, rather than the whole forest.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...en_%20donnelly

I spend a lot of time, for example, reading US focused articles on the KRG issue, and the failure to resolve the disputed boundaries issues, held to be decisive.

As one directly involved in that matter, I knew there were many more issues than all were free to discuss.

Wikileaks, for example, provided the Crocker Memos describing the internal UN efforts (through New York via neighboring countries) to remove De Mistura because of his efforts in that area, and to halt all UN activities in that field. So that is in the public domain now (with very mixed emotions).

These were very complicated issues with many backfields in motion, and far more competing interests than many understand. Much of that competition, however, focused on internal Iraqi politics---they did not want the US and UN dictating the structure of their country anymore.

This, and many other comparable national and ministerial signals at the same time sent a clear signal that Iraq was on its own path, and that further US involvement would be detrimental. That was the SOFA driver.

Crocker's point about long-term strategic engagement is not the same continuing to do what we were doing.

How could these clear marks of Iraqi self-determination have credibly emerged if Sadr City was little more than a launching ramp for mortars, and no national control could be exercised north of Taji?

My guess is that six of the decisive factors on my list will never make it on ones being debated in the foreign policy and military communities----including that the Gates/Petreaus military in 2007/8 became much more effective (and decisively valuable) in civilian transfer (getting the US out of the neo-colonial administration business).

The collapse of US delusions of neo-colonial control happened sometime in there. That was another decisive event.

That's my take.

[Steve the Planner]

PS:

There was a large Iraqi Budget and Finance Conference at Al Rasheed in June 2008 for the 2009 Iraqi Capital Budgets. Two UN and two DoS attendees (by invitation).

Those DoS folks (one of which may or may not have been me) made the mistake of inviting a US officer heavily involved in the budget execution process so that he could understand what was to come.

A senior Iraqi official stopped the officer, and with great courtesy, explained that the US had done many great things for Iraq, but this conference had to be by and for Iraqis. He was set up in great style with a listening device and coffee, but not allowed in.

As the regular budget bickering began (as in Wisconsin, Maryland or DC), the Iraqi budgeteers and planners began arguing over the standards and procedures for project ranking and evaluation----and they all decided to use the federal project submittal standards and procedures from the pre-Baath period, which many were familiar with (and still had copies of). Arrangements were made to republish them for the new folks.

It was at that point that I knew the US involvement in Iraq had substantially turned a corner which would lead directly to the SOFA. (Yes, I wrote one of those papers that is, like the Lost Ark, somewhere in the bowels of government records). But the paper only reported what occurred; the subject event is what was important.

Iraq was it's own country for better or for worse, and after all the formal project submittals were made, with technical racking and stacking, they would then be torn to shreds by the politicians just as they are in the US---but on TV for all Iraqis to see. Dangerous or not, Iraq was ready to go on its own.

As one of the last residents of the Republican Palace (they were literally pulling the CHUs all around us during my last three weeks there while the pallets made a nice, but lonely, bonfire at the old Cigar Club fireplace, I remembered that June day when I knew we were done.

As a former Tank Commander, I really do understand something about the role and purpose of the military, but the end of our Iraq War required civilian transitions for which military matters were supporting.

How many more people like me have their personal and individual trees that have not even surfaced yet. Sooner or later, we might have the parameters of the whole forest.

[ganulv]

The idea of a silk road revival has been trumpeted here and there, but I really don't see much in it.

I see something in not reviving it. The Wakhan Corridor was created with the idea that good fences make good neighbors.* So where the Silk Road connected the world two thousand years ago you now find one of the more inaccessible places on the planet. I get the sense that as with the Darién Gap, folks are well aware that infrastructure improvement would facilitate movement of some less-than-desirable goods, services, and people.



*Chad Haines, Colonial routes, Ethnohistory 51 (Summer 2004): 548.

[Surferbeetle]

You're sadly right that many of us are now sitting back in our arm chairs reflecting on the conflicts we were involved in (and all of us are limited to seeing the trees, despite our claims of seeing the forest), while those afflicted are still suffering terribly and we're wondering what objectives we achieved that were truely in our national interests outside of putting a major hurt on AQ in Afghanistan in the early years.

Agree.

The grand political-social experiment has largely failed.

No; this I do not agree with.

Bill,

Not enough lifetimes have passed to make a call one way or another.

What about the competition between the Morgenthau Plan and the Marshall Plan versus what is starting to take shape with the European Union?

Who knows where the Arab Spring will lead, but I hope that one positive outcome will be greater participation in the free market of ideas.

Although it sounds trite, I wonder if the concept of creative destruction applies?

[omarali50]

Pakistan is the main show, not Afghanistan. And its going downhill: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/10/...his-defenders/