Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."

of those things -- but I do think with respect to the application of HK teams and your "to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well." is doing the same old thing...

...The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.

While that may be true, if you want to change it you have to have concrete and achievable methods to achieve the desired change. I do not disagree with your goal but you have yet to produce a method. To identify a problem is easy, to propose achievable solution is the trick. It is not easy...

Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.

Myths are always preferable to reality.

Reality is harsh, however, I'm not all sure you're correct is saying that we are trying to serve as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo. I really do not see that. I think we're trying to sort out the oncoming status and it's too murky to discern so we're casting about, looking at alternatives and I believe it'll take another ten to twenty years to do that. Major change is always incremental and difficult to predict accurately. We'll work it out. Probably won't be your way or the ways I'd propose but our track record is more good than bad...

[Ken White]

I slinged "B.S." at your writing, not at your mind - and I stick with it.

That would be 'slung,' the past tense of sling in that sense. As long as I'm giving free English pointers -- not lessons, you're English is really good -- another relates to use of the term B.S. The usual meaning in English (as I recall the German equivalent is less pejorative but still not for polite company) is that the originator of the statement is deliberately lying or that the issue itself is totally illegitimate. It is generally considered to be insulting -- and low grade insulting at that. Since you say you're attacking what I wrote and not my mind, then you are saying that, in your opinion, that statement I made was wrong but instead of simply saying that or inquiring about it, you decided to render a low grade or cheap insult.

As I agreed that it was wrong, incorrect or whatever but that is was so worded as a deliberate overstatement to make a nonetheless very valid point -- which I note you do not deign to address or attempt to refute -- then for you to reiterate using the phrase with no discussion can only be construed as a deliberate insult -- which as previously stated "I wouldn't have expected anything else." That out of the way, are you just going to growl for your daily confrontation with the scheiße Amis or do you have anything to contribute to the thread?

[Fuchs]

That would be 'slung,' the past tense of sling in that sense. As long as I'm giving free English pointers -- not lessons, you're "your" English is really good -- another relates to use of the term B.S. The usual meaning in English (as I recall the German equivalent is less pejorative but still not for polite company) is that the originator of the statement is deliberately lying or that the issue itself is totally illegitimate. It is generally considered to be insulting -- and low grade insulting at that. Since you say you're attacking what I wrote and not my mind, then you are saying that, in your opinion, that statement I made was wrong but instead of simply saying that or inquiring about it, you decided to render a low grade or cheap insult.

As I agreed that it was wrong, incorrect or whatever but that is was so worded as a deliberate overstatement to make a nonetheless very valid point (...)

See, to me this point is utter nonsense, wrong, misleading and almost indicative of prejudices, hypocritical tunnel vision and over-generalization.

The West is the cultural sphere that unduly emphasizes extreme war goals (since Napoleon) as opposed to limited war goals. (Exceptions as Imperial Japan existed, of course.)
Accordingly, the notion that accepting an outcome short of the annihilation of unconditional surrender of the enemy would be a surrender itself is quite specific Western right-wing B.S..

Some people may emphasize the fact that accepting limited objectives is a sign that one lacks omnipotence, but that's not the same as the assertion that such a behaviour is "surrender" in "the East".

Your "exaggeration" remark is just an excuse to me, for I consider your statement as factually very wrong. It was also very, very misleading - those who believe your statement would be on a completely wrong track in my opinion, and that justifies the term "B.S.".

I could go on about the "wrong track", but let's just says that there's too much delusional talk floating around the word "surrender" in English discussions about war (and especially GWOT) that I feel compelled to intervene before it gets too ugly.

[Bob's World]

of those things -- but I do think with respect to the application of HK teams and your "to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well." is doing the same old thing...While that may be true, if you want to change it you have to have concrete and achievable methods to achieve the desired change. I do not disagree with your goal but you have yet to produce a method. To identify a problem is easy, to propose achievable solution is the trick. It is not easy...Myths are always preferable to reality.

Reality is harsh, however, I'm not all sure you're correct is saying that we are trying to serve as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo. I really do not see that. I think we're trying to sort out the oncoming status and it's too murky to discern so we're casting about, looking at alternatives and I believe it'll take another ten to twenty years to do that. Major change is always incremental and difficult to predict accurately. We'll work it out. Probably won't be your way or the ways I'd propose but our track record is more good than bad...

Always best to have your thick skin on if you are going to be throwing out any new ideas...and as such I have developed a bit of a Rhino hide over the years.

But as to hunting and same ol', same ol', you know it is all in HOW one does things, not so much what they do. As a kid growing up I would see the occasional story in the news where some long forgotten Nazi got himself rolled up by a relentless, low drama, low visibility effort attributed to Israel. I think that makes a good model for rightsizing our man-hunting efforts. I would like to explore that idea; but we'll never get there if we keep expanding the target list and declaring war on every disgruntled dissident/insurgent organization in the world. Put away the circus tent stake driving mallet and get out the scalpel.

[Ken White]

Put away the circus tent stake driving mallet and get out the scalpel.

I totally agree and have been saying that for years but I've never been able figure out how to convince the US Congress to do that; they -- not the elected and appointed Executive branch types, not the Army, not SOCOM, not budget and space battles all of which have minor impacts -- are the big pole in that tent...

[Ken White]

Re: the 'your.' Good one. Got me cold. So that's a Yea. However...

See, to me this point is utter nonsense, wrong, misleading and almost indicative of prejudices, hypocritical tunnel vision and over-generalization.

To you, perhaps. You seem to have a distressing tendency to see such errors in a good many things and then attempt to refute them with statements like this:

The West is the cultural sphere that unduly emphasizes extreme war goals (since Napoleon) as opposed to limited war goals. (Exceptions as Imperial Japan existed, of course.)Accordingly, the notion that accepting an outcome short of the annihilation of unconditional surrender of the enemy would be a surrender itself is quite specific Western right-wing B.S.

Which while true have little to do with the point at hand. That point is that those from the Middle East and South Asia do not look at compromise in the same way we in the west consider it; they of course accept compromise but the view of what has occurred can and usually will differ. It has nothing to do with limited objectives. So that's a big Nay.

Some people may emphasize the fact that accepting limited objectives is a sign that one lacks omnipotence, but that's not the same as the assertion that such a behaviour is "surrender" in "the East".

Not to one who is overly literal, that's for sure...

OTOH, if one accepts that the follow on to that word was "They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy." the intent of the statement is thus modified and nuanced and not as clearcut as was your interpretation but you seem to have missed that .

Your "exaggeration" remark is just an excuse to me, for I consider your statement as factually very wrong. It was also very, very misleading - those who believe your statement would be on a completely wrong track in my opinion, and that justifies the term "B.S.".

We disagree. You can home in on the on statement that you fired at and then aimed toward but missed however, it's sheer opinion; Neither of us has one that's any better than the other. Anyone who believed my statement would be better served than would those who got all wrapped up in your "limited objective" and "right wing" foolishness which has nothing to do with what I said. So that's another Nay.As for what a difference of opinion justifies, we can differ on that as well.

I feel compelled to intervene before it gets too ugly.

I've noticed. Ugly is also an opinion thing, isn't it? Compulsions are terrible things...

[marct]

Hi Bob,

I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."

I've been operating on the assumption that this thread, and some of the others that you've started, are like discussions at the grad pub - a free for all on ideas. To me, the key thing you bring to the table (outside of yourself ) is a model for us to use for a base for discussion. It let's us look at the questions we have asked and think about reformulating them since, maybe, they just don't work anymore. The key is in new questions, not new answers !

Populaces are rebelling in the middle east for a reason. That reason is not "ideology," it is not about religion, and it is not "because they hate us." It is about politics, and human nature, and man's natural tendency to prefer a hell of his own making than a paradise forced upon him by another. Bin Laden and AQ are born of their time. If not him, it would be someone else. If not AQ it would be some other organization. They may be the enemy, but they are not the threat. The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.

Don't disagree at all with that. Bin Ladin and the Boyz are just a rehashing of a type of movement we have seen time and time again. You have similar types of movements in the US (the various Militias, White Supremacists, etc), and we have them in Canada too.

Where the really interesting part is, IMO, is in the models we assume give rise to these movements, and why some go kinetic and others do not. This means that we have to stop looking at questions derived on the flawed assumption that the State is the primary level of analysis, and dig into other areas.

So here we are. We can keep working to force people to accept what they reject and foment the perpetual conflict of "irregular warfare;" or we can help enable populaces to seek new governmental constructs of their own making, and perhaps allow for more evolution than revolution as these changes work out.

There's an interesting lesson from the Malaysian Insurgency that not many people mention: Malaysia got its independence a couple of years after the insurgency was defeated. Worth thinking about in some depth...

In the end, there is no end. No option is perfect, and there will always be conflict. The real question is what role do you want the United States to play in all of this? Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.

"Creation Myth", please, Bob - it's a technical term . More seriously, you can tell a lot about a people by looking at their foundation myths (creation myth and key, mythologized events). People also get uncomfortable working outside of the normal sheaf of possibilities inherent in those myths. Again, something to think about and see if some new questions are required.

[slapout9]

Always best to have your thick skin on if you are going to be throwing out any new ideas...and as such I have developed a bit of a Rhino hide over the years.

Being a former prosecutor helps to have stuff to say but have to go grill Labor Day....later.

[slapout9]

In the east it's called surrendering. Really. They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy.

That is correct.... Gangs understand this and that is why they can actually coexist next to each other. I would modify it to say you can not negotiate from weakness. Example if you go to the Talliban and say hey lets negotiate a peace agreement I think they would either laugh at you or try to kill you. At a different level it would be seen as weakness and like all predators they would be required to attack a weakness not give in to it. In contrast after you gave them a good thumping maybe several times in a row and said to them you guys are great but so are we, lets make a deal where we can build this pipeline and your family will prosper and in exchange you get rid of the poppies or what ever. There is no guarantee this would work but you would stand a better chance IMO. You have to get respect first....then maybe you can talk. It is the same way about clear,hold and build. Bob's right about shelving that plan. At least for a while. A lot of the time I think they are just playing us for fools....they think just get their money....we can kill the invaders later. My 2 cents worth anyway.

[slapout9]

In the end, there is no end. No option is perfect, and there will always be conflict.

Yep, as I have said before this whole Ends,Ways,and Means thing just garbs my Gamma-Goat (Ask Ken what that is it is time for M.O.M. Motive,Opportunities and Methods.

[Ron Humphrey]

Could you expound a little on what you said above. I can't count the number of conversation's I've had that seem to end unproductively exactly because of the questions or better yet the format in which they are presented.

Are you mainly pointing to the inherent bias each actor brings into the conversation or more deeply at the sub-conscience level where their primary guidelines are found which tend to limit the possibilities they can actually consider.

[Ken White]

I would modify it to say you can not negotiate from weakness. Example if you go to the Talliban and say hey lets negotiate a peace agreement I think they would either laugh at you or try to kill you. At a different level it would be seen as weakness and like all predators they would be required to attack a weakness not give in to it.

what you said...

That's a good word for the ME and south Asia, Predatory -- they are that -- but only if you appear weak. Thanks.

It's not that I'm lazy, you understand...

[Bill Moore]

Yep, as I have said before this whole Ends,Ways,and Means thing just garbs my Gamma-Goat

Slap, you just resurfaced painful memories, that had to be the worst vehicle the Army ever purchased. It was sweet revenge when I saw a gamma-goat on top a tree (tree ran through it) after a mass tactical airborne assault. I wanted to stay and watch them cut the tree and watch that vehicle slam into the ground, but we had an objective time, so we had to move out.

Where the really interesting part is, IMO, is in the models we assume give rise to these movements, and why some go kinetic and others do not. This means that we have to stop looking at questions derived on the flawed assumption that the State is the primary level of analysis, and dig into other areas.

Marc, where are you going with this? I hate models (and Slap I still hate systems ), but this sounds interesting.

[Valin]

I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."

Its a start point.

Populaces are rebelling in the middle east for a reason. That reason is not "ideology," it is not about religion, and it is not "because they hate us." It is about politics, and human nature, and man's natural tendency to prefer a hell of his own making than a paradise forced upon him by another. Bin Laden and AQ are born of their time. If not him, it would be someone else. If not AQ it would be some other organization. They may be the enemy, but they are not the threat. The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.

So here we are. We can keep working to force people to accept what they reject and foment the perpetual conflict of "irregular warfare;" or we can help enable populaces to seek new governmental constructs of their own making, and perhaps allow for more evolution than revolution as these changes work out.

In the end, there is no end. No option is perfect, and there will always be conflict. The real question is what role do you want the United States to play in all of this? Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.

Thank you. Well put!

[marct]

Hi Ron,

Could you expound a little on what you said above. I can't count the number of conversation's I've had that seem to end unproductively exactly because of the questions or better yet the format in which they are presented.

There's an interesting thing about how humans, as a species, think: the answers to our questions are frequently inherent in how we pose them. Questions, as a class, rely on certain presuppositions about concepts, things and relationships, and one of the key things we know coming out of cultural Anthropology is that "concepts", "things" and [perceived] "relationships" vary from group to group, making communications problematic and questions even more so.

Let me give you an example from some of our recent threads. When Bob's World originally started talking about his model, I was asking about corporations. He assumes that they can be controlled through legislation, while I pretty much laughed at the idea. The key difference between our positions comes from the perceived relationship between corporations and government; he perceives them as being in a controllable state (a variant on an authority ranking system), while I perceive them as being in a symbiotic state with governments (especially the US corporations and government). As a result of these perceptual differences, he tends to exclude them and classify what I would consider to be much of the "normal" operations, as rogue and controllable, while I view them as predictable destabilizing agents.

Let me get back to this species level stuff for a minute. We tend to react (see Bill's comment here on energy crises, it's a classic) rather than act. We also have situational epistemologies, which is just a fancy way of saying that we can believe, and act on, different assumptions depending on specific situations. These are evolutionary survival pluses that we inherited from our 5 million or so years on the Savannah, along with a bunch of other mental tricks like lying and detecting people who cheat on social contracts.

Now, for me, the interesting thing is that while many of these relationships are hardwired (like prototype social relations, detection of cheaters, etc.), the content of those systems isn't, although we act as if it was. When we ask most questions, we are assuming that the content that underlies the situating of the question is "true". But there are several types of questions that don't make this assumption, and those are the questions we need to be asking when we are building new models. These are the really "hard" questions, not because they are particularly hard to answer, but because they challenge basic assumptions - think about a 2 year old asking "Why?" and how grating that can be.

Let me give you an example

Are you mainly pointing to the inherent bias each actor brings into the conversation or more deeply at the sub-conscience level where their primary guidelines are found which tend to limit the possibilities they can actually consider.

Now, let's pull your question apart a bit.

Inherent bias: which bias is that, the situational bias? The lived experience bias? The bias caused by stance? Even stating the question this way assumes that a) there is a bias, and b) it is of a certain specific type (NB: you used "the" in place of "an" and singular in place of plural).

Actor: what is an "actor"? In one universe of discourse, it is someone or some group that has a capability for action, while in another universe of discourse it is a person who mindlessly follows the scripts they have been given by their cultures and lives. There's a whole range of variants between these two, but I thought I would toss out some of the biggies. In the case I was mentioning earlier, Bob assumed that corporations were closer to the latter type - actors, but required to follow scripts (legislation). The way you appear to be using it also places it much more on the level of individual as opposed to group.

Brings into the conversation or more deeply at the sub-conscious level: This makes so many assumptions, I'm not sure where to begin . For a start, it presupposes only two "levels" of "perceptible reality": individual consciousness and sub-conscious. Then it presupposes that the "guidelines and limits" are found only at the sub-conscious level. It's very Freudian of you, Ron !

Now, I'll freely admit that this type of a model has around a 60-70% validity for ~60% of the population, at least in North America at the moment. But it also has some very major flaws that are biting people in the butt who use it. For one thing, the conscious mind is not unitary - remember that situational epistemology thing I mentioned earlier? For another thing, the conscious level also needs to be split into at least two if not more sub-forms: what I "know" about myself and what I communicate about myself (which varies by situation). Marketers are finally starting to get a (small) grasp of this but most of them still don't truly "get it" (they confuse the image with the reality).

Next point, the "sub-conscious level", a la Freud, has some major flaws in it as a model - it's why I tend to split it into sub-conscious levels and semi-conscious levels (think about the concept of reflexivity here). We can access semi-conscious levels including our symbolic programming, but it is often a painful process and our culture doesn't support most of the technologies for doing so; indeed, much of current North American cultures oppose our doing so. But this has created a situation where our cultures have a blind spot when it comes to looking at cultures that do have and use such technologies. BTW, if you want an example of such a technology, look at how stories are created and told - that's one of the simpler ones that has some amazingly profound implications.

So, when I talk about questions, one of the things I am talking about is questioning our assumptions about "reality", how we can communicate with people who have different assumptions, and how we go through the process of making sense of our lived experience when our assumptions prove false.

[marct]

Hi Bill,

Where the really interesting part is, IMO, is in the models we assume give rise to these movements, and why some go kinetic and others do not. This means that we have to stop looking at questions derived on the flawed assumption that the State is the primary level of analysis, and dig into other areas.

Marc, where are you going with this? I hate models (and Slap I still hate systems ), but this sounds interesting.

I gave some of the answer to this in my response to Ron. In general where I'm going with it is an attempt to search for models that transcend culture and are based around our how our mental processes, as a species, actually work. Let me just say that it is a tricky thing to do !

At its simplest level, AQ and other, similar, groups are following a process that Wallace called a Revitalization Movement. What's missing from the concept, however, is a conceptual "pulling apart" that shows how it links to communications, lived experience, and choices of going kinetic. That's part of what I am looking at right now - trying to update his model.

Part of the basis of it is that, unlike Bob's model, it does not presuppose the existence or primacy of States, which are a pretty recent invention of ours. Now, the entire "good governance" model that underlies Bob's suggestions assumes the primacy and existence of States, but I don't think that it has any more validity than any other situationally specific model: think about the links between, say, Newton's model of "reality" and Einstein's. Newton's "works" quite nicely in a certain range (e.g. speeds under .3C), but starts to break down miserably after that, while Einstein's works pretty well (albeit with problems).

Which model you base things on has some pretty serious implications at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. So, if "good governance" is the key - the centre of gravity leading to insurgencies - then strategically, we should be aiming our resources at bettering governance. But what if it isn't they centre of gravity? What if the centre of gravity is the perception of a satisficing social environment? Then that changes how we approach things dramatically.

[Bill Moore]

Which model you base things on has some pretty serious implications at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. So, if "good governance" is the key - the centre of gravity leading to insurgencies - then strategically, we should be aiming our resources at bettering governance. But what if it isn't they centre of gravity? What if the centre of gravity is the perception of a satisficing social environment? Then that changes how we approach things dramatically.

Marc, I couldn't agree more with your comment and wish you luck in developing that model. We are coming into every conflict with a good goverance approach without really thinking about it, because we just assume it will work despite the record to the contrary. Of course the challenge is how does a nation-state (like the United States) help resolve (assuming we even should) an internal conflict in another State? All the elements of our national power are state focused. You're thinking in revolutionary terms. I love it.

It is unfortunate that you're starting to pick up military terms (center of gravity), because eventually it will warp your thinking .

[MikeF]

This paper argues that the Russians failed in Afghanistan through its own mis-managed attempts at COIN and nation-building, not repressive population control techniques and tactical losses of helicopters.

Afghanistan is the New Afghanistan
Artemy Kalinovsky
Foreign Policy

In practice, of course, things did not quite work out that way. Much like the efforts of the United States and its allies -- building schools without teachers to man them and promoting farming in desertlike areas where nothing grows -- the Soviet attempt at nation-building suffered from poor coordination, ill-planning, and a misunderstanding of indigenous culture. Moscow informed soldiers they were not in Afghanistan to spread communism, but to help people feel the tangible benefits of a working government. Still, enthusiastic party workers drew on Soviet propaganda and organizing principles, often alienating the local population.

These problems were compounded by rivalries among various Soviet agencies and institutions operating on the ground. Aid sometimes did not reach its destination because military commanders refused to relinquish the necessary transport vehicles or provide security. In other cases, Soviet representatives found that their Afghan "clients" had no intention of playing along with their nation-building plans. On one occasion, the KGB cultivated and promised protection, money, and a house to the leader of an insurgency group. The local governor, in turn, promptly denied the insurgency leader the promised housing and seized the cell's weapons


Likewise, though the Afghan military looked strong on paper, with more than 300,000 men and a generous supply of Soviet weaponry, it proved incapable of leading offensive operations. Within several months Soviet troops were fighting the insurgency directly, while Afghan forces did not take the lead in an operation until 1986. The complaints of Soviet officers working with Afghan troops would sound familiar to U.S. and NATO officers today. Recruitment proved difficult. Desertions were rife. Corruption was widespread. Troops avoided going into battle for fear of retribution against their families.

The broader security and occupation dilemma was familiar as well. The Soviet military was perfectly capable of clearing an area of insurgents, albeit not without significant collateral damage. But Moscow never sent enough troops to keep those areas free of insurgents once an operation was completed. There were never more than about 108,000 Soviet troops operating in Afghanistan at any given time

v/r

Mike

[marct]

Hi Bill,

Marc, I couldn't agree more with your comment and wish you luck in developing that model. We are coming into every conflict with a good goverance approach without really thinking about it, because we just assume it will work despite the record to the contrary. Of course the challenge is how does a nation-state (like the United States) help resolve (assuming we even should) an internal conflict in another State? All the elements of our national power are state focused. You're thinking in revolutionary terms. I love it.

Thanks - we'll see how it goes . Historically, you folks had a great model in US Aid and the Peace Corps, both of which tended to work at sub-state levels. May be time to reinvigorate them....

It is unfortunate that you're starting to pick up military terms (center of gravity), because eventually it will warp your thinking .

LOL - Well, St. Carl stole the term from Newtonian physics.... I'm just returning the complement !

[Bob's World]

I always use "good governance" rather than "good government for a very specific reason. As Marc points out, governance may not in fact come from some government that may well lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the populace. This governance may come from a tribal construct, or even from some industrial/corporate construct.

Point is, that whatever construct it is that the populace recognizes, that is where issues of goodness must be addressed.

This is one reason I have a real hard time with much of the current vogue talk of "failed" and "failing" states; when the criteria to measure success are pure Westphalia; and those that are deemed the most failed are often those with the least in common with western europe and may well have very good governance in place, just not of the westphalian variety.

These things must always be measured with a local ruler. To go around the world with a western ruler and assess whether or not everyone measure up is as arrogant as it is ignorant.