Hostile Takedowns

[jcustis]

VBSS, DA, and similar missions are hard, and expensive to train to, assuming you have a tough standard to meet.

That standard was so expensive, time consuming, and hard that in 2001, the Coalition and Special Warfare cell in Quantico (now SCETC) looked at ratcheting down just the shooting requirement for the DAPs. In other words, the issue of just the marksmanship standard was looked at to see if it was unnecessarily high.

Folks the likes of FBI HRT plank holder Bob Taubert were brought in to discuss the particulars. I left CSW before the study was wrapped up, but I want to say that the standard never went down, but the DA piece went away first.

Those types of missions need not be so difficult to train to, but the standards have...let's just say...developed inertia.

[Ken White]

...Those types of missions need not be so difficult to train to, but the standards have...let's just say...developed inertia.

and frequently it's turf and reputation protection, not a true mission requirement. Still DA isn't easy, particularly if hostages are involved but if COMMAR is correct, the issue is bad guys, not HR. That take's more shooting than we normally do but it's bearable, cost and time wise.

[RJ]

I get the same feeling about "Turf" rearing its ugly puss when the ability of an expert rifleman is judged to be below any requirement necessary to hit a target at sea.

Here is a reply from my son in Austraila.

start
"Dad,

There are more than a few countries with naval support teams now in that area of the world but it seems there is no coordination. The NATO countries have not agreed to protect each others flagged vessels nor intervene. The cooperation with non-NATO countries is less than that.

There are now reports that some naval vessels have sailed away from an attack because it was not their flag...

From on industry point of view, guide lines have been issued to steer clear of Somalia, 500 nm in fact. With the US addressing the pirate attacks the way they did, there is now a sliver of hope that they will lead the discussion to establish a proper protocol of engagement between all maritime nations. Let’s see if we get any good results from the rumors we are hearing in Sydney." end

Seems that the simple order to send a fighting ship into an ocean to seek, find and destroy pirates in the 17th and 18th Centuries is no longer a possibility in any maritime nation, without layers and layers of politics, command drag and clear goals.

So we now have millions of dollars in commerce re routing 500 nautical miles away from Somalia because punks in small open boats are allowed to get away with it.

The next logical step by the pirates will be to move closer to the 500 NM track and set up a base camp in the weeds to attack the unarmed merchant ships.

I understand that the UN frowns upon civilian ships carrying defensive weapons.

Nations tied up by teenaged brigands with old boats and small arms. Absolutely unacceptable.

I looked up Gen. Paul Van Riper and found out he was a Mustang. An enlisted reservist who went through PI four months behind me in 1956. Did his six months and went to college and was accepted in the Marines PLC OCS route.

He is a year old than I. Hell of a career. Makes me proud to see a man better himself through hard work and grit.

[Ken White]

a Viet Namese Marine Battalion based in Vung Tau in 1966 when I was the enlisted advisor with the VN Airborne Battalion also stationed there. Didn't get a chance to talk to him too often because both Bns spent more time away from their bases than they did in them and he got wounded and evaced not long after I arrived. Didn't know his twin brother. Paul was an okay guy, definitely one of the good ones...

You're old...

[RJ]

70 come May 6th -- Joined the Corps on May 22 Sixteeen days later and with prior service in the 71st Infantry, NYNG as a 60mm Mortar Gunner. Joined them at 15 years old. Big for my age and I had a charming Irish way about me.

You, Sir, are much older than I!

But we were both in the Corps when Puttee's were still an issued item.

you are still my brother, even if you went to the darkside.

I found the Light!

[Ken White]

70 come May 6th -- Joined the Corps on May 22 Sixteeen days later and with prior service in the 71st Infantry, NYNG as a 60mm Mortar Gunner. Joined them at 15 years old. Big for my age and I had a charming Irish way about me.

Kentucky Guard at same age in a 105mm How battery...

Also big but rather a glowering Scotch Irish troublemaker. Only in later life did I get to be the jolly and witty icon I am today.

(That last to provide my kids who read this board occasionally an excuse to snort coffee on their keyboards...)

Thanks BTW for your Son's take on the Somali pirates. Knotty prob; hard on shippers but not so much on others. Seems most shippers and the insurance folks -- as well as majority opinions -- are opposed to arming crews or shipping armed guards or military folks aboard; routing away from the area is expensive.

Those suggesting a land campaign there need to apply a little thought to that idea. I doubt most in the World are prepared to accept the huge number of Somali deaths that would occur. Not only are they relatively fearless and terribly vengeful but battling clans and factions will coalesce in seconds to fight any outsider. Add to that they have no compunctions about throwing women and kids in the way to absorb fire. Invader casualties aren't the deterrent...

Pressure of some sort needs to be applied to the elders; they can and will stop it if they deem it advisable but they aren't going to do that until the costs of the Piracy outweigh the benefits to the region as a whole.

[COMMAR]

Those types of missions need not be so difficult to train to, but the standards have...let's just say...developed inertia.

and frequently it's turf and reputation protection, not a true mission requirement. Still DA isn't easy, particularly if hostages are involved but if COMMAR is correct, the issue is bad guys, not HR. That take's more shooting than we normally do but it's bearable, cost and time wise.

Ken is right, DA isn't HR or IHR don't lump them together. HR/IHR's shooting standards are well above that of DA for obvious reasons. A regular SEAL tm (DA) does not maintain the same shooting standards of DevGru(HR).

The FR DAP was rated for IHR. IHR tms maintain the Shooting Standards & Assaulting Techniques of an HR tm, but do not train for the entire Op Cycle of HR. This raises the Quality of shooting in DA but is not necessary to perform DA missions.

Hostile Boardings have no such risk. It is strictly a DA mission, its room clearing Top to Bottom. The only difference btwn that & what USMC Rifle Plts are doing now is more Fire Discipline.

When coupled w/MOUT & the EMP (Confined Space Shooting) course it can be done by adding a 2-3wk Discplined CQB course followed by a few wks of Scenario driven training. This can be added to their work-up prior to deploying.



There's a 30man Template to a 44man Plt. The Strongest Shooters are your Assaulters, next your Trailers, the weakest are your blockers. It wouldn't be that hard just more funding.

[Galrahn]

SWC comes through again. This has been a very useful discussion in my current work and research.

Where can one find a transcript of RADM Guillory remarks from the SNA Lunchen? Is it online?

I think the number 30 is potentially being driven by the manpower payload support capacity of the Littoral Combat Ship. 30 has been a hard number I have heard regarding a potential Marine Corps module for LCS.

I really appreciate the inputs in this conversation, what Guillory is discussing (Marines for VBSS) is something I have been pushing on my blog for several months regarding how to overcome the manpower challenges the Navy faces in the littorals.

I see Marine VBSS as a step towards the Navy taking a serious look where they fit in a SC MAGTF framework at sea, which as we are seeing in several littoral places today, may be the best way to engage at phase 0 in ungoverned spaces where embassey's can't facilitate engagement.

[jcustis]

I see Marine VBSS as a step towards the Navy taking a serious look where they fit in a SC MAGTF framework at sea

When I hear VBSS I think of guys either dropping on the deck of a container ship, or climbing the rails once a zod pulls alongside. The ship is likely hauling some sort of contraband, or attempting to break a confinement zone.

How does this fit into security cooperation?

When it comes up in this context, I am thinking the interdiction of junks, dhows, and other small craft that are moving illegally for whatever reason. Seems to me that the only shooting marksmanship issues there are maintaining a 90 deg angle as you are providing overwatch from the boarding ship, and clearing deliberately if you are the boarders.

Doesn't seem like rocket science at all to me, and it doesn;t strike me as something that requires a higher training (and therefore funding to boot) standard...just guys with good sea legs.

[COMMAR]

SWC comes through again. This has been a very useful discussion in my current work and research.

Where can one find a transcript of RADM Guillory remarks from the SNA Lunchen? Is it online?

I 1st got the intel talking to fellow former SCCO Marines, some are now in MARSOC some are training the Navy's new Riverine Sqdr. Their getting alot of Ground level buzz b/c their experience is being called on. I then Googled it, only using Info fr/ Official sources. Off the top of my head, "Inside The Navy" has touched on it.

A lot of it has been the Navy Brass saying, "Hey, your planning on deploying a Company on our Littorals, we think we can use some of that muscle to assist in our missions." With the Corps answering, "Makes sense to us, lets draw it up." Thats where they're at now.

I think the number 30 is potentially being driven by the manpower payload support capacity of the Littoral Combat Ship. 30 has been a hard number I have heard regarding a potential Marine Corps module for LCS.

I Agree, but the Corps is looking to deploy a Company-sized Det fr/ the LCS, but not looking to maintain more than a Plt on board @ a time.

I think the #30 could be the result of alot of factors.
1) I think like you said payload & equipment support: The LCS will only have the capacity for maybe 1-2 RHIBs + 1-2 small Navy Helos (maybe SH-60's ) Organic.
2) If..., its a situation where all Plt's are trained &whichever Plt is onboard @ the time will conduct the Boarding, the #30 provides for something alot of Marines know... You dont always deploy w/your T/O 44man Plt. This allows for a more Universal #.

I really appreciate the inputs in this conversation, what Guillory is discussing (Marines for VBSS) is something I have been pushing on my blog for several months regarding how to overcome the manpower challenges the Navy faces in the littorals.

I see Marine VBSS as a step towards the Navy taking a serious look where they fit in a SC MAGTF framework at sea, which as we are seeing in several littoral places today, may be the best way to engage at phase 0 in ungoverned spaces where embassy's can't facilitate engagement.

The Navy will also be deploying they're "Global Fleet Stations" Concept inconjunction w/the SC MAGTF. Some of them will have Marine Dets on them along w/the Navy's new Riverine Sqdr.

Its very interesting & the SC MAGTF Concept could pan out to be a real game changer; Persistent, Fwd Presence, in real #'s.

[RJ]

COMMAR,

A tought, an old Marine Gunnery Sgt. once pontificated that "you can expect a minimum of 10%, sick, lame or lazy no matter what the circumumstances might be.
Marine infantry, including a Navy Corpusman - minus 5 - 10 percenters leaves you with 39 effedftives. Now factor in the C&C command structure and you are looking at about 35 Marines.

It is not a big deal. The 5 above are now usable replacements for any Marine killed or wounded in action.

Seems to me, a full Platoon is the minimum the Navy need's to utilize on Hostile Takedowns. Better one or two extra, than one or two short. They can accomodate the larger platoon structure

[Teufel]

Force Recon platoons are smaller than rifle platoons, even with some enablers.

[COMMAR]

Force Recon platoons are smaller than rifle platoons, even with some enablers.

But if they pick up the SOP fr/ the old MEU(SOC)-MSPF days then they'll be reinforced by the Trailer Plt which is always at least 25 CQB trained Grunts fr/the Boat Co. that deploys in stacks & sweeps behind the FR DAP Assault tms in Trailer tms of 3-6.

But RJ's referring to the proposal by a Navy RADM for the USMC to form VBSS tms fr/ the Inf. Company Dets that the USMC is planning to embark on their new Littoral Combat Ships.