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Thread: Hostile Takedowns

  1. #21
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    70 come May 6th -- Joined the Corps on May 22 Sixteeen days later and with prior service in the 71st Infantry, NYNG as a 60mm Mortar Gunner. Joined them at 15 years old. Big for my age and I had a charming Irish way about me.

    You, Sir, are much older than I!

    But we were both in the Corps when Puttee's were still an issued item.

    you are still my brother, even if you went to the darkside.

    I found the Light!

  2. #22
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    Quote Originally Posted by RJ View Post
    and historical Marine Missions - has there been any discussion of putting Marines on American Flag Carriers to welcome the latest style of open boat pirates.

    In the 1920's or 30's gangs began holding up trains and stealing the mail. The Marine Corps was tasked to stop it.

    After several goons were blown away and others captured the stealing ceased forever.

    Would it be worth it to plant a Marine Squad and a MG Section on a Merchant Ship and if it was attacked, let them do what they do best.

    The Marsek Alabama held off the attackers for a couple of hours with water hoses. I would think that getting wiped out by 9 Rifles, 3 SAW's or AR's and two MG's would cause a halt to testing our flag carriers to see if they are safe enough to attack.

    A squad shouldn't be on every carrier in the region, but could be in the mix and make attacking US Merchants something to give the pirates pause.

    You could let one boat excape to tell the tale, or to follow it back to the mother ship and sink it too.

    Just a thought!

    I have a son who is a VP of Ops for a German Flag Carrier in the Pacific. I'll check if the Europeans are thinking along these lines.

    You don't have to look that far back to find examples of it.

    When I was w/ Small Craft Co 2nd MARDIV, I was part of an Anti-Piracy Det in early '03 that did just that.

    We sent a 45man Det led by 3 E-5/Sgts. Along w/the entire Kilo Co 3/8, we Attached to the "FAST Team", 5th Fleet in Bahrain. Fr/there we broke into 15man Squads w/1 .50, 1 240G, 3 M203's, rest M16A4s.

    Being the SCCO was all Infantryman & RTOs (some Recon, Snipers, FAST guys, & Engineers) fr/each MEU's turnover, usually fr/ Boat Co, then trained in Riverine & Coastal Ops it was not a hard transition.

    We did not have boarding Authority, only Physical security. But it was the best Deployment I was ever on.

    We would fly into Souda Bay, Greece sometimes Italy, UAE, or Qatar take a Tugboat out to the ship in international waters board & run security thru the Suez, around HOA, past Hormuz & into Kuwait.

    The Only Comm we had was 1 Sat Phone & I-Comms. Once we hit Kuwait the Det Cmdr/Sgt would Phone in & they'd give us travel plans to get to Our Next ship, or Back to Manama, Bahrain. It was the BEST DEPLOYMENT EVER.



    What you say has been done & can immediately if need be but the Corps is extremely stressed. The only reason we were sent out was b/c it was during the build up to Iraq.

    All those ships were loaded w/billions in DOD equipment, not the latest gadgets fr/Walmart.

  3. #23
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RJ View Post
    70 come May 6th -- Joined the Corps on May 22 Sixteeen days later and with prior service in the 71st Infantry, NYNG as a 60mm Mortar Gunner. Joined them at 15 years old. Big for my age and I had a charming Irish way about me.
    Kentucky Guard at same age in a 105mm How battery...

    Also big but rather a glowering Scotch Irish troublemaker. Only in later life did I get to be the jolly and witty icon I am today.

    (That last to provide my kids who read this board occasionally an excuse to snort coffee on their keyboards...)

    Thanks BTW for your Son's take on the Somali pirates. Knotty prob; hard on shippers but not so much on others. Seems most shippers and the insurance folks -- as well as majority opinions -- are opposed to arming crews or shipping armed guards or military folks aboard; routing away from the area is expensive.

    Those suggesting a land campaign there need to apply a little thought to that idea. I doubt most in the World are prepared to accept the huge number of Somali deaths that would occur. Not only are they relatively fearless and terribly vengeful but battling clans and factions will coalesce in seconds to fight any outsider. Add to that they have no compunctions about throwing women and kids in the way to absorb fire. Invader casualties aren't the deterrent...

    Pressure of some sort needs to be applied to the elders; they can and will stop it if they deem it advisable but they aren't going to do that until the costs of the Piracy outweigh the benefits to the region as a whole.

  4. #24
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    Those types of missions need not be so difficult to train to, but the standards have...let's just say...developed inertia.
    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    and frequently it's turf and reputation protection, not a true mission requirement. Still DA isn't easy, particularly if hostages are involved but if COMMAR is correct, the issue is bad guys, not HR. That take's more shooting than we normally do but it's bearable, cost and time wise.

    Ken is right, DA isn't HR or IHR don't lump them together. HR/IHR's shooting standards are well above that of DA for obvious reasons. A regular SEAL tm (DA) does not maintain the same shooting standards of DevGru(HR).

    The FR DAP was rated for IHR. IHR tms maintain the Shooting Standards & Assaulting Techniques of an HR tm, but do not train for the entire Op Cycle of HR. This raises the Quality of shooting in DA but is not necessary to perform DA missions.

    Hostile Boardings have no such risk. It is strictly a DA mission, its room clearing Top to Bottom. The only difference btwn that & what USMC Rifle Plts are doing now is more Fire Discipline.

    When coupled w/MOUT & the EMP (Confined Space Shooting) course it can be done by adding a 2-3wk Discplined CQB course followed by a few wks of Scenario driven training. This can be added to their work-up prior to deploying.



    There's a 30man Template to a 44man Plt. The Strongest Shooters are your Assaulters, next your Trailers, the weakest are your blockers. It wouldn't be that hard just more funding.

  5. #25
    Council Member Galrahn's Avatar
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    SWC comes through again. This has been a very useful discussion in my current work and research.

    Where can one find a transcript of RADM Guillory remarks from the SNA Lunchen? Is it online?

    I think the number 30 is potentially being driven by the manpower payload support capacity of the Littoral Combat Ship. 30 has been a hard number I have heard regarding a potential Marine Corps module for LCS.

    I really appreciate the inputs in this conversation, what Guillory is discussing (Marines for VBSS) is something I have been pushing on my blog for several months regarding how to overcome the manpower challenges the Navy faces in the littorals.

    I see Marine VBSS as a step towards the Navy taking a serious look where they fit in a SC MAGTF framework at sea, which as we are seeing in several littoral places today, may be the best way to engage at phase 0 in ungoverned spaces where embassey's can't facilitate engagement.

  6. #26
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I see Marine VBSS as a step towards the Navy taking a serious look where they fit in a SC MAGTF framework at sea
    When I hear VBSS I think of guys either dropping on the deck of a container ship, or climbing the rails once a zod pulls alongside. The ship is likely hauling some sort of contraband, or attempting to break a confinement zone.

    How does this fit into security cooperation?

    When it comes up in this context, I am thinking the interdiction of junks, dhows, and other small craft that are moving illegally for whatever reason. Seems to me that the only shooting marksmanship issues there are maintaining a 90 deg angle as you are providing overwatch from the boarding ship, and clearing deliberately if you are the boarders.

    Doesn't seem like rocket science at all to me, and it doesn;t strike me as something that requires a higher training (and therefore funding to boot) standard...just guys with good sea legs.
    Last edited by jcustis; 04-29-2009 at 05:49 AM.

  7. #27
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    Quote Originally Posted by Galrahn View Post
    SWC comes through again. This has been a very useful discussion in my current work and research.

    Where can one find a transcript of RADM Guillory remarks from the SNA Lunchen? Is it online?
    I 1st got the intel talking to fellow former SCCO Marines, some are now in MARSOC some are training the Navy's new Riverine Sqdr. Their getting alot of Ground level buzz b/c their experience is being called on. I then Googled it, only using Info fr/ Official sources. Off the top of my head, "Inside The Navy" has touched on it.

    A lot of it has been the Navy Brass saying, "Hey, your planning on deploying a Company on our Littorals, we think we can use some of that muscle to assist in our missions." With the Corps answering, "Makes sense to us, lets draw it up." Thats where they're at now.

    Quote Originally Posted by Galrahn View Post
    I think the number 30 is potentially being driven by the manpower payload support capacity of the Littoral Combat Ship. 30 has been a hard number I have heard regarding a potential Marine Corps module for LCS.
    I Agree, but the Corps is looking to deploy a Company-sized Det fr/ the LCS, but not looking to maintain more than a Plt on board @ a time.

    I think the #30 could be the result of alot of factors.
    1) I think like you said payload & equipment support: The LCS will only have the capacity for maybe 1-2 RHIBs + 1-2 small Navy Helos (maybe SH-60's ) Organic.
    2) If..., its a situation where all Plt's are trained &whichever Plt is onboard @ the time will conduct the Boarding, the #30 provides for something alot of Marines know... You dont always deploy w/your T/O 44man Plt. This allows for a more Universal #.

    Quote Originally Posted by Galrahn View Post
    I really appreciate the inputs in this conversation, what Guillory is discussing (Marines for VBSS) is something I have been pushing on my blog for several months regarding how to overcome the manpower challenges the Navy faces in the littorals.

    I see Marine VBSS as a step towards the Navy taking a serious look where they fit in a SC MAGTF framework at sea, which as we are seeing in several littoral places today, may be the best way to engage at phase 0 in ungoverned spaces where embassy's can't facilitate engagement.
    The Navy will also be deploying they're "Global Fleet Stations" Concept inconjunction w/the SC MAGTF. Some of them will have Marine Dets on them along w/the Navy's new Riverine Sqdr.

    Its very interesting & the SC MAGTF Concept could pan out to be a real game changer; Persistent, Fwd Presence, in real #'s.

  8. #28
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    COMMAR,

    A tought, an old Marine Gunnery Sgt. once pontificated that "you can expect a minimum of 10%, sick, lame or lazy no matter what the circumumstances might be.
    Marine infantry, including a Navy Corpusman - minus 5 - 10 percenters leaves you with 39 effedftives. Now factor in the C&C command structure and you are looking at about 35 Marines.

    It is not a big deal. The 5 above are now usable replacements for any Marine killed or wounded in action.

    Seems to me, a full Platoon is the minimum the Navy need's to utilize on Hostile Takedowns. Better one or two extra, than one or two short. They can accomodate the larger platoon structure

  9. #29
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    Force Recon platoons are smaller than rifle platoons, even with some enablers.

  10. #30
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    Quote Originally Posted by Teufel View Post
    Force Recon platoons are smaller than rifle platoons, even with some enablers.
    But if they pick up the SOP fr/ the old MEU(SOC)-MSPF days then they'll be reinforced by the Trailer Plt which is always at least 25 CQB trained Grunts fr/the Boat Co. that deploys in stacks & sweeps behind the FR DAP Assault tms in Trailer tms of 3-6.

    But RJ's referring to the proposal by a Navy RADM for the USMC to form VBSS tms fr/ the Inf. Company Dets that the USMC is planning to embark on their new Littoral Combat Ships.
    Last edited by COMMAR; 05-02-2009 at 02:16 PM.

  11. #31
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    Tuefel,

    Force Recon use to have a 9 man squad - 8 paddlers and a coxsun! I may be dating myself with that observation, but Force Recon would be wasted in the effort we have been discussing. Any regular Infantry Bn. platoon could train up and handle the Hostle Takedown mission.

    We are not dealing with super stealth, ninga Spetznaz troops. We are dealing with teenagers who have been given AK-47's and RPG's and training that would be termed "Numba 10" in quality in the Village of Hennoko outside of Camp Schwab, R. Is.

    There are litterally hundreds of ships transversing the waters of the AO of the Somali pirate punks. There are not enough Force Recon assets to handle a tenth of the traffic that is exposed to the attacks.

    I watched a ship owner testify before Congress yesterday.
    He made an eloquent request to allow American Flaged carriers arm their crews. The Captian of the Marsk Alabama, took the stand right after him and said the same thing. Having a few shooters (in the crew) or as supercargo would eleminate the threat.

    The pirates are adapting to the unarmed crews who keep them away with water cannons during daylight. They are attempting to board in the dark of night, as stealthy as possible.

    Put a couple of riflemen, equipped with starlight scopes during the hours of darkness on the bow and fantail and you eleminate the night attack threat.

    Over thinking this threat, with all the command drag and political oversight involved is going to cause some very large embarrasing moments if we let those negative's get in the way.
    Last edited by RJ; 05-07-2009 at 03:04 AM.

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